Constraining Interlocutory Venue Appeals in Multi‑Plaintiff Cases: Commentary on Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. & Blue Bird Body Co. v. Sayre

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. and Blue Bird Body Company v. Sayre addresses a highly practical but technically intricate question: when may a party take an interlocutory appeal from a trial court’s venue ruling in a multi‑plaintiff case?

At the center of the dispute is the interaction between two provisions of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code:

• Section 15.064(a) – the general rule that “[n]o interlocutory appeal shall lie from the determination” of venue questions; and
• Section 15.003(b) – a 2003 amendment creating a narrow exception to that rule in certain multi‑plaintiff cases.

Over time, most Texas courts of appeals had interpreted Section 15.003(b) very broadly, treating it as authorizing an interlocutory appeal of virtually any venue determination in a case with more than one plaintiff. The Supreme Court here decisively rejects that expansive view, aligns with the narrower interpretation of the Fourth Court of Appeals, and closes what it calls a “gaping jurisdictional loophole.”

The case arises from a tragic accident in which six-year-old Emory Sayre was killed by her school bus in Parker County, Texas. Her parents, Sean and Tori Sayre, sued the bus dealer, Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P., and the manufacturer, Blue Bird Body Company, in Dallas County. After the trial court denied the defendants’ motion to transfer venue, the defendants pursued an interlocutory appeal. The Dallas Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and affirmed the trial court’s venue determination. The Supreme Court granted review, but ultimately never reached the underlying venue merits. Instead, it held that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain the interlocutory appeal at all.

The decision is important for at least three reasons:

1. It clarifies the scope of appellate jurisdiction over venue decisions in multi‑plaintiff suits.
2. It resolves a conflict among the courts of appeals regarding Section 15.003(b).
3. It reinforces the Legislature’s strong policy against piecemeal appeals of venue rulings.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

The Sayres filed their products‑liability suit in Dallas County against:

• Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. – an authorized Blue Bird dealer with its principal office in Comal County and a facility in Dallas County operating as “Rush Bus Centers of Dallas”; and
• Blue Bird Body Company – the Georgia‑based manufacturer of the school bus.

They alleged various strict‑liability and negligence‑based claims, contending that venue was proper in Dallas County because a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to [the] claims” occurred there under Section 15.002(a)(1). Among other things, they relied on evidence that Rush Truck:

• proposed, negotiated, and executed the bus sale from its Dallas County facility,
• billed from Dallas County,
• registered the bus in Dallas County,
• inspected the bus in Dallas County, and
• passed title in Dallas County.

Because venue was allegedly proper against Rush Truck in Dallas County, venue against Blue Bird could follow under Section 15.005, which permits all defendants to be sued in any county of proper venue as to one defendant.

Rush Truck and Blue Bird moved to transfer venue to:

• Parker County – where the accident occurred and where the Rush employee who negotiated the sale worked from home and where the bus was delivered; or
• Comal County – where Rush Truck’s principal office is located.

They argued that the Dallas County activities were merely clerical or administrative, and that the “heart of the dispute” lay elsewhere. The trial court denied the motion. The defendants then took an interlocutory appeal; the court of appeals asserted jurisdiction and affirmed the trial court, holding that a substantial part of the events related to the “supply” of the bus occurred in Dallas County.

The defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for review on the merits of the venue question. After full briefing, the Supreme Court sua sponte requested supplemental briefing on whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal at all, referencing its authority to examine jurisdiction in Abbott v. Mexican American Legislative Caucus, 647 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. 2022).

B. Holding

The Supreme Court holds:

“Section 15.003(b) permits interlocutory appeals only in cases where a plaintiff’s independent claim to venue is at issue. … These two plaintiffs assert identical claims, based on identical facts, with identical venue grounds. The court of appeals therefore erred in taking jurisdiction of the interlocutory appeal.”

And more generally:

“We hold that where a trial court never needed to determine whether each plaintiff independently established proper venue—because the venue facts are identical for all the plaintiffs—Section 15.003(b)’s narrow exception does not apply, and Section 15.064(a)’s general rule against interlocutory venue appeals controls.”

Consequently:

• The Supreme Court does not reach the merits of whether Dallas County is a proper venue under Section 15.002(a)(1).
• It vacates the court of appeals’ judgment and remands the case to the district court for further proceedings.

III. Statutory Framework and the Core Legal Issue

A. The General Rule: No Interlocutory Appeals of Venue Rulings (Section 15.064(a))

Section 15.064(a) codifies Texas’s longstanding aversion to piecemeal appeals in venue matters:

“The court shall determine venue questions from the pleadings and affidavits. No interlocutory appeal shall lie from the determination.”

Under this provision, venue rulings—whether correct or not—ordinarily cannot be reviewed until after a final judgment, except in circumstances specifically carved out by statute.

B. The Narrow Exception: Multi‑Plaintiff Cases (Section 15.003(a)–(b))

Section 15.003 addresses multi‑plaintiff suits. Subsection (a) imposes a basic rule:

“In a suit in which there is more than one plaintiff … each plaintiff must, independently of every other plaintiff, establish proper venue.”

If a particular plaintiff cannot independently establish venue, that plaintiff’s part of the suit must be transferred or dismissed unless that plaintiff satisfies a stringent four‑factor “safety valve” (joinder proper, no unfair prejudice, essential need, and fair and convenient venue).

Subsection (b) then provides the key interlocutory‑appeal language:

“An interlocutory appeal may be taken of a trial court’s determination under Subsection (a) that:
(1) a plaintiff did or did not independently establish proper venue; or
(2) a plaintiff that did not independently establish proper venue did or did not establish the items prescribed by Subsections (a)(1)-(4).”

The interpretive fight is over what counts as a “determination under Subsection (a).” Is every venue ruling in a multi‑plaintiff case such a determination (the broad view), or only rulings that actually address a particular plaintiff’s independent venue status or the four factors (the narrow view)?

This case squarely presents that question because:

• Both plaintiffs here—Sean and Tori Sayre—are identically situated as to venue (same relationship to the decedent, same claims, same factual basis, same alleged venue connections).
• The trial court did not make distinct findings about each plaintiff’s independent venue showing.

The Supreme Court’s answer is clear: Section 15.003(b) does not confer interlocutory appellate jurisdiction simply because there is more than one plaintiff. The interlocutory appeal is available only when the trial court has actually made a Subsection (a) determination regarding a particular plaintiff’s independent venue status (or the four-factor safety valve).

IV. Precedents and Authorities Shaping the Decision

A. General Principles on Jurisdiction and Interlocutory Appeals

• Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998): Cited for the bedrock rule that courts must address jurisdiction before reaching the merits. The Court uses this to justify pivoting away from the fully briefed venue merits and focusing on appellate jurisdiction.
• Lehmann v. Har‑Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001): Reiterated to emphasize that Texas courts of appeals generally only have jurisdiction over final judgments; interlocutory appeals are exceptional.
• Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2007): Emphasized that statutes allowing interlocutory appeals are to be strictly construed as narrow exceptions to the final‑judgment rule.
• Abbott v. Mexican Am. Legis. Caucus, Tex. House of Representatives, 647 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. 2022): Cited for the proposition that the Supreme Court always has jurisdiction to examine its own and lower courts’ jurisdiction. This justifies the Court’s sua sponte request for supplemental briefing on appellate jurisdiction.
• Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. 2023): Quoted for the “fundamental rule” that courts may not reach the merits when a jurisdictional defect exists. This underpins the decision to avoid the venue merits once the Court concluded the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction.

B. The Central Venue Statute Precedent: American Home Products v. Clark

Before the 2003 amendments to Section 15.003, the Court in American Home Products Corp. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. 2000), interpreted the earlier version of Section 15.003. That version allowed interlocutory appeal of a trial court’s decisions regarding joinder or intervention of plaintiffs.

In American Home, the Court held:

• Section 15.003 was not a general venue statute.
• The interlocutory appeal right extended only to trial court determinations permitting or denying joinder or intervention—not to general venue determinations under Section 15.002.

The Court warned that a contrary reading would make “any trial court venue decision under § 15.002 in a multi‑plaintiff case reviewable by interlocutory appeal,” directly contradicting the broad prohibition in Section 15.064(a).

The Legislature responded in 2003 by amending Section 15.003(b) to extend interlocutory appeals to determinations about whether “a plaintiff did or did not independently establish proper venue.” However, the Court in Rush Truck emphasizes that even after amendment, Section 15.003(b) still hinges on a “determination under Subsection (a)” and does not convert Section 15.003 into a general venue statute. The American Home warning about turning every multi‑plaintiff venue ruling into an interlocutory appeal remains a critical interpretive backdrop.

C. Competing Courts of Appeals Interpretations

1. The “Broad” View – Interlocutory Appeals in Any Multi‑Plaintiff Venue Case

Most courts of appeals had adopted a broad reading, exemplified by Shamoun & Norman, LLP v. Yarto Int’l Group, 398 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2012, pet. dism’d). Under this line of cases:

• Whenever there were multiple plaintiffs and the trial court ruled on a venue motion, Section 15.003(b) was treated as automatically authorizing an interlocutory appeal.
• The logic was that Section 15.003(b) is more specific than Section 15.064(a), so the specific (“interlocutory appeal may be taken”) was considered to override the more general prohibition on interlocutory venue appeals.

The opinion cites numerous courts of appeals applying this approach, including:

• Ryan Marine Servs., Inc. v. Hoffman, 668 S.W.3d 171 (Houston [1st Dist.] 2023)
• Jackson v. Jackson, No. 02‑15‑00102‑CV (Fort Worth 2016)
• Clear Diamond, Inc. v. Zapata, No. 03‑20‑00057‑CV (Austin 2021)
• Flare Air, L.L.C. v. Burton, No. 06‑18‑00097‑CV (Texarkana 2019)
• Nguyen v. Nguyen, No. 07‑24‑00093‑CV (Amarillo 2024)
• Brown v. Health & Med. Prac. Assocs., Inc., No. 09‑13‑00192‑CV (Beaumont 2013)
• In re AAA Bros. Holdings, LLC, No. 12‑23‑00210‑CV (Tyler 2023)
• Yarto itself

These courts generally treated the mere presence of multiple plaintiffs and a venue ruling as sufficient to trigger Section 15.003(b), without closely examining whether the trial court had actually made a “determination under Subsection (a).”

2. The “Narrow” View – Fourth Court of Appeals’ Basic Energy Line

In contrast, the Fourth Court of Appeals (San Antonio) adopted a much narrower construction in:

• Basic Energy Servs. GP, LLC v. Gomez, 398 S.W.3d 734 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.), and
• Harding Bars, LLC v. McCaskill, 374 S.W.3d 517 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied).

That court held that Section 15.003(b) grants interlocutory appeal rights:

“only to plaintiffs who are unable to independently establish venue apart from the joinder factors set out in [S]ection 15.003(a).”

In other words, the interlocutory appeal is available when the trial court has had to apply the special rules in Section 15.003(a) (independent venue requirement and/or the four factor test) to a particular plaintiff—typically because that plaintiff is a “tag‑along” plaintiff who cannot independently establish venue.

The Supreme Court explicitly endorses this narrow view, declaring that it is “true to the text, context, and structure” of Sections 15.003 and 15.064.

D. Textualism and Canons of Construction

The Court relies on textualist interpretive tools, drawing on:

• Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts – cited for two propositions:
  • Context is critical: “Words in a vacuum mean nothing.”
  • The general/specific canon applies primarily when provisions are irreconcilable; if they can be harmonized, they should be.
• Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. 2017): directing courts to consider “the context and framework of the entire statute.”
• McClane Champions, LLC v. Houston Baseball Partners LLC, 671 S.W.3d 907 (Tex. 2023); and Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. 1994): reiterating that provisions must be read in the context of the whole statutory scheme.

These authorities bolster the Court’s conclusion that Section 15.003(b)’s specific grant of interlocutory appeal rights does not nullify Section 15.064(a)’s general prohibition when both can be sensibly harmonized.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Jurisdiction Comes First

Following Steel Co. and its own precedent, the Court begins and ends with jurisdiction. Although the parties had fully briefed the underlying venue question (whether Dallas County was proper), the Court determined that it must first decide whether the court of appeals had statutory authority to entertain the appeal.

Because interlocutory appeals are purely creatures of statute in Texas, the Court strictly construes Section 15.003(b). If that statute does not apply, the general bar in Section 15.064(a) controls, and the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction.

B. The Central Textual Hook: “Determination Under Subsection (a)”

The phrase “determination under Subsection (a)” in Section 15.003(b) does the heavy lifting. The Court reads it as:

• Not granting a blanket right to interlocutory appeal in all multi‑plaintiff cases, but
• Limiting such appeals to situations where the trial court has actually applied Section 15.003(a)—i.e., decided whether a particular plaintiff independently established venue or, failing that, met the four‑factor test.

In practical terms, Section 15.003(b) is triggered only when:

1. There is more than one plaintiff; and
2. The trial court has made a plaintiff‑specific ruling under 15.003(a):
   • either that a plaintiff has or has not independently established proper venue; or
   • that a plaintiff who could not do so has or has not satisfied the four conditions in (a)(1)–(4).

If the trial court’s ruling is simply a global venue determination—as in, “venue is proper (or improper) in this county for this case”—with no need to differentiate among plaintiffs, then the Court says that is governed solely by Section 15.064(a) and is not subject to interlocutory appeal.

C. Harmonizing Sections 15.003(b) and 15.064(a)

The defendants and many courts of appeals had relied on the canon that specific provisions govern over general ones. On their view:

• Section 15.064(a) announced a general rule—no interlocutory appeals from venue rulings.
• Section 15.003(b) was a specific exception for multi‑plaintiff cases.
• Therefore, any venue ruling in a multi‑plaintiff case was appealable.

The Supreme Court rejects this as an overreach, explaining that:

• The general/specific canon applies when conflict is irreconcilable; here, the provisions can be harmonized.
• Reading Section 15.003(b) as the broad courts of appeals have would effectively “swallow the rule” in Section 15.064(a), contrary to the Legislature’s plain and emphatic prohibition on interlocutory venue appeals.
• If the Legislature had intended to create a global multi‑plaintiff exception, it could have said so explicitly or repealed Section 15.064(a); it did neither.

By insisting that Section 15.003(b) applies only when there is a true Subsection (a) determination (and thus a tag‑along or independent‑venue issue), the Court harmonizes the two sections:

• Section 15.064(a) remains the default rule for all venue determinations—including in multi‑plaintiff cases—unless Section 15.003(a) is actually invoked.
• Section 15.003(b) operates as a exception aimed at preventing improper “tag‑along” venue.

D. Legislative Purpose: Preventing “Tag‑Along” Venue

The Court explains that the 2003 amendments to Section 15.003 were designed to combat “tag‑along” venue:

• “Tag‑along” plaintiffs are those who have no real connection to the chosen venue but try to “ride along” with a properly‑venued plaintiff to litigate in a favorable county.
• Section 15.003(a) requires every plaintiff to either:
  • independently establish proper venue, or
  • prove all four factors in (a)(1)–(4) if they cannot do so.
• Section 15.003(b) then provides a mechanism for immediate appellate review when a trial court’s determination allows or disallows such a tag‑along plaintiff to remain in the chosen venue.

In the Court’s words:

“The concern apparent from the text of Section 15.003 was the prevention of what’s known as ‘tag‑along’ venue… The tag‑along concern is absent where, as here, all plaintiffs assert identical claims, arising from identical facts, with identical venue grounds.”

Since both Sayres are identically situated parents asserting wrongful‑death and survival claims for their daughter’s death, and they invoke precisely the same venue facts, there is no independent or tag‑along issue. The trial court never needed to decide whether one plaintiff, but not the other, could independently establish venue.

E. Application to the Case: Homogeneous Venue Facts, No 15.003(b) Appeal

The Court characterizes this case as a “homogenous venue dispute”:

• Both plaintiffs stand in the same shoes legally and factually.
• They rely on the exact same Dallas County facts to support venue.
• The venue analysis would be identical if there were only one plaintiff (for example, a single parent).

Because the trial court’s venue determination did not require any plaintiff‑specific analysis under Section 15.003(a), there was no “determination under Subsection (a)” and thus no trigger for Section 15.003(b).

The result:

• Section 15.064(a)’s outright prohibition on interlocutory appeals of venue determinations applies.
• The court of appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the interlocutory appeal.
• The Supreme Court vacates the court of appeals’ judgment and remands to the district court, leaving the trial court’s denial of the motion to transfer venue intact (but not finally adjudicated for appellate purposes).

VI. The New Operational Rule and Its Impact

A. The Operational Test Going Forward

After Rush Truck, the following practical framework governs in multi‑plaintiff venue disputes:

1. Is there more than one plaintiff?
   • If no, Section 15.003 does not apply. Venue rulings are not subject to interlocutory appeal (absent some other statute).
2. Did the trial court actually make a determination “under Subsection (a)”?
   • Did it explicitly or implicitly decide whether a particular plaintiff independently established proper venue? or
   • Did it decide whether a plaintiff who could not independently establish venue did or did not satisfy all four factors in Section 15.003(a)(1)–(4)?
3. If yes, an interlocutory appeal lies under Section 15.003(b). This is typically where “tag‑along” issues arise.
4. If no—because all plaintiffs share identical venue facts and the court simply ruled on venue generally—then:
   • Section 15.003(b) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal.
   • Section 15.064(a) bars an interlocutory appeal, and any challenge to the venue ruling must await final judgment.

B. Practical Effects on Litigants and Litigation Strategy

1. Fewer Interlocutory Venue Appeals

Defendants will no longer be able to obtain immediate appellate review of every adverse venue ruling simply because there are multiple plaintiffs. Many multi‑plaintiff cases—especially those involving family members or similarly situated plaintiffs with identical claims—will now be treated like single‑plaintiff cases for interlocutory‑appeal purposes.

2. Higher Stakes at the Trial Court Venue Hearing

Because most venue rulings will be unreviewable until after final judgment, parties will have a strong incentive to:

• Present complete venue evidence and legal argument at the initial motion‑to‑transfer hearing.
• Develop a clean record, recognizing that any appellate review (post‑judgment) will likely be highly deferential to the trial court’s factual determinations.

3. Joinder and Pleading Strategy

The decision affects both sides’ strategic calculus:

• Defendants may find it harder to force appellate scrutiny of venue early in the case, particularly in family wrongful‑death, survival, or similar multi‑plaintiff actions where plaintiffs share identical facts.
• Plaintiffs who cannot independently establish venue may still face early appellate review if the trial court rules against them under Section 15.003(a), but plaintiffs with identical venue facts should not trigger interlocutory review.

Sophisticated litigants may consider whether to:

• structure suits to highlight (or avoid) distinct venue grounds among different plaintiffs; or
• file separate suits for plaintiffs whose venue connections differ, to manage the risk of tag‑along challenges and attendant interlocutory appeals.

C. Impact on the Courts of Appeals

The decision directly disapproves the majority view of eleven courts of appeals and endorses the Fourth Court’s narrower approach. This will:

• reduce the volume of interlocutory venue appeals in multi‑plaintiff cases,
• promote uniformity across districts on the scope of appellate jurisdiction, and
• clarify the limited role of Section 15.003(b) in the appellate system.

In doing so, the Court re‑emphasizes that venue is a threshold procedural issue that, in most cases, should not fragment litigation through mid‑stream appeals.

D. Potential Legislative Response

If the Legislature disagrees with the Court’s narrow construction of Section 15.003(b), it retains the power to amend the statute. For example, it could:

• explicitly authorize interlocutory appeals from all venue determinations in multi‑plaintiff cases, or
• modify or repeal Section 15.064(a) to expand interlocutory review of venue generally.

The Court’s decision, however, is firmly rooted in the existing text and structure; it does not speculate on policy preferences beyond enforcing the Legislature’s existing choices.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Venue

“Venue” is the county where a lawsuit can properly be filed and tried. It is about which court within the state is the appropriate forum, not about whether the court has the power to hear the type of case (that is “jurisdiction”).

In Texas, general venue rules (like Section 15.002) often look to:

• where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,
• where the defendant resides or has its principal office, or
• where the plaintiff resides (in certain cases).

B. Interlocutory Appeal

An “interlocutory appeal” is an appeal taken before the trial court has entered a final judgment resolving all issues and all parties. It is an exception to the normal rule that appeals come only after the case is fully decided.

Because interlocutory appeals can significantly delay trial and increase costs, Texas law allows them only in specifically enumerated situations, such as certain orders involving immunity, arbitration, or—in limited fashion—venue in multi‑plaintiff cases.

C. “Tag‑Along” Plaintiffs and Tag‑Along Venue

“Tag‑along” venue refers to the practice of a plaintiff with no meaningful connection to the chosen county joining a plaintiff who does have proper venue there, in order to litigate in that county. The Legislature sought to prevent this by:

• requiring each plaintiff to independently establish venue (Section 15.003(a)), and
• allowing immediate appeal when a court permits or denies such tag‑along plaintiffs to remain (Section 15.003(b)).

D. Independent Establishment of Venue

To “independently establish proper venue” means that a plaintiff, without relying on another plaintiff’s connections, can show that venue is proper under the general venue rules. For example:

• If Plaintiff A lives in County X and all events occurred there, and Plaintiff B lives in County Y with no connection to County X, Plaintiff A may independently establish venue in County X; Plaintiff B may not.
• Under Section 15.003(a), Plaintiff B could remain in County X only by satisfying the four factors in (a)(1)–(4), and the trial court’s ruling on that question would be immediately appealable under 15.003(b).

E. Homogeneous vs. Heterogeneous Venue Facts

A “homogeneous” venue case is one where all plaintiffs share the same venue facts and legal basis. A “heterogeneous” case has plaintiffs with different connections to the venue county. Rush Truck holds that Section 15.003(b) is really directed at the second category, where independent venue analysis is necessary.

VIII. Conclusion: Significance of the Decision

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. v. Sayre reasserts a core structural principle of Texas civil procedure: venue rulings are generally not subject to piecemeal appellate review. The Court:

• Clarifies that Section 15.003(b) authorizes interlocutory appeals only when the trial court has actually made a plaintiff‑specific determination under Section 15.003(a) about independent venue (or the four safety‑valve factors).
• Rejects the broad multi‑plaintiff exception previously adopted by most courts of appeals, which had transformed Section 15.003(b) into a near‑universal gateway for venue appeals whenever more than one plaintiff appeared in the caption.
• Emphasizes the Legislature’s intent to combat “tag‑along” venue, not to open the floodgates to interlocutory venue appeals in all multi‑plaintiff cases.
• Harmonizes Sections 15.003(b) and 15.064(a), preserving the latter’s strong default prohibition against interlocutory appeals of venue determinations.

In doing so, the Court resolves a split among the courts of appeals, endorses the narrower San Antonio approach, and restores the primacy of the final‑judgment rule in venue disputes. For litigants, the message is clear: absent a true tag‑along or independent‑venue issue under Section 15.003(a), venue fights will be resolved in the trial court and reviewed, if at all, only after final judgment.