Conditioning FMLA Leave on Medical Disclosure as an ADA “Inquiry”: A Commentary on Aileen Mullin v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs

Conditioning FMLA Leave on Medical Disclosure as an ADA “Inquiry”:
A Commentary on Aileen Mullin v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025)

I. Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision arises from a long-running dispute between Aileen Mullin, a Ratings Veterans Service Representative at the Department of Veterans Affairs’ St. Petersburg Regional Office, and her employer. Mullin suffers from serious respiratory issues and later developed breast cancer. She alleged that the VA failed to accommodate her disabilities, discriminated and retaliated against her, and unlawfully disclosed confidential medical information obtained in connection with her Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave.

The district court granted summary judgment to the VA on all Rehabilitation Act and related claims. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit:

  • Affirmed summary judgment on: disability discrimination (disparate treatment), failure to accommodate, retaliation, and retaliatory hostile work environment.
  • Reversed and remanded as to Mullin’s unlawful disclosure claim under the Rehabilitation Act / ADA confidentiality provisions.

The opinion is significant for several reasons, but one stands out as a new, clearly articulated rule in the Eleventh Circuit:

  • The court expressly recognizes that when an employer conditions an employee’s access to statutorily protected leave on the submission of medical information (e.g., via an FMLA certification form), that requirement constitutes a “medical inquiry” under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4). If information obtained through that inquiry is then improperly disclosed, the employee may pursue a private cause of action for damages, including emotional distress, even if the employee is not disabled.

In addition, Judge Tjoflat’s concurrence sharply criticizes the plaintiff’s complaint as a paradigmatic shotgun pleading, admonishing district courts and litigants for allowing such pleadings to proceed. Judge Jordan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, would have treated the “inquiry” question under § 12112(d)(4) as a factual issue for the jury rather than resolved as a matter of law.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Employment and Health History

Mullin began working for the VA in February 2009 as a Ratings Veterans Service Representative. In July 2010 she began to suffer respiratory problems at work, which she believed were triggered by conditions in the St. Petersburg building. She raised concerns internally but was initially told to pursue workers’ compensation.

By December 2011, Mullin’s breathing and asthma symptoms had worsened. She requested:

  • An alternative work schedule to limit time in the building.
  • Relocation of her workstation.

The VA implemented those accommodations: a reduced in-office schedule and a new workstation. Mullin, however, believed these measures were ineffective as she continued to suffer severe respiratory issues, at times resulting in asthma attacks and hospital visits. In January 2012 she again met with HR (Tammi Clarke) and a union representative; her workstation was eventually moved to the third floor, and an air purifier was installed at her request, though she doubted its effectiveness for the office’s size.

B. Cancer Diagnosis, FMLA Leave, and Alleged Disclosure

In March 2012, Mullin was diagnosed with breast cancer. Her oncologist completed an FMLA certification indicating she would need six months off for surgery and treatment. Mullin submitted this FMLA documentation to HR.

In May 2012, union steward Casey Crump emailed Mullin stating that he had learned of her “condition” from HR manager Bonnie Wax and that Wax believed Mullin’s breathing issues were due to her tumor rather than the building. Mullin testified she had told only a workplace friend and manager Sandra Smith about her diagnosis; she had not told Wax. She was surprised to learn that Crump knew about her cancer.

C. Continuing Accommodation Requests

Mullin completed cancer treatment in December 2012 and returned to work in January 2013, still working remotely several days and on-site others. She repeatedly complained that the building exacerbated her health conditions and requested:

  • Full-time telework or work from another location.
  • Arrangements to exchange paperwork outside the building.

The VA responded incrementally:

  • Moved her workstation again.
  • Added more air purifiers (ultimately three in her office).
  • Adjusted her schedule to allow:
    • Initially partial telework, then four days per week from home and only four hours on-site Fridays.
    • Finally, full-time telework, with Friday paper exchanges outside the building.

The parties disputed whether there was an unreasonable delay in reaching full-time telework (Mullin claimed about 10 months; the court found only ~3 months of relevant delay, excluding her cancer-treatment leave period).

D. District Court Proceedings

After extensive proceedings before the EEOC, Mullin filed a civil action asserting:

  1. Disability discrimination (Rehabilitation Act) – disparate treatment and failure to accommodate.
  2. Unlawful disclosure / privacy violations – under the Rehabilitation Act’s incorporation of ADA confidentiality rules.
  3. Retaliation and retaliatory hostile work environment – allegedly in response to her accommodation requests and complaints.

The district court granted summary judgment to the VA on all claims. Mullin appealed.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Decision

The Eleventh Circuit’s key holdings can be summarized as follows:

A. Disability Discrimination (Disparate Treatment)

  • To prevail under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show:
    1. She has a disability;
    2. She is otherwise qualified; and
    3. She suffered an adverse employment action solely by reason of her disability (29 U.S.C. § 794(a)).
  • The court held Mullin failed to produce evidence that any denial or limitation of leave (including advanced sick leave and FMLA determinations) was solely because of her disability. In fact, the VA repeatedly granted advanced sick leave and FMLA leave, as well as admission to the Voluntary Leave Transfer Program.
  • Summary judgment for the VA on disparate treatment was therefore affirmed.

B. Disability Discrimination (Failure to Accommodate)

  • A failure-to-accommodate claim does not require proof of discriminatory intent; the failure itself is actionable discrimination if the employer does not provide a reasonable accommodation enabling the employee to perform the job’s essential functions.
  • The court found that:
    • The VA engaged in an ongoing interactive process and repeatedly modified Mullin’s work schedule, location, and environment.
    • The approximate three-month delay (after her post-cancer-treatment return to regular work) in moving to full-time telework, during which incremental accommodations were provided, was not unreasonable.
  • Summary judgment for the VA on failure to accommodate was affirmed.

C. Unlawful Disclosure / Confidentiality of Medical Information

On this point, the court broke new ground in the Eleventh Circuit’s ADA/Rehabilitation Act jurisprudence.

  • The Rehabilitation Act incorporates the ADA’s medical inquiry and confidentiality provisions (29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 794(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)).
  • The court expressly held that:
    • There is a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4), paralleling the right already recognized under § 12112(d)(2), and it exists regardless of disability status.
    • When an employer conditions an employee’s access to statutorily protected leave (such as FMLA leave) on the submission of medical documentation, that requirement is a “medical inquiry” under § 12112(d)(4).
  • The panel held there were triable issues of fact as to:
    • Whether the VA, through HR manager Wax, unlawfully disclosed Mullin’s cancer diagnosis obtained via the FMLA form to union steward Crump.
    • Whether Mullin suffered a tangible injury (emotional distress) as a result.
  • Accordingly, the court reversed summary judgment on the unlawful disclosure claim and remanded for further proceedings.

D. Retaliation and Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment

  • The court treated Mullin’s “retaliation” theory as essentially a repackaged failure-to-accommodate claim (i.e., VA’s alleged failure or delay in giving her preferred telework accommodation). Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, such a recharacterization cannot sustain a separate retaliation claim.
  • Assuming without deciding that a retaliatory hostile work environment claim is cognizable under the Rehabilitation Act/ADA, the court held that:
    • Mullin’s allegations—centered on dissatisfaction with the timing and nature of accommodations—did not show harassment that was “severe or pervasive” enough to alter the terms or conditions of employment.
  • Summary judgment for the VA on retaliation and hostile work environment was affirmed.

E. Concurrence and Partial Dissent

  • Judge Tjoflat’s concurrence condemns the complaint as a classic shotgun pleading, criticizes both parties (and the district court) for allowing it to proceed, and reiterates that courts should sua sponte require repleading in such situations.
  • Judge Jordan’s partial dissent agrees with most of the opinion but disputes the majority’s conclusion that there was an “inquiry” as a matter of law. He would submit to a jury whether the VA initiated a medical inquiry under § 12112(d)(4) or whether Mullin instead voluntarily disclosed her diagnosis before submitting the FMLA form.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Relied Upon

1. Rehabilitation Act and ADA Framework

  • Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2005) and Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) – confirm that the Rehabilitation Act’s standards mirror those of Title I of the ADA and that ADA cases serve as precedent for Rehabilitation Act claims.
  • Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2008) – recognizes two primary ADA/Rehab Act theories: disparate treatment and reasonable accommodation.

2. Disparate Treatment and Causation

  • Under 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), the adverse action must occur “solely by reason of” the plaintiff’s disability. The court relies on Ellis to reinforce that mixed-motive claims—where disability is only one factor—do not support Rehabilitation Act liability.

3. Reasonable Accommodation and Interactive Process

  • Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2001) – places on the employee the burden to identify a reasonable accommodation that would enable performance of essential job functions.
  • Holly v. Clairson Industries, 492 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2007) – clarifies that an employer’s failure to reasonably accommodate is itself discrimination, with no need to prove animus.
  • Owens v. Governor’s Office of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327 (11th Cir. 2022) – describes the duty to explore the “universe of reasonable accommodations” and implement a “mutually agreeable” solution, while also emphasizing that the employer is not required to provide the employee’s preferred accommodation.
  • Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 1997) – underscores that an employer need only offer a reasonable accommodation, not the “maximum” or the employee’s choice.
  • D’Onofrio v. Costco, 964 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2020) – reiterates that an employer is not obliged to accommodate “in any manner that the employee desires.”
  • Solloway v. Clayton, 738 F. App’x 985 (11th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) – factually analogous telework case used persuasively: the employer’s refusal to grant full-time telework was not unlawful where it instead provided substantial alternative accommodations, and the employee eventually received full-time telework later under a policy change.
  • Ward v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 2014) and Selenke v. Medical Imaging of Colorado, 248 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2001) – cited for the notion that delay in providing an accommodation may be actionable only if it is unreasonable, taking into account length, reasons, interim accommodations, and good faith.
  • Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162 (D.C. Cir. 2010) – cited more generally on unreasonable delay claims.

4. Medical Inquiries and Confidentiality – § 12112(d)

  • Harrison v. Benchmark Electronics Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) – previously recognized a private right of action for improper pre-employment medical inquiries under § 12112(d)(2), and held that plaintiffs must show some damages (emotional, pecuniary, etc.).
  • Owusu-Ansah v. Coca-Cola Co., 715 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2013) – implicitly treated § 12112(d)(4) as enforceable via private suit, and noted that § 12112(d)(4)(A) protects even nondisabled employees.
  • Russell v. City of Mobile Police Dep’t, 552 F. App’x 905 (11th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) – treated § 12112(d)(2)(A) and (d)(4)(A) as parallel provisions with similar prohibitions and damages requirements.
  • Doe v. U.S. Postal Service, 317 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2003) – key out-of-circuit authority: held that an FMLA medical certification demanded as a condition of leave constitutes an ADA “inquiry,” and that disclosure of HIV status obtained through that form could violate Rehabilitation Act confidentiality obligations.
  • Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2000) – held that voluntary disclosures by an employee are not § 12112(d) “inquiries,” and disclosure of voluntarily disclosed information does not implicate ADA confidentiality rules.
  • Out-of-circuit cases on damages/injury requirements under § 12112(d): Armstrong v. Turner Industries, 141 F.3d 554 (5th Cir. 1998); Hustvet v. Allina Health System, 910 F.3d 399 (8th Cir. 2018); Cossette v. Minnesota Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 1999); Tice v. CATA, 247 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2001). These cases generally require a “cognizable injury in fact” – not merely a technical violation.
  • Walters v. Fast AC, LLC, 60 F.4th 642 (11th Cir. 2023) – confirms that a plaintiff’s deposition testimony describing emotional distress or economic harm can suffice to defeat summary judgment.

5. Retaliation and Hostile Work Environment

  • Todd v. Fayette County School District, 998 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2021) and Monaghan v. Worldpay, 955 F.3d 855 (11th Cir. 2020) – articulate the basic elements of retaliation, including the “materially adverse” action standard from Burlington Northern v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
  • Lucas and Stewart – used to emphasize that repackaging a failure-to-accommodate dispute as “retaliation” will not sustain a separate claim.
  • Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) and Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 (1993) – provide the hostile work environment framework and factors for “severe or pervasive” harassment.

6. Shotgun Pleadings and Procedural Rules

  • Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015); Jackson v. Bank of America, 898 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2018); Estate of Bass v. Regions Bank, 947 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2020); Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2021); and Paylor v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 748 F.3d 1117 (11th Cir. 2014) – collectively condemn shotgun pleadings, describe their types, and instruct district courts to strike them and require repleading.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Disparate Treatment Under the Rehabilitation Act

The court applied the standard Rehabilitation Act test: Mullin had to show (1) disability, (2) qualification, and (3) adverse action “as the result of” her disability, which under § 794(a) must be “solely by reason of” disability. This is a stricter causation standard than Title VII’s “motivating factor” test.

Mullin’s disparate treatment theory was narrow: she claimed the VA discriminatorily denied advanced sick leave. The record, however, showed:

  • The VA approved her initial request for 72–80 hours of advanced sick leave and in fact granted the full 80 hours.
  • The VA repeatedly extended advanced sick leave between June and August 2012, even after she had exhausted her own leave.
  • The VA admitted her to the Voluntary Leave Transfer Program, enabling donated leave.

The court identified three supposed “denials” of leave and found none actionable:

  1. Oral denial by HR (Clarke) – Mullin testified that Clarke verbally denied her request. But written records showed the request was ultimately granted. Under Blanco v. Samuel, the court may disregard testimony “blatantly contradicted by the record” at summary judgment.
  2. April 9, 2012 FMLA memo – confirmed Mullin’s entitlement to 12 weeks of FMLA leave for her cancer diagnosis but noted she had already invoked FMLA for a different condition and could not stack another 12 weeks until the first entitlement period expired. This was application of FMLA rules, not disability-based discrimination.
  3. May 11, 2012 FMLA memo – similarly explained that FMLA provides up to 12 workweeks (480 hours) in a 12-month period; additional medical documentation did not confer additional leave beyond the statutory cap.

Critically, the court held Mullin failed to show any denial was “solely” because of her disability. Even if an oral denial briefly occurred, the later written approvals and statutory FMLA limitations broke any inference that disability was the exclusive cause. Thus, the disparate treatment claim could not survive.

2. Failure to Accommodate

Mullin’s theory here was that the VA unreasonably delayed in granting full-time work-from-home, which she viewed as the only effective accommodation, and failed to provide adequate interim accommodations.

The court first clarified the legal framework:

  • Employers must make “reasonable accommodations” to known limitations unless doing so imposes an undue hardship (42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)).
  • A reasonable accommodation is one that enables the employee to perform essential functions, not necessarily the employee’s preferred or ideal solution (Lucas, Stewart, D’Onofrio).
  • Interim delays may be actionable only if they are unreasonable, considering length, reasons, and interim accommodations (Selenke, Ward, Mogenhan).

On the facts, the court rejected Mullin’s assertion of a 10‑month delay. She was out on extended cancer-treatment leave for most of 2012; the court properly refused to count that period as “delay” attributable to the VA. It thus analyzed roughly January–April 2013 – about three months – as the relevant window.

During that period, the VA:

  • Met with Mullin to revisit accommodations.
  • Moved her workstation to further reduce exposure in the building.
  • Added two additional air purifiers (for a total of three).
  • Modified her schedule to four days per week telework and only four hours in-office Friday.
  • Finally, on April 19, 2013, approved full-time telework with paperwork exchanges outside the building.

Drawing on Solloway, the panel reasoned that:

  • A series of accommodations, even if not the employee’s preferred solution at each step, can satisfy the employer’s duty, especially when the employer is responsive to complaints and continually adjusts accommodations.
  • The Rehabilitation Act does not require “the maximum accommodation” or guarantee that the employee “will never encounter” the source of their impairment triggers (e.g., a supervisor or, here, a building) – only a reasonable accommodation.
  • Because Mullin in fact received full-time telework and had never been terminated, the case resembled Solloway, where the employer’s iterative efforts and eventual granting of the requested accommodation defeated the claim.

The three-month period, combined with the VA’s ongoing adjustments, was held not unreasonably long. Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find a failure to accommodate, and summary judgment was affirmed.

3. Unlawful Disclosure Under § 12112(d)(4)

a. Recognition of a Private Right of Action under § 12112(d)(4)

The Eleventh Circuit had already recognized a private right of action under § 12112(d)(2) (Harrison). The panel here explicitly extends that logic to § 12112(d)(4), relying in part on Owusu-Ansah and Russell:

  • Section 12112(d)(4)(A) regulates medical examinations and inquiries of current employees.
  • Section 12112(d)(4)(C) imposes confidentiality requirements on information obtained through such examinations or inquiries.
  • The panel holds that these provisions, like § 12112(d)(2), are privately enforceable and protect employees regardless of disability status.

To establish a claim under § 12112(d)(4), the court requires:

  1. Proof that the employer:
    • Made an unlawful inquiry or examination in violation of § 12112(d)(4)(A); or
    • Violated confidentiality requirements under § 12112(d)(4)(C) after a proper, job-related inquiry.
  2. Proof that the employee suffered a tangible injury (emotional, financial, or other actual harm) caused by the violation.
b. Defining an “Inquiry” – FMLA Medical Certifications as ADA Inquiries

The central new holding is the court’s treatment of Mullin’s FMLA medical certification as a “medical inquiry” under § 12112(d)(4). The VA argued that:

  • An FMLA certification is not an “inquiry” directed at disability status, because FMLA leave can be triggered by “serious health conditions” that may or may not be ADA disabilities.
  • Mullin had voluntarily disclosed her cancer diagnosis by submitting the form; therefore, no employer “inquiry” occurred.

The court rejected these arguments and adopted the reasoning of Doe v. USPS. It held:

“We now hold that when an employer conditions an employee’s access to statutorily protected leave on the submission of medical information, that is an ‘inquiry’ under § 12112(d)(4).”

The court’s rationale:

  • It is the employer that initiates the process by requiring medical documentation as a condition of receiving FMLA leave, which is statutorily guaranteed.
  • Even if the employee chooses to seek FMLA leave, the decision to require medical information to access that right is the employer’s, not the employee’s.
  • To characterize the resulting disclosure as “voluntary” would force employees into a false choice: either waive privacy rights or forgo statutorily protected leave.
  • This would undermine the ADA’s prohibition on non-job-related inquiries into disability status.

The majority also carefully distinguishes between:

  • Whether an inquiry occurred under § 12112(d)(4)(A) (a question of whether the employer required medical information as a condition of a benefit), and
  • Whether confidential information obtained through that inquiry was unlawfully disclosed under § 12112(d)(4)(C) (a separate question of causation and source).

The court emphasizes that a prior voluntary disclosure of medical information (e.g., telling a supervisor informally) does not negate the fact that a later, employer-required FMLA submission constitutes a separate qualifying “inquiry.” Whether the unlawful disclosure stemmed from the voluntary disclosure or from the FMLA-based inquiry goes to the merits of the confidentiality claim, not to whether an inquiry occurred in the first place.

c. The Partial Dissent’s Different Approach

Judge Jordan would have treated the “inquiry” issue as a fact question for the jury, stressing:

  • Evidence that Mullin may have told a co-worker and a manager about her cancer before submitting the FMLA form.
  • Uncertainty about when the VA provided or requested the FMLA form.
  • The possibility that HR manager Wax’s alleged disclosure to Crump preceded Mullin’s FMLA submission.

He relies on Cash and other circuits’ cases for the principle that § 12112(d) does not protect voluntarily disclosed information, and worries that characterizing all FMLA submissions as inquiries, regardless of context, risks conflict with those decisions.

The majority responds that it is not announcing a blanket rule that any FMLA form is always an inquiry in every conceivable scenario. Rather, it accepts as undisputed on this record that VA policy required employees to submit an FMLA form to obtain leave and resolves the “inquiry” issue as a matter of law on that premise.

d. Was There an Unlawful Disclosure?

After finding an inquiry, the court turns to whether confidential information obtained through that inquiry was improperly disclosed by Wax to Crump.

Key factual inferences (viewed favorably to Mullin):

  • An internal VA memorandum approving Mullin’s cancer-related FMLA leave, signed by Wax, intentionally omitted the specific medical condition “to avoid accidental disclosure.”
  • Crump’s email to Mullin (after VA’s FMLA approval) referenced:
    • Mullin’s “condition,” which he said he learned about from Wax; and
    • Wax’s view that Mullin’s breathing issues were caused by her tumor.
  • Mullin testified she never told Wax about her diagnosis and had only told a small circle of individuals (friends, one manager). There was no evidence in the record that any of those people were Crump’s source.
  • Sharing medical information with a small group of trusted individuals (friends, relatives, health providers) does not destroy its confidentiality as a matter of law.

Borrowing from Doe, the panel notes that plaintiffs rarely have direct evidence of who disclosed confidential health information; circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Here, a reasonable jury could conclude that:

  • Wax received Mullin’s diagnosis via the FMLA documentation; and
  • Wax then disclosed that confidential information to Crump in violation of § 12112(d)(4)(C).
e. Tangible Injury from the Disclosure

Finally, the court addresses damages. Relying on Harrison and out-of-circuit authority, it holds that a plaintiff must show some actual injury-in-fact—emotional, economic, or otherwise—to recover under § 12112(d)(4).

Mullin alleged that Wax’s disclosure of her cancer diagnosis caused significant emotional distress, particularly during an already traumatic period:

  • She testified that Wax’s conduct caused severe anxiety and distraction during surgery and treatment—she “went under anesthesia worried about Bonnie Wax,” came out of anesthesia similarly preoccupied, and spent more time crying and worrying than focusing on healing.
  • She described fear about losing pay and general anxiety she attributed to Wax’s alleged conduct.

The court held this testimony was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact regarding tangible injury, citing Walters, which accepted similar deposition testimony as adequate proof of emotional and economic harm at the summary judgment stage.

The panel also noted, without deciding causation, that later Department of Labor records listing diagnoses of PTSD and major depressive disorder might, if causally tied by evidence on remand, further support the existence and magnitude of Mullin’s injuries.

Because triable issues exist as to (1) whether Wax disclosed confidential medical information obtained via the FMLA inquiry and (2) whether Mullin suffered compensable harm, summary judgment on the unlawful disclosure claim was reversed.

4. Retaliation and Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment

a. Retaliation

To prove retaliation, a plaintiff must show:

  1. Engagement in protected activity (e.g., requesting accommodations, filing complaints).
  2. A materially adverse action that might discourage a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.
  3. A causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.

Mullin’s theory, however, was that the same conduct she labeled failure to accommodate—the VA’s delay or refusal to immediately provide full-time telework—also constituted retaliation for her protected activity. The court, citing Lucas and Stewart, rejected this bootstrapping:

  • A plaintiff cannot relabel the underlying discrete discrimination (e.g., failure to accommodate) as “retaliation” without identifying some separate retaliatory act.
  • Because her failure-to-accommodate claim failed on the merits, it could not sustain a distinct retaliation claim.

The panel therefore affirmed summary judgment on retaliation without resolving other elements such as causation.

b. Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment

The Eleventh Circuit has not definitively decided whether a retaliatory hostile work environment claim is cognizable under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. The panel assumed arguendo that such a claim exists, using the traditional hostile environment test from Title VII (Reeves, Harris):

  • Membership in a protected class.
  • Unwelcome harassment.
  • Harassment based on a protected characteristic or protected activity.
  • Harassment that is objectively and subjectively “severe or pervasive” enough to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create an abusive environment.
  • Employer liability (vicarious or direct).

Examining the record, the court held:

  • Mullin’s complaints about accommodation quality and timing, though sincere, did not amount to severe or pervasive harassment.
  • The VA’s conduct—moving workstations, providing purifiers, adjusting schedules, and ultimately granting full-time telework—reflected efforts to accommodate, not to harass.
  • No reasonable jury could conclude that Mullin’s workplace was objectively hostile or abusive due to the VA’s actions.

Thus, summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim was also affirmed.

5. Shotgun Pleading – Procedural Warning from the Concurrence

Judge Tjoflat’s separate concurrence, while not affecting the judgment, delivers a strong message about pleading standards in the Eleventh Circuit.

Mullin’s complaint:

  • Spanned 38 pages and 184 paragraphs.
  • Contained a long factual narrative (¶¶ 12–158) addressing many topics.
  • Incorporated that entire factual section wholesale into each count, so that every claim nominally relied on every fact, regardless of relevance.
  • Attached 53 exhibits totaling ~930 pages, which—by Rule 10(c)—became part of the pleading.

This structure fits squarely within the first category of shotgun pleading identified in Weiland: a complaint where each count adopts all preceding paragraphs, making it impossible to discern which alleged facts support which legal claim. Judge Tjoflat emphasizes:

  • Such pleadings violate Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement of a “short and plain statement” and Rule 10(b)’s requirement of separated, numbered paragraphs.
  • They burden defendants, who must guess which facts they must admit or deny, and burden courts, forced to reconstruct the case from a narrative morass.
  • District courts are “flatly forbidden” from scouring shotgun complaints to craft viable claims for plaintiffs and must instead strike them and require repleading (Estate of Bass, Jackson, Barmapov, Paylor).

He notes that neither party moved to strike or dismiss the complaint, and the district court allowed it to proceed, multiplying the cost and complexity of the case. He calls this “unacceptable” and reiterates that:

  • Plaintiffs should not file shotgun pleadings.
  • Defendants should move early to require a more definite statement or dismissal.
  • District courts should sua sponte demand repleading when faced with such complaints.

V. Key Legal Concepts Explained in Plain Terms

1. Rehabilitation Act vs. ADA

The Rehabilitation Act applies to federal agencies and entities receiving federal funding. It incorporates the substantive employment standards of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for discrimination, accommodation, and medical privacy. In practice, courts usually apply ADA case law to Rehabilitation Act employment claims.

2. “Qualified Individual with a Disability”

This means an employee who:

  • Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, and
  • Can perform the “essential functions” of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations.

3. Reasonable Accommodation and the Interactive Process

A “reasonable accommodation” is a practical change that helps a disabled employee perform their job. It might include modified schedules, changes in work location, assistive devices, or job restructuring. The law expects a back-and-forth “interactive process” between employer and employee to identify a workable accommodation.

The employer:

  • Must consider the request in good faith and explore reasonable options.
  • Is not required to provide:
    • The employee’s preferred solution, or
    • The “maximum” possible accommodation.

4. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is decided before trial. The moving party (here, the VA) wins if:

  • There is no “genuine” dispute about any “material” fact, and
  • The law entitles that party to judgment.

Courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (here, Mullin). But if the non-moving party’s evidence is weak, speculative, or directly contradicted by reliable records, the court can still grant summary judgment.

5. ADA Medical Inquiries and Confidentiality (§ 12112(d))

  • Employers may not ask employees about disability or require medical exams unless they are job-related and consistent with business necessity.
  • If employers obtain medical information through such inquiries or exams, they must:
    • Keep it in separate confidential medical files.
    • Limit disclosure to narrow exceptions (e.g., supervisors needing restrictions information, safety personnel in emergencies).

Information employees share voluntarily, without being asked, is generally not covered by these confidentiality provisions. The dispute in this case was whether requiring an FMLA medical form makes the disclosure “voluntary” or not. The Eleventh Circuit says: no, that requirement is an inquiry.

6. Tangible Injury and Emotional Distress Damages

Violating the ADA/Rehabilitation Act confidentiality rules is not enough by itself to obtain damages. The employee must show they were actually harmed. Harm can be:

  • Financial (lost wages, costs), or
  • Emotional (anxiety, distress, humiliation).

Detailed medical records are helpful but not mandatory; credible testimony about the impact on the plaintiff’s life can be sufficient to go to a jury.

7. Shotgun Pleadings

A “shotgun pleading” is a complaint that:

  • Is overly long, confusing, or repetitive.
  • Mixes all facts into all counts, so it is unclear which facts support which legal claims.
  • Makes it hard for the defendant to answer and for courts to apply the law.

The Eleventh Circuit treats shotgun pleadings as serious procedural defects and expects district courts to strike them and require clearer, more focused complaints.

VI. Likely Impact of the Decision

1. FMLA–ADA–Rehabilitation Act Interplay and Employer Practices

The most consequential aspect of this decision is the rule that:

When an employer requires an employee to submit medical documentation (such as an FMLA certification) as a condition of receiving statutorily protected leave, that requirement constitutes a “medical inquiry” under § 12112(d)(4).

Practical implications include:

  • HR Policies and Forms:
    • Employers, especially within the Eleventh Circuit, must treat medical information on FMLA forms as ADA-confidential information.
    • Such information must be maintained in separate medical files and disclosed only under narrow exceptions.
    • Routine sharing of details about an employee’s medical condition with supervisors, union stewards, or co-workers can expose employers to liability.
  • Training:
    • HR personnel and managers must be trained that discussing an employee’s diagnosis learned from leave documentation with others—even well-intentioned union stewards—may violate federal law.
  • Scope of Protected Employees:
    • Because § 12112(d)(4) protects employees regardless of disability status, any worker seeking FMLA leave for a serious health condition may invoke these protections, even if the condition is not an ADA “disability.”

2. Expansion of ADA Confidentiality Litigation

By expressly recognizing a private cause of action under § 12112(d)(4) and tying it to FMLA-required documentation, the Eleventh Circuit opens the door to more privacy-based employment claims. Employees may bring suits where:

  • Medical certification for leave is required; and
  • Details of their diagnosis or condition are later revealed in the workplace without necessity.

Such cases will often focus on:

  • Who had access to the medical information (HR, supervisors, occupational health), and
  • Who disclosed it to whom, when, and for what purpose.

3. Standards for Emotional Distress Without Economic Loss

The court’s reliance on Mullin’s deposition testimony to establish a triable issue on emotional injury reinforces that plaintiffs do not need:

  • Lost wages, or
  • Medical bills specifically tied to the emotional distress

to proceed to trial under § 12112(d). Credible, detailed testimony about the emotional impact—particularly during a vulnerable period like cancer treatment—can be enough to get past summary judgment.

4. Guidance on Accommodation Timing and Process

Although Mullin lost her failure-to-accommodate claim, the decision provides guidance:

  • Short to moderate delays in granting a preferred accommodation, when coupled with interim measures and ongoing dialogue, are unlikely to be deemed unreasonable.
  • Employers who can document:
    • Consideration of the employee’s requests,
    • Specific steps taken to adjust the work environment or schedule, and
    • Any constraints (operational, policy-based)
    are better positioned to defeat failure-to-accommodate claims.

Employees, in turn, should:

  • Clearly communicate when interim accommodations are not working.
  • Offer alternative suggestions.
  • Maintain records of the interactive process and any undue delays.

5. Limitations on Retaliation and Hostile Environment Theories

The court’s treatment of Mullin’s retaliation claims underscores that:

  • Not every denial or delay in accommodation is retaliation. There must be a distinct retaliatory act beyond the alleged discrimination itself.
  • Attempts—albeit imperfect—to accommodate medical conditions are unlikely to be deemed harassment that is severe or pervasive enough to support a hostile work environment claim.

6. Renewed Emphasis on Pleading Standards

Judge Tjoflat’s concurrence is a warning shot:

  • Eleventh Circuit panels continue to view shotgun pleadings as abusive and incompatible with Rule 8.
  • District courts are expected to enforce pleading rules proactively—even without motions from the parties.
  • Litigants should expect judges to strike complaints that:
    • Incorporate all facts into all counts, or
    • Otherwise make it impossible to match allegations to specific legal claims.

VII. Conclusion

Mullin v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs is a mixed outcome for the plaintiff but an important decision for disability law and workplace privacy in the Eleventh Circuit.

On the discrimination and accommodation fronts, the opinion is largely conservative and employer-friendly. It reiterates that:

  • The Rehabilitation Act demands proof that adverse actions were taken solely because of disability.
  • Employers must provide reasonable accommodations, not ideal or preferred ones, and may satisfy their obligations through a series of good-faith adjustments over time.
  • Retaliation and hostile work environment claims cannot simply duplicate underlying accommodation disputes.

On the medical privacy front, however, the decision marks a significant development. The court:

  • Formally recognizes a private right of action under § 12112(d)(4), extending prior precedent under § 12112(d)(2).
  • Holds that employer-required FMLA medical certifications are “inquiries” under the ADA, triggering stringent confidentiality obligations.
  • Affirms that employees—disabled or not—may seek damages, including for emotional distress, when such confidential information is improperly disclosed.

At the same time, the concurring and dissenting opinions highlight ongoing tensions in the law:

  • How to balance voluntary disclosures with employer-required documentation.
  • The proper role of juries versus courts in determining whether an “inquiry” occurred.
  • The judiciary’s patience (or lack thereof) with poorly drafted pleadings that obscure rather than clarify legal disputes.

Going forward, Mullin will likely be cited for two main propositions:

  1. That medical documentation compelled as a condition of statutory leave is an ADA “inquiry” whose fruits must be kept confidential, and
  2. That reasonable, iterative accommodation efforts and modest delays, backed by evidence of good-faith engagement, can suffice to defeat failure-to-accommodate claims.

Together, these themes affirm the Rehabilitation Act and ADA’s dual character: they are not only anti-discrimination statutes but also privacy statutes, imposing affirmative duties of confidentiality on employers who obtain sensitive medical information in the course of managing leave and accommodations.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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