Constitutional Limits on Venue Restrictions for State Constitutional Challenges

Introduction

In Piasa Armory, LLC v. Raoul (2025 IL 130539), the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a new venue‐setting statute, 735 ILCS 5/2-101.5, which confines actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief from a constitutional challenge to an Illinois statute, rule, or executive order, exclusively to Sangamon and Cook Counties. Plaintiff Piasa Armory, a Madison County firearms dealer, sued the State’s Attorney General, Kwame Raoul, challenging both the substantive merits of the state-level “Firearms Industry Responsibility Act” (815 ILCS 505/2BBBB) and the venue provision itself under due process. The trial court invalidated section 2-101.5 as unconstitutional “as applied” to plaintiff (and broadly to anyone outside the two named counties). On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed that ruling, upholding the venue statute against plaintiff’s as-applied due process challenge.

Summary of the Judgment

The court held, by a 5–2 majority, that section 2-101.5 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure does not violate due process when applied to Piasa Armory. Following the “Mathews v. Eldridge” balancing test, the majority found:

• Private interest: The inconvenience of traveling from Madison to Sangamon County (an extra hour’s drive) and remote-appearance options do not deprive plaintiff of meaningful access to the courts.
• Risk of erroneous deprivation: Because the underlying challenge is facial and unlikely to require a live trial, the risk is minimal and remote participation is available.
• Government interest: The legislature’s choice to consolidate similar constitutional challenges in two venues promotes efficiency and uniformity without imposing an unreasonable burden on the State’s ability to defend its laws.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment and remanded the cause. Justices Theis, Neville, Cunningham, and O’Brien concurred. Justice Holder White specially concurred to underscore procedural considerations regarding the three-readings rule. Justice Overstreet dissented, advocating for broader due-process protections and reliance on the constitutional three-readings requirement.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court’s majority emphasized two lines of authority:

1. Venue statutes and legislative power: From Mapes v. Hulcher (1936) through Chappelle v. Sorenson (1957), the legislature’s power to fix venue has been historically recognized as procedural—subject to constitutional limits only if arbitrary or unreasonable.
2. The Williams decision (1990): In Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm’n, this Court invalidated a Cook-County-only venue statute for defaulted loan suits. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, Williams found that impoverished borrowers faced meaningful-access deprivations when forced into an inconvenient, hostile forum without alternatives.

Legal Reasoning

Applying de novo review, the majority undertook an as-applied challenge—not a facial attack—focusing on Piasa Armory’s specific circumstances:

• Presumption of constitutionality: Statutes stand unless the challenger clearly establishes a violation.
• Venue vs. jurisdiction: Venue is procedural. A statute fixing venue does not implicate courts’ power, only where a case is tried.
• Mathews balancing:
  • Private interest: A one-hour extra drive, the possibility of remote hearings under Supreme Court Rule 45 and Rule 241, and the likely absence of live witnesses in a facial challenge do not render access “not meaningful.”
  • Risk of erroneous deprivation: Minimal, given the summary nature of a facial constitutional suit and remote testimony options.
  • Government interest: Valid interest in consolidated, consistent resolutions of statewide constitutional disputes. The Attorney General’s multiple offices across Illinois already litigate in every county, mitigating any claimed hardship.

The majority distinguished Williams on its facts: indigent, unrepresented borrowers facing default judgments in hostile forum—none of which apply to a well-represented business asserting a facial attack on a state statute.

Impact

This decision sets a controlling precedent on venue-statute challenges in Illinois civil procedure:

• Venue autonomy: The legislature may still prescribe exclusive venues for certain categories of cases—so long as those rules do not extinguish meaningful access as guaranteed by due process.
• As-applied vs. facial scrutiny: Plaintiffs challenging venue limitations must demonstrate a concrete, intolerable burden under their own circumstances; broad, hypothetical inconvenience is insufficient.
• Remote proceedings: The decision fortifies the court’s embrace of remote-appearance rules as a factor mitigating forum burdens, a dynamic absent in earlier venue decisions.
• Legislative strategy: State law drafters should weigh the due-process consequences if venue restrictions force disadvantaged or indigent litigants into impractical fora without meaningful alternatives.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Venue vs. Jurisdiction: Venue answers “where” a case is heard. Jurisdiction answers “whether” the court can decide the dispute at all.
• As-Applied vs. Facial Challenge:
  • Facial: The statute is invalid in all possible applications.
  • As-Applied: The statute is invalid only against the specific party’s actual circumstances.
• Mathews v. Eldridge Test: A three-factor balancing test for due process:
  1. Private interest affected;
  2. Risk of an erroneous deprivation under current procedures;
  3. Government’s countervailing interest, including administrative burdens of additional safeguards.
• Enrolled-Bill Doctrine vs. Three-Readings Rule:
  • Three-Readings Rule (Ill. Const. art. IV, § 8(d)) requires that a bill be read on three separate days in each chamber and that members have copies before the final vote.
  • Enrolled-Bill Doctrine presumes that once the Speaker and Senate President sign a bill, it satisfied all procedural requirements. Justice Holder White’s concurrence notes unresolved tensions between that doctrine and strict enforcement of the three-readings mandate.

Conclusion

Piasa Armory, LLC v. Raoul clarifies the constitutional boundaries of statutorily prescribed venues in Illinois. While the legislature may concentrate litigations that challenge state statutes on constitutional grounds in Sangamon and Cook Counties, venue statutes must not strip litigants of a “meaningful opportunity” to access the courts. This ruling affirms that mere inconvenience—particularly in light of remote-appearance rules—does not equate to a due-process violation when a plaintiff can still be heard fully and fairly. Future litigants must show concrete, intolerable burdens under their own facts to prevail in as-applied venue challenges. Legislators, in turn, should remain mindful that venue restrictions, however procedurally neutral in theory, cannot undermine fundamental due-process guarantees in practice.