Concurrent Misconduct Can Warrant Consecutive Extensions of Disbarment: Louisiana Supreme Court Endorses a “Nature-and-Number” Approach Under Chatelain, With Post-Disbarment Noncooperation Considered Separately

Introduction

In In re: Dounnisei Kuo Gbalazeh, No. 2025-B-0684 (La. Oct. 1, 2025), the Supreme Court of Louisiana issued a per curiam order extending a previously imposed disbarment by an additional five years and directing restitution to an injured client. The case arises from formal charges brought by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) against a disbarred Louisiana attorney, centered on events that began in 2011 when the respondent was administratively ineligible to practice but accepted fees and failed to refund unearned amounts.

The decision is significant for two reasons. First, it confirms that when new disciplinary charges involve misconduct concurrent with earlier proceedings, the court may consider the “nature and number” of those concurrent acts—consistent with Louisiana State Bar Association v. Chatelain—to determine if additional sanctions are warranted, rather than treating the earlier penalty as fully dispositive. Second, relying on In re: White, it reaffirms that the five-year minimum readmission period tied to a disbarment can be extended to run consecutively, effectively delaying the earliest readmission eligibility date, particularly where post-disbarment noncooperation falls outside the Chatelain framework.

The parties are the ODC (applicant) and the respondent, Ms. Gbalazeh, a lawyer admitted in 2007 and already disbarred in 2020 (In re: Gbalazeh, 20-1111). The key issues include whether the respondent’s 2011 actions and later noncooperation violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, how to treat overlapping timeframes under Chatelain, and whether the readmission clock may be extended consecutively given the totality of circumstances.

Summary of the Opinion

After the respondent failed to answer the formal charges, the allegations were deemed admitted under Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). The court independently reviewed the record and held:

Respondent accepted a fee for legal services in 2011 while administratively ineligible to practice, failed to return the unearned fee upon request, and failed to cooperate with the ODC’s 2023 investigation.
The conduct violated Rules 1.1(c), 1.5(f)(5), 5.5(a) and (e), 8.1(c), and 8.4(a) of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. The baseline sanction is disbarment, with several aggravating factors and no mitigating factors.
Applying a Chatelain analysis to misconduct concurrent with earlier proceedings, the court agreed with the hearing committee that the “nature and number” of concurrent acts matters in fashioning the sanction. Additionally, the post-disbarment failure to cooperate lies outside Chatelain and must be treated separately (see In re: Ford).
Relying on In re: White, the court ordered that the five-year minimum period within which the respondent may seek readmission be extended for an additional five years, to run consecutively from the date she would have first been eligible to seek readmission from the 2020 disbarment.
The court also ordered full restitution to the affected client, Souleymane Traore, and assessed costs against the respondent with legal interest per Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

Louisiana State Bar Association v. Chatelain, 573 So. 2d 470 (La. 1991).
Chatelain instructs that when a second disciplinary proceeding involves misconduct occurring during the same period as the first, “the overall discipline to be imposed should be determined as if both proceedings were before the court simultaneously.” The hearing committee, and the court, applied this principle to assess the sanction in light of the overlap between the 2011 conduct and the time period underlying the respondent’s prior discipline (Gbalazeh I and II). Importantly, the court endorsed the committee’s emphasis on the “nature and number” of concurrent acts, signaling that concurrency does not inoculate later-discovered acts from additional consequences—especially where repeated or aggravated misconduct exists.
In re: White, 00-2732 (La. 4/25/01), 791 So. 2d 602.
White confirms that the five-year minimum readmission period for a subsequent disbarment should run consecutively to that stemming from the original disbarment, absent unusual or extenuating circumstances. Here, the court applied White’s logic to extend the respondent’s readmission eligibility by an additional five years, commencing when her initial five-year minimum would have first permitted an application—thus producing a consecutive extension rather than merging the periods.
In re: Ford, 14-0831 (La. 6/20/14), 141 So. 3d 800.
Ford is cited for the proposition that not all acts implicated in a subsequent proceeding fit within Chatelain. Specifically, conduct that occurred after the earlier matter—here, post-disbarment failure to cooperate with the ODC—falls outside Chatelain’s concurrency framework and can independently justify further discipline.
In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09), 18 So. 3d 57.
The court reiterates the standard of review: attorney discipline lies within the court’s original jurisdiction, and the court acts as trier of fact, performing an independent review of the record to determine whether misconduct is proven by clear and convincing evidence.
In re: Donnan, 01-3058 (La. 1/10/03), 838 So. 2d 715.
Donnan clarifies that deemed-admitted facts under Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3) obviate the need for further proof of factual allegations, but legal conclusions require the facts to support them. If the violation is not apparent from the admitted facts, additional evidence may be necessary. The facts here easily supported the charged rule violations.
Louisiana State Bar Association v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173 (La. 1987) and Louisiana State Bar Association v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520 (La. 1984).
These decisions restate the aims of attorney discipline—protecting the public, maintaining high standards, preserving the profession’s integrity, and deterring misconduct—and that sanctions are fact-sensitive, calibrated to the seriousness of the offenses and the presence of aggravation or mitigation.
Respondent’s prior disciplinary matters: In re: Gbalazeh I, 17-1704 (La. 12/5/17), 231 So. 3d 21; and In re: Gbalazeh II, 20-1111 (La. 11/24/20), 304 So. 3d 849.
The 2017 suspension (one year and one day) and the 2020 disbarment contextualize the present matter: repeated practice while ineligible, failure to return unearned fees, and failure to cooperate. The instant case involves overlapping time with Gbalazeh I/II and thus triggers Chatelain considerations, while also adding post-disbarment noncooperation that lies outside Chatelain.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in four steps:

Deemed-admitted procedure and proof. The respondent did not answer the formal charges. Under Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3), the factual allegations are deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court, citing Donnan, confirmed that while facts are established by default, the legal conclusions must logically follow; here, they did.
Rule violations and baseline sanction. The admitted facts establish violations of Rules 1.1(c) (failure to maintain eligibility and registration compliance), 1.5(f)(5) (failure to refund unearned fees), 5.5(a) and (e) (unauthorized practice by acting while ineligible), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities), and 8.4(a) (violating the Rules of Professional Conduct). The hearing committee, applying the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, set the baseline penalty at disbarment because the misconduct involved serious harm, knowing/intentional mental state, and the conversion-like retention of client funds. Aggravating factors included a prior disciplinary record, dishonest/selfish motive, pattern and multiplicity of offenses, victim vulnerability, and indifference to restitution; no mitigating factors were found.
Chatelain concurrency and the “nature-and-number” refinement. The committee—and the court—treated the 2011 conduct as concurrent with earlier disciplinary matters. While Chatelain suggests evaluating overall discipline as if the matters were simultaneous, the court agreed that the “nature and number of the concurrent acts” should guide whether additional sanctions are warranted. This endorsement is notable: it rejects a wooden application of Chatelain that might otherwise compress or neutralize later-discovered misconduct from the same time frame when that misconduct reflects persistent or aggravated violations (for example, knowingly practicing while ineligible and refusing refunds).
Post-disbarment misconduct and consecutive readmission periods. The failure to cooperate with the ODC after the 2020 disbarment is not covered by Chatelain (as clarified by cases like Ford). Thus, it independently supports an additional sanction. The court adopted the committee’s recommendation to extend the five-year minimum readmission period for another five years commencing upon the first eligibility date tied to the 2020 disbarment. This approach is anchored in White’s rule that such periods run consecutively in the absence of extenuating circumstances, thereby safeguarding the protective and deterrent functions of the disciplinary system.

Impact

The decision has several practical and doctrinal implications:

Clarified concurrency doctrine. By expressly “agreeing” with the committee that the “nature and number of the concurrent acts should be considered,” the court clarifies that Chatelain is not an automatic cap on additional sanctions for later-discovered acts from the same timeframe. Where concurrency reveals repetition, escalation, or significant client harm, further sanction—up to and including extension of a disbarment—is appropriate.
Consecutive readmission periods reaffirmed. The court reaffirmed that the five-year minimum readmission period under Rule XIX, § 24 is not a single fixed window immune from extension. Under White, consecutive five-year periods may be imposed, delaying eligibility for readmission. Disbarred lawyers who incur additional charges—whether concurrent or post-disbarment—face a tangible risk of pushing back their earliest readmission date.
Post-disbarment noncooperation is sanctionable on its own. Noncooperation with the ODC after a lawyer has been disbarred will not be folded into a Chatelain concurrency analysis. It is independent misconduct that can justify additional discipline, including extension of the readmission clock.
Administrative ineligibility is serious. Practicing while administratively ineligible (e.g., failure to pay dues, file trust disclosures, maintain MCLE compliance) remains an unauthorized practice of law violation with real disciplinary consequences. The court continues to treat such practice as a serious breach, particularly when paired with fee misconduct.
Restitution is expected and enforceable in discipline. The court ordered restitution of unearned fees. Although restitution is not a substitute for civil remedies, it underscores the profession’s expectation that client funds be promptly and fully returned when not earned.
Procedural efficiency through deemed admissions. The opinion reinforces the efficacy of Rule XIX’s deemed-admitted procedure, balancing due process (facts must support legal conclusions) with efficient enforcement when respondents default.
Staleness is not a bar to discipline. The complaint was filed roughly a decade after the underlying events, yet the court proceeded without suggesting any time bar. This reflects the protective ethos of disciplinary proceedings, which focus on professional fitness and public protection rather than solely on timeliness norms akin to civil statutes of limitation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Administrative ineligibility vs. disbarment. A lawyer can be “ineligible” to practice for administrative reasons (e.g., unpaid dues, missing disclosures, MCLE noncompliance). Practicing during ineligibility is unauthorized practice (Rule 5.5), even though it is distinct from suspension or disbarment. Disbarment is a severe sanction that removes a lawyer from practice and triggers a multi-year readmission process.
Deemed-admitted procedure (Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3)). If a lawyer fails to answer formal charges, the factual allegations are accepted as true (“deemed admitted”). The court still checks whether those facts legally establish each charged rule violation.
Chatelain concurrency. When multiple disciplinary matters involve overlapping time periods, the sanction should be considered as if all were heard together. This prevents gamesmanship and ensures proportional discipline. Here, the court clarifies that concurrency does not prevent additional sanction if the cumulative picture and the “nature and number” of acts warrant it.
Consecutive readmission periods (White). Disbarment carries a minimum five-year waiting period before a lawyer may apply for readmission. If a lawyer is later disciplined again, the court can extend the waiting period, running the new five-year period consecutively—meaning the earliest application date is pushed further into the future.
Baseline sanction and aggravation/mitigation. Under the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, each violation has a “baseline” sanction (e.g., reprimand, suspension, disbarment) that can be adjusted based on factors such as prior discipline, dishonest motive, pattern of misconduct, harm to clients, and whether the lawyer made restitution.
Restitution in discipline. Beyond civil liability, disciplinary authorities can order restitution when a lawyer retains unearned fees. This is part of the profession’s self-regulation to protect clients and the public.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Louisiana’s decision in In re: Gbalazeh meaningfully refines how concurrent misconduct is treated under Chatelain and confirms the availability of consecutive extensions of the five-year readmission period under White. The court’s endorsement of a “nature-and-number” approach to concurrent acts ensures that later-discovered, overlapping misconduct—especially where it manifests as recurring unauthorized practice and retention of unearned fees—can still be sanctioned meaningfully, even when prior discipline covered the same general timeframe. At the same time, the opinion draws a clear line around post-disbarment noncooperation, treating it as separate misconduct that can independently justify extending disbarment.

The decree’s practical consequences are straightforward and significant: the respondent’s earliest readmission date is pushed out by an additional five years (to run consecutively from her initial eligibility date under the 2020 disbarment), restitution is ordered to the harmed client, and costs are assessed. More broadly, the opinion reinforces Louisiana’s disciplinary goals of public protection, integrity of the profession, and deterrence—signaling that administrative ineligibility is no safe harbor for practice, that unearned fees must be returned, and that cooperation with disciplinary authorities remains mandatory, even after disbarment.