Congress’s Exclusive Habeas Jurisdiction over CAT Claims in Extradition: Interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4)

Introduction

This commentary examines the Second Circuit’s March 26, 2025 decision in Kapoor v. DeMarco, which clarified whether U.S. courts retain habeas‐corpus jurisdiction to review Convention Against Torture (CAT) claims in an extradition context. Petitioner Monika Kapoor, an Indian national facing extradition to India on fraud and forgery charges, challenged the Secretary of State’s refusal to block her surrender on the ground she would likely face torture. The district court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4), enacted by the REAL ID Act, divests federal habeas courts of jurisdiction to entertain such CAT‐based habeas petitions. In an appeal raising statutory interpretation and constitutional arguments under the Suspension Clause, the Second Circuit affirmed.

Key issues:

Does § 1252(a)(4) “plainly” and “unambiguously” bar habeas review of CAT claims in extradition?
If so, does that bar violate the Suspension Clause by removing a historically protected habeas remedy?
How does the “rule of non‐inquiry” in extradition inform the constitutional analysis?

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit unanimously held:

Statutory Bar: Section 1252(a)(4) contains an explicit reference to “section 2241 of Title 28” and “any other habeas corpus provision,” declaring that a petition for review of a final order of removal is “the sole and exclusive means for judicial review” of any CAT claim. This clear statement bars habeas petitions by extraditees challenging anticipated torture abroad.
No Suspension Clause Violation: Historically, extradition habeas petitions never permitted courts to evaluate the likely treatment of an individual in the requesting country (the “rule of non‐inquiry”). Because such relief was never available at common law, Congress did not unconstitutionally suspend the writ by depriving courts of that non‐historical form of review.
Affirmation: The district court correctly dismissed Kapoor’s § 2241 petition for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001): Established the “clear‐statement” rule for reading jurisdictional bars to habeas relief.
Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003): Held that FARRA’s original § 2242(d) did not mention § 2241 or “habeas corpus,” thus did not bar habeas review of CAT claims.
Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011): Interpreted § 1252(a)(4) to bar habeas review of CAT claims by military transferees and extraditees.
Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2007): Applied rule of non‐inquiry to deny habeas review of CAT claims in extradition.
Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc): Narrowly construed § 1252(a)(4) to allow minimal habeas review only to confirm literal consideration of the CAT claim.
Historic Supreme Court decisions (e.g., Benson v. McMahon, Neely v. Henkel, Munaf v. Geren) establishing extradition habeas as a limited inquiry into authority and evidence, not merits of foreign trial conditions.

Legal Reasoning

1. Plain‐Meaning and Clear‐Statement: Section 1252(a)(4) explicitly mentions “section 2241” and “any other habeas corpus provision” and declares a petition for review of a removal order to be “the sole and exclusive means” for any CAT cause or claim. Under St. Cyr, implications or legislative history cannot override a statutory text that clearly restricts habeas jurisdiction.

2. Avoidance of Surplusage: Section 1252(a)(5) already bars habeas review of challenges to removal orders. Reading § 1252(a)(4) to do no more than § 1252(a)(5) would render it superfluous. Instead, § 1252(a)(4) must bar habeas review of CAT claims even outside the removal context, including extradition proceedings.

3. Rule of Non‐Inquiry and Separation of Powers: The historical practice—confirmed by Benson, Neely, Glucksman and reaffirmed in Munaf—prohibits courts from evaluating the fairness of foreign justice systems in extradition habeas proceedings. That role belongs to the political branches, particularly the Secretary of State implementing treaties and foreign‐policy judgments.

4. Suspension Clause: The Suspension Clause protects only those habeas remedies traditionally available in Anglo‐American practice. Since relief based on anticipated foreign torture was never cognizable in extradition habeas petitions, depriving courts of such review does not impair the core writ protected by the Clause.

Impact

This decision will guide future extradition and CAT litigation by confirming:

Extraditees cannot bring CAT claims in federal habeas petitions; their remedy lies exclusively in petitions for review of removal orders, subject to narrow exceptions in § 1252(e).
Court challenges to anticipated foreign torture must be brought through the political‐diplomatic process, not the judiciary.
Other Circuits are likely to follow the D.C., Fourth and now Second Circuit view, rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s limited‐review approach.
The decision reinforces the “rule of non‐inquiry” as a separation‐of‐powers guardrail in extradition.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Non‐self‐executing treaty: A treaty whose provisions do not by themselves create enforceable private rights in U.S. courts unless Congress implements them by statute.
Convention Against Torture (CAT): An international agreement prohibiting State Parties from returning anyone to a place where they face a more‐likely‐than‐not risk of torture.
Rule of Non‐Inquiry: A doctrine stating that courts, in extradition habeas petitions, will not examine the fairness of foreign criminal justice systems or conditions of detention abroad.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4): A provision of the REAL ID Act stating that a petition for review of removal is the “sole and exclusive” judicial remedy for any CAT claim, explicitly barring habeas under § 2241 or any other habeas corpus statute.
Suspension Clause: The Constitution’s protection against Congress suspending the writ of habeas corpus except in rebellion or invasion—protecting only those habeas remedies traditionally recognized.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit in Kapoor v. DeMarco held that Congress’s 2005 amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4), plainly and unambiguously stripped federal courts of habeas jurisdiction to review CAT‐based claims in extradition cases. Because the historical common‐law writ never encompassed review of prospective treatment in a requesting country, this jurisdictional bar does not violate the Suspension Clause. The decision affirms that compliance with the Convention Against Torture in extradition is the province of the Secretary of State under treaty implementation statutes, not the judiciary.