Consciousness-of-Guilt and Intent: Wyoming High Court Affirms Admissibility of “Going Back to Prison” Statements Under W.R.E. 404(b) in Felony Stalking

Case: Jason Scott Bragdon v. The State of Wyoming, 2025 WY 112 (Wyo. Oct. 10, 2025)

Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming

Author: Overfield, D.J., for the Court

Disposition: Affirmed

Introduction

In this felony stalking appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming clarifies when a defendant’s own references to “going back to prison” can be admitted under Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prove intent, motive, and consciousness of guilt. After a jury convicted Jason Scott Bragdon of felony stalking of his spouse, the trial court admitted two pieces of evidence over a 404(b) objection: a text message to the victim stating, among other things, “I will go back to prison … I will die before I go back,” and a recorded statement to a responding officer that he “may go back to prison.” The defense argued these references were propensity evidence suggesting prior bad acts. The Wyoming Supreme Court disagreed, holding the district court acted within its discretion in admitting the statements for proper, non-propensity purposes central to the specific intent element of stalking.

This opinion reinforces Wyoming’s structured Gleason framework for 404(b) decisions, recognizes “consciousness of guilt” as a valid 404(b) purpose when the statements are closely connected to the charged conduct, and underscores the importance of a tailored approach that balances probative value against unfair prejudice.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the admission, under W.R.E. 404(b), of (1) a text message in which Mr. Bragdon told the victim he had “nothing to lose,” would “go back to prison,” and would “die before [he] go[es] back,” and (2) a body-camera recorded statement to a police officer that he “may go back to prison.” The trial court found these statements admissible for proper purposes—intent, motive, and consciousness of guilt—after conducting a Gleason analysis. The Supreme Court held that, given the specific intent element of felony stalking, those statements were relevant to show an intent to harass and a guilty mind, and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Court emphasized the district court’s careful tailoring, including exclusion of more prejudicial references (e.g., detailed mentions of a prior conviction and parole) and the availability of a limiting instruction upon request.

Factual and Procedural Background

In 2023, Mr. Bragdon married Helene Reimers. After a brief cohabitation, Ms. Reimers asked him to leave. He continued contacting her frequently—visiting the home, banging on doors, yelling, driving by, following her from places, and sending numerous calls, texts, emails, and direct messages that alternated between conciliatory and hostile.
On October 21, after following her home, he banged on her door, demanded entry, damaged the door, and continued sending threatening messages.
On October 27, after further drive-bys and “blowing up” her phone, he texted: “I have nothing to lose. So remember that. I will go back to prison. I don't give a f**k anymore. Nothing for me here like you said. So why keep living. And I will die before I go back.”
The responding officer took a report, observed damage, and spoke with Mr. Bragdon, who stated on body camera: “I don't know why I can't be left with a warning on this … I know to leave her alone now … I may lose my job. I may go back to prison.”
The State charged felony stalking under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6‑2‑506(b) and (e)(i) (enhanced based on a 2022 stalking conviction). After a Gleason hearing, the court admitted the quoted text and the “may go back to prison” recorded statement but excluded other references to the prior conviction and parole. A jury convicted; the court imposed a 4–8 year sentence.

Issue Presented

Whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting, under W.R.E. 404(b), (1) a text message and (2) a recorded statement that referenced “going back to prison.”

The Court’s Holding

No abuse of discretion. The statements were admissible under W.R.E. 404(b) for the proper purposes of proving intent, motive, and consciousness of guilt. They were relevant to the specific intent element of stalking and, in context, constituted circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer a harassing purpose and awareness of wrongdoing. The district court conducted the required Gleason analysis, tailored the admission to minimize unfair prejudice, and offered a limiting instruction (which the defense did not request).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Dickerson v. State, 2025 WY 26, 564 P.3d 587 (Wyo. 2025): Establishes that a pretrial demand for 404(b) notice functions as an objection, triggering abuse-of-discretion review, and reiterates the Gleason four-part test. The Court used Dickerson to frame both the standard of review and the required analytical steps.
Freer v. State, 2023 WY 80, 533 P.3d 897 (Wyo. 2023), quoting Olson v. State, 2023 WY 11, 523 P.3d 910: Reaffirms the core 404(b) principle that a defendant should not be convicted because he is an “unsavory person” or due to past bad acts, but only for the charged crime. This principle animated the Court’s careful scrutiny of how the prison references were used for non-propensity purposes.
King v. State, 2023 WY 36, 527 P.3d 1229; Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332: Provide the “exacting analysis” framework: (1) proper purpose; (2) relevance; (3) Rule 403 balancing; and (4) limiting instruction upon request. The district court expressly applied this framework.
Bray v. State, 2024 WY 120, 559 P.3d 149; Gonsalves v. State, 2024 WY 49, 547 P.3d 340: Confirm stalking’s specific intent element and that intent can be inferred from conduct and circumstances. The Court relied on Bray to hold the statements supported inferences of intent to harass.
Anderson v. State, 2022 WY 119, 517 P.3d 583; Bhutto v. State, 2005 WY 78, 114 P.3d 1252: Recognize that prior-acts evidence can be admissible to prove motive and intent. These authorities buttressed the State’s claimed purposes.
Jackson v. State, 2021 WY 92, 492 P.3d 911; Palmer v. State, 2009 WY 129, 218 P.3d 941; Wiese v. State, 2016 WY 72, 375 P.3d 805: Endorse use of other-acts evidence to prove “consciousness of guilt,” i.e., that the defendant’s own statements or conduct demonstrate awareness of wrongdoing, which in turn makes culpability more likely. Wiese further recognizes such evidence may help establish the specific intent required by a charged offense.
Vinson v. State, 2020 WY 93, 467 P.3d 1009; Broberg v. State, 2018 WY 113, 428 P.3d 167: If there is no error in admitting evidence, appellate courts need not reach prejudice. Applied here to conclude the analysis once admissibility was affirmed.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning tracks the Gleason test, applied through an abuse-of-discretion lens: the appellate court asks only whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did.

1) Proper Purpose under W.R.E. 404(b)

The State noticed the evidence to show intent, motive, and consciousness of guilt—each an accepted, non-propensity purpose under Rule 404(b). The district court admitted only two statements closely tied to the charged conduct:

The text to the victim: “I have nothing to lose … I will go back to prison … I will die before I go back.”
The body-cam statement to the officer: “I … know to leave her alone now … I may lose my job. I may go back to prison.”

The district court rejected more detailed references to prior convictions and parole, thereby cabining the risk of improper propensity inferences. The Supreme Court agreed that the admitted snippets, in context, were properly directed to (a) intent/motive to harass and (b) an awareness that the ongoing conduct was wrongful and had penal consequences (consciousness of guilt).

2) Relevance to Specific Intent and “Consciousness of Guilt”

Felony stalking is a specific intent crime requiring proof that the defendant, with intent to harass, engaged in a course of conduct reasonably likely to harass. The statute’s definition of “harass” includes written threats directed at a specific person that the defendant knew or should have known would cause a reasonable person to fear for their safety. Given the broader pattern of following, drive-bys, door-banging, and incessant communications, the text message’s “nothing to lose … will go back to prison … will die before I go back” language reasonably supports an inference of a directed threat likely to cause fear, thereby evidencing motive and specific intent to harass.

The statements also reflect “consciousness of guilt”: asking for a warning, acknowledging “I know to leave her alone now,” and forecasting job loss and prison demonstrate awareness of wrongdoing and its consequences, which, under Wyoming precedents, makes it more likely the defendant is guilty of the charged conduct. The Court accepted the trial court’s characterization of the exchange with law enforcement as “bargaining,” further indicating awareness and culpability.

3) Balancing Probative Value and Unfair Prejudice

The third Gleason factor mirrors Rule 403: whether probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The trial court’s tailoring was critical. It:

Admitted only the defendant’s own, contemporaneous statements tethered to the charged conduct;
Excluded more inflammatory references (e.g., the victim’s testimony about a prior conviction and other video segments referencing parole or the prior conviction); and
Offered a limiting instruction upon request.

These steps concentrated the jury’s attention on the statements’ state-of-mind value while trimming unnecessary propensity risk. The Supreme Court found the balance reasonable, especially given the centrality of intent in stalking and the statements’ direct relevance to that element.

4) Limiting Instruction and Preservation

Gleason requires a limiting instruction “upon request.” The trial court stood ready to give one, but the defense did not request it. The absence of an instruction therefore did not undermine the ruling or create error.

5) Direct Evidence vs. 404(b)

The State suggested the text was direct evidence of the crime rather than “other acts” evidence, presumably because it was part of the stalking course of conduct. The Court declined to reach that question, noting the district court’s analysis under 404(b) was sound and sufficient. This leaves open whether, in future cases, such integrated statements are “intrinsic” to the charged offense and therefore outside 404(b). Practitioners should be prepared to argue both routes and request limiting instructions where appropriate.

Impact and Implications

This opinion crystallizes several practice points and likely effects:

Expanded clarity on consciousness-of-guilt evidence: A defendant’s acknowledgment that his ongoing conduct may send him “back to prison,” coupled with requests for leniency and admissions like “I know to leave her alone now,” can be admitted under 404(b) to show a guilty mind and to support specific intent.
State-of-mind probative value in stalking/dating violence contexts: Threat-laden or consequence-aware communications to the victim are powerful circumstantial evidence of intent to harass, especially when paired with a pattern of surveillance, following, or property damage.
Tailoring matters: Courts can and should excise unnecessary or redundant references to prior convictions/parole to reduce prejudice while retaining portions of statements that illuminate intent and motive.
Limiting instructions remain vital: Because they are required only upon request, defense counsel should timely request them to focus the jury on the permitted purpose and to preserve related arguments.
No license for wholesale propensity use: The decision does not greenlight blanket admission of prior-crime evidence. It underscores disciplined application of Gleason and the Rule 403 balance, with context and necessity driving admissibility.
Potential use beyond stalking: Although arising in a stalking case, the reasoning naturally extends to other specific intent crimes where a defendant’s contemporaneous statements about legal consequences may reveal motive, intent, or guilty consciousness.

Complex Concepts Simplified

W.R.E. 404(b): A rule that generally bars using “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” to show a person acted in line with a bad character, but allows such evidence for other purposes—like proving motive, intent, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake—if relevant and not unduly prejudicial.
Gleason analysis: Wyoming’s four-step process for admitting 404(b) evidence: (1) identify a proper non-propensity purpose; (2) ensure relevance; (3) confirm probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; and (4) give a limiting instruction if the accused requests one.
Consciousness of guilt: Evidence that suggests the defendant knew he was doing something wrong (e.g., bargaining for a warning, acknowledging likely legal consequences). Such awareness can make it more likely the defendant is guilty of the charged offense.
Specific intent crime: A crime that requires proof the defendant acted with a particular purpose or objective beyond the act itself. Felony stalking requires proof the defendant acted “with intent to harass.”
Harass (under § 6‑2‑506): Includes written threats directed at a specific person that the defendant knew or should have known would cause a reasonable person to fear for their safety. It is assessed in context and from the standpoint of a reasonable person.
Rule 403 balancing: Even if evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice (like inflaming the jury or prompting a decision on an improper basis).
Abuse of discretion standard: On appeal, the question is not whether the reviewing court would admit the evidence, but whether the trial court could reasonably have admitted it based on the law and the record.

What This Decision Is—and Is Not

Is: A confirmation that defendant-authored statements referencing incarceration consequences, made during and about the charged conduct, can be admitted under 404(b) to prove intent, motive, and consciousness of guilt, if the Gleason framework and Rule 403 balancing are satisfied.
Is Not: A blanket rule permitting prior conviction or parole status to be paraded before a jury. The district court’s exclusion of other prison/parole references illustrates the required restraint.
Leaves Open: Whether such integrated statements can alternatively be treated as direct (intrinsic) evidence of the offense, outside 404(b). The Court did not reach that question because the 404(b) analysis sufficed to affirm.

Conclusion

Bragdon v. State provides authoritative guidance on the admissibility of defendant-authored “going back to prison” statements in stalking prosecutions. By affirming admission under W.R.E. 404(b) for the purposes of intent, motive, and consciousness of guilt—while upholding careful exclusion of more prejudicial references—the Wyoming Supreme Court reinforces the disciplined, four-part Gleason process and clarifies how such statements can be powerful, permissible proof of specific intent. The ruling is poised to influence stalking and other specific intent prosecutions where defendants’ own words reveal both their motive to intimidate and their awareness of wrongdoing, so long as trial courts tailor the evidence and conduct the required balancing to avoid unfair propensity inferences.