Confirming Rosemond’s Reach: Advance Knowledge Plus Participation Suffice for 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Aiding-and-Abetting Liability

Introduction

United States v. Demetris Campbell, No. 24-3142 (7th Cir. June 23 2025), is a non-precedential order that nevertheless supplies valuable guidance for trial practitioners and appellate counsel alike. The Court of Appeals:

Granted appointed counsel’s Anders motion to withdraw and dismissed Campbell’s appeal as frivolous;
Re-affirmed that, under Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014), the government need not prove that an aider-and-abettor “intentionally facilitated the brandishing” of the gun—participation in the underlying robbery plus advance knowledge of the gun’s presence suffices for § 924(c) liability;
Upheld admission of evidence of a victim’s death during an attempted robbery over a Rule 403 objection;
Sustained a two-level leadership enhancement and the district court’s refusal to depart downward despite an intervening homicide; and
Illustrated the Seventh Circuit’s limited review standard in Anders dismissals.

Although issued as a “Nonprecedential Disposition,” the case crystallises key principles on evidentiary balance, § 924(c) jury instructions, sentencing departures, and strategic considerations when filing or opposing Anders briefs.

Summary of the Judgment

Demetris Campbell masterminded a series of 2020 Indianapolis robberies orchestrated through online market-place lures. A co-conspirator, Angel Montano, brandished firearms and fatally shot one victim’s teenage brother during a failed fourth robbery. A jury convicted Campbell of:

Conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery;
Three completed Hobbs Act robberies and one attempted robbery;
Three counts of aiding and abetting the brandishing of a firearm during crimes of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).

He received an aggregate 600-month sentence. On appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief asserting no non-frivolous issues; Campbell responded pro se. Applying its “limited review” protocol, the Seventh Circuit:

Found counsel’s analysis adequate;
Addressed the Rule 403 and jury-instruction challenges raised; and
Determined any remaining issues—including ineffective assistance claims—were either waived or better suited for collateral review.

The court therefore granted the withdrawal motion and dismissed the appeal.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): Framework for counsel to withdraw when an appeal is wholly frivolous. The court adhered strictly to Anders, examining only issues flagged by counsel and by Campbell’s Rule 51(b) response.
Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014): Core precedent confirming that an aider-and-abettor of a § 924(c) offense must have (a) advance knowledge a firearm will be used, and (b) active participation in the predicate offense—nothing more. Campbell sought to graft an additional intent element (“intent to facilitate brandishing”). The Seventh Circuit rejected this, binding itself to Rosemond.
United States v. Johnson, 89 F.4th 997 (7th Cir. 2024) & United States v. LeShore, 543 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2008): Supply the abuse-of-discretion standard for Rule 403 decisions—reversal only if no reasonable judge could agree.
United States v. Kapp, 419 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cooper, 591 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2010): Guideposts for balancing probative value versus prejudice when death evidence is introduced.
United States v. Wright, 85 F.4th 851 (7th Cir. 2023) & Owens, 301 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2002): Articulate the rigorous “manifest miscarriage of justice” plain-error standard applicable when no Rule 29 motion is filed.
United States v. Figueroa, 682 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2012): Clarifies when a defendant exercises leadership warranting a § 3B1.1 enhancement.
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003): Reinforces that ineffective assistance claims are best raised on collateral review.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Evidentiary Ruling (FRE 403)

The district court admitted evidence that the attempted-robbery victim died. Campbell argued unfair prejudice. The Seventh Circuit upheld the ruling because:

The death was directly relevant to the “use of force” element in attempted Hobbs Act robbery;
Campbell’s post-shooting statements were probative of his advance knowledge that Montano would carry firearms—linking back to the § 924(c) counts;
Omitting the death would create narrative gaps and confuse jurors as to the victim’s absence.

Hence, no abuse of discretion.

b. Jury Instructions on § 924(c) Brandishing

Campbell proposed a two-pronged instruction requiring proof that he “intentionally facilitated the brandishing.” The district court adopted the government’s simpler approach: knowledge + participation. The Seventh Circuit:

Relied on the textual and purposive reading in Rosemond that once advance knowledge exists, continued participation constitutes “intent” to aid the firearm use;
Rejected Campbell’s criticism of Rosemond as frivolous because inferior courts must follow Supreme Court holdings;
Confirmed the final instructions adequately defined “advance knowledge” and “intentional facilitation.”

c. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Because Campbell never moved under Rule 29, review was for plain error. The record—Campbell’s own admissions, digital communications, photographs with firearms—made any insufficiency claim untenable.

d. Sentencing

Guideline Calculations: Base level 43 for death (§§ 2B3.1(c), 2A1.1). Leadership +2. Groups collapsed under § 3D1.4. Life range.
Leadership Enhancement: Campbell “told people what to do,” orchestrating locations, timing, and target selection.
Downward Departure Denial: § 2A1.1 cmt. n.2(B) departure for unintentional killings deemed inappropriate; district judge found the homicide intentional and foreseeable.
Substantive Reasonableness: 600-month sentence below life, justified by disparity avoidance (co-defendant 480 months), gravity of offenses, and deterrence.

3. Impact of the Judgment

While non-precedential, the order signals several practical repercussions:

§ 924(c) Litigation: Defendants who merely orchestrate violent crimes cannot evade firearm enhancements by claiming ignorance of specific brandishing intent once advance knowledge is proved.
Evidentiary Strategy: Prosecutors may introduce death evidence tied to violent predicate acts, even where the charged offense is robbery rather than homicide, provided relevance and narrative-integrity rationales are articulated.
Anders Practice: The opinion is a template for thorough issue-spotting—covering Rule 403, sufficiency, jury instructions, sentencing procedure, and substantive reasonableness. Defense counsel must similarly canvass potential claims to meet Anders standards.
Sentencing Enhancements: The Seventh Circuit continues to read § 3B1.1 broadly; “cyber-luring” masterminds are treated as leaders even if they are off-site during violent acts.
IAC Claims: Reinforces the preference for collateral proceedings under Massaro, limiting direct-appeal records to developed facts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Hobbs Act Robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951): Federal crime covering robbery or extortion affecting interstate commerce. “Attempted” means the defendant took a substantial step toward the robbery.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c): Adds mandatory penalties for using or carrying a firearm “during and in relation to” a crime of violence. “Brandishing” (showing or waving the gun) triggers a 7-year mandatory minimum.
Aiding and Abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2): Liability extends to anyone who intentionally assists a crime. Post-Rosemond, advance knowledge a gun will be used + participation in the underlying felony = culpability.
Anders Brief: When court-appointed counsel believes no viable issues exist, they must (1) file a brief listing potential arguments and explaining their frivolity, and (2) move to withdraw. The appellate court independently reviews the record.
Guidelines Offense Level 43: Highest level; corresponds to life imprisonment for Criminal History Category I.
Leadership Enhancement (§ 3B1.1): Adds 2–4 levels if the defendant was an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” of criminal activity involving at least one other participant.
Rule 403: Evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. “Narrative integrity” is a factor in balancing.

Conclusion

United States v. Campbell underscores the Seventh Circuit’s fidelity to Supreme Court precedent on firearm-related accomplice liability, its deferential stance toward district-court evidentiary and sentencing decisions, and its disciplined approach to Anders review. The ruling reinforces that advance knowledge of gun use coupled with any meaningful participation in the predicate crime satisfies § 924(c), shaping trial instructions across the circuit. Practitioners should heed the court’s emphasis on narrative completeness under Rule 403, the expansive reading of leadership enhancements for remote orchestrators, and the strategic imperative to preserve issues with proper motions. Though non-precedential, Campbell’s analytic clarity will influence plea negotiations, jury-instruction drafting, and appellate briefing in firearm-enhanced robbery cases throughout the Seventh Circuit and beyond.