Concrete Plans and Overlapping Laws: Tenth Circuit Tightens Pre‑Enforcement Standing in Second Amendment Challenges

Introduction

In Springer v. Grisham, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed whether a plaintiff had Article III standing to preemptively challenge a New Mexico Department of Health (NMDOH) public health order that prohibited the possession of firearms in public parks and playgrounds within the City of Albuquerque and Bernalillo County. The plaintiff, James Springer, claimed the order violated his Second Amendment rights (and also asserted First Amendment and substantive due process claims not pursued on appeal).

The district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the order’s “parks” prohibition but denied relief on the “playgrounds” prohibition. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part—not on Second Amendment merits, but on jurisdictional grounds. The court held Springer lacked standing to challenge either restriction, vacated the injunction, and remanded with instructions to dissolve it.

The central issues before the court were:

• Injury-in-fact: Whether Springer showed a concrete, imminent plan to engage in conduct proscribed by the order.
• Redressability: Whether any injury could be remedied given separate, unchallenged state and local laws that independently bar the same conduct in the same locations.

The decision is significant for pre-enforcement litigation in the Second Amendment context and beyond. It clarifies that plaintiffs must (1) present concrete and specific plans to engage in the regulated conduct and (2) overcome the presence of overlapping, unchallenged prohibitions that would independently prevent the desired conduct, or else their injuries are not redressable.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit (Judges Hartz, Eid, and Federico; opinion by Judge Eid) held that Springer lacked Article III standing to challenge both the parks and playgrounds restrictions in the NMDOH public health order. The court ruled:

• Injury-in-fact: Springer failed to allege “concrete plans” to carry a firearm in a specific park or playground subject to the order at any definite time. Vague plans to visit parks in Albuquerque or Bernalillo County, references to past visits, and a general intention to hold a rally at Civic Plaza (even assuming it is a “park”) were insufficiently specific.
• Redressability: Even if the NMDOH order were enjoined, overlapping, unchallenged state statutes and local ordinances independently prohibit carrying firearms in the relevant parks and playgrounds. Absent allegations of a willingness to violate those laws, a favorable ruling would not enable Springer to carry a firearm in those locations.

The court affirmed the district court’s denial of an injunction as to the playgrounds restriction (albeit on different reasoning) and reversed the grant of an injunction as to the parks restriction. The panel remanded with instructions to dissolve the injunction and proceed consistent with its standing analysis. The court expressly did not reach Second Amendment merits or revive Springer’s First Amendment and due process claims (which were not pursued on appeal).

The court also clarified that the expiration of the public health order did not moot the case under the voluntary cessation doctrine (because the State had not shown it was “absolutely clear” the conduct would not recur). It further noted that the existence of other injunctions in other cases does not moot Springer’s request for injunctive relief in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., which held federal courts lack authority to issue universal injunctions.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)
  • Provided the bedrock three-part standing test (injury-in-fact, traceability, redressability) and emphasized that “some day intentions” do not constitute an actual or imminent injury. The court relied heavily on Lujan to reject Springer’s generalized plans and his reliance on past visits to parks.
• Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021)
  • Reiterated that plaintiffs must show concrete, particularized injury. The panel used these cases to anchor the constitutional limits of federal court jurisdiction.
• Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43 (2024)
  • At the preliminary injunction stage, plaintiffs must make a “clear showing” they are likely to establish standing. The court used Murthy to frame the heightened rigor applied to standing at the PI stage.
• Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014); Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289 (1979); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013)
  • Set out the pre-enforcement standing framework: plaintiffs must intend to engage in arguably protected conduct proscribed by law and face a “credible threat of prosecution.” The panel measured Springer’s statements against this standard and found them wanting.
• Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488 (2009)
  • Emphasized the need for specific, concrete plans tied to specific places and times; generalized, “vague desire[s]” are insufficient. The court applied Summers to reject Springer’s non-specific assertions of future park visits.
• Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 121 F.4th 96 (10th Cir. 2024)
  • Reinforced that speculative plans to potentially violate a law do not establish imminent injury. The panel drew on this to underscore the insufficiency of Springer’s allegations.
• We the Patriots, Inc. v. Grisham, 119 F.4th 1253 (10th Cir. 2024)
  • Addressed the same NMDOH order. There, standing was lacking for challenges to the playground restriction because overlapping city and county restrictions independently barred firearms, defeating redressability. The panel leaned on this analysis to find a lack of redressability for both parks and playgrounds here.
• Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014); Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991)
  • Support the redressability principle: if unchallenged legal obstacles independently prohibit the same conduct, enjoining one law won’t redress the injury.
• O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974)
  • Courts presume litigants will obey the law; a plaintiff who will not violate overlapping laws cannot show redressability from enjoining only one law unless he challenges the others or alleges a willingness to violate them.
• Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. —, 145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025)
  • Held that federal courts lack statutory authority to issue universal injunctions. The panel noted that, after CASA, the existence of other injunctions does not moot a separate plaintiff’s request for relief—a clarification from the court’s prior approach in We the Patriots—though the panel did not fully delineate CASA’s effect on earlier mootness analysis.
• Robert v. Austin, 72 F.4th 1160 (10th Cir. 2023); Prison Legal News v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 944 F.3d 868 (10th Cir. 2019)
  • Articulate the voluntary cessation exception to mootness. The expiration of the order did not moot the case because the State did not show recurrence was “absolutely” implausible.
• Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255 (2023); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring)
  • Emphasize that redressability concerns what a court’s judgment—not merely its opinion—can do. A favorable opinion that might influence other proceedings is not sufficient for Article III redressability.
• Cayuga Nation v. Tanner, 824 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 2016); Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884)
  • Support the presumption that governments enforce their laws as written and that jurisdictional facts must appear in the record; extra-record media statements cannot supply standing.
• Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013)
  • Reiterates that federal courts decide concrete disputes, not generalized grievances; a personal, particularized injury is essential.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeded along two independent tracks, either of which defeated standing.

1) No Imminent Injury-in-Fact: Plans Too Vague and Non-Specific

A plaintiff asserting pre-enforcement standing must demonstrate a concrete intent to engage in conduct “arguably affected with a constitutional interest,” that is proscribed by law, under a credible threat of enforcement. Springer’s showing was deficient in multiple ways:

• Playgrounds: Neither the complaint nor the declaration identified any specific playground, any date or timeframe, or any concrete plan to carry a firearm into a playground. The filings did not even mention the word “playground.” A statement in a verified motion that he “wishes to carry firearms in…playgrounds” at some point in the future was precisely the sort of “some day intention” rejected in Lujan and Summers.
• Parks: Springer stated he had been “prohibited” from carrying his firearm at parks he attended in September and October for youth sporting events or to enjoy the balloon fiesta, and he referenced a contemplated rally at Civic Plaza. But past visits alone do not establish likely future injury. He did not allege that these events recur at a particular park or specify which park(s) he will visit or when. Regarding the rally, even assuming Civic Plaza is a park covered by the order, he offered no dates or concrete steps—again, a classic “some day” plan.
• Credible threat of prosecution: The court presumes state actors will enforce the law. Springer attempted to rely on media-reported statements by local officials signaling non-enforcement, but those statements were not in the record and, in any event, referenced the public health order (not the overlapping laws). If credited, they would tend to negate any credible threat of enforcement under the order, undercutting injury rather than proving it.

Because Springer’s asserted plans were non-specific, untethered to a particular location or time, and unsupported by record evidence of enforcement threat, he failed to make the “clear showing” of imminent injury required at the preliminary injunction stage.

2) No Redressability: Overlapping, Unchallenged Laws Already Prohibit the Conduct

Even if Springer had a concrete plan, his injury would not be redressable because separate, independent laws would still bar him from carrying a firearm in the same parks and playgrounds. The court cataloged those overlapping restrictions, echoing We the Patriots:

• Bernalillo County ordinance prohibiting firearms in “recreation facilities,” including playgrounds. Bernalillo Cnty. Ord. § 58-12(b)(27); § 58-5.
• City application of state prohibitions on firearm possession in schools and universities to multiple playgrounds. Albuquerque Administrative Instructions 5-19 & 5-20; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-7-2.1(A), (B)(2); § 30-7-2.4(A), (C)(2)(b).
• County ordinance prohibiting firearms in “any park.” Bernalillo Cnty. Ord. § 58-12(b)(27).
• City prohibition on firearms in “Open Space Lands.” Albuquerque Code of Ords. § 5-8-6(G).

The redressability principle is straightforward: If enjoining the challenged state health order would still leave intact independent, unchallenged prohibitions that forbid the same conduct in the same places, a favorable judgment will not enable the plaintiff to do what he seeks to do. The court further underscored that, absent an allegation of willingness to violate the overlapping laws, plaintiffs are presumed to obey them. Because Springer described himself as “a law-abiding citizen” and did not challenge or agree to violate those other laws, any injunction against the NMDOH order would not remedy his asserted inability to carry a firearm in parks or playgrounds.

The court rejected two attempted workarounds:

• Non-enforcement statements: The media statements were outside the record and, in any event, appeared to address only the public health order. If construed as non-enforcement of all laws, they would undermine the existence of any credible threat, defeating injury rather than establishing redressability.
• Parallel litigation: The fact that overlapping laws are being challenged in state court, and a state judge stayed the matter anticipating guidance, does not establish redressability. Courts provide relief through judgments, not the persuasive force of their opinions. A favorable federal judgment here would not invalidate separate municipal or county ordinances or state statutes not before the court.

Impact

The decision has several notable implications:

• Higher specificity bar for pre-enforcement standing: At the preliminary injunction stage, plaintiffs must now expect rigorous scrutiny of their standing allegations, including concrete identification of specific locations and times where they intend to engage in the proscribed conduct. Generalized intentions to “visit parks” or a desire to hold a rally “someday” are not enough.
• Litigation strategy in overlapping regulatory fields: Where multiple jurisdictions (state, county, city) have overlapping prohibitions, plaintiffs must either challenge each independently enforceable restriction or allege a willingness to violate them. Otherwise, redressability will fail. This will drive more comprehensive pleadings, joinder of additional governmental defendants, and broader challenges to layered regulatory schemes.
• Record discipline: Assertions about (non)enforcement must appear in the record; media reports and links in briefs will not suffice. Plaintiffs should expect to submit affidavits or declarations from officials, or other admissible evidence, if they intend to press a “no credible threat” or “non-enforcement” theory.
• No mootness from “universal injunctions”: In light of Trump v. CASA, Inc., the existence of other injunctions elsewhere will not moot a separate plaintiff’s request for relief. Plaintiffs cannot rely on broad, system-wide injunctions to secure relief in their own cases; defendants cannot rely on those injunctions to prove mootness. The panel flagged this shift (without fully reworking prior doctrine) and signaled that injunctions in one case do not necessarily obviate the need for adjudication in another.
• Second Amendment merits postponed: The panel did not reach whether parks or playgrounds are “sensitive places” under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. That question remains open in the Tenth Circuit on a merits basis. District courts will likely continue to see merits litigation, but only in cases where plaintiffs satisfy the standing prerequisites clarified here.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Standing: A constitutional requirement that plaintiffs show (1) a concrete, particularized, actual or imminent injury; (2) caused by the defendant; and (3) likely to be remedied by a court’s judgment.
• Injury-in-fact in pre-enforcement cases: Plaintiffs must show concrete plans to engage in conduct arguably protected but proscribed by law, and a credible threat of enforcement. Vague future intentions are inadequate.
• Redressability with overlapping laws: If other, unchallenged laws independently prohibit the same conduct, a court’s order against one law won’t help. Plaintiffs either challenge the other laws or show a willingness to violate them; otherwise, the court cannot redress the injury.
• Credible threat of prosecution: Courts presume enforcement. To defeat that presumption, plaintiffs must present record evidence. Extra-record media statements are not enough.
• Voluntary cessation: When a government stops challenged conduct (e.g., lets an order expire), a case is not moot unless it’s absolutely clear the conduct will not recur. That did not happen here.
• Universal injunctions after CASA: The Supreme Court has said federal courts lack authority to issue universal (nationwide, non-party) injunctions. That means other injunctions do not necessarily moot your case or grant you relief unless you are a party to them or they otherwise cover you specifically.

Conclusion

Springer v. Grisham cements a rigorous standing framework for pre-enforcement constitutional challenges in the Tenth Circuit, particularly in the context of layered gun regulations. The court demands concrete, specific plans tied to particular locations and times, and it will rigorously enforce redressability where overlapping, unchallenged restrictions remain. Extra-record statements of non-enforcement will not be credited, and even if credited as to one law, they may undermine the requisite injury or enforcement threat rather than establish it.

The practical upshot is a roadmap for litigants: identify specific intended conduct at specific regulated places, substantiate a credible threat of enforcement with record evidence, and account for all overlapping prohibitions by challenging them or alleging a willingness to violate them. Doctrinally, the opinion signals that after Trump v. CASA, Inc., one court’s injunction will not generally moot another plaintiff’s case, reinforcing that standing and redressability must be independently established in each action.

The court did not reach the Second Amendment merits under Bruen, leaving open future merits litigation over whether parks and playgrounds are “sensitive places.” But this opinion will decisively shape which such cases can be heard: only those that clear the standing and redressability hurdles elaborated here.