Introduction

In Conlon v. Scaltreto, the First Circuit (per curiam) addressed a fatal police shooting arising out of a mental-health crisis in Newton, Massachusetts. After officers responded to a report of an armed robbery at a candy store, Michael Conlon fled into the stairwell of his adjacent apartment building, displayed a small kitchen knife, expressed delusional beliefs, and threatened self-harm. A prolonged negotiation followed. When Conlon dropped his knife and a fire extinguisher, a sergeant attempted to incapacitate him with a beanbag shotgun (a less‑than‑lethal tool) but the weapon misfired. Moments later, a trooper deployed a taser and two officers fired their handguns, killing Conlon. A regional crisis-negotiation and tactical team arrived six minutes after the shooting.

Conlon’s parents (as personal representatives) sued individual Newton police officers and the City of Newton under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Amendment excessive force and municipal liability), the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and Massachusetts tort law. The district court dismissed the case in full at the pleading stage. The First Circuit:

• Vacated the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim against the individual officers as to the fatal shooting and remanded for discovery;
• Affirmed qualified immunity for the officer who attempted to use a beanbag shotgun (and for commanding officers on that decision), finding no clearly established prohibition in the circumstances pleaded;
• Affirmed dismissal of municipal liability (Monell) and ADA/Rehabilitation Act claims against the City; and
• Affirmed dismissal of the MCRA claim and deemed certain state claims waived on appeal.

Judge Aframe dissented in part, concluding that the beanbag-shotgun excessive-force claim should also proceed to discovery because (in his view) deploying escalatory force immediately after the suspect disarmed contravened clearly established First Circuit law prohibiting increased force against a non‑resisting person.

Summary of the Opinion

• Standard of review: On Rule 12(b)(6), the court credits nonconclusory allegations and reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor.
• Excessive force – beanbag shotgun: The panel affirmed qualified immunity for the sergeant who aimed and attempted to fire a beanbag shotgun from about 12 feet at Conlon’s collarbone (on captains’ instruction). In the totality of circumstances—including perceived continuing volatility, close quarters, and policy authorizing beanbag use where tasers were likely ineffective (thick winter clothing)—an objectively reasonable officer could believe the action lawful. The absence of controlling or consensus authority to the contrary reinforced qualified immunity.
• Excessive force – fatal shooting: The court vacated dismissal and remanded because key facts were unresolved at the pleading stage, especially whether Conlon had rearmed with a knife and advanced when officers fired. Deadly force is reasonable only when the suspect poses an immediate threat; if unarmed and not threatening, clearly established law would prohibit lethal force. Discovery is needed.
• MCRA: Dismissal affirmed. The MCRA requires threats, intimidation, or coercion in addition to the underlying rights violation; bare excessive force does not suffice under Massachusetts law.
• Monell (failure to train): Dismissal affirmed. Plaintiffs alleged only a single incident, pleaded no pattern of similar violations, and described that the City had some training, including access to a social worker and a regional Council team. That was insufficient to show “deliberate indifference.”
• ADA/Rehabilitation Act: Dismissal affirmed. Even assuming Title II applies pre‑scene‑security and assuming arguendo that claims could be framed against high‑level city officers, plaintiffs did not plausibly plead discrimination “by reason of” disability or denial of services, nor a specific, reasonable accommodation that officers failed to provide in the fast‑evolving context. The Rehabilitation Act claim fell with the ADA claim.
• Waiver: Plaintiffs waived challenges to dismissal of wrongful-death and common-law assault claims by not meaningfully briefing them on appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Fourth Amendment excessive force:
  • Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): Reasonableness is judged from the perspective of an officer on the scene; emphasizes split-second decisionmaking.
  • McKenney v. Mangino, 873 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2017): Deadly force violates clearly established law where an individual in a mental-health crisis slowly approached with a firearm lowered; reiterates “immediate threat” threshold for lethal force.
  • Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2005) and Est. of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 2008): Deadly force justified only for an immediate threat of serious physical harm.
  • Est. of Rahim v. Doe, 51 F.4th 402 (1st Cir. 2022): Knife wielder within 25 feet; analysis of immediacy and threat; supports officers’ perspective on close‑quarters risk.
  • Stamps v. City of Framingham, 813 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2016): Fourth Amendment seizure and reasonableness framework.
• Qualified immunity:
  • Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7 (2020): QI shields officials unless unlawfulness was clearly established.
  • Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011); Conlogue v. Hamilton, 906 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2018); Rahim: “Clearly established” requires controlling or consensus authority; the court also asks whether a reasonable officer would know the conduct violated the law in the situation faced.
  • Johnson v. City of Biddeford, 92 F.4th 367 (1st Cir. 2024); Bannon v. Godin, 99 F.4th 63 (1st Cir. 2024): Emphasize officer-on-the-scene perspective in tense, evolving situations.
• Less‑lethal beanbag deployment:
  • Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 2003); Cortesluna v. Leon, 979 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2020), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Rivas‑Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1 (2021); Glenn v. City of Columbus, 375 F. App’x 928 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished): These cases, among others, reflect no clear consensus condemning beanbag use in analogous scenarios.
  • Dissent’s counter‑authorities: Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001); Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2005); Myers v. Brewer, 773 F. App’x 1032 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished); and First Circuit cases like Jennings v. Jones, 499 F.3d 2 (1st Cir. 2007), Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2010), and Parker v. Gerrish, 547 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008), which hold that escalating force against a now‑compliant or non‑resisting person is unconstitutional.
• Massachusetts Civil Rights Act:
  • Longval v. Comm’r of Corr., 404 Mass. 325 (1989); Sarvis v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 711 N.E.2d 911 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999): MCRA requires threats, intimidation, or coercion beyond the underlying violation.
• Monell municipal liability:
  • Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985): No respondeat superior; failure‑to‑train liability requires a policy/custom, causation, and deliberate indifference—often evidenced by a pattern of similar violations.
  • Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2005); Connick, 563 U.S. at 62: Single‑incident liability is a “narrow” exception requiring an obvious, highly predictable risk.
  • Cosenza v. City of Worcester, 120 F.4th 30 (1st Cir. 2024); Bannon, 99 F.4th 63 (1st Cir. 2024): Stringent deliberate‑indifference standard reaffirmed.
• ADA/Rehabilitation Act:
  • Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158 (1st Cir. 2006): Question left open whether Title II imposes a police duty to draft policies/train on mental illness; cannot premise a Title II claim on the inadequacy of training where training exists.
  • City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600 (2015): Left unresolved key Title II application issues in dynamic arrest settings.
  • Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2000) and Rubin v. De La Cruz, 2025 WL 764603 (5th Cir. 2025): Reluctant to extend Title II to pre‑secured, rapidly evolving police encounters.
  • Jones v. City of Detroit, 20 F.4th 1117 (6th Cir. 2021) (Sutton, C.J.): Skeptical of vicarious municipal liability under Title II for officers’ street‑level decisions; the First Circuit expressed agreement but resolved the case on narrower grounds.
  • Bircoll v. Miami‑Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072 (11th Cir. 2007); Bahl v. County of Ramsey, 695 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 2012); Roell v. Hamilton County, 870 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2017): Reasonableness of accommodation is context‑specific in police settings.
  • Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019): ADA analysis is distinct from Fourth Amendment force analysis.

Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds claim‑by‑claim, anchored in Rule 12(b)(6)’s requirement to accept well‑pleaded facts and reasonable inferences for the plaintiff, and then applying qualified immunity or statutory standards as appropriate.

1) Beanbag shotgun: qualified immunity affirmed

The court assumed the beanbag-shotgun episode constituted a separate seizure and a plausible excessive-force claim, but resolved the case under qualified immunity’s second prong. Even if a constitutional violation could be posited, the unlawfulness was not clearly established in January 2021 on the pleaded facts. Three strands of reasoning drove the result:

• No controlling First Circuit or Supreme Court case squarely forbade aiming and attempting to fire a beanbag shotgun at a collarbone from 12 feet in a narrow hallway during an unstable standoff, and no consensus of persuasive authority from other circuits clearly prohibited it. The panel cited decisions upholding beanbag deployments in various high‑risk contexts.
• Objective reasonableness under Graham: Officers could still perceive Conlon as a volatile, immediate threat despite his momentary disarmament—his knife remained at his feet; he had previously threatened self-harm; Officer Scaltreto stood ~12 feet away; other officers were ~20 feet away; and the scene was tense. The beanbag was aimed at the breastbone (not head/heart), from a distance consistent with control tactics, and selected after troopers doubted taser efficacy due to thick clothing. Under NPD General Order 301, beanbag use is authorized to prevent suicide and to obtain compliance when lesser force is ineffective/inappropriate.
• Malfunction was not foreseeable: Nothing in the pleadings suggested the officers should have anticipated the misfire or that the malfunction itself rendered the attempt unreasonable.

The dissent read the record differently at the pleading stage: once Conlon dropped the knife and fire extinguisher in reliance on assurances that he would not be harmed, further escalatory force (even less‑lethal) was unreasonable and contrary to clearly established First Circuit precedent against increasing force on a now‑compliant person (Jennings, Raiche, Parker).

2) Fatal shooting: dismissal vacated and remanded

Unlike the beanbag episode, the court held it could not resolve qualified immunity for the fatal shots on a bare complaint because dispositive facts remain disputed or undeveloped:

• Whether Conlon rearmed with the knife after the beanbag misfire, the speed and manner of his movement, whether he posed an imminent threat, whether warnings were given, and timing between the misfire and gunfire.
• The complaint alleges “inconsistent statements” by officers about whether Conlon picked the knife back up, and that no photographic proof substantiated the claim that the knife was near him when he was killed.

The court reiterated the governing rule: deadly force is reasonable only where the suspect presents an immediate threat to officers or others. If Conlon was unarmed or did not pose an imminent threat, existing First Circuit law (e.g., McKenney; Bennett; Young) would make the use of lethal force unconstitutional and clearly established. Because the “armed advancement” premise is unsettled on the pleadings, discovery is required.

3) MCRA: coercion beyond the violation is required

Massachusetts’ MCRA requires interference with secured rights by “threats, intimidation, or coercion,” in addition to the underlying violation. The court followed Longval and Sarvis: allegations of excessive force alone do not suffice. Plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that the beanbag deployment or any other act coerced Conlon to surrender some separate right; dismissal was affirmed.

4) Monell failure-to-train: single incident and “minimal” training fall short

The City cannot be held vicariously liable for officers’ acts under § 1983; failure‑to‑train liability requires (1) municipal policy/custom, (2) causation, and (3) deliberate indifference. Plaintiffs alleged only this single incident and no pattern of similar violations. They also alleged—and the record reflected—some training and resources (a full‑time social worker; calling the regional Council). Those facts undermine deliberate indifference, particularly given the “stringent” standard and the narrowness of single‑incident liability recognized in Young and Connick. Dismissal was affirmed.

5) ADA and Rehabilitation Act: no plausible failure-to-accommodate or training-based claim

The panel took a narrow path. It assumed arguendo that Title II can apply before a scene is secured, that high‑level officials might be sued in some posture as a public entity surrogate, and that Conlon was a qualified individual. Even so, the complaint did not plausibly allege:

• Discrimination “by reason of” disability (as opposed to use‑of‑force decisions driven by perceived safety risks),
• Denial of access to any “services, programs, or activities,” or
• A specific reasonable accommodation that was obvious and feasible in the rapidly evolving circumstances yet ignored.

Consistent with Buchanan, a Title II claim cannot rest merely on “inadequate training” where training existed. Given the overlap of the Rehabilitation Act’s standards with the ADA’s, those claims failed as well.

Impact and Significance

A. Clarifying qualified immunity for less‑lethal force in the First Circuit

The panel’s beanbag ruling sets an important marker: in a close‑quarters, volatile encounter with a mentally ill person who has only momentarily disarmed and whose knife remains within reach, an officer’s aimed attempt to deploy a beanbag round at the upper torso can be objectively reasonable—or at least not clearly prohibited by established law. The court emphasized the absence of controlling/cross‑circuit consensus marking such conduct as unconstitutional, the foreseeability of taser ineffectiveness, and the non‑foreseeability of a malfunction. Plaintiffs face a heightened burden to find factually similar authority or to allege facts showing that the specific less‑lethal deployment was plainly excessive given clear de‑escalation, non‑resistance, and less‑intrusive alternatives that were both available and ignored.

The dissent flags a competing doctrinal current: First Circuit cases clearly bar escalating force against a non‑resisting person. This split in emphasis suggests that future beanbag or less‑lethal cases may turn on careful pleading and proof about the suspect’s compliance immediately before force, the immediacy of the threat, and whether officers gave additional commands or had less‑intrusive means ready to hand.

B. Lethal force claims will often survive Rule 12(b)(6) where “immediate threat” turns on disputed facts

The remand reinforces that qualified immunity is sometimes ill‑suited for resolution at the pleading stage when central facts—armed/unarmed status, movement, warnings, distances, and timing—are unresolved or disputed. Plaintiffs who plead officer inconsistencies and the absence of corroborating physical evidence (e.g., knife location photographs) can often secure discovery on lethal‑force claims. Defendants seeking early dismissal should expect courts to require a factual record where the “immediate threat” inquiry is fact‑bound.

C. ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims in street‑level police encounters remain difficult

The panel’s approach channels Buchanan and the post‑Sheehan landscape: Title II claims premised on “inadequate” training fail where training exists, and failure‑to‑accommodate theories must plausibly allege that differential treatment occurred “by reason of” disability and that a specific, feasible accommodation was required in context. Even while assuming arguendo that Title II can apply pre‑security and that certain high‑level actors might be proper defendants, the court found no plausible ADA discrimination on these facts. The opinion also signals agreement with Jones v. City of Detroit’s skepticism about vicarious municipal liability under Title II for line‑officer field decisions—though it stopped short of a holding. Together, these cues keep ADA claims in police‑encounter settings narrow in the First Circuit.

D. Monell and MCRA boundaries reaffirmed

Conlon underscores two recurring limits:

• Monell’s “deliberate indifference” is a stringent standard; a single incident, “minimal” training allegations, and the existence of at least some training/resources will rarely suffice absent an obvious, highly predictable risk or a pattern of similar violations.
• MCRA is not a coextensive substitute for § 1983. Without separate “threats, intimidation, or coercion” that cause a person to forfeit a distinct right, a force‑only claim fails under the MCRA.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified Immunity: A shield for officials unless (1) they violated a constitutional/statutory right and (2) the right was clearly established at the time—meaning existing precedent put the unlawfulness beyond debate for the situation the officer faced.
• Clearly Established Law: Not a general rule; it requires either binding precedent or a robust consensus of persuasive cases with materially similar facts. Ambiguity in the caselaw typically favors qualified immunity.
• Graham Reasonableness Factors: Courts weigh the severity of the crime, immediacy of the threat, and active resistance or flight, viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.
• Monell Liability: Municipal liability for a policy/custom that causes a constitutional violation, shown with deliberate indifference—usually through a pattern of similar incidents. A single event rarely suffices.
• MCRA (Massachusetts): Requires rights interference “by threats, intimidation, or coercion” beyond the underlying violation; excessive force alone is not enough.
• ADA Title II in Policing: Applies to public entities. In fast‑moving police encounters, plaintiffs must plausibly allege discrimination “by reason of” disability and a reasonable, feasible accommodation that officers should have provided under the circumstances.

Practical Implications and What Discovery Will Likely Matter on Remand

• Fatal shooting claim:
  • Whether Conlon rearmed with the knife; location of the knife at the time of shots; body‑worn camera footage; photographs; forensic mapping of shell casings and trajectories; autopsy timing and wound paths.
  • Exact distances and angles in the hallway; whether warnings were given; how much time elapsed between beanbag misfire and gunfire; taser deployment timing and effectiveness.
  • Radio traffic and on‑scene statements; internal reports revealing “inconsistent statements.”
• Beanbag claim (though affirmed on QI here):
  • Agency policy (General Order 301), beanbag round specifications, training logs, malfunction records and maintenance history; whether officers had safer aiming alternatives (lower body) and time to issue additional commands post‑disarmament.
• ADA accommodations (for future cases):
  • Specific accommodations proposed and refused (e.g., time for negotiation team arrival, allowing brief contact with family as a de‑escalation tool, repositioning to increase distance), and whether such measures were feasible given safety constraints.

How Conlon Adjusts the Law’s Trajectory

• Less‑lethal force: The decision fortifies qualified‑immunity protection for beanbag use in the First Circuit when deployed in close quarters against a volatile subject with immediate access to a weapon, especially where tasers may be ineffective. Plaintiffs will likely need more precise allegations (and later proof) of non‑resistance and less‑intrusive alternatives to overcome QI.
• Deadly force: Courts will hesitate to grant Rule 12(b)(6) immunity where immediate‑threat facts are disputed. Complaints that foreground contradictions among officer accounts and the absence of corroborating physical evidence can avert early dismissal.
• ADA/RA: The opinion preserves a narrow pathway for Title II claims in street‑level encounters, requiring robust, context‑sensitive allegations of disability‑based discrimination and reasonable, feasible accommodations. Pure “failure to train” theories are weak where training exists.
• MCRA/Monell: The case reaffirms known limits and will likely deter attempts to “repackage” excessive‑force claims under those statutes absent additional coercion or a pattern of training failures.

Conclusion

Conlon v. Scaltreto delivers a nuanced map for police‑encounter litigation in the First Circuit. The court drew a sharp distinction between less‑lethal and lethal force at the pleading stage. It granted qualified immunity for a beanbag‑shotgun attempt where officers faced a volatile, close‑quarters risk and where no clearly established precedent forbade such deployment—an outcome that will often protect officers using less‑lethal tools in similar settings. At the same time, the court reopened the door to discovery on the fatal‑shooting claim, emphasizing that whether a suspect was armed and posed an immediate threat is a fact‑intensive inquiry rarely suited to Rule 12(b)(6) resolution when the complaint plausibly alleges officer inconsistency.

On the periphery, the opinion tightens the spigots for auxiliary claims: MCRA requires coercion beyond force; Monell demands far more than a single incident and “minimal” training; and ADA/RA claims must be grounded in genuine disability‑based discrimination and feasible accommodations, not simply post‑hoc critiques of tactics in rapidly evolving crises. The dissent, however, highlights a counter‑current—that escalating force after compliance may violate clearly established law—signaling that less‑lethal cases will hinge on precise proof of compliance, commands, alternatives, and immediacy of threat.

The upshot is clear: plaintiffs should frame deadly‑force allegations with granular factual detail challenging the immediacy of the threat; municipalities should document training, the availability of specialized resources, and decision‑trees tailored to mental‑health crises; and litigants on both sides should expect courts to scrutinize the gap between disarmament and force, the availability of less‑intrusive alternatives, and the evidentiary record of what officers knew and when they knew it.