Conflicts, Collateral Orders, and Screening:
The Supreme Court Clarifies When Prosecutorial Conflicts Disqualify the Office of the Attorney General

Introduction

Case: Commonwealth v. Torres (2025 MP 5) — Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (“CNMI”).
Parties: The Commonwealth (Appellant) v. Ralph Anthony DLG. Torres, former Governor (Appellee).
Central Question: Does the exposure of two prosecutors to privileged information require vicarious disqualification of the entire Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) from continuing the criminal prosecution of a former governor? Ancillary issues included:

• Whether the order disqualifying the OAG is immediately appealable.
• The proper time-limit for criminal motions for reconsideration.
• Whether the charges were brought against Torres in his official or personal capacity.
• The scope of Model Rule of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) 1.10’s imputation rule when applied to government law offices.
• The notice a government law office must give when it erects an ethical screen.

The decision reverses the blanket disqualification, affirms the individual disqualifications, and for the first time in CNMI law articulates a set of government-specific conflict-management rules.

Summary of the Judgment

• Jurisdiction: The Court holds that an order disqualifying an entire prosecutorial office satisfies the collateral-order doctrine and is therefore immediately appealable, notwithstanding the narrow statutory appeal provisions in 6 CMC §8101.
• Reconsideration Motions: A new 30-day default deadline (with “good-cause” flexibility) is created for interlocutory motions for reconsideration in criminal cases, paralleling the criminal notice-of-appeal period.
• Capacity of the Accused: Criminal counts of misconduct in public office are brought against the person, not the office; hence Torres was charged in his personal capacity.
• Conflict & Imputation: MRPC 1.10’s firm-wide imputation rule is not to be mechanically applied to the OAG. Disqualification of the Attorney General or isolated prosecutors does not automatically taint the whole office if an effective screen is in place.
• Screening Notice: Even where the target of prosecution is not a current or former “client,” the OAG must still provide written notice describing its screening procedures whenever it prosecutes a government official after earlier giving that official privileged advice.
• Outcome: Blanket disqualification reversed; individual disqualifications of AG Manibusan (already self-recused), Chief Solicitor Glass, and Special Prosecutor Kingman affirmed.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. United States v. Bolden, 353 F.3d 870 (10th Cir 2003) & United States v. Williams, 68 F.4th 564 (9th Cir 2023)
   Adopted for the collateral-order analysis: disqualifying a prosecutor’s office implicates the separation of powers and is unreviewable after final judgment.
2. Commonwealth v. Guerrero, 3 NMI 479 (1993) & Olopai v. Hillblom, 3 NMI 528 (1993)
   Earlier CNMI cases denying collateral-order review for private or defense-counsel disqualification distinguished because they lacked separation-of-powers concerns.
3. Commonwealth v. Atalig, 2002 MP 20 & Commonwealth v. Ogumoro, 2020 MP 8
   Clarified that §3202 misconduct charges lie against “a person” acting under color of office, supporting the Court’s conclusion that Torres was charged personally.
4. In re San Nicolas, 2013 MP 8
   Source of the “narrow circumstances” doctrine for disqualifying an entire prosecutorial office; the Court used it but found its conditions unmet here.
5. Grand Jury Subpoena of Ford, 756 F.2d 249 (2d Cir 1985) and state decisions Page (Ind.), Stenger (Wash.), Wong (Haw.)
   Demonstrated a national consensus allowing ethical screens instead of blanket bans; these authorities persuaded the Court to reject mechanical imputation.
6. Healy v. United States, 376 U.S. 75 (1964)
   Framework for judicially-created reconsideration motions; Court analogised to Healy in adopting a 30-day criminal timeline.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Collateral-Order Doctrine. The Court framed the OAG’s constitutional duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed as a separation-of-powers asset that cannot be restored post-trial; therefore the order is effectively unreviewable later.
2. Reconsideration Deadline. Noting the absence of a criminal counterpart to Civil Rule 59(e), the Court imported (but did not transplant wholesale) the civil 30-day appeal window, preserving flexibility by allowing “good cause” extensions.
3. Personal vs. Official Capacity. The statutory language (a person, being a public official) and past holdings led the Court to repudiate the trial judge’s view that the prosecution was official-capacity litigation.
4. Imputation & Screening.
   • MRPC 1.10 does identify government law departments as “firms,” but the commentary also highlights the special nature of government practice.
   • Rigid imputation would cripple constitutionally mandated prosecutions; thus the Court carved out a government-specific exception, permitting screens unless the record shows pervasive contamination.
5. Notice Requirement. Although Torres is not a client, fairness and transparency require the OAG to provide written notice of the screen, mirroring MRPC 1.10(a)(2)(ii). This promotes confidence while avoiding a full imputation rule.
6. Abuse-of-Discretion Review. The trial court had no factual findings that every OAG attorney was tainted. With screens and physical separation already in place, blanket disqualification was an overreach.

C. Potential Impact

1. Day-to-Day Prosecution Practices.
   • OAG (and likely other Pacific jurisdictions) may continue prosecutions after erecting documented screens.
   • Failure to lodge a timely (30-day) reconsideration motion will now bar late strategic challenges unless “good cause” is shown.
2. Strategic Defense Motions. Defendants can still seek office-wide disqualification, but must supply concrete evidence that the screen is penetrated or ineffective.
3. Separation of Powers. By confirming immediate appellate review, the Court has fortified the Executive’s authority over criminal prosecutions while preserving judicial oversight of conflicts.
4. Professional Responsibility Landscape. The decision signals a more nuanced, context-sensitive application of the MRPC to government lawyers and is likely to be cited in other small jurisdictions grappling with limited prosecutorial staffing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Collateral-Order Doctrine: A narrow exception allowing appeals of certain decisions made before the case ends — but only if waiting would destroy the right at stake.
• Imputation: An ethics rule that treats every lawyer in the same firm as sharing each other’s conflicts. Think of germs in a swimming pool: one person’s contamination is presumed to spread to all, unless there is a valid partition (screen).
• Ethical Screen (“Chinese Wall”): Practical steps (physical separation, password-protected files, memos, staff instructions) to keep conflicted lawyers from sharing or receiving information about a matter.
• Personal vs. Official Capacity: Suing an official personally targets the individual; suing in official capacity targets the office (and often the government treasury). Criminal charges almost always target the individual.
• Motion for Reconsideration: A request asking the trial judge to rethink a ruling based on new law, new evidence, or clear error. After Torres, such a motion in a CNMI criminal case should be filed within 30 days unless good cause exists.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Torres charts a middle course between protecting defendants from conflicted prosecutors and preserving the Commonwealth’s ability to enforce its laws. Major takeaways include:

• Orders removing an entire prosecutorial office are immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.
• Interlocutory motions for reconsideration in criminal cases now carry a presumptive 30-day deadline.
• Misconduct-in-office charges target the individual, not the office holder.
• Conflicts of a few prosecutors do not automatically disqualify the entire OAG; effective, documented screening suffices.
• The OAG must give written notice of its screen to affected current or former officials, reinforcing transparency and public confidence.

By resisting “mechanical” application of private-law ethics rules and instead fashioning pragmatic government-lawyer standards, the Court has provided a durable framework for handling future high-profile prosecutions without undermining either defendants’ rights or the Executive’s constitutional mandate.