Control and Knowledge as Gatekeepers: Eleventh Circuit Clarifies That Staffing Firms Have No Standalone Duty to Investigate Client Motives Under Title VII

Introduction

In Emily Vincent v. ATI Holdings LLC (11th Cir. Sept. 24, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for ATI, a staffing firm that supplies athletic trainers to schools. The case addresses when a staffing firm can be held liable under Title VII for acting on a client’s request to remove a worker and whether the firm must investigate the client’s motives. The court also analyzes a related reassignment claim and a retaliation theory grounded in the employee’s internal complaints of sex discrimination.

The panel (Judges Branch, Brasher, and Ed Carnes; opinion by Judge Brasher) held that: (1) even assuming a staffing firm may be liable if it “knows or should know” the client’s request is discriminatory, the record lacked evidence that ATI knew or should have known that the principal’s removal request was sex-based; (2) the reassignment options ATI offered were not shown to have been driven by sex; and (3) the plaintiff’s retaliation claim failed at the but-for causation stage. Importantly, the court underscored two gateway requirements frequently overlooked in staffing cases: the employer-control threshold for Title VII liability (including under § 2000e-2(m)) and the absence of any freestanding Title VII duty for staffing firms to investigate a client’s motives.

Case Background

ATI contracted to provide two athletic trainers to Pinson Valley High School (Jefferson County, Alabama). Emily Vincent, an ATI employee, worked primarily with the football program. After conflicts over other trainers’ performance and the arrival of a new head coach/athletic director (Sam Shade), the school principal (Michael Turner) asked ATI to remove Vincent. ATI complied and later offered Vincent a choice of three reassignment options; she accepted a middle-school position at reduced pay and then resigned. Vincent sued ATI under Title VII for sex discrimination (removal and reassignment) and retaliation. Claims against the school board, the principal, and the coach were resolved and were not at issue on appeal.

Key Issues

Whether ATI can be liable under Title VII for removing Vincent from a client site at the client’s request, and whether ATI exercised “employer” control over that removal.
Whether ATI knew or should have known the removal request was sex-based such that honoring it could be discriminatory.
Whether ATI’s offered reassignment options reflected sex discrimination.
Whether Vincent’s internal complaints about sex discrimination were a but-for cause of her removal and reassignment (retaliation).

Summary of the Opinion

Employer control: The court agreed there was a genuine dispute as to whether ATI had sufficient control over Vincent’s removal to be treated as her Title VII “employer,” and therefore assumed employer status for summary judgment purposes.
Discriminatory removal: Even assuming a staffing firm may not honor a client’s discriminatory request that it knows or should know is discriminatory (as some other circuits hold), no reasonable jury could find that ATI knew or should have known that the school’s request was sex-based.
No duty to investigate: Title VII imposes no standalone duty on staffing firms to investigate a client’s motivations merely because an employee alleges bias; requesting and receiving a facially nondiscriminatory explanation sufficed here.
Discriminatory reassignment: The record did not support that sex was a motivating factor or true reason behind the limited reassignment options or the reduced pay for middle-school roles.
Retaliation: Although temporal proximity supported a prima facie case, Vincent failed to show that her complaints were a but-for cause of either the removal or the reassignment; ATI articulated legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons and the evidence did not demonstrate pretext or but-for causation.
Judgment: The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to ATI.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Peppers v. Cobb County, 835 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2016): Establishes the “employer” control test under Title VII—who controls the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship and has the power to hire, fire, or modify terms. The panel uses this to frame the threshold inquiry whether ATI could be liable for removal and reassignment decisions.
Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1998): In Llampallas the non-profit “had absolutely nothing to do” with the adverse action. Here, the court distinguishes Llampallas because ATI plausibly had a role in approving or effectuating removal, creating a genuine issue on control. Llampallas also supports the court’s caution against imposing broad investigative obligations on employers.
Quigg v. Thomas County School District, 814 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016): Mixed-motive framework for discrimination (not retaliation) claims. The court applies mixed-motive analysis to the discrimination claims but finds no evidence that sex was a motivating factor.
Lewis v. City of Union City (en banc), 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019): Provides the McDonnell Douglas framework and comparator principles. The court uses Lewis at the burden-shifting steps and in evaluating the legitimacy of ATI’s reasons.
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024): Clarifies that a discriminatory forced transfer is actionable if the employee is “treated worse” on terms or conditions. The court assumes an adverse action for reassignment but still rejects the claim for lack of proof that sex motivated the decision.
Yelling v. St. Vincent’s Health System, 82 F.4th 1329 (11th Cir. 2023): Addresses mixed-motive limits for retaliation (not applicable) and sets out elements of pretext and causation standards relevant to both discrimination and retaliation contexts.
McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2024): Emphasizes that a “convincing mosaic” is simply the summary-judgment inquiry—do the facts allow a reasonable inference of discrimination? The court finds no such mosaic here.
Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare, 84 F.4th 1300 (11th Cir. 2023); Tolar v. Bradley Arant, 997 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2021): Explain the McDonnell Douglas structure for retaliation and the sufficiency of a convincing mosaic; used to structure the retaliation analysis.
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013): Establishes that Title VII retaliation requires proof of but-for causation; the panel applies this strictly, rejecting mixed-motive in retaliation.
Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855 (11th Cir. 2020); Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006): Define “adverse action” in retaliation as one that would dissuade a reasonable worker from making a charge.
EEOC v. Reichhold Chemicals, 988 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1993); Donnellon v. Fruehauf Corp., 794 F.2d 598 (11th Cir. 1986): Temporal proximity suffices at the prima facie stage; the court relies on these to find a prima facie causal link for retaliation before turning to pretext and but-for.
Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., 967 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc): Clarifies the but-for inquiry and the plaintiff’s burden to establish that protected conduct would change the outcome; applied to reject causation on retaliation.
Out-of-circuit standards cited but not adopted: Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. (5th Cir. 2015); Whitaker v. Milwaukee County (7th Cir. 2014); EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc. (9th Cir. 2019). These decisions impose liability on staffing firms that (1) participate in client discrimination (e.g., honor a discriminatory removal request) or (2) know/should know of client discrimination but fail to take corrective measures. The panel assumes arguendo such a standard could apply, yet finds no liability on the facts here. The court expressly declines to decide whether to adopt that test in the Eleventh Circuit.

Legal Reasoning

1) The Control Threshold for Title VII Liability—Including Under § 2000e-2(m)

Title VII provisions at issue—§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and § 2000e-3(a)—proscribe conduct by an “employer.” The court applies Peppers to ask who controls the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship and can hire, fire, or change conditions. Notably, the panel extends this control logic to § 2000e-2(m) (the “motivating factor” provision), even though it does not textually reference an “employer.” Absent vicarious liability, it would “make no sense” to hold an entity liable for an unlawful practice motivated by sex if that entity had no control over the practice. This is a significant clarifying point: even for mixed-motive claims under § 2000e-2(m), a defendant must have some control over the challenged employment practice.

On this record, ATI’s contract placed oversight and performance responsibilities with ATI, and the principal framed his request as asking ATI to remove its own employee. That evidence created a genuine dispute on control; the panel therefore assumed ATI was an “employer” for summary judgment analysis.

2) Discriminatory Removal—Knowledge, Not Investigation, Is the Touchstone

Vincent’s central theory was not that ATI harbored independent animus, but that it “acquiesced” in the school’s discriminatory request. Both Vincent and the EEOC urged the court to hold staffing firms liable where they honor a client’s discriminatory request that the firm knows or should know is discriminatory, or where the firm fails to take corrective measures within its control. Rather than decide whether to adopt the Fifth/Seventh/Ninth Circuit model, the Eleventh Circuit assumed arguendo that such a regime could apply and ruled for ATI anyway because the record did not show actual or constructive knowledge of discrimination.

The court emphasized:

Turner provided ATI with facially nondiscriminatory reasons—“toxic” interactions with coaches and role overreach—that tracked his earlier call. Nothing in ATI’s files contradicted those reasons.
Merely stating a subjective belief that a client was “uncomfortable working with women,” without corroborating facts, does not impute knowledge to the staffing firm.
The replacements did not support a sex-based inference: a male trainer (Gee) filled a vacancy created by another male’s departure, and a female trainer (Cole) soon joined as the second ATI trainer at the school.

Critically, the panel rejected an asserted duty to investigate client motives. Title VII “does not impose a freestanding obligation on staffing firms to formally investigate the motivations of their clients.” Requesting, receiving, and relying on a non-discriminatory explanation that is not undermined by known facts does not amount to “knowing participation” in discrimination. Requiring more would improperly turn constructive knowledge into a roving duty to investigate—a standard the court declined to create, echoing Llampallas’s reluctance to mandate investigations into all potentially biased actions.

3) Discriminatory Reassignment—No Evidence of Sex-Based Motive

Even assuming the reassignment was an adverse action (consistent with Muldrow’s lowered threshold), the claim failed because no record evidence tied the limited set of available positions (including two lower-paying middle-school roles) to sex. The court noted:

Vincent did not show other positions were actually available on the date ATI made the offer (June 11), nor that any exclusion was sex-based.
ATI’s pay scale encompassed the offered middle-school rates, and ATI also offered one high-school role at the same pay as her prior assignment.
Comparisons to Blackmon were not probative; he also retained pay, and Vincent was offered a role at her prior rate.
Managerial comments encouraging her to “move forward” did not evidence sex as a motivating factor for the menu of options.

4) Retaliation—Temporal Proximity Isn’t Enough at the But-For Stage

The court agreed Vincent engaged in protected activity when she complained to ATI’s supervisor about alleged sex discrimination tied to the new coach. Earlier complaints about a coworker’s misconduct (students’ sexualized behavior) and a coworker’s performance were not Title VII-protected activities.

On causation, the panel carefully identified the relevant decision time. Although the school collected Vincent’s keys on June 5, ATI finalized removal on June 8 after soliciting the principal’s written reasons and consulting HR. That timing allowed temporal proximity to support a prima facie case for both removal and reassignment. ATI then articulated nonretaliatory reasons: honoring the school’s request and offering the positions available at that time.

At the pretext/but-for stage, the claim failed. The close timing was explained by the client’s request occurring in the same window as Vincent’s complaint; there was no evidence that, but for her complaint, ATI would have declined the client’s request or offered her different options. Nor did Vincent argue the client’s request itself was retaliatory. Without evidence that her protected complaint changed the outcome, the claim could not survive summary judgment under Nassar and Gogel.

Impact and Practical Takeaways

For Staffing Firms and Contingent Workforce Providers

No freestanding investigative duty: The Eleventh Circuit makes clear that Title VII does not impose an automatic duty to investigate a client’s motives when a client asks a staffing firm to remove a worker. A reasonable, facially nondiscriminatory explanation can be credited absent red flags that would impute knowledge of discrimination.
Document the process: Request and retain the client’s written, nondiscriminatory reasons for a removal; route decisions through HR; and record contemporaneous availability of reassignment options.
Control still matters: Expect courts to ask whether your firm had authority in, or approval over, the adverse action. Contract language assigning “oversight and performance” to the firm may create a control finding sufficient to reach the merits; this cuts both ways (exposure and defense).
Open question preserved: The Eleventh Circuit did not decide whether to adopt the Fifth/Seventh/Ninth Circuits’ “knows or should know” standard for staffing-firm liability. Firms should still treat credible “red flags” seriously and consider corrective measures within their control.

For Client-Hosts (e.g., schools, hospitals, manufacturers)

Provide clear, performance-based reasons: When requesting removal, supply specific, job-related reasons in writing. Your statements may be relied upon by the staffing firm and scrutinized in litigation.
Expect joint scrutiny: While this appeal involved the staffing firm, client-request rationales can influence both the staffing firm’s exposure and any separate claims against the client entity.

For Employees

Evidence beyond belief is critical: A good-faith belief that a client decision-maker is biased will not, by itself, impute knowledge to the staffing firm. Corroboration matters (comments, comparators, patterns, or inconsistent explanations).
Retaliation requires but-for proof: Temporal proximity helps at the prima facie stage, but you must link your protected complaint to the outcome—show that, absent your complaint, the employer would have acted differently.
Muldrow’s “treated worse” threshold helps on the adverse-action element for discriminatory transfers but does not relax the need to prove discriminatory motive.

Unresolved Questions to Watch

Will the Eleventh Circuit adopt the “knows or should know” staffing-firm liability standard in a future case, and if so, how will it define “constructive knowledge” (what red flags are sufficient)?
How will courts treat “cat’s paw” style theories when the biased actor is employed by the client-host rather than the staffing firm?
What constitutes adequate “corrective measures within the staffing firm’s control” if the client’s request appears tainted (e.g., refusing the request, reassigning, escalating to the client’s HR, or terminating the client contract)?

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mixed-motive discrimination (Quigg; § 2000e-2(m)): The employee can win by showing that sex was one motivating factor in the decision, even if other legitimate reasons also played a role. Not available for retaliation claims.
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting: A three-step proof structure—(1) plaintiff makes out a prima facie case; (2) employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory (or nonretaliatory) reason; (3) plaintiff proves the reason is pretext and, for retaliation, that protected activity was a but-for cause of the outcome.
Convincing mosaic: Not a separate test, but a reminder that the totality of circumstantial evidence must allow a reasonable inference of discrimination or retaliation to defeat summary judgment.
Employer control: Title VII liability generally attaches to entities that control hiring, firing, and conditions of work related to the challenged practice—even for § 2000e-2(m) mixed-motive claims.
Constructive knowledge: What an employer “should have known” given the facts available. The court declined to equate constructive knowledge with a duty to investigate every allegation; some independent indicia of discrimination is needed to impute knowledge.
Adverse action for transfers after Muldrow: A transfer can be actionable if it leaves the employee “treated worse” on terms or conditions, without needing to show significant harm. Proof of discriminatory motive is still required.
Retaliation causation (Nassar): The protected activity must be a but-for cause of the adverse action—i.e., if you remove that cause, the result would have been different. Temporal proximity alone rarely carries this burden at the pretext stage.

Conclusion

Vincent v. ATI Holdings LLC reinforces two central gatekeeping principles for Title VII suits against staffing firms. First, control matters: even for mixed-motive claims, a defendant must exercise control over the challenged employment practice to be liable. Second, knowledge—not investigation—is the touchstone: Title VII does not impose a freestanding duty on staffing firms to investigate a client’s motives absent red flags that would impute actual or constructive knowledge of discrimination.

On the merits, the panel found no evidence that ATI knew or should have known the client’s removal request was sex-based, no evidence that sex motivated the reassignment options, and no evidence that the plaintiff’s internal complaint was a but-for cause of either action. The decision affirms that while Muldrow lowers the adverse-action threshold for discriminatory transfers, plaintiffs must still tie outcomes to discriminatory or retaliatory motives with evidence. For staffing firms and their clients, careful documentation and clear, job-related rationales remain the best defenses; for employees, corroborated facts—not speculation—are essential to survive summary judgment.