Constructive Notice Jury Question for Defective Store Fixtures When Evidence Suggests Ongoing Disrepair

Case: Helon Dollar v. Walmart Stores East LP (11th Cir. Dec. 30, 2025) (unpublished)
Posture: Appeal from summary judgment for Walmart; judgment vacated and remanded.

1. Introduction

This premises-liability appeal arises from an injury in Walmart’s Springville, Alabama store. Plaintiff-appellant Helon Dollar alleged Walmart negligently maintained a shoe-department bench. While Dollar was seated and leaned forward to change shoes, the bench tipped forward, causing her to fall and suffer wrist and back injuries. After the incident, Dollar observed the bench was not attached at the back where it should have been secured. Walmart’s assistant manager, Traci Argo, later inspected the bench and reported bent/broken rear brackets, that the bench was “not attached to the fixture,” and “not stable.” Argo also observed “several” shoe benches that were “broken and hanging off and not safe.”

The key legal issue was not whether Dollar fell, but whether Walmart had the requisite notice of the allegedly defective condition under Alabama law—specifically whether a jury could find constructive notice (that Walmart should have known of the defect) given the nature of the bench as a fixture and evidence suggesting broader disrepair in the department.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Walmart and remanded. The district court had held Dollar’s negligence claim failed for lack of evidence that Walmart knew or should have known of the defect before the fall. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that a genuine dispute of material fact existed on constructive notice.

Drawing heavily on Alabama Supreme Court fixture-defect cases, the court concluded the record could support a reasonable inference that the bench’s condition resulted from customer use over time and that Walmart’s maintenance/inspection practices may have been insufficient to discover and remedy the defect—issues that must be decided by a jury rather than on summary judgment.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Organizing principle: The panel treated the shoe bench as “part of the premises” (a fixture) and applied Alabama authority indicating that, for fixture-related defects, whether the defect existed long enough to be discovered through ordinary and reasonable maintenance is typically a jury question.

Federal summary-judgment framework

Brady v. Carnival Corp., 33 F.4th 1278 (11th Cir. 2022): Cited for the appellate standard of review—de novo—and the obligation to view evidence and inferences in favor of the non-movant. This framing mattered because Dollar’s case depended on permissible inferences (e.g., disrepair developing over time), not direct evidence of how long the bench was defective.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986): Cited for the “reasonable jury” test. The panel used Anderson to emphasize that if evidence permits a reasonable verdict for the plaintiff, summary judgment must be denied—even where multiple inferences are possible.

Alabama premises-liability basics: duty, breach, and notice

Ex parte Harold L. Martin Distrib. Co., Inc., 769 So. 2d 313 (Ala. 2000): Reinforces that injury to an invitee does not itself create a presumption of negligence. The panel used it to confirm Dollar had to prove negligent maintenance and causation, not merely a fall.
Maddox v. K-Mart Corp., 565 So. 2d 14 (Ala. 1990): Cited for the plaintiff’s burden to prove proximate causation by the store owner’s negligence.
Burlington Coat Factory of Ala., LLC v. Butler, 156 So. 3d 963 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014): Used for the general rule that the plaintiff must show not only a defective condition but also that the owner knew or should have known of it. The panel also relied on Butler’s discussion of Mims, including the notion that visible looseness/missing components can support an inference of inadequate inspection and repair.
Quillen v. Quillen, 388 So. 2d 985 (Ala. 1980): Cited for the foundational concept that invitor liability rests on “superior knowledge” of the danger. This is the doctrinal reason notice matters: without superior knowledge (actual or constructive), there is no breach based on failure to warn or remedy.

Fixture/instrumentality cases driving the holding

Norris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 628 So. 2d 475 (Ala. 1993): Cited for the proposition that when the instrumentality is part of the premises (e.g., a display rack), the owner has a duty of ordinary and reasonable maintenance. The court analogized the shoe bench to the types of store fixtures addressed in Norris.
Mims v. Jack's Restaurant, 565 So. 2d 609 (Ala. 1990): The central authority. In Mims, a loose threshold with missing screws at a heavily traveled entrance created a jury question on whether the defect existed long enough that the restaurant should have discovered it through reasonable maintenance. The panel deemed Dollar’s evidence “not meaningfully distinguishable,” making Mims the primary reason summary judgment could not stand.
Edwards v. Intergraph Servs. Co., Inc., 4 So. 3d 495 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008): Supports the theory of breach: failing to conduct reasonable inspection/maintenance to discover and remedy a defective condition. Edwards supplies the doctrinal bridge from “duty to maintain” to “negligent failure to inspect/repair.”
Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. Weeks, 504 So. 2d 1210 (Ala. 1987): Cited as Mims’s antecedent. Weeks emphasized that where evidence is susceptible to multiple inferences about defectiveness and duration, fact questions should be left to the jury. The panel invoked Weeks to validate letting jurors resolve the “how long” and “should have discovered” questions without direct temporal proof.

Diversity principle and inferential reasoning

Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 787 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015): Cited for the principle that federal courts in diversity aim to reach the result the state’s highest court would reach on the same facts. This justified the panel’s close alignment with Mims/Weeks rather than a more restrictive federal gloss on notice.
United States v. Doe, 661 F.3d 550 (11th Cir. 2011): Used to defend the legitimacy of “common sense” inferences. The court relied on ordinary experience to infer that frequent customer use could progressively bend/break brackets and that multiple defective benches could reflect a systemic maintenance failure.

Distinguishing contrary authority and addressing related defenses

Goggans v. Target Corporation, No. 21-10971, 2021 WL 5298900 (11th Cir. Nov. 15, 2021) (unpublished): Distinguished. In Goggans, discovering the alleged defect would have required an “exacting inspection” and even then might not reveal a subtle (1/8 inch) height discrepancy. Here, by contrast, the alleged defect (bent/broken brackets leaving the bench unattached) was discoverable without an “exacting inspection,” supporting submission to the jury.
Denmark v. Mercantile Stores Co., Inc., 844 So. 2d 1189 (Ala. 2002): Invoked to note that “open and obvious” is generally a jury question. The panel emphasized the record did not compel a ruling that Dollar had equal knowledge of the defect as a matter of law, undercutting any suggestion that openness/obviousness justified summary judgment.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in a structured sequence:

Identify the governing duty and notice requirement under Alabama law. For invitees, the premises owner’s liability depends on negligence and superior knowledge of the danger (Quillen; Butler). Notice can be actual or constructive.
Classify the instrumentality as a fixture “part of the premises.” The shoe bench, like a threshold or display rack, required “ordinary and reasonable maintenance” (Norris; Mims). This classification is pivotal: it frames the inquiry as one about reasonable inspection/maintenance rather than an isolated, transient hazard.
Evaluate evidence supporting an inference of constructive notice. Dollar testified the bench was unattached at the back and could tip forward; Argo confirmed bent/broken brackets and instability. Importantly, Argo observed “several” benches “broken and hanging off,” suggesting non-isolated disrepair. From these facts, a jury could infer the condition developed over time and should have been discovered through routine maintenance.
Reject Walmart’s “policy testimony” as dispositive at summary judgment. The store manager described general inspection policies, but the testimony indicated associates would not inspect benches unless they looked broken/dislodged during walk-throughs. Because the bench could appear normal while still being unsecured, a jury could find that policy inadequate to satisfy reasonable maintenance.
Apply Mims/Weeks to allocate the “duration/constructive notice” question to the jury. As in Mims and Weeks, the record lacked precise evidence of how long the defect existed, but Alabama law allows a jury to decide whether it existed long enough to be discoverable through ordinary care—especially where physical condition (bent/broken hardware) and context (frequent use; multiple similar defects) support that inference.

3.3 Impact

Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the opinion is practically significant in three ways.

Clarifies the evidentiary path to constructive notice for fixture defects. Plaintiffs can survive summary judgment without timestamps or prior complaints where they present (i) evidence of a fixture’s physical disrepair (e.g., missing/bent/broken components) and (ii) contextual facts permitting a reasonable inference the condition was discoverable through ordinary maintenance.
Highlights “pattern” evidence within a department as probative of unreasonable maintenance. Argo’s testimony that “several” benches were unsafe helped transform the case from a single unexplained failure into an arguable maintenance/inspection breakdown, strengthening constructive notice and breach.
Constrains reliance on generalized inspection policies at the summary-judgment stage. The decision signals that policy testimony may be insufficient when the hazard could evade cursory walk-by observation yet be obvious upon closer look, especially for customer-facing fixtures subject to repeated stress.

For retailers, the case underscores litigation risk where fixtures are repeatedly used in predictable ways (here, customers leaning forward while changing shoes) and maintenance programs do not include targeted checks for attachment, stability, and hardware integrity. For courts, it reinforces that Alabama’s fixture line (Mims/Weeks) often makes notice a fact question when disrepair is physically evidenced.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Invitee: A customer invited onto the premises for the owner’s business purposes. Owners owe invitees reasonable care to keep premises safe.
Actual notice vs. constructive notice: Actual notice means the store actually knew of the hazard (e.g., an employee reported it earlier). Constructive notice means the hazard existed long enough or was sufficiently discoverable that the store should have found it through reasonable care.
“Part of the premises” / fixture: A fixed feature like a threshold, display rack, cart corral, or here a shoe bench attached to a fixture. Alabama cases treat these differently from transient spills because fixtures implicate routine inspection and maintenance obligations.
Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling that ends a case when no genuine dispute of material fact exists. If reasonable jurors could disagree based on the evidence and inferences, summary judgment must be denied.
Open and obvious: A defense arguing the danger was so apparent the plaintiff had equal knowledge and the owner had no duty to warn. Alabama often treats this as a jury question unless the evidence compels only one conclusion.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit held that, under Alabama fixture-defect premises-liability doctrine, Dollar produced enough evidence to allow a jury to decide whether Walmart should have discovered and remedied the defective shoe bench through ordinary and reasonable maintenance. By anchoring its analysis in Mims v. Jack's Restaurant and Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. Weeks, and by distinguishing Goggans v. Target Corporation, the court reinforced a practical rule: where a store fixture shows physical disrepair and the surrounding facts support an inference of ongoing or systemic maintenance problems, constructive notice is typically a triable question, not a basis for summary judgment.