Constructive Possession Through Circumstantial and DNA Evidence: Landry v. State

Introduction

Landry v. State, decided by the Supreme Court of Delaware on May 20, 2025, examines the sufficiency of circumstantial and DNA evidence to establish constructive possession of drugs and a firearm during a felony. The appellant, Keith Landry, was convicted in the Superior Court of Delaware on multiple counts: Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (PFDCF), Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (PFBPP), Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited (PABPP), Drug Dealing, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Landry challenged his convictions on appeal, arguing that the State failed to present enough evidence for any reasonable juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he constructively possessed the contraband found in a hotel room rented to another individual.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the Court concluded that a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Landry knowingly constructively possessed the drugs and firearm. Key evidentiary facts included:

Police surveillance and entry into Room 216, where Landry was arrested standing next to a vanity adjacent to the bathroom.
Controlled substances (cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, amphetamine) and paraphernalia within Landry’s reach.
A loaded .38 special revolver hidden in a backpack under the vanity, bearing Landry’s DNA on the trigger.
A hotel room key on Landry’s person and a second key on the vanity.

Applying Delaware’s three-part constructive possession test, the Court held that (1) Landry knew the location of the contraband, (2) he could exercise dominion and control over it, and (3) he intended to guide its destiny. The judgment was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Swan v. State, 820 A.2d 342 (Del. 2003): Standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence under “plain error” when no motion for acquittal is preserved.
White v. State, 906 A.2d 82 (Del. 2006): Defines the three elements of constructive possession—knowledge, dominion and control, and intent to guide the contraband’s destiny.
Holden v. State, 305 A.2d 320 (Del. 1973): Clarifies that mere proximity is insufficient; constructive possession may rest on circumstantial evidence.
Lecates v. State, 987 A.2d 413 (Del. 2009): Equates the standard for weapon possession by a prohibited person to that for drug possession and confirms reliance on constructive possession doctrine.
Pauls v. State, 476 A.2d 157 (Del. 1984): Interprets “availability and accessibility” in PFDCF without requiring immediate physical control.
Sawyer v. State, 2025 WL 707871 (Del. Mar. 5, 2025): Recent application of DNA evidence plus circumstantial facts to uphold constructive possession.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s deliberation hinged on two questions: Was the evidence sufficient to prove constructive possession of contraband? And, did the timing and location satisfy the “during the commission of a felony” requirement for PFDCF?

1. Constructive Possession: Drawing on White and Lecates, the Court applied the three-part test. Officers observed Landry moving in and out of Room 216, found the contraband within his reach, and matched his DNA to the firearm trigger. Though the room was registered to a third party, multiple occupants and shared use did not undermine a finding of constructive possession so long as the elements were met.

2. PFDCF Timing and Accessibility: Under Pauls and subsequent decisions, it is enough that the firearm was “physically available or accessible” during the felony, not necessarily in Landry’s immediate grasp. The Court emphasized that PFDCF aims to prevent escalation of non-violent felonies into violent ones, so an “extended time frame” around the felony is encompassed.

Impact

Landry v. State reinforces that:

Circumstantial evidence—even the presence of DNA on a weapon—can satisfy the State’s burden to prove constructive possession when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
Joint occupancy or shared premises does not defeat constructive possession if the defendant exercises or intends to exercise control over contraband.
PFDCF liability may attach even when the firearm is not on the defendant’s person, provided it was readily accessible during the commission of the underlying felony.

Future litigants will cite Landry for the proposition that DNA swabs, room-entry surveillance, and proximity evidence combine to uphold convictions for weapon and drug offenses where direct physical possession is absent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Constructive Possession: When a person does not physically hold an item but knows where it is, can control it, and intends to use or dispose of it.
PFDCF (“Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony”): A felony-triggered offense requiring that the weapon be accessible at the time of another crime, to discourage escalation.
Plain Error Review: An appellate standard applied when a defendant did not object or move for acquittal at trial; the error must be obvious and affect the verdict’s fairness.
Circumstantial Evidence: Indirect proof (e.g., surveillance logs, footprints, DNA) that, when combined, supports a fact-finder’s conclusion.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Delaware’s decision in Landry v. State clarifies and solidifies Delaware’s constructive possession doctrine, especially as it applies to PFDCF and drug offenses. It underscores that circumstantial factors—surveillance observations, proximity to contraband, key possession, and DNA matches—are sufficient to satisfy the high burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This precedent will guide future cases where direct possession is absent but control over illicit items is demonstrated through indirect evidence.