Consensual Entry and Probable Cause: Delineating Fourth Amendment Boundaries in Warrantless Home Arrests

Introduction

Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff's Department (2nd Cir. Apr. 10, 2025) addresses key Fourth Amendment issues regarding warrantless home arrests, the scope of consent to enter private premises, and the evidentiary threshold for probable cause in first-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument cases. Plaintiff-appellant Kelly Glover alleged that deputies unlawfully entered her home, detained her without a warrant, and arrested her on suspicion of passing counterfeit bills, thereby violating her federal and state rights. She further claimed due process and municipal liability violations. The Second Circuit, in a summary order, affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants—Onondaga County, its Sheriff’s Department, and two deputies.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendants on all federal and state claims.
The court held that Deputy Albanese had probable cause to arrest Glover based on surveillance footage, the physical characteristics of the bills, and Glover’s admission that she used twenty-dollar bills at the store.
Glover’s consent to the deputy’s entry into her home precluded any Fourth Amendment challenge to the entry.
No due process violation occurred because Glover was released within hours without formal charges, and New York law does not require immediate arraignment under those facts.
Monell municipal-liability claims failed because Glover suffered no cognizable injury and the form she signed did not extend her detention or waive viable constitutional claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) – Established that, absent consent or exigent circumstances, warrantless home arrests violate the Fourth Amendment.
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) – Held that a judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours satisfies the Fourth Amendment after a warrantless arrest.
Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1996) – Confirmed that the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to false arrest claims under § 1983 and New York law.
Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006) – Defined probable cause as “knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances” sufficient to warrant arrest.
Jackson v. Fed. Express, 766 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2014) – Clarified standards for reopening discovery and opposing summary judgment under Rule 56(d).
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) – Set forth municipal liability requirements under § 1983.

Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit’s analysis rests on two pillars: consent to enter and the existence of probable cause. First, the court emphasized that Glover invited Deputy Albanese into her home after he identified himself as law enforcement. Under Payton and its progeny, voluntary consent dispenses with the warrant requirement, so no Fourth Amendment violation occurred in the entry.

Second, the court detailed the facts supporting probable cause:

Surveillance video showed a woman using counterfeit twenty-dollar bills at a grocery store.
Deputy Albanese visually inspected the bills and noted the absence of the proper watermark.
He traced the transaction to Glover via the store’s rewards card and DMV photos.
Glover admitted being the purchaser and using twenty-dollar bills at the store.

Those facts, held the court, were “sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution” that Glover knowingly passed forged instruments, satisfying N.Y. Penal Law § 170.30 and the probable-cause standard in Jaegly and Weyant. The court clarified that rejecting a suspect’s “innocent” explanation does not negate probable cause (citing Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018)).

On due process, the court applied Riverside and McLaughlin to conclude that releasing Glover without formal charges after approximately four hours did not implicate a constitutional violation or trigger a private right of action under N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 140.20. Finally, her Monell claim failed because she could not show any injury from signing a release form or any policy causing a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Impact

Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff’s Dept. offers important guidance for both law enforcement and civil-rights litigants:

It reaffirms that voluntary consent to entry eliminates the need for a warrant, even when an arrest follows shortly thereafter.
The decision underscores that police officers need not accept a suspect’s post-arrest explanation or forensic evidence to maintain probable cause.
Summary-judgment motions may be deemed unopposed when a party fails to file any response, and Rule 56(d) relief requires a clear showing that withheld evidence is material.
Municipal liability claims under Monell remain dependent on demonstrating both a constitutional violation and actual injury.

Going forward, law enforcement agencies will rely on Glover to defend warrantless, consent-based home entries followed by arrests supported by surveillance and physical evidence. Similarly, plaintiffs challenging such arrests must identify concrete deficiencies in consent or probable cause, or risk summary judgment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable Cause: A reasonable belief—based on facts and trustworthy information—that a suspect committed a crime. It does not require certainty or proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Consent to Enter: A voluntary agreement by a homeowner or occupant allowing police to enter a private residence without a warrant. Once given, entry is lawful and no separate exigent-circumstances showing is needed.
Monell Liability: A municipality can be sued under § 1983 only if a municipal policy or custom causes a constitutional violation and the plaintiff suffers actual injury as a result.
Rule 56(d) Relief: Allows a party opposing summary judgment to request more time for discovery by showing that additional, non-cumulative evidence is material and cannot be obtained without undue hardship.

Conclusion

Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff's Dept. clarifies that warrantless home arrests based on voluntary consent and supported by surveillance and physical evidence do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The decision reinforces the importance of clear consent and establishes that officers need not accept every post-arrest explanation to maintain probable cause. It also illustrates the strict requirements for discovery-based delays and municipal liability under § 1983. As a practical matter, Glover refines the balance between individual privacy rights in the home and the investigatory prerogatives of law enforcement in counterfeiting and similar offenses.