Introduction

The Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in In the Interest of LC, minor child; TC v. State of Wyoming, 2025 WY 105 (Sept. 26, 2025), addresses when a juvenile court may change a child’s permanency plan from reunification to adoption and whether a court must adopt a concurrent plan (pursuing adoption and reunification simultaneously). The Court affirmed the juvenile court’s order changing the plan to adoption and ceasing reunification efforts based on the Department of Family Services’ (the Department) reasonable efforts and the father’s lack of progress on his case plan.

The parties include TC (Father), who appealed the change in permanency plan, and the State of Wyoming, with a guardian ad litem (GAL) representing the child, LC. The child’s mother did not challenge the order due to her stated intention to relinquish parental rights.

The key issues were: (1) whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in changing the permanency plan to adoption and ceasing reunification efforts; and (2) whether the court committed plain error by not adopting a concurrent permanency plan. The Court resolved both against Father, clarifying that concurrent planning is permissive, not mandatory, under Wyoming law.

Summary of the Opinion

• The Court affirmed the juvenile court’s change of the permanency plan from reunification to adoption, concluding the Department made reasonable, accessible, available, and appropriate efforts directed at reunification but they were unsuccessful largely due to Father’s noncompliance.
• Evidence supporting the change included Father’s delayed and incomplete engagement with critical services (especially a psychosexual evaluation and therapy), a high risk of sexual re-offense per the evaluator, the child’s documented fear and trauma responses tied to Father, and the Multidisciplinary Team’s (MDT) recommendation to move to adoption.
• On Father’s new argument—raised for the first time on appeal—that the court should have adopted a concurrent plan, the Court reviewed for plain error and held there was no violation of a clear rule of law. Wyoming statutes require the court to adopt a primary permanency plan, and allow—but do not require—adoption of a concurrent plan. Therefore, declining to order a concurrent plan was not plain error.

Factual and Procedural Background

In October 2023, law enforcement responded to a report that Father struck LC, then nine years old, in the head. LC reported physical and verbal abuse, fear of Father, and concerns about retaliation. She also raised concerns about inappropriate sexual behavior by Father. Father is a registered sex offender; the record reflects a 2002 third-degree sexual assault conviction and a history of allegations involving sexual abuse and neglect within the family system. LC has a history of sexual exploitation or abuse by family members.

The State filed a neglect petition in October 2023. After Father admitted the physical and verbal abuse allegations with a factual basis, the court adjudicated LC neglected. The court ordered a reunification plan and placed LC in the Department’s legal and physical custody with supervised visitation.

Father’s case plan, signed January 14, 2024, required, among other things: maintaining a safe and stable home; completion of a psychosexual evaluation with parental capacity and following recommendations; individual counseling; family therapy as recommended; parenting classes; substance abuse evaluation and testing; and compliance with home visits and appropriate visitation.

The psychosexual evaluation was pivotal because visitation was contingent upon its completion and engagement in therapy. The Department arranged an April 16, 2024 evaluation and sent multiple reminders, but Father arrived too late for completion and indicated “other things were a priority.” The Department could not secure a replacement appointment until it paid a $1,500 no-show fee to the original evaluator; the evaluation was rescheduled and completed in October 2024.

Father did not engage in individual therapy. When local therapist availability was inadequate, the Department referred Father to five out-of-state telehealth providers; four reached out to Father, but he did not respond and never initiated therapy.

The MDT met on October 23, 2024, after the evaluation. The evaluator concluded Father had sexually and physically abused a child in the past and was at high risk to reoffend. LC’s therapy disclosed sexual abuse by both parents, stepparents, and other relatives or parental knowledge of abuse. The MDT recommended changing the permanency plan from reunification to adoption.

At the November 21, 2024 permanency hearing, the State called LC’s therapist, the evaluator, and the caseworker. Neither the GAL nor Father presented witnesses. The juvenile court found the Department’s efforts reasonable, accessible, available, and appropriate; that reunification was not in LC’s best interests; and changed the plan to adoption, ceasing reunification efforts. Father appealed.

Standards Applied

• Change in permanency plan: Abuse of discretion. The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that reasonable reunification efforts were made without success and that reunification is no longer in the child’s best interests.
• Statutory interpretation under the Child Protection Act: De novo review.
• Unpreserved challenge to lack of concurrent plan: Plain error (requiring a clear record, transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, and material prejudice).

Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Influence

• In re SK, 2024 WY 25, 544 P.3d 606 (Wyo. 2024): Confirms abuse-of-discretion review for changes to permanency plans and frames how appellate courts assess whether trial courts exceeded the bounds of reason.
• In re MA, 2022 WY 29, 505 P.3d 179 (Wyo. 2022), and In re RR, 2021 WY 85, 492 P.3d 246 (Wyo. 2021): Articulate the two-part predicate for changing a plan—(a) reasonable efforts by the Department unsuccessful; and (b) reunification no longer in the child’s best interests. These cases also define “reasonable efforts” as efforts that are “accessible, available, and appropriate,” tailored to the family’s unique circumstances, aimed at preventing removal or enabling safe return.
• In re AM, 2021 WY 119, 497 P.3d 914 (Wyo. 2021) and In re DT, 2017 WY 36, 391 P.3d 1136 (Wyo. 2017): Confirm the preponderance standard and the deferential evidentiary lens—viewing evidence in the State’s favor as prevailing party.
• In re SRS, 2023 WY 50, 529 P.3d 1074 (Wyo. 2023): Emphasizes the child’s right to stability and permanency; supports time-limiting foster care under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-431(m).
• In re PT, 2025 WY 11, 562 P.3d 848 (Wyo. 2025) and In re JN, 2023 WY 83, 534 P.3d 455 (Wyo. 2023): Confirm de novo review for interpretations of the Child Protection Act.
• In the Interest of LH, 2025 WY 28, 565 P.3d 683 (Wyo. 2025): Reinforces that a juvenile court does not abuse its discretion by changing plans when a parent fails to make sufficient progress within a reasonable time.
• Plain error authorities: In the Interest of BG, 2023 WY 40, 528 P.3d 402 (Wyo. 2023); In the Interest of DT, 2017 WY 36; In the Interest of JG, 742 P.2d 770 (Wyo. 1987); Lott v. State, 2022 WY 143, 519 P.3d 646 (Wyo. 2022); Klingbeil v. State, 2021 WY 89, 492 P.3d 279 (Wyo. 2021). These cases define the demanding plain error test and the appellant’s burden to establish each element.
• Statutes: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-440(a), (b), (c), (k) (reasonable efforts, primacy of child health and safety, permissive concurrency, and requirement to adopt a primary plan); § 14-3-431(m) (time limits to advance permanency).

Collectively, these authorities supplied the analytical framework: deference to the juvenile court on fact-laden permanency decisions; a tailored, reasonableness-based assessment of Department efforts; primacy of the child’s safety and need for timely permanency; and tight constraints on reversing for unpreserved issues absent a clear legal transgression and prejudice.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Reasonable efforts and best interests. The record established that the Department’s efforts were both extensive and specifically targeted at the reasons for removal and barriers to reunification. Those efforts included:

• Arranging, funding, and rescheduling a critical psychosexual evaluation, including payment of a $1,500 no-show fee after Father missed the initial evaluation by arriving too late and stating other priorities.
• Linking Father to therapy: when local therapists were not suitable due to specialization/qualification constraints, the Department made multiple out-of-state telehealth referrals and four providers reached out to Father—but he did not respond and never began therapy.
• Providing or arranging concrete services: foster care placement; therapy for LC; utility assistance; gas cards; clothing; assessments (ASI/ASAM) for both parents; parenting education; and ongoing home-visit coordination and visitation options tailored to safety and therapeutic guidance.

Despite these efforts, Father did not make meaningful progress. He completed a parenting class but did not complete therapy or engage with recommended providers. Crucially, the psychosexual evaluation ultimately completed in October 2024 placed him at a high risk of sexual reoffense. The evaluator, noting Father’s claimed prior years of treatment, nonetheless saw no demonstrated risk reduction and did not foresee LC’s safe return within 3–6 months.

Child’s safety and welfare. LC’s therapist testified to LC’s severe fear responses and trauma—fear that Father was watching her, might kidnap her, and would gravely harm her. After an early visit, LC experienced a “complete meltdown,” and professionals recommended halting visits to protect her emotional stability. The MDT, informed by the evaluation results and LC’s disclosures that parental and other family abuse had occurred or was known, recommended changing the plan to adoption.

Given these findings, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that: (1) the Department had made reasonable efforts tailored to the case; (2) those efforts were unsuccessful due to Father’s noncompliance, delay, and minimization; and (3) reunification was not in LC’s best interests. The Supreme Court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and applying the preponderance standard, held that the record contained ample support for changing the plan to adoption.

3) No Plain Error in Declining a Concurrent Plan

Father argued for the first time on appeal that the court should have ordered a concurrent permanency plan (reunification and adoption). The Supreme Court reviewed for plain error. The second element—transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law—failed. Wyoming law provides:

• “Reasonable efforts to place a child for adoption or with a legal guardian may be made concurrently with the reasonable efforts [to preserve and reunify the family].” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-440(c) (emphasis added).
• The juvenile court must adopt a primary permanency plan. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-440(k).

Because concurrency is permissive (“may”), not mandatory, the juvenile court did not violate any clear rule of law by declining to adopt a concurrent plan on the facts presented. Father also did not show material prejudice. Thus, no plain error.

4) Why the Court Found No Abuse of Discretion

• The Department’s actions cleared the “accessible, available, and appropriate” threshold: coordinated evaluations, paid missed-appointment fees, sought telehealth solutions when local options were inadequate, and supplied practical supports.
• Father’s actions—nonattendance, nonresponse to providers, resistance to therapy, and tardiness—prevented progress and undermined reunification.
• The psychosexual risk assessment and therapeutic testimony showed ongoing danger and trauma that made reunification against LC’s best interests within the foreseeable timeframe.
• Wyoming’s statutory emphasis on child safety and timely permanency supported the court’s refusal to prolong a plan that was not working.

5) Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

Clarifying concurrency’s status. The decision clarifies and cements that concurrent permanency planning is not required in Wyoming; it is discretionary. A court satisfies its statutory duty by adopting a primary plan, and it may decide—based on safety, risk, and case progress—that concurrency is unwarranted. This eliminates any basis to argue plain error from the absence of a concurrent plan and shifts the advocacy focus to whether concurrency would be appropriate under the case-specific facts.

Reasonable efforts in practice. The Department’s concrete efforts—such as paying a no-show fee to reschedule an essential evaluation and offering out-of-state telehealth referrals when local capacity was lacking—illustrate what “accessible, available, and appropriate” can mean in real terms. Agencies should document similar creative and persistent efforts to tailor services to parental needs and known risks.

Time and permanency. The opinion underscores that children’s rights to stability and permanency will not be subordinated to open-ended reunification attempts when parents fail to engage meaningfully. Courts may—and should—move toward adoption when progress stalls and risk remains high, especially after about a year of intervention without meaningful change.

Practice pointers.

• For the Department/GAL: Build a detailed record of efforts, especially when specialized services are scarce. Show the link between the reasons for removal and the services offered.
• For parents’ counsel: Encourage timely engagement with evaluations and therapy; stress that nonresponsiveness to telehealth referrals will weigh heavily against reunification. If seeking concurrency, make a record in the juvenile court so the issue is preserved.
• For juvenile courts: Articulate specific findings on reasonable efforts and best interests; explain why concurrency is or is not appropriate to fortify the order against appellate challenge.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Permanency plan: The court-approved long-term goal for the child’s placement (e.g., reunification, adoption, guardianship).
• Concurrent permanency plan: Pursuing two plans at once (typically reunification and adoption) to avoid delay and ensure timely permanency if reunification fails. In Wyoming, concurrency is permissible, not mandatory.
• Reasonable efforts: Services and steps the Department must take that are accessible, available, and appropriate to prevent removal or enable the child’s safe return, tailored to the family’s unique situation.
• Best interests of the child: The guiding principle in juvenile cases; child safety and well-being are paramount and outrank other considerations when in conflict.
• Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard; reversal occurs only if the trial court’s decision exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.
• Preponderance of the evidence: The standard of proof for changing a permanency plan; the State’s proof must show it is more likely than not that a change is justified.
• Plain error: Appellate review for unpreserved issues. The appellant must show a clear record, violation of a clear rule of law, and material prejudice.
• Psychosexual evaluation: A specialized assessment of sexual risk factors and treatment needs; here, it was a prerequisite to visitation and reunification efforts due to abuse concerns.
• MDT (Multidisciplinary Team): A team of professionals who coordinate case planning and make recommendations about services and permanency.
• GAL (Guardian ad Litem): An attorney appointed to advocate for the child’s best interests in court proceedings.

Conclusion

In In the Interest of LC (2025 WY 105), the Wyoming Supreme Court affirms two vital propositions.

• First, the State satisfied its reasonable-efforts obligation by providing targeted, accessible services and persisting in overcoming logistical barriers, while the parent’s noncompliance and the high risk of reoffense made reunification contrary to the child’s best interests. The shift to adoption, after approximately a year without meaningful progress and against a backdrop of trauma and risk, was well within the juvenile court’s discretion.
• Second, a juvenile court is not required to adopt a concurrent permanency plan. Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-440(c) and (k), concurrency is discretionary; declining to order it does not violate a clear rule of law and is not plain error.

The decision strengthens Wyoming’s emphasis on timely permanency and the primacy of child safety, while offering practical guidance on what constitutes “reasonable efforts” when specialized services are at issue. It also clarifies that concurrency remains a tool, not a mandate, to be deployed when and if the circumstances warrant.