Constitutionally Entrenched Quo Warranto: The Texas Supreme Court in Paxton v. Annunciation House

Constitutionally Entrenched Quo Warranto: The Texas Supreme Court in Paxton v. Annunciation House

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Warren Kenneth Paxton, Jr., in his Official Capacity as Texas Attorney General, and the State of Texas v. Annunciation House, Inc., No. 24‑0573 (Tex. May 30, 2025) (opinion by Justice Young).

The case sits at the intersection of state corporate law, immigration enforcement, religious liberty, and separation of powers. The Texas Attorney General (“AG”) alleged that Annunciation House, a long‑standing Catholic-affiliated migrant shelter in El Paso, is engaged in unlawful “harboring” of undocumented immigrants in violation of the Texas Penal Code. Relying on:

  • his constitutional authority under Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22 to police corporate charters via quo warranto; and
  • statutory authority to inspect corporate records under Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code §§ 12.151–.152,

the AG demanded immediate access to Annunciation House’s records and sought leave to bring a quo warranto action that could ultimately revoke its corporate charter and shut down its operations.

Annunciation House responded in district court, securing a temporary restraining order and then a sweeping summary-judgment victory. The trial court:

  • declared key inspection provisions of the Business Organizations Code facially unconstitutional under the First and Fourth Amendments;
  • held that the AG had no valid statutory or constitutional authority to pursue a quo warranto action on the alleged “harboring” conduct;
  • found the Texas alien‑harboring statutes preempted and unconstitutionally vague; and
  • held that the proposed quo warranto action and injunction would violate the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and even the state’s “Save Chick‑fil‑A” religious‑liberty statute.

Because the trial court’s disposition turned on the constitutionality of several state statutes, the AG took a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas under Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.001(c) and Tex. R. App. P. 57. The Court reversed, vacated the injunction, and remanded, but deliberately confined itself to threshold legal issues rather than the ultimate merits of the harboring allegations or the RFRA defense.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court’s holdings can be grouped around five major questions identified by its own framing:

  1. Scope of the AG’s quo warranto authority.
    The Court holds that:
    • Article IV, § 22 of the Texas Constitution constitutionally entrenches the AG’s authority to bring actions “in the nature of quo warranto” against private corporations, including on the basis of alleged criminal conduct.
    • This authority exists unless “expressly directed” otherwise by statute; it does not depend on new legislative authorizations case by case.
    • Business Organizations Code § 11.301(a)(5) (criminal‑conduct based corporate winding‑up) does not “supplant” quo warranto, and chapter 66 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code does not strip the AG of authority here.
  2. Standard for granting leave to file a quo warranto information.
    The Court clarifies that:
    • A trial court deciding whether to grant the AG leave to file an information in the nature of quo warranto applies a pleading‑stage standard, not an evidentiary one.
    • The court must assume the truth of the petition’s factual allegations and ask only whether they state a cognizable quo warranto claim and satisfy the “probable ground” requirement of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 66.002(d).
    • The trial court erred by effectively trying the merits—especially by evaluating evidence and constitutional defenses—at the leave‑to‑file stage.
  3. Validity and scope of the state alien‑harboring statutes.
    The Court:
    • endorses the Fifth Circuit’s construction in Cruz v. Abbott, 849 F.3d 594 (5th Cir. 2017) that “harboring” requires concealment or shielding from detection and does not criminalize mere provision of shelter or basic necessities;
    • nonetheless holds that, taking the AG’s allegations as true, the pleadings assert conduct (systematic shielding from detection and refusal to allow law enforcement access) that falls within that narrower definition;
    • rejects field and conflict preemption challenges under the Supremacy Clause, holding that the Texas provisions are neither preempted by, nor in conflict with, 8 U.S.C. § 1324; and
    • rejects vagueness challenges both to the harboring statute and to the use of its violation as a basis for quo warranto.
  4. RFRA’s role at the threshold.
    The Court assumes, without deciding, that Texas RFRA (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 110) applies fully in this context, but holds:
    • RFRA cannot be used at the leave‑to‑file stage to prevent the AG from even initiating a quo warranto action.
    • RFRA questions are merits questions that should be resolved on an adequate factual record, not as a bar to filing.
    • The decision expressly leaves open RFRA-based merits defenses or affirmative RFRA claims later in the litigation.
  5. Constitutionality of the AG’s corporate‑records inspection statutes.
    As to Texas Bus. Orgs. Code §§ 12.151–.152, the Court holds:
    • These provisions are not facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment as construed in City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 (2015).
    • Reading the statute against the background of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 176.6(e) and applying the canon of constitutional avoidance, “immediately” in § 12.152 is construed to allow for some delay sufficient to seek precompliance review before sanctions like forfeiture attach.
    • The trial court erred in declaring the statute facially invalid and in imposing a sweeping injunction that effectively subjected all future record requests to its prior approval for two years.

The Court therefore:

  • reverses the summary judgment for Annunciation House;
  • reverses the denial of leave for the AG to file a quo warranto counterclaim and remands so the action may proceed;
  • vacates the injunction that barred the AG from making records requests absent prior court approval; and
  • remands the AG’s request for an injunction against Annunciation House’s operations for reconsideration under the clarified legal standards.

Crucially, the Court does not decide whether Annunciation House in fact violated the alien‑harboring statutes, whether its charter should be forfeited, or whether RFRA ultimately protects its ministry. Those are left expressly for further proceedings.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. The Historical and Constitutional Framework of Quo Warranto

1. From royal prerogative to corporate oversight

The opinion devotes substantial space to explaining the medieval English origins and evolution of quo warranto:

  • Originally a royal writ under Edward I to challenge baronial “franchises” and reclaim royal prerogatives (“by what warrant” they claimed royal powers).
  • Over time it morphed into an “information in the nature of quo warranto”—a proceeding originally criminal in form but ultimately treated as a purely civil mechanism for testing the lawful exercise of governmental privileges and corporate franchises.
  • By Blackstone’s time, quo warranto was the accepted vehicle for challenging a corporation’s continued existence for “misuser or nonuser” of its chartered privileges.

The Court then tracks the doctrine into American and Texas law:

  • The Republic of Texas adopted the English common law (1840 act), which included quo warranto.
  • Early Texas cases like State v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 24 Tex. 80 (1859), recognized quo warranto against corporations as part of that inherited common law.
  • The Legislature sometimes placed quo warranto duties on the AG in specific charters (e.g., Texana Academy in 1850).

2. Constitutionalization in Article IV, § 22

The key structural move came with the 1876 Constitution, which wrote the AG’s corporate‑oversight function into the fundamental law:

[The Attorney General] shall especially inquire into the charter rights of all private corporations, and from time to time, in the name of the State, take such action in the courts as may be proper and necessary to prevent any private corporation from exercising any power or demanding or collecting any species of taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage not authorized by law. He shall, whenever sufficient cause exists, seek a judicial forfeiture of such charters, unless otherwise expressly directed by law.

The Court underscores several implications:

  • This is a constitutional grant and duty. The AG’s quo warranto authority regarding corporate charters is not merely statutory—it is elevated to constitutional status.
  • It contains an internal clear‑statement rule. The phrase “unless otherwise expressly directed by law” means that:
    • only express legislative directions can curtail this power; and
    • courts may not infer restrictions by implication or broad construction of unrelated statutes.
  • The scope is not limited to rate‑setting. The text covers preventing any private corporation from “exercising any power…not authorized by law,” alongside specific references to tolls and taxes. Using standard tools of textual interpretation (the “series‑qualifier” canon), the Court rejects Annunciation House’s argument that the AG’s authority is confined to financial exactions (tolls, freight, etc.).

The Court also cites contemporaneous legislation—the 1876 act “to provide for the judicial forfeiture of charters” and the 1879 quo warranto statute (now Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 66)—as legislative confirmation that art. IV, § 22 was understood to constitutionalize quo warranto with the traditional “misuser/nonuser” grounds.

3. Criminal conduct as “exercise of power not authorized by law”

A critical doctrinal move is the Court’s rejection of the argument that criminal conduct lies outside the scope of the AG’s constitutional quo warranto authority. Annunciation House contended that art. IV, § 22 only covered unlawful exaction of rates/tolls, not “ordinary” criminal violations.

The Court concludes:

  • The text speaks broadly of preventing corporations from “exercising any power…not authorized by law.”
  • It would be illogical to say that conduct forbidden by criminal law is “authorized by law”; thus, at least some categories of criminal conduct can qualify as an ultra vires exercise of corporate power.
  • Historical authorities from other states (Iowa, Nebraska, Indiana, Ohio, Illinois) treated criminal violations as valid grounds for corporate charter forfeiture by quo warranto under similar statutory language.

The Court is careful, however, to limit its holding: it does not decide that all criminal offenses can necessarily support quo warranto, but it rejects the categorical bar Annunciation House advocated. That is sufficient to hold that alleged violations of the alien‑harboring statute can, in principle, be a predicate for a quo warranto action.

4. Who decides when “sufficient cause exists”?

Annunciation House argued that only the Legislature may define when “sufficient cause exists” for the AG to seek forfeiture, implying that the AG must await specific statutory triggers before acting.

The Court instead:

  • relies heavily on State v. Teachers Annuity Life Insurance Co., 149 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1941, writ ref’d), which read art. IV, § 22 to:
    • give the AG general authority to seek charter forfeiture whenever he determines sufficient cause exists under existing law; and
    • limit that authority only when the Legislature has “expressly” directed otherwise.
  • ties this to long‑standing doctrines about the AG’s broad discretion as “chief legal officer of the state” (e.g., Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. 1991); Maud v. Terrell, 200 S.W. 375 (Tex. 1918); and the 2024 decision in Webster v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline).

Thus, “sufficient cause” is primarily a discretionary determination by the AG, bounded by existing substantive law and any express statutory withdrawals of power, not an element that must be pre‑defined by statute case‑by‑case.

B. Statutory Interplay: § 11.301 and Chapter 66 Do Not Supplant Quo Warranto

1. Business Organizations Code § 11.301(a)(5): a parallel, not exclusive, mechanism

Section 11.301(a)(5) authorizes a court, in an action brought under § 11.303, to decree winding up and termination of a corporate entity’s existence when:

  • the entity or a high managerial agent has been convicted of a felony committed in the conduct of the entity’s affairs;
  • the entity or agent has engaged in a persistent course of felonious conduct; and
  • termination is necessary to prevent future similar felonious conduct.

The trial court held that this criminal‑conviction‑based winding‑up remedy "supplants" the AG’s ability to pursue charter forfeiture via quo warranto on criminal grounds; i.e., that a conviction (and this mechanism) is the exclusive path.

The Supreme Court rejects that reading:

  • No textual reference to quo warranto. The statute nowhere mentions quo warranto or art. IV, § 22.
  • Silence cannot satisfy the constitutional clear‑statement rule. Because art. IV, § 22 demands that any withdrawal be “expressly directed by law,” mere implication or silence is insufficient.
  • Constitutional avoidance and common‑law canon. The Court invokes the canon that statutes do not alter the common law absent clear language, and notes that here even that lower threshold is not met, much less the explicitness art. IV, § 22 requires.
  • Harmonizing regimes. The Court views § 11.301 as a distinct remedial path, deeply integrated into the Business Organizations Code’s administrative regime (especially the Secretary of State’s role), not as an implied repeal or displacement of quo warranto.

As a result, the AG may pursue quo warranto even in situations where no felony conviction exists, and the availability of § 11.301(a)(5) does not make conviction a prerequisite to charter forfeiture.

2. Civil Practice & Remedies Code chapter 66: grounds for quo warranto, not limits on constitutional power

Chapter 66 codifies the 1879 quo warranto statute and enumerates grounds on which “[a]n action in the nature of quo warranto is available,” including:

  • § 66.001(4): when a corporation “does or omits an act that requires a surrender or causes a forfeiture of its rights and privileges as a corporation”; and
  • § 66.001(5): when a corporation “exercises power not granted by law.”

The trial court concluded that because these subsections do not explicitly mention “criminal conduct,” they implicitly preclude such conduct as a ground. Annunciation House invoked the expressio unius canon to argue that what is not listed is excluded.

The Court responds in two moves:

  • Constitutional hierarchy. The constitutional text of art. IV, § 22 already authorizes inquiry and forfeiture where a corporation exercises “power…not authorized by law”; chapter 66’s parallel language cannot be read to cut that back without an express limitation.
  • Parallel phrasing. Given that § 66.001(5) tracks the constitutional phrase almost verbatim, the Court holds that it cannot plausibly mean something narrower than the Constitution itself—especially not to the point of excluding all criminal predicates when the Constitution does not.

Thus, chapter 66 is treated as an enabling and structuring statute—providing procedure and illustrative grounds—but not as a comprehensive and exclusive catalog that silently excludes criminal‑based quo warranto.

C. The Leave‑to‑File Standard: Pleading Sufficiency, Not Mini‑Trial

1. The “probable ground” requirement and Hunnicutt

The statutory procedural requirement appears in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 66.002(d), which requires the court to be “satisfied that there is probable ground for the proceeding” before granting leave to file an information in the nature of quo warranto.

The Court traces earlier authority:

  • Hunnicutt v. State ex rel. Witt, 12 S.W. 106 (Tex. 1889), which held that:
    • evidence submitted to obtain leave “establishes no facts on which the merit of the [quo warranto] rests; these must be established by evidence on final trial”; and
    • the AG’s “official statement, unsworn, would be sufficient to authorize a judge” to permit filing.
  • Modern courts of appeals decisions (State v. City of Double Horn, 2019 WL 5582237 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet. denied); Ramirez v. State, 973 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.); State ex rel. Manchac v. City of Orange, 274 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1955, no writ)) uniformly applying a pleading sufficiency test: if the petition states a cause of action, leave should be granted.

The Supreme Court expressly approves this approach: at the leave‑to‑file stage,

  • the court assumes the truth of the AG’s allegations;
  • asks only whether, if true, they state a valid ground for quo warranto and are not foreclosed by law (e.g., because the statute relied on is plainly inapplicable, preempted, or unconstitutional);
  • does not weigh competing evidence, resolve factual disputes, or adjudicate affirmative defenses like RFRA; and
  • does not prejudge the outcome of subsequent dispositive motions (e.g., Rule 91a motions, summary judgment) that test sufficiency in more depth with developed records.

The Court analogizes the leave stage to screening out petitions that “cannot survive even though the court assumes the truth of the allegations”—a narrow role aimed at avoiding plainly futile filings, not adjudicating merits.

2. Application to the alien‑harboring allegations

For purposes of this appeal, the Court assumes the truth of the AG’s pleaded facts, which it summarizes as alleging that Annunciation House:

  1. provides shelter to noncitizens who are unlawfully present;
  2. is aware that many of its guests lack lawful status;
  3. proactively refuses to cooperate with, or allow entry by, law enforcement in order to protect those guests from detection; and
  4. “purposefully, knowingly, and systematically” shields unlawfully present aliens from detection.

Annunciation House argued that, under Cruz v. Abbott, these allegations just amount to providing shelter—which cannot be criminalized as “harboring.” The Court draws an important distinction:

  • It agrees with Cruz’s interpretation that “harboring” requires “some level of covertness” and cannot mean mere provision of housing or aid; it expressly adopts Cruz’s limiting construction as consistent with legislative intent and prior federal interpretations of similar language.
  • But it reads the AG’s pleadings as alleging something more—covert shielding from detection and active obstruction of law enforcement access—precisely the kind of conduct Cruz suggested could amount to harboring.

Accordingly, at the leave‑to‑file stage, those allegations are enough to constitute “probable ground for the proceeding” under § 66.002(d). The Court explicitly cautions that this is not a judgment that any of the allegations are true or that they will survive merits scrutiny; it is only a threshold determination that they state a plausible claim.

D. RFRA: A Merits Defense, Not a Gatekeeping Bar to Filing

1. RFRA’s framework

Texas RFRA, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 110.001–.012, provides that a “government agency” may not substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion unless it demonstrates that:

  1. the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest; and
  2. is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. (§ 110.003)

RFRA can be raised:

  • as an affirmative defense in a judicial or administrative proceeding (§ 110.004); or
  • as an affirmative cause of action for declaratory or injunctive relief (§ 110.005).

Annunciation House invoked RFRA as a defense against:

  • the records‑inspection demand; and
  • the AG’s proposed quo warranto action and associated injunction, arguing that shutting down its faith‑motivated shelter ministry would impose a substantial burden on religious exercise that could not satisfy strict scrutiny.

2. Why RFRA cannot block the filing of the quo warranto action

The Court’s key conceptual move is to distinguish:

  • the initiation of litigation (the AG filing an information in quo warranto) from
  • the ultimate relief sought (charter forfeiture and closure of the shelters).

RFRA, the Court reasons:

  • is designed to be litigated within a judicial proceeding as a defense or as the basis for affirmative relief;
  • often requires granular factual analysis of the claimant’s religious exercise, the nature and extent of the burden, and the availability of alternatives—precisely the kinds of questions that cannot responsibly be answered before a case is even filed and developed;
  • can certainly justify early injunctive relief in some cases (as in Hensley v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct, 692 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 2024)), but still must be adjudicated through normal procedural stages on an adequate record.

Thus, at the leave‑to‑file stage, the “government action” under review is only the filing of the lawsuit, not the potential future closure of Annunciation House. The Court notes that litigation itself is generally not the type of “substantial burden” RFRA is aimed at preventing; RFRA is the mechanism to contest burdensome state action within the litigation.

The Court notably does not decide:

  • whether RFRA applies with full force to a quo warranto proceeding brought under art. IV, § 22; or
  • whether, on the facts ultimately developed, RFRA would bar charter forfeiture or require narrower relief.

Those questions are left entirely open for remand.

E. Federal Preemption and Vagueness: Validation of Texas Alien‑Harboring Laws

1. Rejection of field and conflict preemption

The trial court had held that Texas Penal Code §§ 20.05(a)(2) (harboring) and 20.07(a)(1) (using property as a “stash house”) are both field‑ and conflict‑preempted by federal law, particularly 8 U.S.C. § 1324.

The Supreme Court proceeds as follows:

a. Field preemption
  • The Court notes that “field” preemption requires carefully defining the field Congress is said to have occupied. Annunciation House’s briefing was largely conclusory and did not clearly identify such a field (e.g., alien registration, which was at issue in Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)).
  • It emphasizes Supreme Court authority, particularly Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S. 191 (2020), and De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), holding that not every state law dealing with noncitizens or immigration‑related conduct is per se preempted.
  • It notes supporting appellate authority (Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013)) rejecting field preemption even in the narrower “anti‑harboring” space.

Given this doctrinal landscape and the lack of a coherent field definition from Annunciation House, the Court rejects field preemption.

b. Conflict preemption: impossibility and obstacle

For “impossibility” conflict, the Court finds no contradiction between:

  • federal law criminalizing harboring under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), and
  • Texas law criminalizing harboring persons “remain[ing] in this country in violation of federal law.”

Because the Texas statute tracks federal definitions and targets the same conduct (harboring those in federal violation of immigration law), compliance with both is not “physically impossible.”

For “obstacle” preemption, the Court stresses:

  • The danger of free‑form purposivism in preemption analysis and instead focuses on statutory text.
  • The significance of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c), which affirmatively authorizes state officers charged with enforcing criminal laws to make arrests for § 1324 violations.
  • This textual authorization of state enforcement cuts strongly against any inference that Congress intended to exclude state participation in anti‑harboring enforcement.

The Court also relies on Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011), which upheld an Arizona statute that tracked federal law on unauthorized employment and applied similar standards. It analogizes:

  • like the Arizona law in Whiting, Texas’s harboring statute adopts federal definitions and penalizes substantially the same conduct;
  • this “parallel standards” approach reduces, rather than heightens, the risk of conflict with federal enforcement priorities (Zyla Life Sciences, L.L.C. v. Wells Pharma of Houston, L.L.C., 134 F.4th 326 (5th Cir. 2025)).

Accordingly, the Court holds that the Texas alien‑harboring provisions are neither field‑ nor conflict‑preempted and thus can serve as valid predicates for state enforcement, including quo warranto.

2. Vagueness: prosecutorial discretion vs. “standardless sweep”

The trial court had also held that applying §§ 20.05(a)(2) and 20.07(a)(1) via quo warranto would render both those provisions and the enabling quo warranto statute unconstitutionally vague.

On vagueness, the Court:

  • assumes that the Texas “due course of law” clause (Tex. Const. art I, § 19) and federal “due process” standards are functionally identical for this issue;
  • applies the standard that a law is unconstitutionally vague if it (i) fails to give fair notice of what conduct is prohibited, or (ii) is so open‑ended that it invites arbitrary, discriminatory enforcement.

The Court then:

  • relies on its adoption of the Cruz limiting construction of “harboring” to reject the notion that the statute gives no fair notice—Cruz’s gloss helps avoid vagueness problems by requiring concealment.
  • distinguishes ordinary prosecutorial discretion (including discretion to choose between criminal prosecution and a civil quo warranto action) from the sort of “standardless sweep” condemned in cases like Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) and Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
  • emphasizes that the AG’s discretion is tethered to defined criminal laws—he cannot invent new offenses; he can only rely on legislatively defined crimes, which themselves must satisfy vagueness standards.

Thus, neither the harboring statute nor its use as a trigger for corporate charter forfeiture via quo warranto is, on this record, unconstitutionally vague.

F. Corporate Records Inspections, Patel, and Constitutional Avoidance

1. The statutory scheme and the Patel problem

Texas Bus. Orgs. Code §§ 12.151–.152 authorize the AG to:

  • “inspect, examine, and make copies, as [he] considers necessary” of a corporation’s records; and
  • compel a “managerial official” to “immediately permit” such inspection upon written request, with failure triggering potential forfeiture of the right to do business and criminal penalties (§§ 12.155–.156).

Annunciation House argued that this scheme is indistinguishable from the Los Angeles hotel‑records ordinance that the U.S. Supreme Court struck down in City of Los Angeles v. Patel:

  • Patel condemned an ordinance that authorized police officers to demand immediate access to hotel guest registries; refusal could result in instant arrest and penalties.
  • The Supreme Court held such a scheme facially unconstitutional because it afforded no opportunity for precompliance review by a neutral decision‑maker before sanctions were imposed.

The Texas trial court read “immediately” in § 12.152 as forbidding any delay, thus precluding precompliance review and making the statute facially unconstitutional under Patel.

2. The Court’s saving construction

The Supreme Court of Texas applies several interpretive principles:

  • Constitutional avoidance. Courts must, if reasonably possible, construe statutes to avoid constitutional infirmities.
  • Legislative awareness of background law. The Legislature is presumed to legislate against the backdrop of existing law—here, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 176.6(e), which already provided that a person commanded to permit inspection may seek a protective order “before the time specified for compliance.”

On that basis, the Court:

  • rejects a literal reading of “immediately” as “instantly, without any lapse of time” as physically impossible and inconsistent with background procedure;
  • interprets “immediately” to mean “as soon as practicable,” requiring substantial expedition but not eliminating the window necessary to:
    • consult counsel; and
    • seek precompliance review (e.g., via a Rule 176.6(e) protective order) before penalties attach.
  • finds nothing in §§ 12.151–.152 that purports to eliminate or restrict the availability of such protective orders or any other court‑based precompliance mechanisms.

Under this construction, the statute scheme does offer the precompliance review demanded by Patel, and thus is not facially unconstitutional. The Court explicitly cautions that while the AG may demand prompt compliance, he may not use the statute to bypass or preclude judicial review of the legality or scope of a records request.

3. Rejection of § 2400.002 (“Save Chick‑fil‑A Law”) as a basis for the injunction

The trial court had also held that the AG’s records request violated Tex. Gov’t Code § 2400.002, which forbids adverse governmental action against an entity based wholly or partly on its religious affiliation or donations (“Save Chick‑fil‑A” provision).

The Supreme Court finds:

  • no evidence in the record that the AG targeted Annunciation House “based wholly or partly on” its Catholic identity or religious exercise; and
  • strong presumptions of regularity and legality constrain courts from inferring such bias without evidence (Von Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d 387 (Tex. 2022); Webster; Borgelt).

Therefore, § 2400.002 could not justify the sweeping injunction that required the AG to preclear all future record requests with the same district court for two years.

G. Institutional Themes: Separation of Powers and Judicial Restraint

Beyond doctrinal holdings, the opinion sends strong institutional signals about separation of powers and the judiciary’s stance toward the Attorney General:

  • Presumption of good faith. The Court admonishes the trial court for repeatedly accusing the AG of political harassment and bad faith, and reminds lower courts of their “duty to extend to the [AG]…a presumption of regularity, good faith, and legality.”
  • Limits on supervisory injunctions. The Court flags, without fully analyzing, the serious concerns raised by an injunction that effectively forces a constitutional officer to seek a single district judge’s permission before exercising statutory oversight power, and does so for a fixed future period.
  • Direct‑appeal caution. The Court repeatedly stresses the narrowness of its decision, emphasizing that direct appeals from constitutional rulings come to it early, with undeveloped records, and are not occasions to resolve the entire controversy. It insists on leaving factual and mixed questions (harboring, RFRA balancing, remedies) to the ordinary trial‑and‑appeal process.

IV. Complex Concepts Explained (In Plain Terms)

1. Quo warranto and “information in the nature of quo warranto”

  • Quo warranto (Latin for “by what warrant”) is a type of legal proceeding used to challenge whether someone (or some entity) has the legal right to hold a public office, exercise a governmental privilege, or enjoy a corporate charter.
  • The historic royal “writ” evolved into an information in the nature of quo warranto, which in Texas today is simply a civil lawsuit brought by the State (through the AG or other authorized officials) seeking, for example, to:
    • oust an unlawfully seated official;
    • invalidate an illegal municipal annexation; or
    • forfeit a corporation’s charter for abuse or misuse of its powers.
  • Art. IV, § 22 of the Texas Constitution gives the AG a special role and duty to use this tool to police private corporations’ charter rights.

2. “Facial” vs. “as‑applied” constitutional challenges

  • A facial challenge attacks a law in all its applications—arguing that the statute is unconstitutional no matter how it is implemented.
  • An as‑applied challenge concedes that the law might be valid in general but argues that, in the particular circumstances of the case, its application violates the constitution.
  • Here:
    • Annunciation House brought a facial challenge to §§ 12.151–.152 (records inspection) under the Fourth Amendment; the Court rejected that challenge.
    • The harboring vagueness and preemption arguments were essentially as‑applied to this case, but the Court found no constitutional defect either way.

3. Preemption (field, conflict, obstacle)

  • Field preemption: Congress has so completely regulated a subject area that there is no room for states to regulate, even if state law does not contradict federal law.
  • Conflict preemption:
    • Impossibility: it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law at the same time.
    • Obstacle: the state law frustrates the full purposes and objectives of Congress, even if compliance with both is technically possible.
  • In this case, the Court held that:
    • Congress has not occupied the entire field of immigration‑related criminal law to the exclusion of state efforts (especially when federal law invites state cooperation); and
    • Texas’s harboring statute does not conflict with or stand as an obstacle to the federal scheme, particularly given the explicit federal authorization of state enforcement in 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c).

4. Vagueness and prosecutorial discretion

  • A statute is unconstitutionally vague if:
    • ordinary people cannot understand what conduct it prohibits; and/or
    • it is so open‑ended that it invites arbitrary enforcement (allowing officials to punish essentially whatever they wish).
  • Normal prosecutorial discretion—choosing whether to prosecute and under which statute—is not by itself a vagueness problem, so long as the underlying statutes define offenses clearly enough.
  • Here, the Court sees the AG’s choice between pursuing criminal charges or a civil quo warranto action as an exercise of ordinary prosecutorial discretion, not the kind of standardless power condemned in classic vagueness cases.

5. RFRA and “precompliance review”

  • RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act) requires the government to justify any substantial burden on religious exercise under the strictest constitutional test: compelling interest and least restrictive means.
  • Precompliance review means an opportunity, before penalties are imposed, to go to a neutral court and challenge a government demand (like a demand for records or for entry) as unlawful or unconstitutional.
  • Patel holds that, absent exigent circumstances, such review must be available before someone can be punished for refusing to comply with an administrative inspection demand.

V. Likely Impact and Future Implications

1. Strengthening and clarifying the AG’s structural role

This opinion significantly reinforces the Attorney General’s institutional position in Texas law:

  • Constitutional entrenchment of quo warranto. The explicit reliance on art. IV, § 22 and its clear‑statement clause means that legislative or judicial attempts to curtail the AG’s power to seek corporate charter forfeiture must now meet a high bar of textual clarity.
  • Discretion confirmed. By endorsing Teachers Annuity and the line of cases on the AG’s broad discretion, the Court cements the view that, absent express statutory limitations, the AG—not the Legislature, not lower courts—decides when “sufficient cause exists” to initiate corporate forfeiture proceedings.
  • Template for future corporate oversight. Although quo warranto has been relatively underused against private corporations in modern practice, this decision may embolden the AG (current or future) to revive it as a tool for policing perceived corporate or nonprofit misconduct that implicates criminal law or ultra vires acts.

2. Implications for religious nonprofits involved in migrant services

For faith‑based organizations like Annunciation House, the decision has a mixed valence:

  • Door remains open to RFRA defenses. The Court goes out of its way to leave RFRA arguments “unforeclosed,” indicating that:
    • faith‑based organizations can still invoke RFRA against shutdowns or other burdensome remedies; and
    • in an appropriate record, RFRA may well constrain the State’s remedial options even if some illegal conduct is proven.
  • But litigation cannot be blocked at the threshold. Religious organizations cannot rely on RFRA (or similar doctrines) to prevent the AG from even filing suit; they must contest burdens within the litigation process.
  • Clarification of harboring law. By endorsing Cruz’s narrow construction of “harboring,” the Court gives faith‑based shelters clearer guidance:
    • Mere provision of food and lodging—even to undocumented migrants—is not, by itself, criminal “harboring.”
    • However, conduct that systematically hides individuals from law enforcement or obstructs lawful enforcement efforts may cross the line.

The ultimate boundaries between charitable ministry, religious exercise, and unlawful harboring will likely be worked out in future fact‑intensive cases, including this one on remand.

3. State immigration‑related criminal enforcement space

The Court’s preemption analysis provides an important signal for Texas’s broader immigration‑related enforcement efforts:

  • Not every immigration‑adjacent state law is preempted. So long as a state statute:
    • does not regulate a field Congress has clearly occupied (like alien registration), and
    • does not conflict with or thwart federal statutes,
    it can coexist with federal immigration law even if it involves noncitizens and status‑related concepts.
  • Parallel‑tracking federal law is relatively safe. Laws that adopt federal definitions and regulate the same primary conduct, as Texas’s harboring statute does, are easier to defend against preemption challenges.
  • Cooperative enforcement is textually grounded. The Court’s reliance on 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c)’s authorization for state officers to enforce federal harboring offenses may bolster other state efforts premised on cooperative federalism rather than unilateral state immigration codes.

4. Administrative inspection powers and procedural safeguards

Regarding regulatory practice, the decision clarifies:

  • Precompliance review is constitutionally required. After Patel and now this opinion, Texas agencies (including the AG) must afford targets of administrative subpoenas or inspection demands an opportunity for judicial review before imposing penalties for non‑compliance.
  • Statutory language like “immediately” will be read in light of that requirement. Agencies cannot interpret such language to justify bypassing courts entirely or coercing instantaneous compliance on pain of forfeiture.
  • Over‑broad “supervisory injunctions” are suspect. Trial courts may be rebuked (and reversed) if they arrogate ongoing control over executive officers’ statutory powers through expansive, forward‑looking injunctions not tightly tied to proven legal violations.

5. Litigation strategy going forward

For litigants on both sides, the decision carries strategic lessons:

  • Defendants in quo warranto actions:
    • cannot prevent the AG from filing by front‑loading merits arguments and evidentiary disputes at the leave stage;
    • should instead prepare to use tools like:
      • Rule 91a motions (no‑basis‑in‑law or fact),
      • summary judgment,
      • RFRA defenses and counterclaims, and
      • targeted constitutional challenges,
      once the pleadings are on file.
  • The Attorney General:
    • benefits from a clarified, deferential standard for obtaining leave, but
    • remains bound by substantive law and constitutional safeguards—including RFRA and the Fourth Amendment—as litigation proceeds.

VI. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

Paxton v. Annunciation House is not a decision about whether a Catholic migrant shelter has unlawfully harbored undocumented immigrants or whether religious liberty ultimately shields its operations. Those questions remain unresolved and will depend on factual development and full merits litigation on remand.

Instead, the opinion’s enduring significance lies in its structural and doctrinal clarifications:

  • Constitutional quo warranto. The Court emphatically confirms that the Texas Attorney General possesses a constitutionally entrenched power—and in some respects duty—to bring quo warranto actions against private corporations, including on the basis of alleged criminal conduct, unless the Legislature has expressly provided otherwise.
  • Threshold standards and judicial restraint. It defines the leave‑to‑file threshold as a limited pleading sufficiency inquiry, rejecting attempts to convert it into a merits adjudication or a vehicle for early RFRA or constitutional determinations.
  • Validation of state alien‑harboring laws. It holds that Texas’s carefully drafted alien‑harboring and stash‑house provisions, which track federal immigration law, are neither preempted nor unconstitutionally vague, at least as used here to support a quo warranto action.
  • Patel‑compliant reading of inspection powers. It preserves the AG’s broad statutory power to inspect corporate records by construing “immediately” in harmony with the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of precompliance review, thereby avoiding facial invalidation of important investigative tools.
  • Respect between branches. It admonishes lower courts to respect the institutional role and presumed good faith of constitutional officers, even while preserving full judicial authority to correct legal errors and enforce constitutional limits.

In the broader landscape of Texas law, the case revives and modernizes an ancient common‑law remedy, situates it firmly within the constitutional separation of powers, and outlines a framework for balancing robust state enforcement powers with religious liberty and federal supremacy. How those balances are struck in concrete cases—especially at the intersection of immigration enforcement and faith‑based social services—will now play out against the clear doctrinal backdrop this opinion provides.

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