Core Fiduciary Duty and Harmless-Error Review in Honest-Services Wire Fraud: United States v. Pullman (1st Cir. 2025)

Introduction

United States v. Pullman is a consolidated appeal of two related cases from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Defendants Dana A. Pullman, former Massachusetts State Police trooper and president of the State Police Association of Massachusetts (“the Union”), and Anne M. Lynch, lobbyist and head of Lynch Associates, were convicted of various federal crimes arising from alleged kickback schemes tied to negotiation of retroactive overtime payments (the “days-off-lost grievance”), payments from Lynch to Pullman, tax-reporting omissions, and grand jury obstruction. The key issues on appeal include:

Whether the evidence sufficed to prove honest-services wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346;
Whether certain jury instructions—especially on fiduciary duty—were erroneous and, if so, whether any error was harmless;
Sufficiency of proof for a “Klein” tax-conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371;
Lawfulness of obstruction-of-justice convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1503; and
Validity of related wire-fraud, tax-fraud, and RICO conspiracy convictions.

Summary of the Judgment

The First Circuit affirmed most of the convictions but reversed on several counts where the government conceded insufficiency of evidence or flawed legal theories:

An acquittal was entered on the district court’s wire-fraud verdicts not based on honest- services fraud (Counts III–V).
One of Lynch’s tax-fraud counts tied to those wire-fraud schemes (Count D) was reversed.
Lynch’s obstruction conviction for asking the Union attorney to delay or alter subpoenaed documents (Count VIII) was reversed for lack of intent.
All other convictions—honest-services wire fraud (Count II), the “Klein” tax-conspiracy (Count VI), Pullman’s obstruction conviction (Count VII), Lynch’s false-statements obstruction conviction (Count IX), and the RICO conspiracy (Count I)—were affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Skilling, 561 U.S. 358 (2010): Narrowed § 1346 to bribes and kickbacks only, defining core honest-services fraud.
United States v. Percoco, 598 U.S. 319 (2023): Reaffirmed quid-pro-quo requirement for honest-services wire fraud.
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957): Held that verdicts under multiple theories must be clear or otherwise reviewed for harmless error.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), and Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008): Established harmless-error review for instructional mistakes, including Yates-type errors.
United States v. Mubayyid, 658 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2011): Discussed Klein conspiracies and tax-reporting offenses.
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995): Defined the omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503—requiring specific intent and “endeavor” to obstruct justice.
United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957): Origin of the federal tax- conspiracy to conceal income from the IRS (“Klein conspiracy”).

Legal Reasoning

1. Honest-Services Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 & 1346)
• Elements: (a) scheme to defraud, (b) use of wires in furtherance, (c) breach of fiduciary duty depriving the principal of honest services, (d) specific intent, and (e) quid pro quo if the defendant is a public official or agent. Skilling, Percoco.

• The court found ample evidence of a tacit quid-pro-quo: Pullman, acting as Union president, agreed to press for an extra $150,000 from Union funds in exchange for Lynch’s $20,000 payment to him.

• On jury instructions, defendants argued the court incorrectly told jurors Pullman owed fiduciary duties to both the Union and the Commonwealth. Applying Neder and Hedgpeth, the First Circuit held that any instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the evidence overwhelmingly established a breach of duty to the Union alone—the core relationship required by Skilling.

2. Klein Tax Conspiracy (26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) & 18 U.S.C. § 371)
• Proof required an agreement to conceal income from the IRS and knowing participation. • Lynch’s failure to issue Forms 1099 and Pullman’s corresponding failures to report the same payments supported an inference of mutual coordination—the classic “Klein conspiracy.” United States v. Mubayyid.

3. Obstruction of Justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503 & § 2)
• Section 1503(a)’s omnibus clause requires a “corrupt endeavor” with specific intent to obstruct a judicial or grand jury proceeding. Aguilar; United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692 (10th Cir. 1993).

• Pullman’s direct requests that the Union secretary lie about document-destruction policies in response to a grand jury subpoena were sufficient to prove intent and an “endeavor.” • Lynch’s request to delay production of records was too innocuous—no evidence she knew what was missing or appreciated the subpoena’s scope—so her obstruction count was reversed.

4. RICO Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d))
• Predicate acts—honest-services fraud, tax fraud (via Klein), obstruction—were upheld for Pullman and Lynch (except those reversed above). The conspiracy conviction therefore stood.

Impact

Reinforces that honest-services fraud hinges on a single, core fiduciary relationship; jury instructions need not list every theoretic duty if one clear duty is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirms that Yates-type instructional errors in multi-theory cases are subject to harmless- error review under Neder/Hedgpeth.
Confirms that tacit agreements and parallel concealment can suffice for Klein conspiracies without written contracts.
Clarifies that a single request to falsify or delay subpoenaed documents may be enough to prove a § 1503 “endeavor” if the speaker appreciates the subpoena’s scope and stakes.
Limits obstruction liability where a causal link or wrongful intent is lacking, as with Lynch’s overly generalized “delay” request.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Intangible Right of Honest Services: The public or principal’s right to have fiduciaries act honestly, without undisclosed self-dealing or bribes.
Quid Pro Quo: A “something for something” exchange—evidence of an agreement that money or benefit was exchanged for an official act.
Harmless-Error Review: Even if jury instructions are flawed, courts may uphold a verdict when it is “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the error did not affect the outcome.
Klein Conspiracy: A tacit agreement to hide income from the IRS by both the payer and payee, frustrating tax-collection efforts.
Omnibus Clause of § 1503: Makes it a crime to “corruptly endeavor” to obstruct justice by lies, threats, or document manipulation.
RICO Predicate Acts: To prove a racketeering conspiracy, prosecutors must establish at least two acts (e.g., fraud, obstruction) that are related and threaten continued criminality.

Conclusion

United States v. Pullman delivers important guidance on the scope and proof of honest-services wire fraud, Klein tax conspiracies, and omnibus-clause obstruction. It underscores that:

The government need only prove one core fiduciary duty in honest-services cases, and misstatements about secondary duties are harmless if that core duty is established;
Yates errors in jury instructions are subject to harmless-error review under Neder and Hedgpeth;
Parallel non-reporting of payments can support a tacit tax-conspiracy;
A single, clear request to fabricate or delay subpoenaed records can satisfy § 1503’s “endeavor” requirement when made with knowledge of the grand jury; and
RICO conspiracies survive when at least two predicate acts remain valid.

This decision will shape future litigation strategies and instructional practices in public- corruption prosecutions and grand jury obstruction cases, emphasizing precision in charges and clarity in jury guidance.