Contractual Definition of Law-Firm Partnerships and Limits of CPLR 3211 Dismissals:
Commentary on Epstein v. Cantor, 2025 NY Slip Op 06990 (2d Dept)

I. Introduction

Epstein v. Cantor¹ is a significant Appellate Division, Second Department decision arising from the dissolution of a New York law firm, Cantor, Epstein & Mazzola, LLP (“CEM”). The case addresses:

How courts determine whether a lawyer is a partner (as opposed to, for example, an employee or contract attorney) where a written “partnership” agreement exists.
The limits of using CPLR 3211(a)(1) “documentary evidence” to dismiss partnership-based claims at the pleading stage.
The interaction between a written partnership agreement and the default rules in New York’s Partnership Law.
The stringent requirements for obtaining leave to renew a prior motion under CPLR 2221(e).

The plaintiff, Scott Epstein, sued, among others:

Robert I. Cantor and Robert I. Cantor, PLLC (the “Cantor defendants”); and
Bryan J. Mazzola, W. Todd Boyd, and the firms Boyd Richards Parker Colonelli, P.L. and Boyd Richards NY, LLC (collectively, the “Boyd defendants”).

Epstein asserted causes of action including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, violation of Partnership Law § 20(3), and a demand for an accounting. The opinion at issue concerns an order that:

Upon reargument, effectively reinstated Epstein’s partnership-based claims (fiduciary duty, Partnership Law, and accounting) against the Cantor defendants; and
Upon reargument, adhered to the prior dismissal of all claims against the Boyd defendants, and denied leave to renew Epstein’s opposition to their CPLR 3211 motion.

At its core, the decision confirms an important principle: where a complete, written agreement expressly “forms a partnership” and denominates a lawyer as a partner, that agreement will generally govern the characterization of the relationship at the pleading stage, and cannot be used as “documentary evidence” to defeat partnership-based claims if it is consistent with, rather than refutative of, the plaintiff’s allegations.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

The appeal and cross-appeal arise from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Martin, J.), dated August 19, 2022. That order:

As to the Cantor defendants: Upon reargument, it “in effect” vacated the prior December 11, 2020 order insofar as that earlier order had dismissed the second, third, and fourth causes of action (breach of fiduciary duty, violation of Partnership Law § 20(3), and accounting). On reconsideration, the Supreme Court denied the Cantor defendants’ CPLR 3211(a) motion as to those claims.
As to the Boyd defendants: Upon reargument, the Supreme Court adhered to its prior determination dismissing the amended complaint against them pursuant to CPLR 3211(a). The court also denied Epstein leave to renew his opposition to that motion, despite “new” materials (Cantor’s deposition testimony and an affidavit from a former partner).

Epstein appealed the adverse rulings concerning the Boyd defendants; the Cantor defendants cross-appealed the reinstatement of the partnership-based claims against them.

B. Holdings

The Appellate Division held:

Order affirmed as to both appeal and cross-appeal. The Second Department affirmed the August 19, 2022 order in all respects “insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from,” issuing:

One bill of costs to Epstein, payable by the Cantor defendants (reflecting their unsuccessful cross-appeal); and
One bill of costs to the Boyd defendants, payable by Epstein (reflecting his unsuccessful appeal as to them).

Partnership status and 3211(a)(1): Because a 1995 written agreement between Cantor and Epstein expressly provided that it was entered into to “form the partnership” that would become CEM and was the complete agreement between the parties, the agreement confirmednot serve as “documentary evidence” that “utterly refuted” his claims, and dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(1) was improper.
Fiduciary, statutory, and accounting claims preserved: In view of the partnership agreement, Epstein’s second (breach of fiduciary duty), third (violation of Partnership Law § 20[3]), and fourth (accounting) causes of action against the Cantor defendants could not be dismissed at the pleading stage.
Claims against Boyd defendants remain dismissed: The Supreme Court correctly adhered to its original dismissal of the amended complaint against the Boyd defendants pursuant to CPLR 3211(a), “for the reasons stated in” a related decision on another appeal (Epstein v. Cantor, Appellate Division Docket No. 2020-09376, decided the same day). The Appellate Division adopted that reasoning without restating it.
Leave to renew properly denied: Epstein’s motion for leave to renew his opposition to the Boyd defendants’ motion properly failed because:
- The “new facts” (Cantor’s deposition testimony and a former partner’s affidavit) would not have changed the prior determination; and
- CPLR 2221(e) requires a showing that the new facts would be outcome-determinative and that there was a reasonable justification for not presenting them previously—both lacking here.

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. CPLR 3211 Standards

1. CPLR 3211(a)(1): Documentary Evidence

The Court restated the familiar standard from Piccoli v. Cerra, Inc.²:

“To succeed on a motion to dismiss based upon documentary evidence pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), the documentary evidence must utterly refute the plaintiff’s factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law.”

Key features:

“Documentary evidence” means unambiguous, authentic documents such as contracts, deeds, or official records—not affidavits or disputed emails.
To “utterly refute” means that, once the document is read, no factual dispute remains; if reasonable persons could read the document consistently with the plaintiff’s allegations, dismissal is improper.
The defense must be established “as a matter of law,” meaning that even if all factual allegations are true, the document legally bars recovery.

The Court’s use of Esposito v. Weiner³ reinforces that where documentary evidence is at least consistent with, or not squarely inconsistent with, a plaintiff’s partnership allegations, it cannot support 3211(a)(1) dismissal.

2. CPLR 3211(a)(7): Failure to State a Cause of Action

The Court relied on a series of well-established precedents—Bono v. Stim & Warmuth, P.C.⁴, Leon v. Martinez⁵, and Gorbatov v. Tsirelman⁶—to articulate the pleading standard:

“In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must:

afford the pleading a liberal construction,

accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true,

accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and

determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.”

Klein v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Is., Inc.⁷ (quoting Connaughton v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.⁸) further emphasizes:

“Dismissal of the complaint is warranted if the plaintiff fails to assert facts in support of an element of the claim, or if the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery.”

And Jennings v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth.⁹ (relying on Young v. 101 Old Mamaroneck Rd. Owners Corp.¹⁰) reminds that:

“Conclusory allegations—claims consisting of bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity—are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”

Importantly, the Court cites Jennings for the further proposition that when evidentiary material is considered but the motion is not converted to summary judgment, the inquiry becomes whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not merely whether the pleading adequately states one. This is drawn from the classic case Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, though not cited here by name.

B. Partnership Law and Contractual Freedom

1. Statutory Definition: Partnership Law § 10(1)

The Court began with the basic statutory definition:

“A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit” (Partnership Law § 10[1]).

This definition is broad and functional, focusing on whether parties are co-owners carrying on a business for profit, not on formal labels alone.

2. Contractual Freedom and the Primacy of the Partnership Agreement

The Court relied heavily on three key authorities to reaffirm that a written partnership agreement, if complete, governs the rights and duties between partners:

Congel v. Malfitano¹¹: The Court of Appeals emphasized:
- “In the agreement establishing a partnership, the partners can chart their own course.”
- New York’s Partnership Law contains mostly default rules that apply only when the agreement is silent.
- “Where the agreement clearly sets forth the terms between the partners, it is the agreement that governs.”
Zohar v. LaRock¹²: A Second Department decision applying Congel, holding that where a written agreement comprehensively sets forth partnership terms, the court looks first and foremost to that agreement rather than to default statutory provisions.
Lanier v. Bowdoin¹³: An older Court of Appeals case stating that, absent statutory or public policy constraints, partners may agree among themselves to any arrangement they wish regarding profits, losses, distributions, and other internal matters, and that such a complete agreement controls “as between the partners.”

Together, these cases stand for the principle that partnership law is highly contractarian: default provisions (e.g., equal sharing of profits and losses) yield to explicit contractual terms negotiated among partners.

3. Determining Partnership in the Absence of a Written Agreement

The Court also cited Saibou v. Alidu¹⁴ and Delidimitropoulos v. Karantinidis¹⁵:

“When there is no written partnership agreement between the parties, the court must determine whether a partnership in fact existed from the conduct, intention, and relationship between the parties.”

These decisions illustrate that, in the absence of a written contract, courts perform a fact-intensive inquiry into whether a de facto partnership existed. Factors can include profit-sharing, joint control, contributions of capital or labor, and holding out to third parties.

By contrast, Epstein v. Cantor involves the opposite scenario: the existence of a comprehensive written agreement expressly creating a partnership and naming Epstein as partner. That distinction is critical to the Court’s reasoning.

C. Motions to Renew: CPLR 2221(e)

The Court quotes CPLR 2221(e)(2) and (3) verbatim and cites 1KB & MS, LLC v. Happy Living Constr., LLC¹⁶ to reinforce that:

A motion for leave to renew must:
- Be based on new facts “not offered on the prior motion” that would change the prior determination; and
- Provide a reasonable justification for failing to present such facts earlier.
Renewal is not a mere “second bite at the apple”; it is reserved for circumstances where genuinely new, material evidence emerges that could alter the outcome.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. The Central Contract: The 1995 Partnership Agreement

It was “undisputed” that Cantor and Epstein executed a written agreement in 1995 which:

Expressly stated it was entered into to “form the partnership” that would become Cantor, Epstein & Mazzola, LLP; and
Declared that the agreement was the complete agreement of the parties governing the terms of the partnership.

On this basis, the Court concluded that:

“Thus, pursuant to the plain language of the agreement between Cantor and Epstein, which ‘govern[ed]’ their relationship, CEM was a partnership and Epstein was a partner thereof.”

This finding is foundational: once the Court determines that the agreement itself confirms Epstein’s status as a partner, the Cantor defendants cannot invoke that very document as “documentary evidence” that refutes the allegation of partnership.

B. Why CPLR 3211(a)(1) Dismissal Was Improper as to the Cantor Defendants

The Cantor defendants had previously persuaded the Supreme Court (in the December 11, 2020 order) to dismiss the second, third, and fourth causes of action under CPLR 3211(a), relying in part on the partnership agreement as documentary evidence.

On reargument, and as affirmed by the Appellate Division, that reasoning could not be sustained for a simple but crucial reason: the document did not “utterly refute” Epstein’s allegations; it supported them.

Specifically:

The partnership agreement explicitly formed a partnership and named Epstein as a partner.
Epstein’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty, violation of Partnership Law § 20(3), and an accounting all presuppose the existence of a partnership.
Because the documentary evidence confirmed that relationship, it could not “conclusively establish a defense as a matter of law.”

Accordingly, the Court held:

“As such, the agreement did not utterly refute Epstein’s factual allegations that he was a partner of CEM or conclusively establish a defense as a matter of law to the second and third causes of action … and the fourth cause of action, for an accounting (see CPLR 3211[a][1]; Piccoli v. Cerra, Inc., 174 AD3d at 756–757; Esposito v. Weiner, 160 AD3d at 930).”

Thus, the court correctly denied the Cantor defendants’ CPLR 3211(a) motion on reargument as to those causes of action.

C. Effect on Specific Causes of Action Against the Cantor Defendants

1. Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Second Cause of Action)

Partners in a New York partnership owe each other fiduciary duties, including duties of loyalty, care, and full disclosure with respect to partnership affairs. These duties arise both from the Partnership Law and from the nature of the relationship as “co-owners” of a business for profit.

Because the Court recognized Epstein as a partner in CEM:

Cantor, as a fellow partner, owed fiduciary duties to Epstein.
At the pleading stage, Epstein’s allegations, read liberally, were sufficient to state a viable fiduciary duty claim, assuming the truth of his factual assertions.
No documentary evidence conclusively disproved those duties or established a complete defense.

The fiduciary duty claim therefore survives dismissal under CPLR 3211.

2. Violation of Partnership Law § 20(3) (Third Cause of Action)

Partnership Law § 20(3) (not quoted in full in the opinion) essentially requires partners to render to co-partners, on demand, “true and full information of all things affecting the partnership.” It embodies the statutory aspect of the fiduciary obligation of disclosure among partners.

Once Epstein is recognized as a partner, he can invoke § 20(3) to allege that Cantor failed to provide required information concerning CEM’s affairs, financial condition, or transactions. Given that the agreement confirms a partnership, the Court held that the agreement did not “utterly refute” such a statutory claim, and the cause of action against Cantor could not be dismissed at this early stage.

3. Accounting (Fourth Cause of Action)

An “accounting” is an equitable remedy long associated with partnership disputes. A partner may demand an accounting to:

Determine the extent of partnership assets and liabilities.
Ascertain the partner’s share of profits or distributions.
Ensure that departing or continuing partners have not diverted or concealed partnership property.

Because Epstein is deemed a partner and alleges dissolution-related disputes over firm affairs, he is presumptively entitled to seek an accounting. No document conclusively barred that remedy; thus, the accounting claim against the Cantor defendants survives the 3211 motion.

D. Claims Against the Boyd Defendants

Unlike the analysis of the Cantor defendants, the Court’s reasoning regarding the Boyd defendants is incorporated by reference from a separate, contemporaneously decided appeal (Epstein v. Cantor, Appellate Division Docket No. 2020-09376):

“Contrary to Epstein’s contention, the Supreme Court, upon reargument, properly adhered to the determination granting the Boyd defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them for the reasons stated in our decision and order on the related appeal.”

Because that companion decision is not reproduced here, we do not have the detailed rationale. What can be safely inferred from this opinion is:

All claims against the Boyd defendants were dismissed at the pleading stage under CPLR 3211(a).
On reargument, the trial court revisited the issues but confirmed its original ruling.
The Second Department agreed with that assessment and referred to its separate opinion for the specific analysis (likely involving issues such as the sufficiency of allegations, the absence of a duty, or the lack of causation or damages as to those defendants).

Thus, as of this decision, Epstein’s litigation continues only against the Cantor defendants on the surviving claims; the Boyd defendants are dismissed from the action.

E. Denial of Leave to Renew Under CPLR 2221(e)

Epstein sought leave to renew his opposition to the Boyd defendants’ CPLR 3211 motion, based on:

Deposition testimony of Cantor in a related action; and
An affidavit of an attorney who had been a partner at CEM.

The Court held that renewal was properly denied because the new materials:

“failed to demonstrate that the new facts … would have changed the prior determination.”

Under CPLR 2221(e):

The “new facts” must be material and likely to produce a different result; mere elaboration or cumulative evidence is insufficient.
The movant must show a reasonable justification for not presenting the evidence earlier (e.g., it did not exist, or could not reasonably have been obtained, at the time of the original motion).

The Court’s reference to 1KB & MS, LLC v. Happy Living Constr., LLC underscores that renewal is not a tool for litigants to:

Reargue old theories with slightly different evidence; or
Patch over strategic or evidentiary choices made on the original motion.

Here, the deposition and affidavit—even if new—were not outcome-determinative as to the Boyd defendants. The prior dismissal therefore stood.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Is a “Partnership” in This Context?

Under New York law, a “partnership” is simply two or more people who:

Carry on a business for profit, and
Do so as co-owners (sharing control and economic interests).

In professional firms (such as law firms), partners often sign formal “partnership agreements” specifying:

Capital contributions;
Profit and loss sharing;
Management rights and voting;
Admission and withdrawal of partners; and
Procedures for dissolution and winding up.

In Epstein v. Cantor, the written agreement left no room for doubt: it specifically said it was forming a “partnership” that would operate as CEM, and Epstein was one of the partners.

B. LLP versus General Partnership

CEM’s name includes “LLP” (Limited Liability Partnership). An LLP is a particular form of partnership designed to limit partners’ personal liability to third parties (for example, for the malpractice of another partner). However:

An LLP is still a partnership for most internal purposes.
Partners in an LLP continue to owe each other fiduciary duties and remain subject to their partnership agreement and the Partnership Law, unless altered by contract where permitted.

The decision implicitly recognizes that while the LLP designation affects external liability, it does not negate the internal partnership status and corresponding rights (such as the right to an accounting).

C. Fiduciary Duty Between Partners

“Fiduciary duty” means a duty to act in good faith, with loyalty, and with fair dealing toward another person whose interests are entrusted to you. Among partners, this typically includes:

Not diverting partnership business or opportunities for personal benefit without consent;
Not misusing or concealing partnership assets;
Providing accurate and complete information about partnership affairs.

When law firms dissolve, fiduciary duty disputes often concern:

Who “owns” ongoing or potential client matters;
How accounts receivable and work-in-progress are allocated; and
Whether any partner acted secretly or in bad faith during the wind-down.

D. Partnership Law § 20(3)

Although not quoted fully in the opinion, Partnership Law § 20(3) requires each partner to provide co-partners with:

“True and full information of all things affecting the partnership.”

This duty of disclosure means that a partner cannot hide key financial or operational information from other partners. A violation of § 20(3) can form the basis of a statutory cause of action, as Epstein alleged here.

E. What Is an “Accounting”?

An “accounting” is different from a normal damages claim in that it seeks a detailed, equitable reckoning of the partnership’s finances over a period. In an accounting:

The court supervises a systematic review of revenues, expenses, assets, and liabilities;
The parties’ capital accounts and profit/loss allocations are determined; and
The court may order payments to or from partners to adjust inequities.

An accounting is common in partnership dissolutions because simple “snapshot” damages do not capture the complexity of shared ownership over time.

F. Reargument vs. Renewal (CPLR 2221)

Reargument (CPLR 2221[d]):
- Asks the court to reconsider a decision because it allegedly misapprehended the facts or the law.
- Generally based on the same record—no new evidence is required (and usually not allowed).
Renewal (CPLR 2221[e]):
- Based on new facts not previously available or not previously submitted.
- Requires a showing that:
  - The new facts would likely change the outcome; and
  - There was a reasonable justification for not presenting them earlier.

In this case:

Reargument led the court to change course as to the Cantor defendants (reinstating certain claims), but to adhere to its original ruling as to the Boyd defendants.
Renewal was denied because the “new” evidence did not materially change the analysis regarding the Boyd defendants.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Clarifying the Role of Written Partnership Agreements in Law-Firm Disputes

The main doctrinal contribution of Epstein v. Cantor is its clear affirmation that where lawyers sign a formal, complete partnership agreement expressly forming a partnership and identifying them as partners, that agreement will:

Be treated as controlling of their status at the pleading stage; and
Preclude defendants from using that same agreement as “documentary evidence” under CPLR 3211(a)(1) to argue that the plaintiff was not a partner.

This is particularly important in modern law-firm practice, where titles such as “partner,” “income partner,” “non-equity partner,” or “of counsel” may be used flexibly. This case underscores that when the operative document unambiguously establishes a partnership relationship, courts will give it effect and allow partnership-based claims to proceed.

B. Limits on 3211(a)(1) Motions in Contract-Based Partnership Disputes

The decision is a practical reminder to litigators:

CPLR 3211(a)(1) is a powerful but narrow tool. It is not enough that a contract exists; it must conclusively defeat the claim.
If a written agreement can reasonably be read in a way that supports the plaintiff’s theory (here, partnership status), a 3211(a)(1) dismissal is improper.
Partnership disputes over law-firm dissolution often involve nuanced readings of partnership agreements; courts may be inclined to allow such cases to proceed beyond the pleading stage when the contract’s application is not entirely one-sided.

C. Reinforcing the Contractarian Nature of New York Partnership Law

By heavily emphasizing Congel, Zohar, and Lanier, the Court reinforces that:

Partners have broad freedom to structure their relationship by contract.
When they exercise this freedom in a comprehensive written agreement, courts will generally enforce that agreement as written.
Default statutory rules (e.g., equal profit shares, default rights to management) recede in importance when a detailed contract is in place.

In disputes like Epstein v. Cantor, this approach creates predictability: the parties’ own drafting largely determines their rights and obligations—and their ability to sue each other when things go wrong.

D. Guidance on Motions to Renew

The Court’s denial of leave to renew, anchored in CPLR 2221(e) and 1KB & MS, reiterates that:

Renewal is not a vehicle for routine do-overs of motion practice.
Even deposition testimony obtained later and affidavits from witnesses who might bolster one side’s narrative will not justify renewal unless they are:
- Truly new (not reasonably obtainable earlier); and
- Clearly capable of changing the result.

This message is particularly relevant in multi-party, multi-firm disputes, where depositions and affidavits often accumulate over time in related actions. Litigants cannot assume that the mere existence of additional testimony will open the door to re-litigating previously decided motions.

E. Practical Consequences for Law-Firm Dissolution Litigation

For lawyers and firms, Epstein v. Cantor carries several practical lessons:

Drafting precision matters: If a firm intends certain individuals not to have full partnership rights (including fiduciary duties among co-owners and the right to an accounting), the formal agreements should be drafted accordingly and avoid unqualified statements that they are forming a “partnership.”
LLP status does not erase internal partnership duties: The limited-liability shield for external obligations does not negate partners’ internal rights and duties under their agreement and Partnership Law.
Early dispositive motions face real constraints: Given the high bar for 3211(a)(1) dismissal and the liberal reading of complaints under 3211(a)(7), many partnership and fiduciary duty disputes will proceed to discovery where the governing agreements do not unequivocally preclude claims.

VII. Conclusion

Epstein v. Cantor, 2025 NY Slip Op 06990, is a notable addition to New York’s growing jurisprudence on law-firm breakups and partnership disputes. The key takeaways are:

Express partnership agreements control: Where a written agreement expressly forms a partnership and identifies the plaintiff as a partner, courts will treat that status as established, at least for pleading purposes. Such an agreement cannot be used as documentary evidence to negate partnership status under CPLR 3211(a)(1) if it is consistent with the plaintiff’s allegations.
Fiduciary, statutory, and equitable claims survive: On the basis of the partnership agreement, Epstein’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty, violation of Partnership Law § 20(3), and for an accounting against the Cantor defendants were properly allowed to proceed.
Strict standards for dismissal and renewal maintained: The Court reaffirmed the rigorous standards for:
- 3211(a)(1) dismissal—requiring documentary evidence that utterly refutes the claim; and
- Leave to renew—requiring new facts likely to change the outcome and a reasonable excuse for the earlier omission.
Boyd defendants remain out of the case: By adopting the reasoning of a related decision, the Court confirmed the dismissal of all claims against the Boyd defendants and denied Epstein’s attempt to revive them through renewal.

In the broader legal context, the case reinforces New York’s contract-centered approach to partnership disputes and clarifies that written partnership agreements will be taken seriously at the pleading stage. For lawyers drafting and litigating law-firm agreements, Epstein v. Cantor underscores that the way a relationship is memorialized in writing can decisively shape the trajectory of any later litigation.

Notes

Epstein v. Cantor, 2025 NY Slip Op 06990 (2d Dept Dec. 17, 2025).
Piccoli v. Cerra, Inc., 174 AD3d 754 (2d Dept 2019).
Esposito v. Weiner, 160 AD3d 928 (2d Dept 2018).
Bono v. Stim & Warmuth, P.C., 215 AD3d 911 (2d Dept 2023).
Leon v. Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 (1994).
Gorbatov v. Tsirelman, 155 AD3d 836 (2d Dept 2017).
Klein v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Is., Inc., 231 AD3d 797 (2d Dept 2024).
Connaughton v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 29 NY3d 137 (2017).
Jennings v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 226 AD3d 662 (2d Dept 2024).
Young v. 101 Old Mamaroneck Rd. Owners Corp., 211 AD3d 771 (2d Dept 2022).
Congel v. Malfitano, 31 NY3d 272 (2018).
Zohar v. LaRock, 185 AD3d 987 (2d Dept 2020).
Lanier v. Bowdoin, 282 NY 32 (1939).
Saibou v. Alidu, 187 AD3d 810 (2d Dept 2020).
Delidimitropoulos v. Karantinidis, 186 AD3d 1489 (2d Dept 2020).
1KB & MS, LLC v. Happy Living Constr., LLC, 228 AD3d 604 (2d Dept 2024).

Contractual Definition of Law-Firm Partnerships and Limits of CPLR 3211 Dismissals: Commentary on Epstein v. Cantor, 2025 NY Slip Op 06990 (2d Dept)