Consistency of Medical Causation Evidence in Kentucky Workers’ Compensation –
A Comprehensive Commentary on Michael Hardin v. Ford Motor Co. (Sup. Ct. Ky. 2025)

1. Introduction

In Michael Hardin v. Ford Motor Co., the Supreme Court of Kentucky delivered an unpublished opinion affirming the denial of three consolidated workers’ compensation claims alleging (1) a left-elbow injury, (2) a low-back injury, and (3) a repetitive motion injury to the neck and left upper extremity. Although labeled “Not to be Published,” the decision is instructive for two reasons:

• It reinforces the consistency requirement for medical causation opinions first articulated in Cepero v. Fabricated Metals Corp., and re-stated recently in Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Gosper.
• It reiterates the stringent “compelling evidence” threshold that appellants must clear to disturb an Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ’s) factual findings in workers’ compensation cases.

Parties. Michael Hardin (claimant/appellant) – an assembly-line worker at Ford’s Louisville plant – sought income and medical benefits. Ford Motor Company, the ALJ (Hon. Monica Rice-Smith), and the Workers’ Compensation Board were appellees.

Key Issues Presented

1. Did the medical evidence compel a finding that Hardin suffered work-related repetitive motion injuries to his neck and left arm?
2. Did the ALJ misapply the doctrine of Cepero when discounting the claimant’s medical proof?

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, which had in turn affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Board and the ALJ’s denial of permanent benefits. Central to the holding were two findings:

1. The ALJ acted within her discretion in disbelieving Dr. Farrage’s opinion that Hardin’s neck/arm condition was caused by repetitive motion, because the opinion rested on a factual history inconsistent with Hardin’s own testimony and other medical records.
2. Cepero was properly invoked to illustrate that a medical opinion premised on a substantially inaccurate history cannot constitute “substantial evidence.” The Court held the ALJ neither misapplied Cepero nor overlooked any controlling precedent.

Accordingly, Hardin failed to establish that the evidence was “so overwhelming” as to compel a finding in his favor, and the prior rulings were left undisturbed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Cepero v. Fabricated Metals Corp., 132 S.W.3d 839 (Ky. 2004)
  Cepero bars reliance on medical opinions grounded in an “irrefutably corrupt” history. In Hardin, the ALJ used Cepero in a general sense — not to exclude the doctor’s testimony outright, but to explain why it lacked persuasive force. The Supreme Court approved this usage and, importantly, clarified (with help from Gosper) that the Cepero rule is evidentiary, not exclusionary: opinions based on erroneous histories are simply not “substantial evidence.”
• Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Gosper, 671 S.W.3d 184 (Ky. 2023)
  Gosper had recently summarized Cepero and reiterated the multi-level standard of review. Hardin leverages Gosper both for its articulation of the ALJ’s fact-finding supremacy and for its clarification of when a medical history becomes “irrefutably corrupt.”
• Snawder v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. App. 1979) & REO Mechanical v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. App. 1985)
  These cases establish the “burden of persuasion” and define “compelling evidence.” They supply the metric that an appellate court may reverse an ALJ only when the evidence is so strong that no reasonable fact-finder could rule otherwise.
• Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1985) and Bowerman v. Black Equipment Co., 297 S.W.3d 858 (Ky. App. 2009)
  Both reaffirm the ALJ’s prerogative to weigh conflicting evidence.
• Laboratory Corp. of America v. Smith, 701 S.W.3d 228 (Ky. 2024)
  Cited for the notion that an appeal presenting only routine factual disputes does not warrant extended Supreme Court review.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in five logical steps:

1. Standard of Review Recited. The Court outlined the three-level review framework (ALJ → Board → Court of Appeals → Supreme Court) and stressed its own limited role — it will not “third-guess” lower tribunals on pure fact questions.
2. Evaluation of Medical Evidence. The ALJ had two competing sets of expert opinions:
   • For the employer (Ford) – Dr. Loeb found only temporary, resolved injuries and no repetitive trauma.
   • For the employee (Hardin) – Dr. Farrage linked Hardin’s cervical condition to repetitive work.
   The ALJ discredited Dr. Farrage because his report:
   • Described an acute injury occurring on a date neither pleaded nor corroborated;
   • Omitted discussion of repetitive job activities central to Hardin’s claim;
   • Mislabeled the mechanism of injury, thereby conflicting with Hardin’s sworn testimony.
3. Application of Cepero. Because the doctor’s history was “substantially inaccurate,” the ALJ concluded his opinion could not constitute substantial evidence. The Supreme Court agreed, holding this was a textbook application of Cepero as elucidated in Gosper.
4. No Compelling Evidence Standard Met. With Dr. Loeb’s contrary opinion on the table, the evidence was conflicting. Therefore, it could not be “so overwhelming” as to compel a finding for Hardin.
5. Routine Affirmance Doctrine. Citing Laboratory Corp. v. Smith, the Court observed that Hardin’s appeal raised no novel legal question, only a disagreement with the ALJ’s reading of the evidence—precisely the type of dispute the Supreme Court generally declines to revisit.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation

Although unpublished and not citable as binding precedent under RAP 40(D), the opinion carries persuasive weight and signals how Kentucky’s appellate courts will treat similar disputes:

• Reinforcement of the Consistency Test. Medical experts must base causation opinions on an accurate, claimant-consistent history. Where history and opinion materially diverge, the ALJ may (and likely will) disregard the testimony.
• Tactical Advice for Practitioners. Counsel should ensure that Form-101 allegations, claimant testimony, and physician histories are synchronized. Any mismatch invites Cepero-based attack.
• Clarification of “Compelling Evidence.” Litigants seeking reversal must show more than a better case; they must show an unassailable case that leaves no room for reasonable disagreement.
• Further Integration of Gosper. The Court cites Gosper repeatedly, embedding that 2023 decision as the modern anchor for workers’-comp appellate standards.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Substantial Evidence. Evidence with enough substance that a reasonable person could rely upon it; more than a scintilla, less than overwhelming proof.
• Compelling Evidence. Evidence so overwhelming that any reasonable fact-finder must reach the opposite conclusion; an extremely high bar for appellants.
• Cepero Rule. A doctor’s opinion is worthless if based on a history that is “irrefutably corrupt” (e.g., omits prior injuries or misstates critical facts). The ALJ may then disregard it entirely.
• Repetitive Motion (Cumulative Trauma) Injury. An injury that develops gradually from repetitive work activity rather than a single identifiable incident; requires medical proof linking the activity to the progressive harm.
• MMI (Maximum Medical Improvement). The point at which further recovery or lasting improvement is not anticipated; determines when an injury becomes “permanent” for impairment ratings.

5. Conclusion

Michael Hardin v. Ford Motor Co. adds another layer of clarity to Kentucky’s workers’ compensation jurisprudence by underscoring two practical lessons: (1) an ALJ is entitled — even obliged — to reject medical causation opinions grounded in a claimant history that diverges from the claimant’s own account, and (2) appellate intervention is rare unless the evidence was compelling in the claimant’s favor. While unpublished, the ruling operates as a cautionary tale for litigants: consistency between pleadings, testimony, and expert history is paramount. Failing that, the Cepero doctrine will swiftly erode the evidentiary foundation of a claim, and higher courts will not rescue a case that amounts to mere disagreement with an ALJ’s credibility call.