Constitutional Limits on Judicial Ethics: Legislative-Testimony Ban, Judicial Speech, and Willful Legal Error in Disciplinary Counsel v. Grendell, 2025-Ohio-5239

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Disciplinary Counsel v. Grendell, 2025-Ohio-5239, is a major opinion at the intersection of judicial discipline, the First Amendment, and juvenile justice. The court:

• Holds that Jud.Cond.R. 3.2—Ohio’s broad ban on judges voluntarily testifying before executive or legislative bodies except on narrow topics—is an unconstitutional, content-based restriction on speech under the First Amendment, and declines to enforce it.
• Holds that discipline may not be imposed for core political speech by a judge at a local Tea Party meeting, where the state cannot satisfy strict scrutiny and there is no proof of knowing or reckless falsehood.
• Clarifies that judicial legal errors are ordinarily remediable by appeal, not discipline; only a willful failure to follow the law can support a violation of Jud.Cond.R. 2.2 (“uphold and apply the law”).
• Finds that a juvenile/probate judge willfully violated juvenile law and key judicial-conduct rules by orchestrating the weekend detention of two teenagers who refused visitation with their father, and by continuing to preside after losing impartiality.
• Restructures the use of aggravating/mitigating factors and cautions against “piling on” general rule violations such as Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) where specific rules already apply.

Judge Timothy J. Grendell, of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas (Probate and Juvenile Divisions), faced three operative counts (a fourth was dismissed pre-hearing):

• Count 4 – “Legislative testimony”: Voluntary testimony before an Ohio House committee supporting a COVID-19 data-reporting bill (H.B. 624) sponsored by his wife, Rep. Diane Grendell.
• Count 3 – “Tea Party event”: Public comments at a Geauga County Tea Party meeting about a long-running dispute with County Auditor Charles Walder and the June 27, 2019 courthouse incident.
• Count 1 – “Glasier matter”: His management of a highly contentious custody/reunification case involving three teenagers refusing contact with their father, culminating in the detention of two boys for refusing court-ordered visitation.

The Board of Professional Conduct recommended an 18‑month suspension with six months stayed. The Supreme Court:

• Rejected all misconduct findings on Count 3 (Tea Party) and all enforceable misconduct on Count 4 (legislative testimony) on constitutional grounds.
• Sustained several, but not all, violations in Count 1 (Glasier) based on a willful disregard of juvenile law and loss of impartiality.
• Imposed an 18‑month suspension with 12 months stayed, meaning a 6‑month actual suspension, and an immediate suspension from judicial office without pay for the duration of the disciplinary suspension.

Justice DeWine authored the majority opinion (joined by Kennedy, C.J., and Deters, Hawkins, and Shanahan, JJ.). Justice Fischer concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Judge Edelstein (sitting for Justice Brunner).

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Legislative Testimony (Count 4)

• The Board had found violations of:
  • Jud.Cond.R. 3.2 (ban on voluntary appearances before legislative/executive bodies except on limited topics), and
  • Jud.Cond.R. 1.3 (abuse of the prestige of office to advance personal/economic interests) because the bill was sponsored by his wife.
• The court:
  • Held that the evidence did not establish a violation of Jud.Cond.R. 1.3. The mere fact that his spouse sponsored the bill did not prove abuse of prestige for personal or economic interests.
  • Concluded that Grendell’s testimony exceeded the permitted subject-matter limits of Jud.Cond.R. 3.2 (most of it was about COVID data, suicides, opiates, school/business closures, etc., not about “the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice” or knowledge acquired in judicial duties).
  • But then held that Jud.Cond.R. 3.2 is an unconstitutional content-based restriction on judges’ speech that cannot survive strict scrutiny. Consequently, the court declined to discipline him under that rule.

B. Tea Party Event (Count 3)

• The Board found violations of:
  • Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 (promote public confidence; avoid impropriety/appearance),
  • Jud.Cond.R. 1.3 (abuse of prestige), and
  • Jud.Cond.R. 2.10(A) (no statements that might interfere with fair trial/hearing).
• The court:
  • Characterized his remarks as core political speech about local government operations and political processes, delivered in an explicitly political forum at a Tea Party meeting.
  • Applied strict scrutiny to the application of Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 1.3, and 2.10(A) in this context.
  • Held that Disciplinary Counsel did not carry the burden to show a compelling interest and narrow tailoring, and that there was no evidence he knowingly or recklessly made false statements.
  • Concluded that disciplining him for this speech would violate the First Amendment; his as‑applied challenge succeeded. No discipline was imposed for the Tea Party event.

C. The Glasier Custody Matter (Count 1)

• The Board charged violations of:
  • Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 (independence, integrity, impartiality; avoidance of impropriety),
  • Jud.Cond.R. 2.2 (uphold/apply law; perform duties fairly/impartially),
  • Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A) (ex parte communications),
  • Jud.Cond.R. 2.11 & 2.11(A)(7)(c) (recusal when impartiality reasonably questioned; judge as material witness), and
  • Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
• The Board largely premised its findings on alleged legal errors in interpreting and applying juvenile law and on discretionary choices.
• The court clarified that:
  • Good‑faith legal errors are not discipline-worthy; the remedy is appeal, not ethics sanctions.
  • Discipline is appropriate only for a “willful failure to follow the law”, consistent with Gov.Jud.R. I(1)’s “willful breach” standard and Comment [3] to Jud.Cond.R. 2.2.
• Applying that standard, the court:
  • Found violations of:
    • Jud.Cond.R. 2.2 – willful misuse of detention and “trumped‑up” unruly charges to coerce visitation, in disregard of Juv.R. 6 and 7 and Juv.R. 7(J)’s contact rights.
    • Jud.Cond.R. 2.11 – failure to recuse once impartiality was reasonably in question, especially after orchestrating detention and favoring one party in subsequent proceedings.
    • Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 – conduct (including detention and threats about “clawing back” GoFundMe funds) that undermined public confidence in judicial impartiality and integrity.
  • Declined to find:
    • A violation of Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A), either in the June 1 consultation with the boys’ counsel (not ex parte in context) or in the later call to mother’s counsel about the GoFundMe image.
    • A separate violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), reasoning that “stacking” general rule violations atop specific ones, especially when similar conduct underlies both, does not serve the ends of the disciplinary process.

D. Sanction

• The Board had found six aggravating factors and two mitigating factors and recommended an 18‑month suspension with 6 months stayed.
• The court:
  • Eliminated most aggravators (selfish/dishonest motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, submission of false evidence, refusal to acknowledge wrongfulness), leaving only harm to vulnerable victims (the teenagers) as an aggravating factor.
  • Gave :
    • No prior discipline in a long legal and judicial career.
    • Substantial character and reputation evidence, leadership roles, and community education programs.
  • Imposed an 18‑month suspension with 12 months stayed (thus 6 months of actual suspension), along with immediate unpaid suspension from judicial office under Gov.Jud.R. III(7)(A).

E. Separate Opinion (Fischer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)

• On Count 4 (legislative testimony), Justice Fischer:
  • Agreed there was no Jud.Cond.R. 1.3 violation.
  • But disagreed that Jud.Cond.R. 3.2 was violated at all. Because “law” in the Code expressly includes statutes, testimony in support of a bill that would become a statute is “in connection with matters concerning the law” under Jud.Cond.R. 3.2(A). On that textual reading, he would find no rule violation and thus no need to reach the constitutional question under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.
  • On Count 1 (Glasier), he:
    • Agreed with majority’s findings under Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.11.
    • Would also find a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), reasoning that wrongfully incarcerating two juveniles is quintessentially “prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
    • Criticized the majority’s reluctance to enforce 8.4(d) concurrently with specific rule violations.
  • He nonetheless joined the ultimate sanction.

  III. Detailed Analysis

  A. Count 4 – Legislative Testimony and the Unconstitutionality of Jud.Cond.R. 3.2

  1. Factual setting

  In spring 2020, COVID‑19 policy dominated Ohio’s legislative agenda. H.B. 624 sought to require the Ohio Department of Health and local health authorities to collect and release more granular COVID testing, hospitalization, and death data. Its primary sponsor was State Representative Diane Grendell, the judge’s spouse.

  Judge Grendell voluntarily appeared (not under subpoena) before the Ohio House State and Local Government Committee. He stated he was testifying “primarily” as a judge, “but also as a citizen.” His testimony:

  • Critiqued the Department of Health’s daily “scary half of the facts” reporting and its alleged role in creating an “atmosphere of fear.”
  • Compared COVID‑19 to prior flu outbreaks.
  • Described secondary harms: delayed medical care, increased opiate-related deaths, suicides, mental-health civil commitments, unruly juvenile cases, and domestic violence in Geauga County.
  • Noted that his court never closed during the pandemic and that he and other judges were drafting letters to encourage juror participation by reassuring them regarding safety.
  • Concluded that H.B. 624 would better inform Ohioans by providing full data on current hospitalizations, daily deaths, and active cases.

  2. Board’s legal theory

  The Board found violations of:

  • Jud.Cond.R. 1.3, based solely on the fact that his wife sponsored the bill, concluding his testimony could have no plausible purpose other than to promote their personal interests.
  • Jud.Cond.R. 3.2, reasoning that:
    • The Judicial Conference had not flagged H.B. 624 as affecting the judiciary.
    • He offered scant data to support claims about court impacts.
    • Only about one minute of a nearly 19‑minute presentation related to court operations; the balance was public-health policy.

  3. Rejection of Jud.Cond.R. 1.3 violation

  The court reversed the 1.3 finding, emphasizing:

  • Multiple plausible non‑personal motives existed: a judge-citizen offering views on public data policy and sharing court-related experience during COVID‑19.
  • The Board never articulated any concrete personal or economic interest advanced by the testimony, beyond bare reliance on the spouse’s sponsorship.
  • Jud.Cond.R. 1.3 does not bar a judge from testifying on a bill simply because a spouse sponsors it.

  Thus, disciplinary counsel failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence any abuse of the office’s prestige to advance personal/economic interests.

  4. Violation of the text of Jud.Cond.R. 3.2

  On the text, the majority held that:

  • Parts of the testimony linked to the “law, the legal system, or the administration of justice” (e.g., juror reassurance, court caseload data) or to knowledge acquired in judicial duties.
  • But “the bulk” concerned general COVID policy, statistics, opiates, suicides, school/business closures, comparisons with flu, and testing regimes.
  • Those topics were not:
    • “in connection with matters concerning the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice,” nor
    • “matters about which the judge acquired knowledge or expertise in the course of the judge’s judicial duties.”

  Accordingly, as a matter of rule interpretation, the court concluded Grendell’s testimony exceeded the content limits in Jud.Cond.R. 3.2.

  5. First Amendment analysis: content-based restriction and strict scrutiny

  The court then pivoted to the constitutional question raised by Grendell: whether Jud.Cond.R. 3.2 is facially overbroad under the First Amendment. Key steps:

  • Judges and lawyers retain First Amendment rights. Codes of conduct must be applied “consistent with constitutional requirements” (Jud.Cond.R., Scope [5]).
  • Ordinary First Amendment standards apply. There is no special, relaxed test for judicial speech:
    • Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) – struck down Minnesota’s “announce clause,” applying strict scrutiny.
    • Williams‑Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015) – confirmed that restrictions on judicial-candidate speech must be narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.
    • Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Toole, 2014‑Ohio‑4046 – this court struck down Ohio’s ban on “true but misleading” judicial campaign statements.
  • Jud.Cond.R. 3.2 is content-based:
    • It prohibits voluntary appearances before legislative or executive bodies based on the topic of the testimony, allowing only speech on specified subject matters.
    • Under Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015), that is a quintessential content-based regulation.
    • Such regulations are “presumptively unconstitutional” and must survive strict scrutiny.

  6. Compelling interests asserted and why they failed

  Disciplinary Counsel advanced three alleged compelling interests:

  1. Judicial impartiality (independence, fairness, lack of bias).
  2. Public confidence in judicial independence and impartiality.
  3. Separation of powers.

  a. Judicial impartiality and narrow tailoring

  Relying on White, the court distinguished three senses of “impartiality”:

  • Impartiality as absence of bias for or against a party – a compelling interest.
  • Impartiality as lack of predisposition on legal issues – not a compelling interest, as judges inevitably have legal views.
  • “Open‑mindedness” – arguably important, but White doubted broad speech bans are plausibly aimed at it.

  The court accepted that protecting against party bias is a compelling interest, but held Jud.Cond.R. 3.2 is not narrowly tailored:

  • Like the announce clause in White, Jud.Cond.R. 3.2 targets positions on issues, not parties.
  • It sweeps extremely broadly:
    • Covers all testimony or “consultation” with executive/legislative officials beyond narrowly defined topics.
    • Applies even when legislation is vanishingly unlikely ever to come before the judge.
    • Bars a judge from discussing school funding, taxation, infrastructure, and countless civic issues with elected officials, even privately, if deemed “consultation.”
  • At the same time, it is underinclusive:
    • Allows testimony on bills “concerning the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice,” even though those laws are most likely to be litigated in the judge’s court.
    • Bars testimony on a distant topic (e.g., tax credits) that may never enter that court at all.
  • Narrower tools already exist:
    • Jud.Cond.R. 2.10(B) – bars pledges, promises, or commitments inconsistent with impartial adjudication on issues likely to come before the court.
    • Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A) – requires recusal when impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including if prior testimony has created questions about neutrality; litigants can seek disqualification via statutory procedures.

  Because less restrictive means (no-pledge rule and recusal) adequately protect impartiality in the rare case where legislative testimony is genuinely problematic, Jud.Cond.R. 3.2 fails the “least restrictive means” and narrow‑tailoring requirements.

  b. Public confidence in impartiality

  Disciplinary Counsel also invoked a compelling interest in public confidence, citing Williams‑Yulee, which upheld a ban on personal solicitation of campaign contributions by judicial candidates.

  The court distinguished Williams‑Yulee:

  • That case targeted the direct exchange of money between potential litigants/lawyers and judicial candidates, a context rife with apparent quid pro quo.
  • Here, the interest was defined in overly broad and amorphous terms – concern that judges who support or oppose legislation may appear partial in future cases.

  Drawing again from White, the majority reiterated that:

  • Since judges cannot be free of legal preconceptions, “pretending otherwise” by preserving an appearance of such neutrality cannot be a compelling interest.
  • All over‑ and under‑inclusiveness problems that undercut the impartiality justification also undercut the appearance justification.

  Thus, Jud.Cond.R. 3.2 could not be justified as necessary to protect public confidence in impartiality.

  c. Separation of powers

  The court explicitly refused to accept “separation of powers” as a compelling interest for restricting judges’ speech:

  • Separation of powers is a structural principle limiting one branch from exercising another’s powers, not a license to suppress inter-branch communication.
  • Speech (such as testimony) does not itself exercise legislative or executive power; no branch “asserts control” merely by expressing policy views.
  • Effective constitutional governance depends on robust communication among branches (executive lobbying the legislature, legislative oversight, judicial interaction with prosecutors and agencies, etc.).

  The court found no precedent making separation of powers a compelling interest for speech restrictions, and declined to create one.

  7. Vagueness and chilling effect

  The court also flagged vagueness in the “consult with” language—judges frequently converse with legislators and executive officials:

  • When does casual discussion cross the line into prohibited “consultation”?
  • Uncertainty encourages judges to self‑censor and avoid altogether benign conversations with elected officials (including, in Grendell’s case, his own spouse).

  That chilling effect is disfavored under the First Amendment and reinforces the conclusion that Jud.Cond.R. 3.2 is unconstitutional.

  8. Holding and its scope

  The court held that Jud.Cond.R. 3.2 cannot survive strict scrutiny and therefore declined to enforce it in this case. Although formally framed as case‑specific, the reasoning is effectively facial:

  • It treats the rule as inherently overbroad, overinclusive, underinclusive, vague, and not narrowly tailored to any valid compelling interest.
  • No alternative construction is offered under which the rule might be sparingly applied.

  At the same time, the majority cautioned that:

  There are good reasons why judges should tread with caution before embroiling themselves in the day-to-day workings of the state legislature. But whether we may discipline someone for engaging in constitutionally protected conduct is a far different question than whether such conduct is a good idea.

  9. Justice Fischer’s textual and avoidance critique

  Justice Fischer’s partial dissent on Count 4 is important for rule‑drafters:

  • He notes that the Code’s definition of “law” includes “statutes”, and Jud.Cond.R. 3.2(A) permits testimony “in connection with matters concerning the law.”
  • A bill that, if passed, will become a statute is ipso facto a matter concerning the law.
  • Therefore, Grendell’s testimony in support of H.B. 624 fell within the express exception and did not violate the rule’s plain text.
  • On that view, there is no rule violation to begin with; hence, no need to rule on constitutionality under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, which both state and federal law strongly favor.

  His approach would have preserved Jud.Cond.R. 3.2 while resolving this case on narrow statutory grounds. The majority instead opted to confront the constitutional defect head‑on.

  B. Count 3 – Tea Party Event: Robust Protection for Judicial Political Speech

  1. Factual background

  By June 2019, relations between Judge Grendell’s court and Auditor Walder were badly strained over new auditing and payment procedures. On June 27, 2019, a confrontation in the auditor’s office led to:

  • Auditor staff calling police, accusing court staff of “stealing” documents.
  • Police involvement, discussion of potential trespass charges against court employees, and the judge’s expressed intent to issue an order authorizing staff access to the auditor’s public office and to enforce it via contempt.
  • Subsequent meetings among law enforcement, the prosecutor, and the auditor about possible charges and office‑access policies.

  Local media (the Geauga County Maple Leaf) reported the incident and published an edited video suggesting that Judge Grendell had angrily threatened a lieutenant with arrest. The Geauga County Tea Party invited both Walder and Grendell to address its members; only Grendell accepted.

  At the Tea Party meeting, the judge:

  • Criticized Walder’s refusal to attend and suggested political protection from the county prosecutor.
  • Recounted in detail the procedural disputes between court and auditor, and the events of June 27.
  • Defended his actions as ensuring court access to the auditor’s public office, not threatening law enforcement for its own sake.
  • Showed the edited video, explaining how it had been “doctored” with splices and captions (which he attributed to the auditor’s office).
  • When asked what citizens could do about alleged “misfeasance,” he declined to prescribe political remedies, saying he was “just there to tell the facts.”

  2. Why this was “core political speech”

  The court grounded its First Amendment analysis in the classic understanding of political speech:

  • Speech about “the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and . . . matters relating to political processes” (Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52–53 (1982), quoting Mills v. Alabama).
  • Speech at a political meeting, before “civic-minded voters,” about elected county officials, disputes over the implementation of statutory duties, and law-enforcement actions.

  The court characterized the event as: “a group of civic-minded voters” inviting local officials to account for their conduct—a textbook example of the “free discussion of governmental affairs” that is at the “core” of the First Amendment.

  3. Strict scrutiny and as-applied challenge

  Grendell did not seek to invalidate Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 1.3, or 2.10(A) on their face. Instead he argued it would be unconstitutional to apply them to his particular speech.

  The court:

  • Recognized that imposing discipline on core political speech triggers strict scrutiny:
    • The state must show a compelling interest and narrow tailoring for the sanction in these circumstances.
  • Emphasized that under New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny, the First Amendment protects even erroneous or misleading political speech absent proof of knowing falsity or reckless disregard for truth (“actual malice”).
  • Invoked O’Toole in rejecting discipline based on “true but misleading” or innocently inaccurate statements; such rules overly chill legitimate political discussion.

  The Board had characterized his statements as “baseless and disparaging,” “reckless and untrue,” “filled with inaccuracies and half-truths,” but:

  • Offered no concrete proof that he knew they were false or was recklessly indifferent to their truth.
  • Did not show any specific pending or impending proceeding that his comments threatened to prejudice (relevant to Jud.Cond.R. 2.10(A)).

  Disciplinary Counsel, for its part, failed to articulate:

  • A clear compelling interest as applied to these particular remarks (beyond abstract concerns with “appearance” and decorum), or
  • Any explanation of narrow tailoring—why punishing this speech, at this meeting, was necessary to serve that interest and how less restrictive means would not suffice.

  Given that failure, the court held that applying Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 1.3, or 2.10(A) here would violate the First Amendment. The as‑applied challenge thus succeeded, and no misconduct was found on Count 3.

  C. Count 1 – The Glasier Matter: When Legal Error Becomes Discipline

  1. Background: an entrenched reunification problem

  The case originated in domestic-relations court. Judge Carolyn Paschke asked the juvenile court to accept transfer of a “heavily contested” custody case involving allegations of parental alienation and three teenage children who had refused all contact with their father for about 1½ years, despite an Agreed Entry (August 2018) incorporating recommendations from psychologist Dr. Farshid Afsarifard.

  Key context from Dr. Afsarifard’s report:

  • Evidence of a formerly positive father-child relationship.
  • Children now “heavily entrenched” in viewing their father as abusive, some of it based on their own experiences but exacerbated by mother’s empowerment of their choice to sever ties.
  • Adverse effects of allowing children to “make decisions that involve eliminating a parent” without “very serious consideration.”
  • Recommendations:
    • Mother to retain custody.
    • Therapeutic visitation and counseling, with goal of phased progression to standard visitation within months.
    • Consequences for mother if she failed to support the reunification process.

  After transfer, the juvenile court:

  • Attempted therapeutic services through Ohio Guidestone; the children refused.
  • Worked through a case manager to de‑escalate pressure and focus on parental work; this ultimately failed.
  • Selected Dr. Stephen Neuhaus, a specialized reunification therapist, but progress stalled due to cost-sharing disputes.
  • Held multiple hearings (January and April 2020), during which the judge expressed determination not to “throw in the towel,” admonished both parents, and emphasized the legal obligation to foster relationships with both parents.

  2. The May 27 hearing and May 29 detention

  On May 27, 2020:

  • Therapeutic visitation had still not commenced.
  • Father moved to withdraw his motion to modify custody and support, intending to defer to Dr. Neuhaus.
  • Judge Grendell sua sponte converted the motion into one to enforce parenting time and granted alternating‑weekend visitation starting that weekend.
  • He ordered exchanges at the sheriff’s office with a court constable present, who would remain for an hour and whose contact number the boys would have.
  • He warned mother that any “shenanigans” would prompt “serious discussion about jeopardizing one’s custody.”

  On May 29:

  • Mother delivered the boys to the constable; at first they appeared calm, then signaled refusal to go with their father.
  • The constable called the judge; evidence showed that, immediately afterward, the judge contacted juvenile probation to arrange for detention, pre‑set the duration (Friday to Monday noon), and barred contact with mother.
  • The constable called mother on speaker; when the older boy said he would rather be detained than go with father, the constable informed her the boys would be charged as “unruly” and detained.
  • Deputies transported the boys to detention; paperwork described the charge as “Unruly per Judge.”

  3. The June 1 proceedings and subsequent maneuvering

  On June 1:

  • The boys were brought to court. The judge met with their attorneys (one retained by mother, then appointed at county expense; one separately appointed) in the courtroom, without the boys or parents present.
  • He announced he would handle the matter under Juv.R. 9(A) diversion and did not want “unruly” adjudications on their records.
  • His goal remained to compel participation in reunification therapy with Dr. Neuhaus; he planned to order mother to pay her share of Neuhaus’s retainer.
  • He signed orders releasing the boys and requiring them to obey all parenting-time orders.

  After June 1:

  • Boys’ counsel sought an appellate stay of the visitation order.
  • Father moved in juvenile court to vacate the May 28 visitation order and substitute standard parenting time starting months later.
  • Without request, the judge appointed appellate counsel for father (at a $225/hour rate, above the court’s standard), to oppose the stay.
  • He twice denied mother’s requests for appointed counsel.
  • He pursued diversion: a contract requiring family participation in Neuhaus’s assessment and compliance with recommendations; mother refused to sign, believing the boys were not “guilty” of wrongdoing.
  • On June 11, the constable formally filed unruly complaints; on June 30, the judge dismissed them without prejudice and referred the case back to diversion.

  4. The GoFundMe episode

  A friend created a GoFundMe page titled “Honor roll students incarcerated by Judge Grendell,” displaying mother and the boys’ photo and harshly criticizing the judge’s actions as an “abuse of our judicial system.”

  On July 23:

  • The court of appeals had stayed the May 28 visitation order and remanded for ruling on the motion to vacate.
  • At the remand hearing, father explained that he recognized the boys would not go without therapy and supported vacating the order; the judge did so and set an evidentiary hearing for October.
  • Before adjourning, the judge:
    • Announced his willingness to enjoin mother and anyone associated with her from using the boys’ names/likenesses in public in connection with the proceedings, claiming harm to their best interests.
    • Stated he would ask why the clerk should not “claw back” GoFundMe funds to reimburse the county for public-defense expenditures.
    • Spoke at length disputing “many false statements” on the GoFundMe page.
  • Mother’s counsel agreed her client would follow the instructions regarding the image.

  Five days later, the judge called mother’s counsel to say the image was still up and demand an explanation. Counsel removed it, noting she had awaited a written order to clarify the precise scope. Ultimately, on September 16, 2020, the judge transferred the matter back to domestic-relations court, ending his involvement.

  5. Legal framework: when do judicial errors become misconduct?

  Crucially, the court framed this case within a broader doctrine:

  • “A mere mistake in the exercise of judicial discretion . . . is not and should never be the cause or subject of a disciplinary proceeding” (Franko; reaffirmed in Gaul, 2023‑Ohio‑4751).
  • “Honest mistakes or misapprehensions of law” are grounds for appeal, not discipline.
  • Jud.Cond.R. 2.2’s Comment [3] expressly recognizes that “good‑faith errors of fact or law” do not violate the rule.
  • Gov.Jud.R. I(1) authorizes discipline only for a “willful breach” of the Code.
  • Citing Michigan’s In re Gorcyca, the court equated a willful failure to follow the law with a decision made with knowledge of the law and a deliberate refusal to follow it.

  The court thus drew a sharp distinction:

  • Good‑faith error (even egregious) ⇒ appellate correction, not discipline.
  • Willful disregard of law + lack of impartial performance of duties ⇒ potential disciplinary violations (Jud.Cond.R. 2.2 and related provisions).

  6. Specific violations found

  a. Jud.Cond.R. 2.2 – willful failure to uphold/apply juvenile law

  The court’s reasoning centered on two aspects:

  • The basis for “unruly child” charges (R.C. 2151.022(A)).
  • The legal standards for taking a child into custody and placing in detention (Juv.R. 6 & 7; R.C. 2151.31(A)(3)(b)).

  On unruly charges, the court:

  • Noted that precedent typically involves children who:
    • Physically evaded control (running away, boarding buses without permission), and/or
    • Repeatedly refused visitation habitually, not on a single occasion.
  • Found no clear evidence that the boys had disobeyed a direct parental order to attend visitation, much less habitually.

  On detention, the court held:

  • Juv.R. 6 and 7 permit custody and detention pre‑disposition only if a child is in “immediate danger” from surroundings and removal is necessary to prevent immediate or threatened harm.
  • Even accepting the psychologist’s view that long‑term harm could ensue from loss of paternal contact, that does not equate to “immediate danger” justifying incarceration.
  • The constable himself testified the boys were not in immediate physical or emotional danger at the sheriff’s office.

  The court also found the no-contact-with-mother order contrary to Juv.R. 7(J), which expressly guarantees immediate telephone contact and parental visitation at reasonable times in detention.

  Although the judge maintained a belief that visitation was in the children’s best long-term interests, the court concluded:

  • He consciously used the threat and reality of detention as coercive leverage to compel visitation.
  • He “willfully turned a blind eye” to procedural safeguards and statutory limits designed to prevent unnecessary detention of juveniles.
  • He orchestrated “trumped‑up charges” for unruliness, using his constable as the charging instrument, and pre‑set the detention duration and contact restrictions.

  That conduct went well beyond reasonable misinterpretation; it amounted to a willful failure to follow the law and to perform duties “fairly and impartially,” in violation of Jud.Cond.R. 2.2.

  b. Jud.Cond.R. 2.11 – failure to recuse

  Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A) requires judges to disqualify themselves from any proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

  The court held that, particularly after the weekend detention:

  • The judge’s objectivity had eroded:
    • Sua sponte conversion of father’s motion to enforce visitation, without notice or opportunity to be heard, signaled a shift from neutral adjudicator to participant pursuing a reunification project.
    • Appointment of appellate counsel for father (at an enhanced rate) to defend the judge’s own visitation order, while denying counsel to mother, underlined partiality.
  • A reasonable observer would question his ability to fairly adjudicate further motions in the case.

  Accordingly, his failure to recuse constituted a violation of Jud.Cond.R. 2.11. The majority treated the specific subpart (2.11(A)(7)(c), judge as material witness) as illustrative rather than a separate rule; the violation is of 2.11 as a whole.

  c. Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 – undermining confidence in judicial integrity

  Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 requires judges to act in a way that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and to avoid impropriety and its appearance.

  Two main strands supported a 1.2 finding:

  • The detention itself: ordering two teenagers jailed for a weekend on legally untenable grounds and forbidding contact with their mother is antithetical to the public perception of a fair juvenile court system.
  • The GoFundMe episode:
    • Threatening to “claw back” donated funds to reimburse the county for appointed counsel (without any identified legal basis) appeared driven by personal pique at criticism rather than genuine concern for children’s interests.
    • Using judicial authority to police public criticism in this manner risks chilling legitimate scrutiny and undermines confidence in judicial restraint and neutrality.

  Taken together, these actions reasonably tend to erode, rather than promote, public confidence in judicial integrity.

  7. Violations rejected or cabined

  a. Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A) – ex parte communications

  The Board had treated the June 1 courtroom discussion with the boys’ lawyers as an ex parte violation and suggested the call to mother’s counsel about the GoFundMe image was similarly improper.

  The court disagreed:

  • On June 1, both boys’ counsel (the only parties to the then-pending juvenile diversions) were present; no adverse party was excluded. Characterizing this as “ex parte” misconceived the procedural posture.
  • The subsequent call regarding the GoFundMe image was:
    • Administrative in nature, relating to compliance with the judge’s oral directive about use of the juveniles’ images.
    • Not about substantive issues in controversy, nor did it provide any procedural or tactical advantage to either side.

  While the court admonished that the better practice would have been to include both counsel, it did not find a willful breach of Jud.Cond.R. 2.9.

  b. Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) – “piling on” general rule violations

  The Board had also found a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to administration of justice). The majority declined to endorse this finding where the same conduct supported specific Code of Judicial Conduct violations:

  • Any significant violation of judicial-conduct rules could be described as “prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
  • When the probable‑cause panel had dismissed a more specific rule (Jud.Cond.R. 1.1 – compliance with law), the Board could not resurrect that theory by shoehorning it into 8.4(d).
  • As a matter of disciplinary policy, the court discouraged “stacking” or “piling on” generic rule violations where more tailored provisions already capture the misconduct, aligning with other jurisdictions’ caution against overcharging under broad “prejudicial conduct” rules.

  Justice Fischer’s dissent takes the opposite position: he would explicitly find an 8.4(d) violation for the wrongful incarceration, viewing it as paradigmatically prejudicial to justice.

  IV. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors; Sanction Analysis

  A. Recalibrating aggravation and mitigation

  The Board found six aggravating factors (dishonest/selfish motive; multiple offenses; pattern-of-misconduct; false statements; harm to vulnerable victims; refusal to acknowledge wrongfulness) and two mitigators (no prior discipline; some character evidence).

  The court’s independent review significantly revised this landscape:

  1. Dishonest or selfish motive – rejected

  The Board reasoned that Grendell was selfish because he wanted to “succeed where other courts had failed” in reunification.

  The court rejected this:

  • “Selfish” ordinarily means acting for personal advantage, disregarding others’ rights (e.g., Webster’s definition). Wanting to achieve a difficult professional goal (e.g., effective reunification) does not, without more, fit that description.
  • There was no evidence he gained or sought personal financial, professional, or other tangible advantage from his decisions.
  • Desire to accomplish reunification—however misguided the means—is not inherently a “selfish motive” in disciplinary terms.

  Similarly, the Board’s conclusion that he “dishonestly” claimed to act in the children’s best interests lacked evidentiary support; the record suggested he genuinely held that belief.

  2. Pattern of misconduct / multiple offenses – rejected

  The Board counted “eleven rule violations” across three matters. The court, however:

  • Found no violations as to the Tea Party event or legislative testimony (once constitutional issues were resolved).
  • Identified misconduct in a single matter (Glasier), albeit serious.

  Without multiple distinct matters or a demonstrable pattern of repeated similar violations, the court declined to treat this as a “pattern of misconduct” or “multiple offenses” for aggravation.

  3. False evidence / refusal to acknowledge wrongfulness – rejected

  On alleged false statements about the June 1 hearing (e.g., whether boys entered the courtroom and had handcuffs removed there), the court:

  • Viewed discrepancies as minor inaccuracies of recollection over a multi‑year span, in the context of otherwise detailed and extensive responses.
  • Found no clear and convincing evidence of intent to deceive or “deceptive practices” in the disciplinary process.

  Regarding “refusal to acknowledge,” the court emphasized:

  • Respondents in disciplinary matters are entitled to vigorously contest charges and offer nonfrivolous legal arguments.
  • Here, the judge expressed regret and discomfort about the detention, while still defending its legality; this is not equivalent to a blanket denial of responsibility in the face of undeniable wrongdoing.
  • Given that the court itself agreed with many of his legal positions (especially in Counts 3 and 4), his defense cannot fairly be recharacterized as an aggravating “refusal.”

  4. Only remaining aggravator: harm to vulnerable victims

  The court retained one aggravating factor under Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(8): the vulnerability of and harm to the victims. Two minors were wrongly detained in a juvenile facility over a weekend, separated from their mother, on an improper legal basis. That harm is significant and plainly aggravating.

  5. Mitigation: substantial character and service evidence

  Mitigating factors under Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C) included:

  • No prior discipline – in a career as an Ohio lawyer since 1978 and as a judge since 2011.
  • Character and reputation – nearly 60 letters, plus live witnesses, attesting to:
    • His diligence and work ethic.
    • Positive reputation in the community.
    • Leadership roles in:
      • Ohio Juvenile Judges Association,
      • Ohio Probate Judges Association,
      • National College of Probate Judges, and
      • Ohio Judicial Conference.
    • Military service in the U.S. Army JAG Corps.
    • Creation of educational programs (Good Deeds program; Geauga Learn) to educate citizens and youth about probate, agriculture, history, and local government.

  The Board had discounted this testimony because many supporters were not deeply familiar with the factual allegations. The court corrected that approach, holding that character evidence retains significant mitigating force even if not predicated on intimate familiarity with the charged conduct.

  B. Sanction: Positioning Grendell Within Existing Case Law

  The final sanction—18 months with 12 stayed—was set by comparing multiple lines of precedent.

  1. Cases with 18‑month suspensions (often fully or partly stayed)

  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoover, 2024‑Ohio‑4608:
    • Judge engaged in a systemic pattern across 16 cases: jailing defendants to collect fines/costs, ignoring statutory limits, displaying bias and misuse of contempt.
    • Some wrongful incarcerations, but in context of widespread, longstanding processes.
    • Sanction: 18 months, 6 stayed (12 actual).
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker, 2007‑Ohio‑5635:
    • Over a dozen matters, the judge abused contempt powers, improperly jailed individuals, and committed other serious violations.
    • Sanction: 18 months, 6 stayed.
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 2004‑Ohio‑6402:
    • Systematic misuse of small-claims procedures to jail a “significant number” of people in debt‑collection contexts; 16 rule violations.
    • Sanction: 18 months, 6 stayed.

  These cases involved broader patterns and repeated misuse of authority than Grendell’s misconduct, which was confined to one matter.

  2. Juvenile incarceration precedent: Karto

  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Karto, 2002‑Ohio‑61:

  • The judge:
    • Illegally sentenced a juvenile to 90 days’ detention for offenses that did not authorize jail time.
    • Conducted detention hearings without counsel despite the juveniles stating they had lawyers, directing them to cross-examine witnesses themselves.
    • Improperly used contempt in additional matters.
  • Sanction: 6‑month suspension (no stay).

  Karto thus involved multiple abuses, but the overall sanction was lower than the 18‑month baselines in Hoover/Parker/Medley.

  3. Single‑matter incarceration cases: Bachman and Repp

  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020‑Ohio‑6732:
    • Magistrate chased a disruptive woman in the courthouse hallway, dragged her into the courtroom, placed her in the jury box, and summarily jailed her for 10 days for contempt (she served 2 before being released by the presiding judge).
    • Incident was videotaped, involved over 20 deputies/staff in a violent arrest, and was described as “difficult to watch.”
    • No prior discipline; good character; but “utter indifference” to harm and lack of remorse.
    • Sanction: 6‑month actual suspension (no stay).
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Repp, 2021‑Ohio‑3923:
    • Judge ordered a courtroom spectator (not a party) to submit to a drug test, then jailed her for 10 days when she refused; simultaneously directed inflammatory comments at her boyfriend (a defendant appearing by video).
    • Sanction: 12‑month actual suspension (no stay), found “substantially more egregious” than Bachman’s conduct.

  Grendell’s case resembles Bachman and Repp in that a single proceeding produced wrongful incarceration. Differences:

  • Motivation:
    • Bachman and Repp acted largely out of anger and assertion of courtroom control.
    • Grendell acted, in his own lights, to force a result he believed was in the children’s best interests (though he chose unlawful methods).
  • Victims:
    • Bachman and Repp dealt with adults (a disruptive hallway screamer; a spectator). Grendell’s victims were two minors in a sensitive custody context.
  • Process:
    • Bachman’s was an impulsive incident; Repp’s was also sudden and unmoored from any procedural basis.
    • Grendell’s conduct involved planning and multiple phone calls; there was more time for reflection and course correction.

  The court concluded:

  • An actual suspension at least as long as Bachman’s six months was necessary to send a consistent message about misuse of incarceration.
  • Given the victims’ youth and the planning involved, a somewhat more severe overall sanction was warranted, but strong mitigation supported staying a substantial portion.

  Thus, the court settled on an 18‑month suspension with 12 months stayed, which yields a 6‑month actual suspension but also:

  • Signals greater formal severity than Bachman (longer total term),
  • While distinguishing Grendell from the more egregious and multiplicity‑laden patterns in Hoover, Parker, and Medley.

  V. Key Legal Concepts Simplified

  1. Content-based restrictions and strict scrutiny

  • A speech rule is content-based if it applies because of what is being talked about—the “topic discussed or idea or message expressed.”
  • Jud.Cond.R. 3.2 is content-based because it allows judges to testify only on certain subjects (law, legal system, administration of justice) and bans all other topics in certain forums.
  • Under the First Amendment, content-based rules are:
    • “Presumptively unconstitutional,” and
    • Must pass strict scrutiny: the rule must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, and it must be the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.

  2. Facial vs. as-applied challenges

  • A facial challenge argues that a law is invalid in all or most of its applications (e.g., Jud.Cond.R. 3.2 cannot constitutionally be enforced with respect to any judge’s legislative testimony, because it is overbroad, etc.).
  • An as-applied challenge argues that, as enforced against a particular person under particular facts, the law violates the Constitution, but might be valid in other contexts.
  • Grendell raised a facial challenge to Jud.Cond.R. 3.2, which the court accepted.
  • He raised an as-applied challenge to the application of Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 1.3, and 2.10(A) to his Tea Party remarks, which the court also accepted.

  3. Good-faith legal error vs. willful failure to follow the law

  • Good-faith legal error:
    • Judge misinterprets a statute or rule while trying to get it right.
    • Even if clearly wrong and harmful, the remedy is appeal, not discipline.
  • Willful failure to follow the law:
    • Judge either knows the controlling law and ignores it, or deliberately uses power in a way that is plainly inconsistent with legal safeguards.
    • This can support discipline under Jud.Cond.R. 2.2 (uphold/apply law) and Gov.Jud.R. I(1) (willful breach).

  4. Core political speech

  • Speech about government, public officials, public policy, and political processes is at the “core” of the First Amendment.
  • Restrictions on such speech are viewed with the greatest suspicion and almost always subject to strict scrutiny.
  • Judges, even incumbent, retain these rights when speaking outside the courtroom (subject to narrow, properly tailored ethics rules).

  5. Actual malice and protection of erroneous political speech

  • Under New York Times v. Sullivan and related cases:
    • Public officials cannot recover damages or impose penalties for false statements about their conduct unless the speaker knew the statement was false or acted with “reckless disregard” for truth.
  • This principle undergirds the court’s reluctance to punish a judge for statements at a political meeting that may have been incomplete or inaccurate but not proved to be intentionally or recklessly false.

  6. Constitutional avoidance

  • Courts should avoid deciding constitutional questions if a case can be resolved on other grounds (e.g., plain text of a rule).
  • Justice Fischer relied on this principle in contending that because Jud.Cond.R. 3.2, properly read, permitted Grendell’s testimony, there was no need to reach the First Amendment issue.

  VI. Impact and Broader Significance

  A. For Judicial Rulemaking in Ohio

  • Jud.Cond.R. 3.2 must be revisited:
    • The current broad ban on voluntary legislative/executive testimony on topics outside “law/legal system/administration of justice” cannot constitutionally stand.
    • The Supreme Court has effectively signaled that any replacement must be:
      • More narrowly drawn, perhaps focusing only on matters likely to come before the judge, and
      • Directed at specific harms (pledges on pending issues; party bias) rather than general topic-based censorship.
  • Rule-drafters must also consider the interplay with Jud.Cond.R. 2.10(B) (no pledges/commitments) and 2.11 (recusal) as less restrictive tools to protect impartiality.

  B. For Disciplinary Practice and the Board of Professional Conduct

  • Boards must squarely confront constitutional defenses in as‑applied contexts; they cannot declare such questions solely within the Supreme Court’s purview where the Code itself commands application “consistent with constitutional requirements.”
  • Charges should not:
    • Rely on overbroad general canons (e.g., “appearance of impropriety”) to punish core political speech without precise justification.
    • Stack Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) on top of specific judicial-conduct rules merely to inflate the number of violations.
  • When legal errors are alleged, the inquiry must focus on willfulness and impartiality, not mere disagreement with a judge’s interpretation.

  C. For Judges and Judicial Speech Nationwide

  • Judges retain robust First Amendment protections when speaking as citizens, especially on political matters, even if they mention their judicial role.
  • However:
    • Speech that includes pledges or commitments about issues likely to come before the court remains restricted (Jud.Cond.R. 2.10(B)).
    • Statements or activities that demonstrably show bias toward parties or create a reasonable appearance of partiality may justify recusal or discipline.
  • This decision provides persuasive authority for other states with similar legislative-testimony canons (e.g., Arkansas, which had already limited its rule in Griffen), confirming a national trend of subjecting judicial-speech rules to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny post‑White and Williams‑Yulee.

  D. For Juvenile Justice and Custody Courts

  • The opinion sends a clear warning against:
    • Using detention as coercive leverage in civil/family disputes.
    • Short‑circuiting statutory procedures and juvenile safeguards in pursuit of even well-intentioned goals like reunification.
  • It affirms that children’s liberty interests and procedural rights must be scrupulously respected; judges cannot use juvenile detention as a tool to enforce family-court orders absent the narrow criteria in Juv.R. 6 and 7.

  E. For Future Judicial Misconduct Cases

  • Courts will likely scrutinize:
    • Whether alleged violations stem from bad-faith disregard of law or from honest, even if serious, mistakes.
    • Whether speech-related charges target specific harms (e.g., promises to rule a certain way) as opposed to broad topic‑based bans or vague “appearance” concerns.
  • Sanctions will continue to be calibrated against comparative case law, with special weight given to:
    • Wrongful incarceration of litigants or third parties,
    • Vulnerability of victims (e.g., juveniles), and
    • Patterns versus single incidents of misconduct.

  VII. Conclusion

  Disciplinary Counsel v. Grendell marks a significant development in Ohio law on multiple fronts:

  • It strikes down a long‑standing judicial‑ethics rule (Jud.Cond.R. 3.2) as an unconstitutional content-based speech restriction, reinforcing that judges do not shed their First Amendment rights upon taking office.
  • It provides a robust shield for judicial political speech in non‑campaign settings, insisting that disciplinary authorities meet strict scrutiny and respect the actual‑malice standard before punishing allegedly inaccurate public commentary.
  • It clarifies that judicial discipline for legal error is reserved for willful failures to follow the law, not for good‑faith mistakes—yet simultaneously demonstrates a willingness to impose a substantial suspension when a judge seriously abuses detention powers, particularly over minors.
  • It rebalances the use of general catch‑all provisions like Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), urging more precise reliance on specific rules and discouraging charge‑stacking.

  At the same time, the decision underscores an important normative point: while constitutionally protected, judges’ involvement in political or legislative debates carries prudential risks to the perception of neutrality and should be approached with caution. The court’s message is that constitutional boundaries sharply limit how far disciplinary authorities can go in policing such speech—but ethical self‑restraint and sensitivity to public confidence remain essential attributes of judicial office.