Consent, Distance, and Equal Shared Custody: Relocation as a Factor in Initial Custody Determinations — Commentary on Matter of Brian Q. v. Allysa R.

---

I. Introduction

This decision from the Third Department addresses a recurring but legally subtle scenario: an initial custody determination where one parent has relocated to another state with a very young child, and the court must fashion a workable custodial arrangement across state lines.

In Matter of Brian Q. v. Allysa R., the court affirms a Family Court order awarding joint legal and joint physical custody to both parents of a child born in 2022, with an alternating weekly schedule across New York and Pennsylvania. The mother had moved approximately 2 to 2½ hours away to live with her grandparents in Pittston, Pennsylvania. The father argued that Family Court failed to give sufficient weight to this relocation and that primary physical custody should rest with him in New York.

The decision is legally significant because it clarifies several points:

• How a parent’s relocation is treated when the court is making an initial custody order, rather than modifying an existing one.
• The role of parental consent or acquiescence to the relocation in later objections.
• The permissibility of equal shared physical custody across state lines for a very young child, even where the Attorney for the Child (AFC) recommends primary custody with one parent.
• The practical and jurisdictional role of designating a “home state” for UCCJEA purposes in such arrangements.

This commentary examines the opinion’s reasoning, its reliance on existing precedents, and its likely impact on future interstate custody and relocation disputes in New York.

---

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Parties and the Move

The parties, referred to as the father (petitioner) and the mother (respondent), are the parents of one child, born in 2022. Initially, the family lived together at the father’s residence in Chemung County, New York.

In May 2023, the mother moved with the child to her grandparents’ home in Pittston, Pennsylvania, about 2 to 2½ hours by car from Chemung County. The record reflects that:

• The father was fully aware of the move at the time it occurred.
• He did not contemporaneously object and even assisted by helping load a piece of furniture into the mother’s vehicle.
• Only afterward did he become opposed to the relocation.

B. The Litigation in Family Court

Shortly after the move, the father filed a pro se article 6 petition in Family Court seeking custody, alleging that the relocation made contact with the child difficult. With counsel, he later amended his petition to seek:

• Joint legal custody and
• Primary physical custody with himself,

alleging that the mother:

• Moved the child to Pennsylvania over his objection, and
• Was residing with the child in allegedly unsafe and unsanitary conditions at the grandparents’ home.

The mother, in turn, filed a cross-petition seeking joint legal custody and primary physical custody with herself as the primary residential parent.

The court held a fact-finding hearing. After hearing testimony (including from nonparty witnesses) and reviewing photographic evidence, Family Court:

• Awarded the parties joint legal and joint physical custody.
• Directed that the child’s time be split equally between New York and Pennsylvania on an alternating weekly basis.
• Declared that the child’s “home state” is New York (Footnote 1).
• Expressly noted that, when the child reaches school age, a primary physical custodian will likely need to be designated if the parties remain in different states.

An attorney for the child, Andrea J. Mooney, was appointed. On appeal, she advocated (substituting judgment because of the child’s young age) that primary physical custody with the father would better serve the child’s interests, expressing concern about the short-term and transitional nature of the equal weekly arrangement.

C. The Appeal

The father appealed, arguing principally that:

1. Family Court failed to give sufficient weight to the mother’s relocation out of state.
2. The court mis-evaluated the home environments, undervaluing alleged unsanitary and unsafe conditions at the maternal grandparents’ home.
3. Joint physical custody across state lines was not in the child’s best interests, particularly in light of the AFC’s recommendation and the mother’s allegedly obstructive behavior (e.g., withholding the child and daycare information).
4. Family Court insufficiently credited or misweighed the testimony of nonparty witnesses.

The Third Department, applying a deferential standard of review, affirmed the Family Court’s order in all respects.

---

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department’s opinion can be distilled into several core holdings:

1. Best interests framework governs initial custody:
   In an initial custody determination under Family Court Act article 6, the central inquiry is the child’s best interests, evaluated through a multi-factor analysis regarding home environments, stability, parental fitness, and willingness to foster the child’s relationship with the other parent.
2. Relocation is a “very important factor,” not a separate test, in initial determinations:
   When the initial custody decision involves a parent who has relocated, the move is treated as a very important factor within the best-interest analysis, particularly where there is evidence that the move may detrimentally affect the nonmoving parent’s relationship with the child. However, the strict Tropea relocation framework is not rigidly applied in initial custody settings (Footnote 2, referencing Matter of Aden HH. v Charish GG.).
3. Father’s consent/acquiescence to the move undermines his relocation objection:
   The record showed that the father knew of and effectively consented to the mother’s move to Pennsylvania, and assisted in effectuating it. This made his later challenge to the relocation less persuasive, distinguishing this case from others where a parent relocates over the express objection of the other.
4. No demonstrated detriment to the father-child relationship:
   Despite the move, the father:
   • Saw the child almost every weekend,
   • Enjoyed frequent phone and video contact, and
   • Shared in transportation duties by meeting at a halfway point.
   The court found no evidence that the relocation has or will detrimentally impact the father’s relationship with the child.
5. Both homes are safe and appropriate; unsanitary-condition allegations unproven:
   The court credited evidence that both parents had stable employment and could provide safe, loving homes. Allegations of unsanitary conditions, secondhand smoke, and pet-related respiratory issues at the grandparents’ house were not supported by testimony or medical evidence.
6. Joint custody is workable despite conflict:
   Although the parents had acrimonious communication and the mother had at times withheld information and access (described as “concerning”), their relationship had not deteriorated to a degree that made joint custody “untenable.” They successfully conducted child exchanges without incident.
7. Appellate deference: “sound and substantial basis”:
   Family Court is in a superior position to judge credibility. Because the record provided a sound and substantial basis for the joint custodial arrangement, the Third Department declined to disturb the order—even though the appellate AFC favored primary physical custody with the father.
8. Short-term nature and future modification acknowledged:
   The court explicitly recognized that this equal interstate week-on/week-off arrangement may be untenable once the child reaches school age, and that a later modification will likely be necessary to select a primary residential parent if the parties still live in different states.

---

IV. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. Best-Interests Framework

The court begins, as it must, with the well-established principle that in initial custody determinations, the “paramount concern” is the best interests of the child. To define that concept and its factors, the court cites:

• Matter of Christopher MM. v Mackenzie NN., 237 AD3d 1271 (3d Dept 2025)
• Matter of Kody O. v Maya P., 227 AD3d 1196 (3d Dept 2024)
• Matter of Steven U. v Alisha V., 209 AD3d 1184 (3d Dept 2022)
• Matter of Holly P. v George Q., 240 AD3d 1029 (3d Dept 2025)

These cases reiterate the familiar list of factors:

• Quality of each parent’s home environment.
• Stability and continuity in the child’s life.
• Each parent’s willingness and ability to foster a positive relationship between the child and the other parent.
• Each parent’s past performance, relative fitness, and ability to meet the child’s intellectual, emotional, and overall needs.

By invoking these precedents, the Third Department signals that even in an interstate situation involving relocation, relocation is not a separate legal test so much as one critical factor within the best-interest paradigm—at least when the court is making the initial custodial assignment.

2. Relocation as a “Very Important Factor” in an Initial Determination

The court cites:

• Matter of Eldad LL. v Dannai MM., 155 AD3d 1336 (3d Dept 2017)
• Matter of Britney A. v Jonathan A., 238 AD3d 1447 (3d Dept 2025)

These decisions articulate that, where one parent’s decision to reside “in a distant locale” is implicated, the relocation is a “very important factor among the constellation of factors” relevant to best interests—particularly if the move may detrimentally affect the other parent’s relationship with the child.

However, in Footnote 2, the court emphasizes its earlier holding in:

• Matter of Aden HH. v Charish GG., 226 AD3d 1109 (3d Dept 2024)

that strict application of the factors set out in the Court of Appeals’ landmark relocation decision,

• Matter of Tropea v Tropea, 87 NY2d 727 (1996)

is not necessary when the court is faced with an initial custody determination.

In other words, Tropea governs classic relocation-modification petitions—cases in which an existing custody order is in place and one parent wants to move away. By contrast, where no prior custody order exists and the court is deciding initial custodial arrangements, Aden HH. and now Brian Q. hold that:

• The Tropea factors are informative but not rigidly binding.
• The focus remains a flexible best-interest inquiry, with the relocation as a critical consideration but not the centerpiece of a separate, formal test.

3. Deference to Family Court: “Sound and Substantial Basis”

The court relies on:

• Matter of David JJ. v Verna-Lee KK., 207 AD3d 841 (3d Dept 2022)
• Matter of William Z. v Kimberly Z., 212 AD3d 1036 (3d Dept 2023)

for the proposition that appellate courts will not disturb Family Court’s custody determinations so long as they are supported by a “sound and substantial basis” in the record, especially given Family Court’s superior vantage point in assessing credibility.

This standard effectively frames the father’s appeal: he must show not just that a different order would also have been reasonable, but that the Family Court’s decision lacks adequate evidentiary support. The panel finds that the record amply supports the equal joint custody arrangement, making reversal unwarranted.

4. Consent to Relocation and Distinguishing Contrary Precedents

On the issue of the mother’s move to Pennsylvania, the opinion references:

• Matter of Carol Q. v Charlie R., 230 AD3d 948 (3d Dept 2024)
• Matter of Dunaway v Espinoza, 23 AD3d 928 (3d Dept 2005)

By saying the record shows the move was made with the father’s “full awareness and consent,” and then using “compare” signals to these cases, the court indicates that those cases involved materially different facts, such as:

• A move against the clear objection of the other parent, or
• Unilateral relocation that significantly undermined the nonmoving parent’s relationship.

Here, the father’s initial cooperation (including helping with furniture) makes his subsequent claims that the move was “over his objection” much less compelling. This tacitly establishes or reinforces a practical principle:

When a parent knowingly acquiesces in or facilitates a relocation, it becomes significantly harder to later argue that the move itself is improper or should be used as a major strike against the relocating parent in a best-interest analysis.

5. Detrimental Impact (or Lack Thereof) on the Relationship

To evaluate the effect of the relocation on the father’s relationship with the child, the court cites:

• Matter of Lonny C. v Elizabeth C., 186 AD3d 950 (3d Dept 2020)
• Matter of Julie E. v David E., 124 AD3d 934 (3d Dept 2015)
• Matter of Rose v Buck, 103 AD3d 957 (3d Dept 2013)

In Lonny C., the Third Department affirmed an arrangement where, despite relocation, the noncustodial parent’s relationship remained robust, showing that distance alone, without demonstrated harm, does not necessarily defeat an otherwise sound custody configuration.

By contrast, Julie E. and Rose represent scenarios in which a relocation more clearly threatened to erode the nonmoving parent’s bond. The court uses these comparisons to underline that:

• Here, the father maintained frequent, substantial contact—almost every weekend and regular electronic communication.
• Transportation logistics were manageable, as both parties had reliable vehicles and cooperated in meeting at a midpoint.

Accordingly, the panel concludes that there is no evidence of actual or likely detriment to the father’s relationship, thereby undermining any argument that the relocation alone should justify awarding him primary custody.

6. Home Conditions and Allegations of Unsanitariness

The father alleged that the maternal grandparents’ four-bedroom trailer was unsafe or unsanitary and that secondhand smoke and pets caused the child respiratory issues. To address this, the court cites:

• Matter of Venable v Venable, 122 AD2d 374 (3d Dept 1986)
• Matter of Richard Y. v Vanessa Z., 146 AD3d 1050 (3d Dept 2017)

Venable stands for the proposition that a parent’s allegations about the other parent’s home environment must be substantiated; mere assertions of poor conditions, absent corroboration, are insufficient. Richard Y. involves medical/health concerns; it demonstrates that when a child’s health is genuinely compromised by environmental conditions, the court can and will intervene based on credible medical evidence.

Here, however:

• Testimony and photographs failed to show the home was unsafe or unsanitary.
• The mother testified that the child’s physician found no medical basis for respiratory issues.
• No objective evidence linked any health issue to the home’s conditions, secondhand smoke, or pets.

Therefore, consistent with Venable, the court found these claims unproven and did not allow them to tip the best-interests analysis in favor of the father.

7. Parental Conflict and the Viability of Joint Custody

On the subject of whether joint custody is appropriate in the face of conflict, the court cites:

• Matter of Elizabeth B. v Scott B., 189 AD3d 1833 (3d Dept 2020)
• Matter of Patricia RR. v Daniel SS., 172 AD3d 1471 (3d Dept 2019)

These cases clarify that while high conflict between parents can render joint custody unworkable, joint arrangements are still permissible unless the acrimony is so severe that cooperation on major child-rearing decisions is effectively impossible. The court here notes:

• The parties have a history of poor and acrimonious communication.
• The mother’s prior withholding of the child and daycare information is “concerning.”
• However, exchanges of the child have occurred without incident, and the mother has since agreed to share necessary information going forward.

On balance, this falls short of the kind of chronic, high-intensity conflict that would render joint custody “untenable” under Elizabeth B. and Patricia RR..

8. Weight of Attorney for the Child’s Recommendation

The court cites:

• Matter of Bradley D. v Andrea D., 144 AD3d 1417 (3d Dept 2016)

for the principle that an AFC’s position is entitled to “considerable weight” but is not controlling. In Footnote 5, the Third Department acknowledges:

• The AFC substituted judgment due to the child’s age and advocated for primary physical custody with the father.
• The AFC raised legitimate concerns about the short-term nature of a week-on/week-off interstate schedule for a growing child.

Yet, the court maintains that, after independent review, Family Court’s decision remains supported by a sound and substantial basis. This underscores that:

Appellate courts may affirm custody arrangements that diverge from an AFC’s recommendation, provided the record otherwise robustly supports the trial court’s determination.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Initial Custody Determination vs. Relocation Modification

A central—and sometimes overlooked—legal distinction is that this case involves an initial custody determination, not a modification of an existing order. This matters because:

• In classic relocation-modification cases, the Tropea factors are central: reasons for the move, distance, impact on existing access patterns, feasibility of maintaining a relationship, etc.
• In an initial custody case, the court is not altering a pre-existing custodial equilibrium but creating one from scratch.

Here, both parents filed competing article 6 petitions after the mother had already moved. Thus, the question was not “Should the mother be allowed to relocate with the child?” but rather: “Given current realities (including the mother’s presence in Pennsylvania), what custodial arrangement best serves this very young child’s interests?”

That framing justifies the court’s reliance on Aden HH. and its reiteration that strict application of Tropea is unnecessary. The relocation remains an important factor, but the court does not apply a formal relocation burden-shifting structure as in typical Tropea cases.

2. Weight Given to the Relocation and the Role of Consent

The father’s main complaint is that Family Court did not give the relocation sufficient weight. The Third Department’s response can be broken into stages:

1. Consent/Acquiescence:
   By finding that the father was fully aware of and did not object to the move at the time—and even helped the mother move furniture—the court effectively treats him as having acquiesced. It notes he only later opposed the relocation. This significantly blunts his ability to portray the mother’s conduct as a unilateral, wrongful removal.
2. Actual Effect on Access:
   The court then asks: despite the move, what is the reality of the relationship?
   • The father has seen the child “almost every weekend” since the move.
   • Both parties cooperate to meet at a halfway point for exchanges.
   • There is ample phone and video contact.
   These findings lead the court to conclude that there is no current or reasonably foreseen deterioration in the father-child bond attributable to the move.
3. Distance and Feasibility:
   A 2–2½ hour drive is not trivial, but the court implicitly finds it manageable—particularly for alternating weekend or weekly schedules—given that both parties have reliable vehicles and successfully implemented exchanges even before the final order.

Thus, while the relocation is acknowledged as a “very important factor,” the court concludes that on this record it does not weigh decisively against the mother, especially where the father’s own conduct suggests initial acceptance and actual contact has remained strong.

3. Evaluation of Home Environments and Safety

The court also systematically evaluates each parent’s home:

• Father:
  • Owns a three-bedroom residence in Chemung County.
  • Has stable employment.
  • Has family nearby to assist with childcare.
• Mother:
  • Has stable employment.
  • Lives in a four-bedroom trailer with her grandparents, her uncle, and the uncle’s child (who is there only on weekends).
  • Currently shares a bedroom with the child but plans for the child to move into a spare bedroom later.

The father’s allegations of “unsafe” or “unsanitary” conditions are tested against:

• Photographic evidence.
• Testimony from involved parties and nonparties.
• Medical evidence (or lack thereof) regarding respiratory problems.

Finding inadequate corroboration and no medical confirmation of alleged health risks, the court declines to treat the Pennsylvania residence as inferior in a way that would justify awarding primary physical custody to the father.

4. Parental Conduct, Cooperation, and Joint Custody

The mother’s conduct—particularly alleged withholding of the child “on a couple of occasions” and initial withholding of daycare information—is taken seriously. The court describes these episodes as “concerning” and notes that Family Court had to intervene to establish a temporary schedule.

Yet, the court balances this against:

• The mother’s subsequent willingness to provide information and commit to sharing it going forward.
• The overall success of child exchanges, which have occurred without incident or conflict.
• The absence of any severe or entrenched breakdown in communication that would make joint custody functionally impossible.

By concluding that the parties’ acrimony has not rendered joint custody “untenable,” the court reaffirms that some level of hostility is tolerable within a joint-custody arrangement, so long as the parents can still cooperate on the essentials (logistics, basic communication, and major decisions).

5. Short-Term vs. Long-Term Best Interests

One of the more nuanced aspects of the opinion is its treatment of time. The court explicitly acknowledges:

• The “short-term nature” of the equal weekly interstate arrangement.
• The probability that the existing order will need modification once the child reaches school age.

Nonetheless, the court upholds the current arrangement because:

• The child is very young, and school obligations are not yet a constraint.
• Frequent, meaningful contact with both parents is particularly beneficial at this developmental stage.
• Nothing in the record shows that the present arrangement is unworkable or harmful now.

This reflects an important doctrinal point: best interests are assessed in light of current circumstances, even if the court anticipates that a different configuration may become preferable or necessary in the medium term. The law anticipates and provides for future modification proceedings when circumstances materially change—e.g., school enrollment, new employment, or changed living situations.

6. Home State Designation and Jurisdiction

In Footnote 1, Family Court declared that the child’s “home state” is New York. This is a term of art under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)—the statutory framework governing jurisdiction over child custody cases among states.

By affirming this order, the Third Department implicitly supports:

• New York’s continuing jurisdiction over the child’s custody disputes.
• The notion that, even in a shared-custody interstate arrangement, one state may be designated as the “home state” for jurisdictional clarity and future dispute resolution.

Practically, this gives both parties procedural certainty: any future modifications (e.g., when the child reaches school age) will presumptively be litigated in New York, unless jurisdiction shifts under UCCJEA principles.

7. Reconciling the AFC’s Recommendation with the Affirmance

The AFC supported primary physical custody for the father, based on concerns that:

• The week-on/week-off interstate schedule is short-term and potentially destabilizing in the long run.
• A more anchored primary residence might better promote stability.

The court acknowledges these concerns and accords the AFC’s position “considerable weight,” as required by Bradley D.. Yet it underscores that the AFC’s view is not binding and that:

• The record still supplies a sound and substantial basis for Family Court’s different, but reasonable, choice.
• The law permits a transitional arrangement that optimizes contact with both parents now, subject to later adjustment as the child’s needs evolve.

This underscores the principle that best interests may reasonably be viewed from more than one defensible perspective, and appellate courts are not to substitute their own judgment—or that of the AFC—for that of the trial court when the latter’s decision is well supported.

C. Impact and Future Implications

1. Clarification of Relocation’s Role in Initial Custody Cases

Doctrinally, this case strengthens and elaborates the Third Department’s earlier holding in Aden HH.:

• In an initial custody determination, the Tropea relocation factors need not be rigidly applied.
• Relocation is treated as a politically and practically significant but integrated factor within the broader best-interest analysis.
• The relocating parent is not per se disadvantaged, particularly when the nonmoving parent maintained robust access to the child despite the move.

This guidance will be important in trial courts where parents commence custody litigation following an informal or consensual separation that included a move by one parent.

2. Emphasis on Actual, Not Theoretical, Detriment

The case illustrates the court’s increasing insistence on demonstrable detriment to the nonmoving parent’s relationship, rather than mere geographical complaint. Future litigants should note:

• Distance alone, without evidence of impaired access or weakened relationship, is insufficient to justify a reallocation of custody.
• Courts will focus on whether meaningful, regular contact is feasible and occurring in practice.
• Evidence that the nonmoving parent has, in fact, maintained a strong relationship post-move will weaken arguments that relocation is harmful in itself.

3. Importance of Contemporaneous Objection or Consent

This decision also highlights the strategic importance of a parent’s immediate response to a proposed or actual relocation:

• If a parent vocally and promptly objects and seeks judicial intervention before or as the move occurs, courts are more likely to frame the relocation as unilateral and potentially wrongful.
• Here, the father’s lack of objection at the time—and his assistance in the move—signaled acquiescence, undermining his ability to cast the relocation as improper later.

Future nonmoving parents should understand that acquiescence can have significant legal consequences for how courts later interpret the relocation in the best-interest calculus.

4. Interstate Equal Shared Custody as a Viable Short-Term Model

Substantively, this case affirms that equal week-on/week-off joint physical custody across state lines:

• Is not inherently disfavored,
• Can be consistent with a child’s best interests, especially when the child is very young and not yet in school, and
• May be used as a transitional structure to maximize the child’s relationship with both parents.

Trial courts may cite this case to justify similar arrangements where:

• Both parents’ homes are safe and appropriate;
• Both parents are capable and invested caregivers;
• The distance, while not trivial, is still manageable with cooperative exchanges; and
• There is recognition that a more settled arrangement will be needed at or before school age.

5. Reinforcement of Appellate Deference in Custody Cases

By affirming despite the AFC’s disagreement and the father’s multiple arguments, the Third Department reinforces a strong posture of deference to Family Court’s fact-intensive, discretionary determinations. This signals to practitioners that:

• Custody appeals will rarely succeed absent a clear showing that the trial court’s decision lacks evidentiary support.
• Simply arguing that another configuration would also have been reasonable is insufficient; the appellant must show that the chosen configuration was unreasonable on this record.

---

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. “Best Interests of the Child”

This is the core standard in custody cases. Courts look at a bundle of factors, including:

• The child’s physical safety and basic needs.
• Emotional bonds with each parent.
• Stability and continuity (avoiding disruptive frequent changes, when possible).
• Each parent’s mental and physical health.
• Each parent’s willingness to encourage a good relationship with the other parent.
• Schooling and community ties, when age-appropriate.

No single factor is automatically decisive; the court weighs them together to decide what arrangement is most beneficial overall for the child.

2. Initial Custody Determination vs. Custody Modification

• Initial determination: The court is making the first formal custody order. There is no legally established status quo.
• Modification: There is already a custody order, and one parent asks the court to change it based on changed circumstances and the child’s best interests.

Relocation law (especially Tropea) is more rigidly applied in modification cases. In initial determinations, the court can be more flexible, considering relocation as one factor among many.

3. Relocation as a Factor, Not a Separate Test (in Initial Orders)

In classic relocation cases, courts follow Tropea and apply a structured list of factors (reason for move, impact on access, etc.). But in initial custody settings, as here, the Third Department clarifies that:

• Relocation is a big consideration, but
• It is still just one part of the global best-interests assessment, not a distinct test that overrides all else.

4. “Sound and Substantial Basis” Standard

On appeal, a custody order will be upheld if there is a “sound and substantial basis” in the record. This simply means:

• There is enough credible evidence to support the trial court’s decision.
• The appellate court may think another arrangement is also reasonable, but it will not substitute its judgment so long as the chosen arrangement is reasonable and well supported.

This standard reflects the reality that Family Court sees and hears witnesses directly and is better positioned to judge credibility and nuance.

5. Attorney for the Child (AFC)

The AFC is an attorney appointed to represent the child’s interests. When the child is very young, the AFC may “substitute judgment,” meaning:

• The child is too young to express meaningful preferences.
• The AFC independently determines what arrangement best serves the child’s interests and advocates for that in court.

Courts must give the AFC’s views “considerable weight,” but those views are not binding. The judge must still independently decide what is best for the child.

6. Joint Legal vs. Joint Physical Custody

• Joint legal custody: Both parents share the right and responsibility to make major decisions about the child’s education, health care, religion, and general welfare.
• Joint physical custody: The child spends substantial, often roughly equal, amounts of time living with each parent.

In this case, the court ordered both joint legal and joint physical custody, with an equal alternating weekly schedule between New York and Pennsylvania.

7. “Home State” Under the UCCJEA

“Home state” is a jurisdictional term used to decide which state’s courts have primary authority over custody matters. Generally, it is the state where the child has lived with a parent for at least six consecutive months (for newborns, where they have lived since birth).

Here, Family Court declared New York as the child’s home state, and the Third Department left that designation intact. This helps:

• Provide predictability about which court system (New York vs. Pennsylvania) will handle future custody disputes.
• Reduce the risk of conflicting orders from courts in different states.

---

VI. Conclusion

Matter of Brian Q. v. Allysa R. is a significant addition to New York’s custody jurisprudence in at least three respects:

1. Refinement of relocation doctrine in initial custody cases:
   Building on Aden HH., the decision confirms that Tropea’s structured relocation analysis is not mandatory in initial determinations. Instead, relocation is a “very important factor” folded into the broader best-interest inquiry.
2. Emphasis on consent/acquiescence and actual impact on relationships:
   The court underscores that a parent who initially consents to or facilitates a move cannot easily recast it as improper later. More broadly, it insists on evidence of actual or likely detriment to the nonmoving parent’s relationship, not merely increased distance, before treating relocation as a basis to award primary custody to the other parent.
3. Validation of short-term, interstate equal shared custody arrangements:
   The decision affirms that equal week-on/week-off joint physical custody across state lines is permissible and can be in the best interests of a very young child, even if its long-term viability is uncertain and the AFC advocates a different configuration. Courts may adopt such transitional arrangements now, with an eye toward future modification as the child grows and educational needs crystallize.

Ultimately, the Third Department’s deference to Family Court, coupled with its nuanced handling of relocation, consent, and best interests, signals to practitioners and parents that:

• Custody decisions are highly fact-driven and context-specific.
• Appellate review will be restrained when the trial record reasonably supports the chosen arrangement.
• Parents should act promptly and consistently if they oppose a relocation, and should be prepared to document real, not speculative, harms to their relationship with the child.

For family law courts and practitioners, Brian Q. offers a clear template for approaching initial custody disputes involving interstate moves: focus holistically on the child’s current well-being, insist on evidence of actual relational impact, recognize the role of prior consent or acquiescence, and craft flexible orders that preserve strong bonds with both parents while leaving room for future adjustment as the child’s needs evolve.