Converging Paths at Summary Judgment: The Eleventh Circuit Re-Affirms the Interchangeability of the “McDonnell Douglas” and “Convincing Mosaic” Approaches

Introduction

In Amy Sanusi v. Grady Memorial Hospital Corporation, No. 23-13376 (11th Cir. 2025), the Eleventh Circuit was asked to decide whether two former nurses at Grady Memorial Hospital had presented sufficient evidence of national-origin discrimination and retaliation under Title VII to survive the employer’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs—Samantha Banks (born in Georgia) and Amy Sanusi (born in Sierra Leone)—alleged that their supervisor, Tabitha Johnson, harboured and acted on anti-African bias. While the district court granted summary judgment to the hospital on all counts, the appeal squarely raised two recurring questions in Title VII litigation:

How should courts evaluate circumstantial evidence at summary judgment—under the burden-shifting rubric of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), or the so-called “convincing mosaic” approach?
What proof is necessary to show that an adverse action (reprimand, termination, or constructive discharge) was caused by discriminatory or retaliatory animus?

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion answers the first question with striking clarity: both analytical routes lead to the same destination. In doing so, the Court cements a growing line of circuit precedent that treats “convincing mosaic” not as a freestanding test but as a re-statement of the ordinary Rule 56 standard.

Summary of the Judgment

Affirming the district court, the Eleventh Circuit held that:

Neither plaintiff produced evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the employer’s stated reasons for discipline or termination were pretexts for national-origin discrimination or retaliation.
Temporal gaps of five months (Banks) and over seven months (Sanusi) between protected activity and adverse actions defeated any inference of causation.
Banks’s written reprimand and loss of promotional eligibility did not render her working conditions “so intolerable” as to constitute constructive discharge.
An employer’s mistaken but honest belief that an employee violated work rules is a legitimate, non-discriminatory ground for discipline.
Importantly, whether a plaintiff elects to proceed under McDonnell Douglas or under a “convincing mosaic,” the dispositive inquiry is the same: Does the totality of the evidence permit a reasonable factfinder to find intentional discrimination?

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) – Established the familiar three-step burden-shifting framework for circumstantial Title VII cases.
Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 88 F.4th 939 (11th Cir. 2023) – Reiterated that plaintiffs may prove discrimination via direct evidence, the McDonnell Douglas pathway, or a “convincing mosaic,” and that the latter is merely a metaphor.
Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300 (11th Cir. 2023) – Stated explicitly that “convincing mosaic is a metaphor, not a legal test.”
McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2024) – Described the two approaches as “paths to the same destination.” This opinion heavily informs the panel’s articulation of law in Sanusi.
Tanner v. Stryker Corp. of Mich., 104 F.4th 1278 (11th Cir. 2024) – Reaffirmed that an employer’s honest but mistaken belief in rule-breaking negates pretext.
Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2007) – Set the benchmark that a “three-to-four-month” gap typically fails to show causal connection.
Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) – Supreme Court authority that temporal gaps of similar length defeat causal inference.
Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2009) – Defined constructive discharge standard (intolerable conditions forcing resignation).

Collectively, these cases guided the Court to conclude that the plaintiffs’ evidence—even viewed in their favour—could not cross Rule 56’s threshold.

2. Legal Reasoning

Choice of Analytical Framework. The Court observed that Banks invoked both McDonnell Douglas and “mosaic,” whereas Sanusi relied only on “mosaic.” Echoing McCreight, the panel held that the frameworks are interchangeable in function; therefore, the result would be identical under either.
Honest-Belief Doctrine. For Banks, the hospital’s stated reason—insubordination for contacting nurse-complainants—was upheld because managers “reasonably believed in good faith” that she violated instructions, defeating an inference of pretext (Tanner).
Lack of Causal Nexus. The five-month (Banks) and seven-month (Sanusi) intervals between the last protected activity and the adverse actions were deemed too attenuated to create causation (Thomas; Breeden).
Legitimacy of Performance-Related Discipline. For Sanusi, undisputed evidence of patient-care lapses on 17 Sept 2020 and 2 Oct 2020 constituted legitimate, non-discriminatory grounds for termination. Her attempt to cast doubt on the four-hour delay proved insufficient because (a) the underlying safety lapse remained, and (b) pretext requires more than a dispute over accuracy; it requires evidence that the employer didn’t believe its own proffered reason.
Constructive Discharge Standard. Banks’s inability to show that a written reprimand and temporary promotion bar rendered her environment “intolerable” doomed her constructive-discharge claim (Bryant).

3. Likely Impact of the Judgment

The decision is unpublished, but it carries persuasive weight within the Eleventh Circuit and offers important practical guidance:

Convergence Solidified. Litigants can no longer credibly argue that the “convincing mosaic” approach is a less demanding standard than McDonnell Douglas. Courts will evaluate both through the same Rule 56 lens.
Temporal Proximity Clarified. The opinion reinforces that lapses exceeding roughly three months, without more, rarely support causation in retaliation claims.
Honest-Belief Doctrine Strengthened. Employers may rely on mere belief in wrongdoing, even if mistaken, provided the belief is honest and nondiscriminatory.
Constructive Discharge Threshold. A single reprimand—even if career-affecting—will seldom meet the “intolerable conditions” test.
Practical Litigation Strategy. Plaintiffs’ counsel must think twice before relying exclusively on a mosaic theory when their case would falter under McDonnell Douglas; the two are now inextricably linked.

Complex Concepts Simplified

McDonnell Douglas Framework: A three-step dance. (1) The employee makes out a minimal “prima facie” case. (2) The employer states a legitimate reason. (3) The employee shows that reason is a pretext.
Convincing Mosaic: Think of assembling enough circumstantial tiles so that a picture of discrimination becomes visible; no rigid steps, just aggregate proof.
Honest-Belief Doctrine: If bosses genuinely (even mistakenly) believe you broke a rule, acting on that belief is not illegal discrimination.
Temporal Proximity: The shorter the gap between complaint and punishment, the stronger the inference of retaliation. Beyond ~3 months, the inference fades.
Constructive Discharge: Quitting because it’s bad is not enough; it must be unbearably bad, as if any reasonable person would walk out.

Conclusion

Sanusi v. Grady Memorial Hospital Corporation adds another brick to the Eleventh Circuit’s consistent edifice: whether plaintiffs invoke McDonnell Douglas or a “convincing mosaic,” courts will scrutinise the evidence under the same summary-judgment standard. For employers, the case underscores the protective power of contemporaneous documentation and honest-belief investigations. For employees, it is a cautionary tale: alleging egregious discriminatory statements is not enough; one must still link those statements causally to the tangible adverse action and rebut the employer’s legitimate explanations. Ultimately, the judgment tightens the doctrinal seams between two analytical frameworks and clarifies the evidentiary showing required to avoid dismissal before trial in Title VII cases.