Constitutional Supremacy and the Court’s Mandatory Jurisdiction: A Commentary on Louisiana v. Callais (606 U.S. ___ (2025))

1. Introduction

Louisiana v. Callais is the latest chapter in the increasingly fraught interaction between Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case arises from Louisiana’s 2022–2024 redistricting cycle, during which the State, prodded by earlier Voting Rights Act litigation (Robinson v. Ardoin), enacted Senate Bill 8 (SB 8) creating a second majority-Black congressional district. That new map was soon attacked from the opposite flank: plaintiffs contended that the second majority-Black district was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.

A three-judge district court agreed and enjoined the use of SB 8. Because constitutional challenges to congressional redistricting trigger a statutory right of direct appeal (28 U.S.C. §1253), Louisiana and intervenor–defendants came straight to the Supreme Court. After full briefing and oral argument the Court, instead of issuing a merits opinion, ordered the cases restored to the calendar for re-argument. Justice Thomas filed a forceful dissent, criticizing the majority for postponing resolution and highlighting what he sees as an “intractable conflict” between current §2 doctrine and the Constitution.

Although the Court’s order is procedurally modest, Justice Thomas’s dissent sketches a potentially transformative approach to race and redistricting. The commentary below dissects the opinion, maps the doctrinal fault lines it exposes, and surveys the likely consequences for voting-rights litigation going forward.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Majority Action: The Court, without written explanation, removed the consolidated appeals from decision and scheduled them for re-argument in a future Term.
• Dissent (Thomas, J.): Justice Thomas argues the Court is shirking its mandatory jurisdiction and should decide the merits immediately. He would hold that where the Court’s reading of §2 requires race-based districting that conflicts with the Equal Protection Clause, “the Constitution controls.”

In practice, the Court’s action leaves the district court’s preliminary injunction in effect (pending further orders), while sending a signal that additional briefing—perhaps on the proper interpretation of §2 after Allen v. Milligan—is forthcoming. Justice Thomas, by contrast, would have resolved both the §2 and equal-protection questions now, repudiating what he views as an unconstitutional proportional-representation mandate.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)
   Invoked for the elementary proposition that the Constitution is supreme over conflicting statutes. Thomas uses it to argue that the Court must disregard any statutory interpretation of §2 that violates equal protection.
2. Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 (2023)
   The fulcrum of the dissent. Thomas reprises his disagreement with the Milligan majority, asserting that it effectively requires states to engineer racially proportional representation whenever polarized voting exists—an outcome allegedly irreconcilable with strict-scrutiny jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause.
3. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)
   Establishes that racial gerrymanders, even if motivated by benign intent, trigger strict scrutiny. Thomas cites Shaw to show the danger of race-based districting ostensibly mandated by §2.
4. Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579 (2018)
   Illustrates the Court’s acknowledgment of tension between §2 compliance and equal-protection constraints.
5. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994); Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254 (2015)
   Provide historical context for Justice Thomas’s long-standing skepticism of expansive §2 interpretations.
6. Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, 600 U.S. 181 (2023) & Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
   Analogies from affirmative-action doctrine. Thomas highlights these cases to emphasize that any use of race must meet the highest justificatory bar, something he believes current §2 jurisprudence fails.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning (as reflected in the dissent)

Because only Justice Thomas issued an opinion, the legal reasoning analyzed here is his alone:

• Mandatory Jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. §1253, the Supreme Court must hear direct appeals from three-judge district court decisions granting or denying an injunction in redistricting cases. Thomas contends that once a case is argued the Court has an obligation to decide it, not delay.
• Constitutional Primacy. Relying on Marbury, Thomas asserts that any statutory interpretation (here, of §2) that conflicts with the Constitution must yield.
• Reading of §2 after Milligan. According to Thomas, Milligan transformed §2 into a proportional-representation mandate achievable whenever racially polarized voting exists—a condition “relatively easy to establish.” That reading, he argues, allows (or forces) states to create districts predominantly on racial lines even when no specific recent discrimination is identified.
• Strict-Scrutiny Trigger. Drawing from Shaw and affirmative-action cases, Thomas underscores that race-based districting is presumptively unconstitutional unless narrowly tailored to remedy concrete, recent discrimination.
• Irreconcilable Conflict. Because §2 as currently applied demands the creation of majority-minority districts without that stringent predicate, Thomas sees a “direct conflict” with the Equal Protection Clause. Consequently, compliance with §2 cannot justify racial gerrymandering.

3.3 Likely Impact on Future Litigation and Doctrine

While the majority’s procedural posture postpones immediate doctrinal change, the dissent signals at least four potential ramifications:

1. Heightened Scrutiny of §2 Remedies. Litigants will cite Thomas’s opinion to argue that district courts cannot impose racially drawn maps unless the record contains specific evidence of past intentional discrimination.
2. Pressure to Revisit Milligan. The dissent practically invites future briefs challenging the proportional-representation reading of §2. States in the Fifth Circuit, Eleventh Circuit, and beyond may test the limits by declining to create additional majority-minority districts absent compelling evidence.
3. Redistricting Uncertainty. Legislatures will struggle to balance VRA compliance with equal-protection risks. Some may choose “race-blind” approaches, forcing plaintiffs to challenge under §2 and triggering the very conflict Thomas highlights.
4. Expanded Role of Three-Judge Courts. Because Congress preserved direct appeals in redistricting cases, Justice Thomas’s focus on mandatory jurisdiction may encourage litigants to fast-track disputes to the Supreme Court, pressuring the Court to clarify the law sooner rather than later.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. A federal statute banning voting practices that result in discrimination “on account of race.” Courts typically apply it using the Gingles framework, which asks (1) can the minority group form a majority in a district, (2) is voting racially polarized, and (3) does the minority group usually lose because of bloc voting by the majority.
• Majority-Minority District. An electoral district where a racial minority comprises more than 50 % of the voting-age population. Often created to enhance the minority community’s ability to elect preferred candidates.
• Racial Gerrymander. Drawing district lines predominantly on the basis of race. Even if intended to help minority voters, such gerrymanders are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
• Strict Scrutiny. The highest level of judicial review. The government must show its racial classification (a) serves a compelling interest and (b) is narrowly tailored (i.e., there is no less-restrictive alternative).
• Three-Judge District Court & Direct Appeal. Certain cases—such as statewide redistricting challenges—are heard by a special panel of three federal judges. Their orders granting or denying injunctions can be appealed directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the Courts of Appeals.

5. Conclusion

The Court’s decision to re-argue Louisiana v. Callais keeps the doctrinal status quo—for now. Yet Justice Thomas’s dissent plants a prominent marker: he and perhaps other Justices are prepared to hold that the contemporary interpretation of §2 is unconstitutional where it mandates race-based districting untethered to specific findings of discrimination. His emphasis on the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction also admonishes the majority against delay in cases Congress has deemed of exceptional importance.

Whether the full Court ultimately narrows §2, affirms Milligan, or crafts a new reconciliation between the VRA and the Equal Protection Clause, Callais underscores the ongoing volatility of voting-rights doctrine. Legislatures, litigants, and lower courts should therefore proceed with caution, recognizing that the constitutional foundation of race-conscious redistricting remains in flux. In short, the case serves as a vivid reminder that, in the Supreme Court’s own words from more than two centuries ago, “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”—and to say it promptly when Congress so directs.