Constitutionalizing Quo Warranto: Texas Attorney General’s Expanded Authority to Target Corporate Misconduct in Paxton v. Annunciation House

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Warren Kenneth Paxton, Jr., in his Official Capacity as Texas Attorney General, and the State of Texas v. Annunciation House, Inc. is a far‑reaching opinion that does several important things at once:

It revitalizes and constitutionalizes the State’s ancient quo warranto remedy against corporations.
It clarifies the threshold standard for allowing the Attorney General (“AG”) to file such actions.
It preserves, at least at the pleading stage, Texas’s alien‑harboring statute against preemption and vagueness attacks.
It rejects an expansive, pre‑filing use of the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to block enforcement actions.
It saves the AG’s statutory records‑inspection authority from a facial Fourth Amendment challenge by adopting a limiting construction.

The case arises from the Texas Attorney General’s effort to investigate and potentially shut down Annunciation House, a long‑standing Catholic-affiliated nonprofit in El Paso that operates migrant shelters. After state officials served an immediate records request backed by threats of corporate forfeiture, and the AG later alleged that the nonprofit was operating as an “illegal alien harboring” organization and “stash house,” Annunciation House obtained sweeping relief in the trial court:

A declaration that several state statutes (including the records inspection statutes) were unconstitutional.
An injunction barring the AG from enforcing them or even filing a quo warranto action to revoke the nonprofit’s charter.

Because the trial court’s orders rested on constitutional grounds, the AG invoked the Texas Supreme Court’s direct‑appeal jurisdiction. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Young, reverses almost everything the trial court did, but it also emphasizes the procedural posture: the Court decides only that the AG may file a quo warranto action and pursue records under a properly construed statute. It deliberately does not decide whether Annunciation House actually violated any law, or whether its charter should ultimately be forfeited.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court addresses five core rulings made below and resolves them as follows:

AG’s quo warranto authority: The Court holds that the Texas Constitution (art. IV, § 22) gives the Attorney General a robust and long‑standing power to bring quo warranto actions against private corporations, including where the predicate is alleged criminal conduct. That authority can be withdrawn only if the Legislature “expressly” says so. Business Organizations Code § 11.301(a)(5) does not supplant or abrogate that authority, and Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 66 does not preclude criminal predicates.
Standard for leave to file quo warranto: The Court clarifies that at the “leave to file” stage, the trial court must accept the State’s allegations as true and grant leave if the petition on its face states a viable legal basis—i.e., there is a “probable ground for the proceeding.” Evidence disputes and defenses are reserved for later stages.
Alien‑harboring statute: Taking the AG’s allegations as true, the Court holds that the petition plausibly alleges violations of Texas Penal Code §§ 20.05(a)(2) and 20.07(a)(1) as construed in the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Cruz v. Abbott. It further holds that those provisions are neither field‑nor conflict‑preempted by federal immigration law, nor unconstitutionally vague as applied in the manner alleged.
RFRA: The Court assumes without deciding that RFRA applies in this context, but holds that RFRA cannot, at this early stage, be used to stop the AG from merely filing a lawsuit. RFRA defenses and claims must generally be resolved on a fuller factual record, focused on the concrete burden and remedy actually sought—not on speculative future outcomes.
Records‑inspection statutes and precompliance review: The Court holds that Business Organizations Code §§ 12.151–.152, which authorize the AG to inspect and copy corporate records and demand that managers “immediately permit” inspection, are not facially unconstitutional under City of Los Angeles v. Patel. Construed in light of Texas procedural law (particularly Rule 176.6(e) protective orders) and the canon of constitutional avoidance, these provisions allow for precompliance judicial review before penalties attach. The trial court’s permanent injunction against future records requests is vacated.

The Court also:

Rejects the notion that the AG’s actions violated the “Save Chick‑fil‑A” Law (Government Code § 2400.002), finding no evidentiary basis for inferring religious animus.
Holds that the records‑request dispute is not moot, despite the AG’s asserted abandonment of the original request.
Admonishes the trial court for intemperate rhetoric impugning the AG’s motives and for entering an unusually broad preclearance injunction.

Ultimately, the Court:

Reverses the judgment.
Vacates the injunction that protected Annunciation House from records requests.
Orders that the AG be allowed to file his quo warranto counterclaim.
Remands for further proceedings, explicitly declining to prejudge the merits, including RFRA issues, harboring liability, or the propriety of charter forfeiture.

III. Historical and Doctrinal Background

A. Quo Warranto from Edward I to Texas

The Court devotes substantial space to quo warranto’s history, both to explain an increasingly obscure procedure and to reinforce the constitutional stature of the AG’s role.

English origins. In the thirteenth century, King Edward I used the writ of quo warranto—literally, “by what warrant”—to question barons’ exercise of “franchises” or “liberties” that belonged to the Crown. If a baron could not show a royal grant (or had misused or failed to use the franchise), the Crown could revoke it. Over time, the formal writ gave way to an “information in the nature of quo warranto,” a proceeding initiated by the Attorney General in the Court of King’s Bench. Though it originated as a criminal information, it evolved into a purely civil device used to challenge the usurpation or misuse of public offices and corporate charters.

Application to corporations. As corporate law developed, private corporations—creatures of legislative grant—became subject to quo warranto. Blackstone recognized that a corporation could lose its charter for “negligence or abuse” of its franchises and that quo warranto was the means for inquiring “by what warrant” corporate powers were being exercised. Similar logic applied in colonial America, where even colony charters could be revoked via quo warranto (famously, Massachusetts Bay’s in 1683).

Early American and Texas adoption. Justice Story in 1815 described quo warranto as “the common law of the land,” a tacit condition on every corporate charter. Texas adopted the common law of England in 1840, thereby adopting quo warranto as a remedy against corporations. Early statutes in the Republic and State periods acknowledged and sometimes mandated the AG’s use of information in the nature of quo warranto when corporations violated their charters.

B. Article IV, § 22: Constitutionalizing the Attorney General’s Duty

Texas’s 1876 Constitution goes further than most states by explicitly constitutionalizing the Attorney General’s duties regarding corporations. Article IV, § 22 provides that the AG shall:

especially inquire into the charter rights of all private corporations, and from time to time, in the name of the State, take such action in the courts as may be proper and necessary to prevent any private corporation from exercising any power or demanding or collecting any species of taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage not authorized by law. He shall, whenever sufficient cause exists, seek a judicial forfeiture of such charters, unless otherwise expressly directed by law.

Key features:

Mandatory inquiry and action: The AG must “especially inquire” into corporate charter rights and “take such action in the courts as may be proper and necessary” to prevent unlawful exercises of power.
Express reference to charter forfeiture: When “sufficient cause exists,” the AG “shall” seek judicial forfeiture, unless the Legislature has “otherwise expressly directed.”
Constitutional clear‑statement rule: The phrase “unless otherwise expressly directed by law” is a built‑in clear‑statement requirement: the Legislature may limit or reroute this authority only by express language, not by implication.

Within a few years of ratification, the Legislature adopted statutes that:

Restated the AG’s duty to seek forfeiture for corporate “misuser or nonuser” of charter rights.
Created a procedural framework (now Civil Practice & Remedies Code ch. 66) for actions “in the nature of quo warranto,” including petitions for leave to file informations when corporations “exercise power not conferred by law.”

This historical and textual backdrop frames all of the Court’s major holdings.

IV. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Scope of the Attorney General’s Constitutional Quo Warranto Authority

1. Rejecting a narrow, “tolls‑only” reading of Article IV, § 22

Annunciation House argued that the AG’s constitutional power to challenge the “exercise of any power” “not authorized by law” is limited to cases involving illegal “taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage.” On this view, Article IV, § 22 would not apply where the alleged predicate is criminal conduct unrelated to charging illegal rates. If that were right, the case could be recast as a pure statutory question about quo warranto, avoiding any constitutional dimension.

The Court rejects this interpretation as inconsistent with the text and grammar. In the critical clause, the statute prohibits:

“exercising any power” not authorized by law, or
“demanding or collecting any species of taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage” not authorized by law.

Each object—“power,” “taxes,” “tolls,” etc.—is modified by “not authorized by law,” but “power” is distinct from the list of revenue‑related items. This reading is reinforced by:

The separate treatment of rate‑setting in an (now repealed) Article XII provision of the 1876 Constitution.
The 1879 quo warranto statute, which listed “exercise of power not conferred by law” and illegal rates as separate grounds.

Accordingly, “exercising any power not authorized by law” has broader reach, not confined to taxes or tolls.

2. Criminal conduct can be a “power not authorized by law”

A more central argument by Annunciation House was that criminal conduct cannot form the predicate for a quo warranto action—that is, that violating criminal law is categorically distinct from “exercising power not authorized by law.”

The Court rejects that as well:

Logically, a corporation engaged in criminal acts is exercising power that is not authorized by law; the inverse (that criminal acts could be “authorized” by law) is untenable.
Other state supreme courts, interpreting similar constitutional and statutory language, have consistently held that criminal violations can be grounds for corporate charter forfeiture in quo warranto.
Given that quo warranto’s historical function included addressing “misuse or abuse” of corporate franchises, there is nothing odd about criminal misconduct being a triggering “misuser.”

The Court therefore holds that criminal acts are not categorically excluded as quo warranto predicates. It deliberately leaves open whether all criminal acts could qualify in all contexts, but it forecloses the broad claim that criminal law is off‑limits as a basis for corporate quo warranto.

3. Who decides when “sufficient cause exists”?

Another key dispute concerned the phrase “whenever sufficient cause exists” in Article IV, § 22. Annunciation House argued that it is the Legislature that must define when “sufficient cause” exists—so unless a statute specifically tells the AG that a particular criminal offense is grounds for forfeiture, the AG cannot act.

The Court instead adopts, and elevates, the reasoning of State v. Teachers Annuity Life Insurance Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1941, writ ref’d):

Article IV, § 22 gives the AG general authority (and duty) to seek forfeiture when “sufficient cause exists,” with that determination lodged in the AG’s discretion, subject to judicial adjudication of the merits of any case he files.
That general authority continues “unless otherwise expressly directed by law.” The Legislature can narrow, redirect, or require quo warranto in particular situations, but it does not have to specifically bless each factual predicate.

This dovetails with broader separation‑of‑powers precedent underscoring the AG’s “multifarious” duties and broad discretion to decide what suits to file on behalf of the State (e.g., Maud v. Terrell; Webster v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline).

B. The Clear‑Statement Rule: “Unless Otherwise Expressly Directed by Law”

Article IV, § 22’s last clause—“unless otherwise expressly directed by law”—operates as a constitutional clear‑statement requirement. It does three things:

Prevents inadvertent legislative encroachment on the AG’s quo warranto authority.
Limits judicial inference of implied repeal or limitation of that authority.
Requires that any statutory drawbacks on this power be explicit and unmistakable.

Thus, when the Court evaluates the Business Organizations Code and Chapter 66 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the key question is not whether those statutes might be read to narrow quo warranto, but whether they expressly do so in the face of a constitutional presumption that the AG’s authority persists.

C. Interaction with Business Organizations Code § 11.301(a)(5)

Section 11.301(a)(5) allows a court to decree the “winding up” and termination of a filing entity when, in an action brought under § 11.303, the court finds that:

The entity or a high managerial agent has been convicted of a felony in the conduct of the entity’s affairs;
The entity or agent has engaged in a persistent course of felonious conduct; and
Termination is necessary to prevent future similar felonious conduct.

The trial court read this provision as the exclusive route for dissolving a corporation based on criminal misconduct, thereby impliedly displacing the AG’s quo warranto power in such cases.

The Supreme Court disagrees:

No textual reference to quo warranto. Section 11.301 nowhere mentions Article IV, § 22, quo warranto, or chapter 66, much less states that it is an exclusive remedy.
Silence cannot satisfy the clear‑statement rule. At most, § 11.301 might trigger a common‑law presumption that the statute modifies existing remedies if its “express terms or necessary implications” clearly indicate that intent. Here, nothing in the text or structure of Chapter 11 does so. And even if it did, that would still fall short of the constitutional requirement that withdrawal of quo warranto be “expressly” directed.
Statutory harmony. The Court instead reads § 11.301(a)(5) as creating an additional, structured, conviction‑triggered dissolution mechanism, primarily integrated with the Secretary of State’s administrative functions, not as a replacement for quo warranto. The AG may choose among tools; one does not displace the other absent explicit language.

The Court also rejects an “absurdity” argument that its reading makes it easier to dissolve an acquitted corporation than a convicted one. Quo warranto and § 11.301 operate differently; their coexistence does not yield genuine absurdity.

D. Interaction with Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 66

Chapter 66 is the modern codification of the 1879 quo warranto act. Section 66.001 lists situations in which “[a]n action in the nature of quo warranto is available,” including when:

“a corporation does or omits an act that requires a surrender or causes a forfeiture of its rights and privileges as a corporation” (§ 66.001(4)); or
“a corporation exercises power not granted by law” (§ 66.001(5)).

The trial court held the AG had failed to plead a “probable ground” under these enumerated categories and essentially applied an expressio unius inference: because the statute did not explicitly list “criminal violations” as a ground, they were excluded.

The Court responds in two steps:

Constitutional constraint on negative implication. Whatever the normal force of expressio unius, it cannot lightly be used to infer a limitation on a constitutionally entrenched power that may be withdrawn only by express direction.
Textual overlap with Article IV, § 22. Section 66.001(5) uses essentially the same language as Article IV, § 22 (“exercises power not granted by law” vs “exercising any power…not authorized by law”). Since the Court has already held that this phrase does not exclude criminal conduct in the constitutional provision, it follows that it cannot be read to exclude such conduct in the statute.

Thus, Chapter 66 authorizes (rather than forbids) the AG to use quo warranto where a corporation’s criminal misconduct amounts to exercising power not granted by law or requires surrender of corporate rights.

E. Standard for Granting Leave to File a Quo Warranto Action

An important procedural holding concerns the gateway requirement that the AG obtain “leave” to file an information in the nature of quo warranto. The Court confirms and clarifies the governing standard:

Nature of the inquiry: At the leave‑to‑file stage, the trial court does not weigh evidence or decide whether the AG will ultimately prevail. Instead, it decides whether the petition, taken as true on its face, states a cause of action within the scope of quo warranto.
“Probable ground” requirement: Under § 66.002(d), leave may be granted when “there is probable ground for the proceeding.” This is satisfied if the petition alleges conduct that, if proven, would fall within § 66.001’s categories and is not foreclosed by an express statutory or constitutional bar.
Pleadings‑based standard: Consistent with prior cases (e.g., Hunnicutt v. State ex rel. Witt, State v. City of Double Horn), the trial court must accept as true the petition’s factual allegations and evaluate only whether “a cause of action” is stated. The Attorney General’s “official statement, unsworn,” can be sufficient to authorize filing; the facts must be proven later.
Non‑preclusive effect: Granting leave does not prejudge later dispositive motions (such as Texas Rule 91a motions) or the merits. It simply allows the litigation process to begin.

The Court notes that, historically, Texas Supreme Court cases involving quo warranto have almost always arisen after leave was granted; denials of leave are rare, and this posture—review of a refusal to allow filing—underscores the exceptional nature of what the trial court did.

F. Application: Alleged Harboring by Annunciation House

Applying the standard above, the Court treats the Attorney General’s allegations as true for now. Those allegations include that Annunciation House:

Provides shelter to noncitizens who are unlawfully present.
Knows many guests are illegally present.
Refuses to cooperate with law enforcement or allow access to shelters, in order to protect guests from detection and removal.
Purposefully and systematically shields illegal aliens from detection.

Annunciation House contended that, at most, these allegations describe the provision of humanitarian shelter, which Cruz v. Abbott held is not “harboring” within the meaning of Texas Penal Code § 20.05(a)(2). In Cruz, the Fifth Circuit—making an Erie guess—limited “harboring” to conduct involving “some level of covertness,” “hiding,” or concealment, beyond simply renting or providing a place to live.

The Texas Supreme Court:

Endorses Cruz’s limiting construction—making clear that mere provision of food, shelter, or survival necessities, without more, is not criminal “harboring.”
Nevertheless finds the AG’s allegations sufficient at the pleading stage, since they involve deliberate shielding from detection, refusal to admit law enforcement, and efforts to hamper authorities’ ability to locate noncitizens—conduct that Cruz itself contemplated as “harboring.”

Accordingly, even under Cruz’s narrow definition, the petition alleges enough to state a possible criminal violation of §§ 20.05(a)(2) and 20.07(a)(1). Whether those allegations are true, or whether Annunciation House’s conduct will ultimately qualify as “harboring” under that standard, is left for further litigation.

G. RFRA’s Role and Its Limits at the Pre‑Filing Stage

The Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Civil Practice & Remedies Code ch. 110) forbids a “government agency” from substantially burdening a person’s free exercise of religion unless the agency can show that applying the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means.

Annunciation House raised RFRA as an affirmative defense, asserting that:

Its mission is religious, rooted in Catholic teaching about service to migrants and the poor.
Shutting down its shelters by charter forfeiture would substantially burden its religious exercise.
Even if the State has a compelling interest in enforcing immigration‑related laws, closure is not the least restrictive means.

The trial court embraced this defense and used RFRA as a basis to deny leave to file the quo warranto counterclaim altogether.

The Supreme Court takes a more cautious approach:

It assumes without deciding that RFRA fully applies in quo warranto cases and that RFRA’s protections can constrain executive branch enforcement in this context.
But it holds that RFRA, as a merits‑focused, fact‑intensive strict‑scrutiny inquiry, cannot be used to short‑circuit the filing stage on this record. The current question is whether the AG may merely initiate litigation, not whether the ultimate remedy (charter forfeiture) is justified or the least restrictive means.
The “government action” currently at issue is the act of filing a lawsuit, not yet shutting down facilities; litigation itself is not ordinarily treated as a “substantial burden” under RFRA, especially given that RFRA is designed to be applied within litigation.
RFRA claims and defenses should be resolved “as soon as practicable” once there is an adequate factual record and an appropriate procedural posture, as in Barr v. City of Sinton and Hensley v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct. Nothing in the opinion forecloses robust RFRA arguments later in the case.

Thus, RFRA does not bar the AG from filing his quo warranto action, but RFRA may yet play a “significant role” on remand as facts develop and specific burdens and alternatives can be weighed.

H. Federal Preemption Challenges to Texas’s Alien‑Harboring Statute

Annunciation House argued that Penal Code §§ 20.05(a)(2) and 20.07(a)(1) are preempted by federal immigration law, particularly 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), which criminalizes the harboring of undocumented noncitizens.

1. Field preemption

Under field preemption, Congress can so thoroughly occupy a field that states are ousted entirely. But the Court notes:

Annunciation House did not clearly define the preempted “field.” References to “alien registration schemes” (like those at issue in Arizona v. United States) are inapposite; the Texas statute does not address registration documents at all.
Supreme Court precedent (De Canas v. Bica, Kansas v. Garcia) rejects the idea that all state laws touching on aliens or immigration are per se preempted.
At least one circuit (Keller v. City of Fremont) has held that the federal harboring statute, standing alone, does not occupy the field so completely as to oust all state anti‑harboring measures.

Given this, the Court finds no field‑preemption basis to bar Texas from enacting a parallel harboring offense keyed to “violation of federal law.”

2. Conflict preemption

Conflict preemption can be:

Impossibility preemption: It is “impossible” to comply with both state and federal law.
Obstacle preemption: The state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”

The Court finds neither satisfied here:

Parallel standards. Like the Arizona law upheld in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, Texas’s statute closely tracks federal law. It criminalizes harboring of persons who “remain in this country in violation of federal law,” and defines the status element by reference to federal illegality. When a state law simply mirrors federal elements, “there can by definition be no conflict” regarding the substantive standard.
State enforcement of federal law invited. Section 1324(c) explicitly authorizes state and local officers who enforce criminal laws to arrest for violations of § 1324. This cuts strongly against any inference that state participation in anti‑harboring enforcement is an “obstacle” to congressional purposes.
Enforcement priorities vs. law itself. Under Kansas v. Garcia, any tension between state enforcement and federal priorities or policy preferences is not itself Supremacy Clause conflict. Only contradiction with “Laws of the United States” counts.

Thus, Texas’s alien‑harboring statute is neither field‑ nor conflict‑preempted, and it can validly serve as the predicate for the AG’s quo warranto filing.

I. Vagueness Challenges

The trial court also held that applying the harboring and “stash house” provisions to Annunciation House (via quo warranto) would render both the Penal Code and the quo warranto statute unconstitutionally vague under Article I, § 19’s “due course of law” guarantee (treated as coextensive with federal due process for these purposes).

Vagueness doctrine guards against laws that:

Fail to give “fair notice of what conduct may be punished,” or
Are so unclear as to invite arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement—granting officials a “standardless sweep.”

Annunciation House argued:

That “harboring” is sufficiently fuzzy that, without Cruz’s construction, it would not give fair notice.
That allowing the AG to use criminal‑law predicates in quo warranto grants him unguided discretion to target corporations for charter forfeiture.

The Court’s responses:

Fair notice via Cruz. By reading §§ 20.05(a)(2) and 20.07(a)(1) in line with Cruz, which confines “harboring” to concealment or shielding from detection, the statute is given a precise, judicially recognized meaning. Annunciation House itself argued that Cruz’s gloss alleviates vagueness concerns; the Court accepts that premise.
Discretion vs. arbitrariness. The AG’s decision to pursue a corporation via quo warranto based on objective criminal laws is materially different from enforcing a statute that has no objective standard at all (like “annoying behavior” in Coates v. City of Cincinnati). Prosecutorial discretion, including choices between civil/quasi‑civil and criminal remedies, has long been accepted as consistent with due process (United States v. Batchelder, Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Missouri).
No authority for categorically vague use of criminal law in quo warranto. There is no precedent holding that supporting quo warranto with criminal law predicates is inherently unconstitutional, and the long history of such use in other jurisdictions suggests the opposite.

Consequently, neither the harboring statute nor its use as a basis for quo warranto is unconstitutionally vague as applied here.

J. Constitutionality of the AG’s Records‑Inspection Authority

The AG’s original on‑site records request to Annunciation House was made under Business Organizations Code §§ 12.151–.152, which:

Give the AG authority to “inspect, examine, and make copies” of any corporate record he considers necessary.
Require that upon a written request, “a managerial official…shall immediately permit the attorney general to inspect, examine, and make copies.”

Penalties for refusal include forfeiture of the corporation’s right to do business (§ 12.155) and potential criminal exposure (§ 12.156).

The trial court held that these provisions were facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, relying on City of Los Angeles v. Patel, which struck down an ordinance that allowed police to demand hotel guest records on pain of immediate arrest with no opportunity for precompliance review.

The Supreme Court:

Confirms Patel’s core requirement: Administrative inspection regimes must allow an opportunity for precompliance review before a neutral decisionmaker before sanctions for noncompliance attach.
Distinguishes the Texas statute if properly construed. Sections 12.151–.152 do not expressly forbid precompliance review; they simply require that managerial officials “immediately” permit inspection on request.
Uses constitutional avoidance and background law. Applying the presumption that the Legislature acts with knowledge of existing law, and given that Rule 176.6(e) already allowed any “person commanded…to permit inspection and copying” to seek a protective order “before the time specified for compliance,” the Court construes “immediately” to mean “as soon as practicable,” subject to the availability of precompliance review.
Rejects a literal, instantaneous reading of “immediately.” Such a reading would be physically impossible and constitutionally suspect. Instead, “immediately” sets an expectation of prompt compliance but does not negate the right to seek judicial review before sanctions are imposed.

Under this reading, §§ 12.151–.152 are not facially unconstitutional, because:

They do not, by their own terms, foreclose precompliance review.
Texas procedural law provides a ready mechanism (protective orders) for such review.

The Court therefore reverses the facial invalidation and vacates the associated injunction.

K. The “Save Chick‑fil‑A” Law and Alleged Religious Harassment

The trial court also found that the records request was “religious harassment” barred by Government Code § 2400.002 (the “Save Chick‑fil‑A” Law), which prohibits adverse governmental actions “based wholly or partly on the person’s membership in, affiliation with, or contribution [to] a religious organization.”

On appeal, Annunciation House did not defend this ruling, and the Supreme Court finds nothing in the record indicating that the AG’s actions were motivated by Annunciation House’s Catholic affiliation or Christian faith. Instead, the AG’s actions were tethered to suspicions of criminal harboring under state law.

The Court reiterates the presumption of legality and good faith that attaches to coordinate branches and notes that, under Von Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, that presumption applies even when Chapter 2400 is invoked. Without concrete evidence of religious animus, § 2400.002 provides no basis for the injunction.

L. Mootness and Voluntary Cessation

The AG argued that the records‑request controversy was moot because:

He had allegedly ceased pressing the initial request; and
The trial court had described that particular request as “moot” once discovery in the litigation superseded the administrative process.

The Court rejects both theories:

Voluntary cessation doctrine. Under cases like Matthews v. Kountze ISD and United States v. W.T. Grant Co., a defendant cannot moot a case by voluntarily ceasing challenged conduct unless it is “absolutely clear” that it cannot reasonably be expected to recur. Here, the AG is simultaneously asserting a right to use the same statutory mechanism in the future and appealing an injunction that bars him from doing so. That is the opposite of mootness.
“Procedural mootness” argument rejected. The existence of parallel discovery orders does not extinguish the live controversy over whether the AG may again use §§ 12.151–.152 to demand immediate production on pain of forfeiture.

Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction to reach (and reverse) the trial court’s constitutional ruling and injunction.

M. Critique of the Trial Court’s Injunction and Rhetoric

The trial court’s injunction did two remarkable things:

It required the AG, for two years, to file any records requests to Annunciation House in that specific court and obtain preclearance (“precompliance review”) before serving them.
It used strong, accusatory language suggesting that the AG was acting as a political actor abusing the law to “harass” a “human rights organization.”

The Supreme Court notes two concerns:

Overbreadth and separation of powers. Injunctions “must be narrowly drawn and precise.” Requiring a constitutional officer to seek permission from a single trial court before exercising a statutory authority statewide raises serious concerns. While the Court does not mechanically analyze this under every injunction standard, it flags the breadth as “doubtful” and clearly influenced by the invalid constitutional premises it has now rejected.
Presumption of regularity. Citing Webster and Borgelt, the Court reminds the trial court that it owes the Attorney General—as a member of a coordinate branch—a presumption of “regularity, good faith, and legality.” Courts should not assume unlawful motives in the absence of evidence, nor should they frame their orders in a way that suggests bias.

These admonitions will shape the proceedings on remand and signal to lower courts the need for restraint, precision, and institutional respect when reviewing executive enforcement actions—especially on a sparse record at an early stage.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Is Quo Warranto?

In modern Texas practice, quo warranto is:

A civil proceeding brought by the State (typically through the AG) to challenge a corporation’s right to exist, or a person’s right to hold an office, or a city’s right to exercise certain governmental powers (like annexations).
Historically “in the nature of” a criminal information, but now functionally a civil suit with specialized statutory triggers and procedures.
The exclusive mechanism in Texas for certain government‑power challenges: for example, attacking the validity of municipal annexations or, here, seeking corporate charter forfeiture for misuse or abuse.

In this case, the AG is not prosecuting Annunciation House criminally; he is asking a civil court to revoke its charter on the ground that, by allegedly acting as an illegal “harboring” organization, the nonprofit has misused the corporate privileges granted by the State.

B. The Line Between “Harboring” and Humanitarian Aid

Texas’s alien‑harboring statute does not criminalize:

Feeding hungry people.
Providing temporary shelter.
Offering medical care or clothing.

Those acts, standing alone, are not “harboring” under the statute as construed by Cruz v. Abbott and endorsed by the Supreme Court of Texas. “Harboring” requires:

An element of concealment or covert protection from authorities;
Purposefully shielding noncitizens from detection, not just refusing unreasonable or unlawful intrusions.

The difficulty in practice is distinguishing:

Legitimate assertion of legal rights (e.g., declining warrantless entry, requiring a warrant, protecting guest privacy), from
Intentional facilitation of evasion of immigration enforcement (e.g., hiding people, moving them to evade detection, systematically blocking lawful enforcement efforts for the purpose of avoiding removal).

The Court holds only that the AG’s allegations, taken as true, land on the latter side of that line sufficiently to justify filing a case. The factual and legal nuances of that distinction will be explored on remand.

C. RFRA’s Mechanism in Plain Terms

Texas RFRA operates in three steps:

Threshold: The claimant (or defendant) must show that government action substantially burdens their sincere religious exercise.
Government justification: If a substantial burden is shown, the government must prove that applying that burden serves a compelling interest (e.g., preventing crime, protecting life) and uses the least restrictive means available.
Remedy: Courts can grant declaratory and injunctive relief (and sometimes damages) to prevent or undo the substantial burden.

RFRA is fact‑intensive: it asks what is actually happening to this religious claimant, from this law or action, in this context, and whether there is a narrower alternative. Because so much depends on concrete facts and available alternatives, RFRA disputes are rarely suitable for resolution at a purely pleading‑based, pre‑filing stage.

D. Federal Preemption

Federal preemption comes in several forms:

Express preemption: Congress explicitly says state laws in a particular area are displaced.
Field preemption: Federal regulation is so pervasive in a field that we infer Congress meant to exclude states.
Conflict preemption: Either it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or the state law undermines the purposes and objectives of the federal law.

States can often adopt laws that parallel federal standards—especially in traditional areas of state authority, like criminal law and corporate chartering—so long as they do not contradict federal text and are not in a field Congress has clearly reserved to itself. Here, Texas’s harboring statute:

Targets the same conduct as federal law;
Determines “unlawful presence” by reference to federal law; and
Resides in the traditional heartland of state police powers.

That is why the Court finds no preemption at this stage.

E. Vagueness Doctrine Simplified

A statute is unconstitutionally vague if:

People of ordinary intelligence cannot reasonably understand what conduct is prohibited (no fair notice); or
The law is so open‑ended that it allows officials to enforce it arbitrarily (no reasonable standards to constrain enforcement).

Vagueness is not about whether a law is harsh or controversial; it is about whether it is too unclear. Here, the Court concludes that:

“Harboring” has a sufficiently well‑understood meaning—bolstered by case law—to give fair notice.
Overlaying that criminal standard onto a quo warranto remedy does not add vagueness; it simply creates an additional consequence for proven violations.

F. Precompliance Review

“Precompliance review” means:

Before facing penalties for refusing a government records demand, the recipient must have the opportunity to go to a neutral judge and argue that the demand is unlawful, overbroad, or unconstitutional.
The government cannot make compliance mandatory “on the spot” under threat of immediate arrest or crippling sanctions, without any chance to object.

The Court’s construction of §§ 12.151–.152 ensures that:

Businesses (including nonprofits) retain that opportunity via protective orders or similar procedural tools.
At the same time, the AG can still insist on prompt compliance once legitimate objections are resolved.

VI. Broader Implications

A. For the Texas Attorney General’s Enforcement Powers

This opinion significantly strengthens, or at least clarifies, the Attorney General’s hand in several respects:

Constitutional anchoring of quo warranto. By reaffirming Article IV, § 22 and reading it broadly, the Court cements the AG’s authority to investigate and pursue corporate charter forfeiture for misuse or abuse, including criminal misconduct, absent express legislative withdrawal.
Strong presumption in favor of filing. The leave‑to‑file standard is intentionally deferential. Trial courts may screen out legally defective or barred petitions, but cannot convert the threshold into a mini‑trial on the merits or on disputed statutory defenses.
Deference to AG’s discretion. Echoing Webster, the Court frames the AG’s prosecution decisions (including whether to use civil/quasi‑civil remedies) as exercises of broad, constitutionally grounded discretion. Courts must respect that discretion while adjudicating legal challenges to specific actions.
Resistance to implied limitations. The Court’s insistence on the “expressly directed” standard will make it harder for future litigants to argue that newer regulatory statutes implicitly displace or narrow the AG’s quo warranto powers.

Practically, future AGs—regardless of political party—may invoke this opinion to:

Target corporations (including nonprofits) whose operations allegedly involve systematic violations of criminal law or abuses of public trust.
Justify the use of charter forfeiture or business dissolution as a compliance stick in areas ranging from consumer protection to environmental or financial regulation, provided they can allege statutory violations that amount to “exercising power not granted by law.”

B. For Religious and Humanitarian Organizations Assisting Migrants

For religious charities and NGOs engaged in migrant aid, this decision is both cautionary and clarifying.

Cautionary:

Organizations cannot assume that faith‑based or humanitarian motives shield them from scrutiny if their operations intersect with immigration enforcement.
Systematic practices perceived as shielding noncitizens from lawful detection—especially if coupled with noncooperation with law enforcement—may support allegations of criminal harboring.
Corporate charters and nonprofit status are not immune from aggressive use of quo warranto authority.

Clarifying and potentially protective:

The Court’s endorsement of the Cruz standard draws a clear line between mere humanitarian shelter and active concealment. Legitimate humanitarian activity, even if it involves serving undocumented persons, is not itself a crime.
RFRA remains available as a robust defense on the merits where governmental enforcement substantially burdens religious exercise; the Court pointedly leaves RFRA arguments open for development on remand.

Prudently, religious and humanitarian organizations may wish to:

Review their protocols for interacting with law enforcement, ensuring they assert legal rights appropriately without veering into deliberate evasion of lawful detection.
Document religious motivations and practices, in anticipation of potential RFRA defenses if government actions meaningfully burden those practices.
Develop compliance and record‑keeping procedures responsive to possible AG inspections, including readiness to seek protective orders where requests are overbroad or invasive.

C. For State Immigration‑Related Enforcement

Although the Court does not decide federal–state immigration conflicts in the abstract, its preemption analysis sends a clear message:

Texas may legislate in areas that parallel federal immigration law (such as harboring), provided the state statute’s elements track federal law and avoid direct contradiction.
State criminal enforcement in this realm is presumptively valid when Congress has not clearly reserved the field and, indeed, has invited state enforcement of the relevant federal provision (as in § 1324(c)).

This aligns Texas with other states that have adopted complementary enforcement regimes and suggests that similar, carefully drafted statutes are more likely to survive preemption challenges, especially when grounded in traditional state police powers and corporate regulation.

D. For Corporate Dissolution and Oversight of Nonprofits

By reaffirming quo warranto as a central mechanism for corporate oversight and clarifying that criminal acts can serve as predicates, the Court:

Reinvigorates a remedy that had fallen into relative disuse in favor of shareholder and regulatory enforcement.
Signals that nonprofit and for‑profit corporations alike remain subject to the State’s ultimate sanction of charter forfeiture when they misuse or abuse granted privileges.
Clarifies that modern Business Organizations Code dissolution mechanisms (like § 11.301) supplement, but do not displace, this constitutional power.

This may embolden future efforts—by Attorneys General of any political stripe—to pursue charter forfeiture as a remedy for systematic, organization‑wide misconduct.

VII. Conclusion

Paxton v. Annunciation House is formally a procedural decision: it restores the Attorney General’s ability to file a quo warranto counterclaim and removes an overbroad injunction against statutory records requests. But procedurally modest decisions can have substantial substantive effects, and this one does.

Key takeaways:

Article IV, § 22 firmly anchors the AG’s quo warranto authority in the Constitution, subject only to express legislative direction.
Criminal conduct by corporations—including alleged violations of Texas’s alien‑harboring statute—can serve as a predicate for seeking corporate charter forfeiture.
At the “leave to file” stage, courts must accept the AG’s allegations as true and ask only whether they state a legally cognizable basis within quo warranto’s scope; evidentiary disputes, RFRA defenses, and detailed statutory construction questions belong later.
Texas’s alien‑harboring provisions, as construed in line with Cruz, are neither preempted nor unconstitutionally vague on their face or as alleged here.
RFRA remains a potent protection for religious exercise but cannot be deployed at the threshold to bar the State from even initiating litigation on disputed facts.
The AG’s statutory authority to inspect corporate records survives a facial Fourth Amendment challenge when construed to allow precompliance judicial review.

While the Court scrupulously avoids expressing any view on whether Annunciation House has in fact violated the law or whether its charter should ultimately be revoked, it profoundly shapes the legal battlefield on which those questions will be fought. It strengthens the Attorney General’s institutional role, clarifies limits on trial‑court intervention in executive enforcement decisions, and sketches the contours of permissible state action in the sensitive intersection of immigration, religious liberty, and nonprofit operations.

On remand, the parties will litigate—likely through discovery, motions, and possibly trial—whether the factual reality matches the allegations, how RFRA applies to those specifics, and whether the extraordinary remedy of corporate forfeiture is warranted. The Supreme Court of Texas has ensured that those questions will be answered through the “due course of the law of the land,” not foreclosed at the courthouse door.