Concrete, Imminent Harm and the SAMS Safety Threshold: The Montana Supreme Court Raises the Bar for Youth-in-Need-of-Care Adjudications in Matter of J.D.

I. Introduction

In Matter of J.D., 2025 MT 274 (DA 25-0073), the Montana Supreme Court reversed a district court’s adjudication of a 14-year-old boy, J.D., as a Youth in Need of Care (YINC) and vacated a subsequent decree of guardianship. The case centers on whether the State may remove a child and adjudicate him as a YINC based primarily on a parent’s serious mental health symptoms and generalized safety concerns, without concrete evidence of past harm or a clearly defined, imminent, substantial risk of future harm to that specific child.

The opinion, authored by Justice Ingrid Gustafson, articulates an important clarifying rule: mental illness and generalized concern are not enough. To sustain a YINC adjudication and removal, the Department of Public Health and Human Services (the Department) must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, actual harm or a specific, non-speculative, imminent substantial risk of harm to the child, and it must respect—and document—its own SAMS (Safety Assessment and Management System) safety threshold in doing so.

Chief Justice Swanson, joined by Justice Rice, dissents, arguing that the majority has impermissibly substituted its own judgment for that of the district court and has undervalued both the risk factors posed by an untreated, chronic mental illness and the ongoing vulnerability of teenagers.

This decision will likely become a central precedent in Montana’s abuse-and-neglect jurisprudence, particularly in cases involving parental mental health and the threshold for removal under the statutory YINC framework and the Department’s SAMS policy.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Removal and Initial Intervention

On February 7, 2023, S.M. (Mother) was arrested for allegedly making repeated, inappropriate calls to the Beaverhead County Sheriff’s Department dispatch over a two-year period. J.D., then 14, had no other adult with legal custody. Mother identified her sister, T.M., as a possible caregiver, and the Department placed J.D. with T.M. on an emergency basis.

Child Protection Specialist (CPS) Brenda Kirkley interviewed Mother in custody and again on release (February 28, 2023). Kirkley reported:

• Mother claimed she had been placed under hypnosis.
• Mother said she used Narcan to “knock off the hypnosis.”
• She accused the government of conspiring against her.
• She exhibited difficulty communicating clearly, regulating emotions, and was observed acting erratically in detention (screaming, banging pipes, uncooperative behavior).
• A urinalysis confirmed Mother was not under the influence of drugs.

The Department’s prior history with Mother included concerns about her mental health.

B. Petition for YINC Adjudication and Temporary Legal Custody

On March 8, 2023, the Department filed a petition seeking:

• Emergency protective services,
• Adjudication of J.D. as a YINC, and
• Temporary legal custody.

The petition was supported by an affidavit from CPS Kirkley asserting J.D. had been neglected and was in need of immediate protection due to Mother’s mental health. The district court granted the requested relief ex parte, continuing J.D.’s placement with T.M.

At the March 21, 2023 show cause hearing, Mother denied the material allegations but stipulated to cause (i.e., she did not contest the court’s temporary emergency involvement at that time). The court set a contested adjudicatory hearing for April 18, 2023, to allow Mother to obtain a mental health evaluation in her separate criminal case.

C. The Adjudicatory Hearing

At the April 18, 2023 adjudication:

• The Department called CPS Brenda Kirkley and Chief of Police Jeremy Alvarez.
• Mother testified on her own behalf.
• J.D.’s counsel represented that J.D. was not scared of or uncomfortable with his mother.

A central part of the testimony involved the Department’s use (or non-use) of the Montana Safety Assessment and Management System (SAMS), which:

• Implements the statutory requirement for safety and risk assessment,
• Defines a “safety threshold,”
• Requires consideration of specific, enumerated factors before finding a child “unsafe.”

Kirkley testified she was familiar with SAMS but could not recall its five safety criteria. Her substantive testimony, as the Supreme Court later emphasized, failed to tie Mother’s mental health symptoms to:

• Actual harm suffered by J.D., or
• A clearly defined, imminent, severe risk of harm to J.D.

The Department’s theory of neglect, adopted by the district court, was that Mother’s mental health constituted “physical neglect,” particularly:

• Failure to provide basic necessities, and
• Exposing the child to an unreasonable physical or psychological risk (§ 41‑3‑102(22), MCA).

D. District Court Ruling

On April 19, 2023, the district court adjudicated J.D. a YINC. The court’s primary concern was Mother’s stability and her ability to ensure J.D.’s basic needs, including school attendance, food, medical care, and shelter. J.D. was recognized as somewhat self-sufficient, but still in need of parental oversight. The court:

• Granted the Department temporary legal custody for six months,
• Continued placement with Aunt T.M., and
• Later imposed a guardianship (December 11, 2024 Decree of Guardianship).

Mother appealed both the adjudication and the guardianship.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

A. Issue and Holding

The Court restated the dispositive issue as:

Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it adjudicated J.D. as a YINC?

The Court answered yes, holding that:

• The finding of abuse and neglect (specifically, physical neglect) was not supported by substantial evidence under Montana’s statutory standards.
• The Department failed to establish either actual harm or a substantial, imminent risk of harm to J.D.
• The Department effectively ignored its own SAMS safety threshold when it removed J.D. without real or imminent danger.

As a result, the Court:

• Reversed and vacated the April 19, 2023 order adjudicating J.D. as a YINC; and
• Vacated the December 11, 2024 Decree of Guardianship.

Given this disposition, the Court did not reach Mother’s additional claims about the Department’s reasonable efforts and alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

B. Core Rationale

The Supreme Court’s reasoning can be distilled into several central propositions:

1. Removal and YINC adjudication require more than generalized concern or parental abnormality. The law demands proof of actual harm or a substantial, non-speculative, imminent risk of harm to the child.
2. Parental mental illness, by itself, is not abuse or neglect. There must be a demonstrated causal link between the parent’s mental health manifestations and harm, or substantial risk of harm, to the child.
3. The Department must faithfully apply and document the SAMS safety threshold. None of the five SAMS safety conditions—let alone all five—was clearly present here, particularly given J.D.’s age and self-protective capacities.
4. J.D.’s actual circumstances did not show unmet basic needs or educational harm. He had stable housing, food, clothing, a working parent, and normal school progression. His absences did not reach chronic levels and were not shown to be harmful or tied to Mother’s mental health.

IV. Analysis

A. Statutory and Policy Framework

1. Statutory Limits on Forced Removal

Section 41‑3‑101(1)(d), MCA, frames Montana’s child-protection policy:

[T]here is no forced removal of a child from the child’s family unless the department has reasonable cause to suspect that the child is at imminent risk of harm.

This provision is crucial: it requires reasonable cause and a risk that is not only substantial, but also imminent. Removal is described as a “grave and cautious undertaking,” balanced against the presumption that a child’s best interests are ordinarily served by preserving the family unit.

2. YINC Adjudication Standards

To adjudicate a child as a YINC, the Department must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child has been:

• Abused,
• Neglected, or
• Abandoned.

Key statutory definitions (all from § 41‑3‑102, MCA) include:

• Child abuse or neglect means:
  • Actual physical or psychological harm, or
  • A substantial risk of such harm, or
  • Abandonment (§ 41‑3‑102(7)).
• Physical or psychological harm occurs when a parent inflicts or allows to be inflicted physical abuse, physical neglect, or psychological abuse or neglect (§ 41‑3‑102(23)).
• Psychological abuse or neglect requires severe maltreatment injurious to the child’s intellectual or psychological capacity, and must be identified as such by a licensed professional (§ 41‑3‑102(25)(a)).
• Physical neglect includes:
  • Failure to provide basic necessities (nutrition, shelter, weather-appropriate clothing),
  • Failure to provide cleanliness and general supervision,
  • Exposing the child to an unreasonable physical or psychological risk,
  • Allowing sexual abuse or exploitation, or
  • Causing malnutrition or failure to thrive (§ 41‑3‑102(22)).

The district court found physical neglect primarily in Mother’s alleged inability to provide necessities and her mental health as an “unreasonable risk.” The Supreme Court holds that this finding is not supported by substantial evidence.

3. Safety and Risk Assessment Requirements

Under § 41‑3‑202(1)(a) and (c), MCA, when a report of potential abuse or neglect is received:

• The Department must promptly assess the information and determine the level of response required.
• If warranted, a CPS must:
  • Conduct a thorough investigation, and
  • Perform a safety and risk assessment to determine whether the child’s living arrangement is unsafe.

“Safety and risk assessment” is defined at § 41‑3‑102(30), MCA, and requires evaluation of:

1. Existing threats to child safety,
2. Protective capabilities of the parent or guardian,
3. Child’s vulnerabilities,
4. Interventions needed to protect the child, and
5. Likelihood of future physical or psychological harm.

The Supreme Court stresses that this is not a mere paperwork exercise: the assessment must connect specific conditions in the home with specific threats to the specific child.

4. The SAMS Safety Threshold

The Department’s own SAMS model operationalizes the statutory safety/risk assessment and uses a “safety threshold” composed of five criteria:

1. The potential harm is severe.
2. The harm is imminent (present or likely within days).
3. The danger is clearly observable.
4. The child is vulnerable and depends on others for protection.
5. Family conditions are out of control or unmanaged.

SAMS is designed to distinguish risk (a broader, longer-term possibility of harm) from actual danger (present, severe, observable, imminent risk of harm). According to SAMS:

• Intervention up to and including removal is warranted only when all threshold conditions are satisfied.
• Removal should occur only when no in-home (or “home safety”) plan can sufficiently control the safety threats.

The Court notes that:

• CPS Kirkley could not recite the five criteria.
• Her testimony did not demonstrate that the five conditions were met in J.D.’s situation.
• The Department thereby “abandoned the safeguards it specifically designed to prevent unnecessary family disruption” (¶ 19).

By foregrounding SAMS and tying it closely to the statutory standards, the Court effectively elevates SAMS compliance to a necessary part of establishing substantial evidence for YINC adjudications.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Montana Cases on Standard of Review and Substantial Risk

• In re K.H., 2012 MT 175, 366 Mont. 18, 285 P.3d 474:
  • Confirms abuse-of-discretion review of YINC adjudications.
  • Instructs courts to consider a parent’s past conduct to inform decisions, but crucially in terms of its effect on the child.
  • Cited here (¶ 20) to reinforce that the focus must remain on the impact of the conduct on the child, not simply the existence of problematic behavior.
• In re A.J.W., 2010 MT 42, 355 Mont. 264, 227 P.3d 1012:
  • Defines abuse of discretion as acting arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment, or beyond the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice.
• In re J.H., 2016 MT 35, 382 Mont. 214, 367 P.3d 339:
  • Reiterates that substantial evidence is evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
  • Clarifies that appellate courts view evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party (here, normally the Department).
• In re L.B., 2025 MT 6, 420 Mont. 192, 562 P.3d 497:
  • Provides the familiar “clearly erroneous” definition for factual findings—either unsupported by substantial evidence, based on misapprehension of evidence, or clearly mistaken on full record review.

The Court uses these precedents primarily to set the standard of review and then concludes that the district court’s findings of neglect do not meet that standard.

2. Montana Cases Defining “Substantial Risk” and Harm

• In re I.B., 2011 MT 82, 360 Mont. 132, 255 P.3d 56:
  • Parents of an infant with a respiratory condition were specifically instructed on a safe feeding method to avoid choking or aspirating vomit.
  • They disregarded that method; a social worker found the baby with a bottle propped in its mouth in the very manner prohibited.
  • The Court upheld YINC adjudication because the parents’ disregard posed an immediate, life-threatening risk to a child with no self-protective capacity.

  In Matter of J.D., the Court contrasts this stark, concrete, and imminent danger with the more speculative risks posed to a 14-year-old by a parent’s untreated mental illness, where no specific risk scenario was tied to J.D.

• In re D.T.H., 2001 MT 138, 305 Mont. 502, 29 P.3d 1003:
  • Teen mother had been sexually abused by her stepfather, who later married her and moved in with her and the baby.
  • Evidence: social worker’s testimony about the family’s chaotic boundaries, the stepfather’s status as an untreated sex offender, and the likely lifelong psychological harm to the child if left in that environment.
  • The Court upheld YINC adjudication based on substantial risk of psychological harm and a bleak prognosis for healthy emotional and moral development.

  The Court uses D.T.H. to illustrate that “substantial risk” can be met without current, observable psychological scars—but only when detailed evidence establishes a specific, defined threat to the child’s ongoing development.

• In re K.C.H., 2003 MT 125, 316 Mont. 13, 68 P.3d 788, and In re C.P., 2001 MT 187, 306 Mont. 238, 32 P.3d 754:
  • Both cases involve newborns adjudicated as YINCs when parental rights had already been terminated regarding older siblings, and conditions had not materially changed.
  • These decisions approve YINC adjudication based on substantial risk where:
    • The child is a newborn (no self-protective capacity); and
    • There is documented, ongoing parental incapacity established by prior terminations.

  The Court distinguishes these cases because J.D. is an older youth with significant self-protective abilities, and there is no such history of prior terminations or established harm.

• In re G.S., 2002 MT 245, 312 Mont. 108, 59 P.3d 1063:
  • Cited for the general principle that courts must focus on the effect of parental conduct on the child, reinforcing the need for evidence of actual or likely harm.

3. Out-of-State Reversal Cases

The Court surveys several decisions from other jurisdictions where findings of neglect were reversed because the evidence showed only speculative or generalized risk, not specific, harm-linked threats:

• In re K.M., 75 A.3d 224 (D.C. App. 2013):
  • Mother had delusions and paranoia; expert testimony described what could happen to a child in general.
  • No evidence showed that this mother’s condition created a specific risk to this child.
  • Neglect finding reversed.
• In re David M., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 411 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2005):
  • Parents had mental health issues and substance abuse problems.
  • Court of Appeal reversed neglect finding because there was no evidence of a specific, defined risk to the children; concerns were speculative.
• In re Dahlia G., 10 N.Y.S.3d 113 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 2015):
  • Three-month-old child was present during an act of domestic violence but there was no evidence the child observed, understood, or was emotionally impacted.
  • Neglect finding reversed.
• S.S. v. Department of Children & Families, 81 So. 3d 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012):
  • Mother had psychological instability and substance abuse issues.
  • No expert testimony showed a likelihood that these problems would substantially impair the children’s health.
  • Reversal of imminent harm findings.

From these cases, the Montana Supreme Court extracts an important limiting principle: courts cannot adjudicate based on mere possibility, speculation, or generalized fear; there must be concrete, imminent, child-specific risk. This mirrors and reinforces Montana’s own statutory requirement of a “substantial risk” and “imminent” harm.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Standard of Review Applied to the Facts

Although the Court recites a deferential standard of review, it effectively concludes that:

• The district court’s finding of physical neglect was clearly erroneous because it was not supported by substantial evidence of:
  • Failure to provide basic necessities, or
  • Exposure to an unreasonable physical or psychological risk.
• Accordingly, the district court’s ultimate decision to adjudicate J.D. as a YINC was an abuse of discretion.

Key to this determination is the Court’s granular review of each category of evidence and its insistence on a causal nexus between Mother’s conduct and J.D.’s safety.

2. Mother’s Provision of Basic Necessities

The Court emphasizes that prior to removal:

• Mother raised J.D. alone since birth.
• She provided stable housing (a three-bedroom townhouse), food, clothing, and shared household chores with J.D.
• She had stable income as a part-time delivery driver at the time of adjudication.
• There was no evidence that J.D.’s physical or emotional needs were not being met at or near the time of adjudication.

Thus, the element of physical neglect based on failure to provide necessities was not supported; J.D. had not suffered malnutrition, homelessness, lack of medical care, or unsanitary conditions.

3. Mother’s Mental Health and Abnormal Conduct

The Court acknowledges serious concerns about Mother’s mental health:

• Episodes of delusional thinking (hypnosis, CIA conspiracy, aliens, implanted device);
• Off-label or irrational belief in using Narcan as an “anti-hypnosis” remedy;
• Erratic behavior in custody; and
• Frequent irrational calls to law enforcement.

However, the Court insists that mental illness itself is not enough. The Department was required to prove that Mother’s abnormal conduct:

• Inflicted or allowed physical or psychological harm on J.D., or
• Created a substantial, imminent risk of harm to J.D.

Crucially, the Court notes:

• Most of the bizarre conduct occurred outside J.D.’s presence and was unrelated to him.
• J.D. reported no fear of Mother.
• No licensed professional identified any psychological injury or disorder in J.D. attributable to Mother’s behavior.

The Court rejects the argument that the mere presence of severe mental illness in a parent automatically translates into an unreasonable physical or psychological risk to a teenager—even one who may still need oversight—absent concrete evidence of how that risk would materialize.

4. Alleged Past Physical Incidents

The Department pointed to:

• Mother’s admission that she may have inflicted physical pain on J.D. once in the past.
• An incident where she threw Styrofoam coffee cups at him approximately five months before removal.

The Court views these as:

• Remote in time and not clearly connected to J.D.’s current safety.
• Unsubstantiated in terms of resulting physical or psychological injury.
• Mitigated by Mother’s own actions (self-reporting to her doctor and arranging for J.D. to stay with Aunt T.M. during prior instability, demonstrating protective capacity).

Thus, while the Court acknowledges that these incidents raise legitimate concerns, they do not, on this record, amount to abuse or establish a substantial risk of imminent harm—particularly when no injuries or lasting impact on J.D. were documented.

5. School Attendance and Educational Concerns

CPS Kirkley testified that J.D. missed approximately 15 days of school. The district court cited these absences and Mother’s inability to clearly explain them as evidence of neglect.

The Court responds by:

• Placing the absences in context: 15 of 172 days is about 8.7%, below the commonly used 10% threshold for “chronic absenteeism.”
• Observing that statewide, a substantial percentage of students miss at least 10% of the school year.
• Noting that Mother referenced COVID as a contributing factor, and there was no evidence to refute that explanation.
• Highlighting that J.D. was not failing classes, not behaviorally problematic, and was progressing normally through school.

Therefore, the Court finds no evidentiary basis for concluding that Mother’s mental health caused educational neglect or that J.D. suffered educational harm.

6. Excessive Police Calls

The Department also relied on Mother’s repeated, irrational calls to the police and her criminal arrest as supporting neglect. The Court concedes that:

• These calls show poor judgment.
• They expose Mother to legal consequences that could temporarily affect her availability to J.D.

But the Court distinguishes potential future incarceration or detention from a current, substantial, imminent risk of harm:

• The possibility that Mother might re-offend and be detained does not itself constitute “abuse or neglect.”
• J.D. is now older (17 at the time of decision) and possesses self-protective capacities.
• The law requires reasonable cause to suspect imminent harm, not a broad, speculative forecast of potential future events.

7. Substantial vs. Speculative Risk

The Department argued that courts need not wait until a child has visible emotional or psychological scars. The Court agrees in principle but clarifies:

• The law demands a substantial risk of harm, not a mere possibility.
• The risk must be imminent, not remote or speculative.
• The inquiry must remain on the effect on the child, not the mere existence of parental pathology.

Synthesizing its own precedents (I.B., D.T.H., K.C.H., C.P.) with the out-of-state reversals, the Court effectively announces a more explicit rule:

An adjudication based on “substantial risk of harm” cannot stand when the evidence shows only speculative or generalized concerns, rather than specific, concrete, and imminent threats of harm to the child caused by the parent’s conduct (¶ 31).

In Matter of J.D., the Court finds the record devoid of such specific, imminent threats.

8. J.D.’s Age and Self-Protective Capacities

A key differentiator is J.D.’s age—14 at removal, 17 by the time of appellate decision. The Court emphasizes:

• He could dress himself, maintain personal hygiene, cook, do laundry, follow a schedule, and use a phone.
• He had a positive relationship with Mother, grandmother, and aunt and could reach out to them for help.
• He expressed that he was not afraid of Mother.

Contrasting J.D. with newborns or medically fragile infants, the Court concludes that:

• His self-protective capacities significantly reduce his vulnerability.
• The record shows no evidence that his physical, emotional, or academic well-being was impaired in Mother’s care.

Thus, the Court finds the Department and the district court overestimated the risk and undervalued J.D.’s resilience and Mother’s demonstrated ability to meet his needs despite mental health challenges.

D. The Dissent’s Perspective

Chief Justice Swanson, joined by Justice Rice, dissents, providing an important counterpoint.

1. Emphasis on Deference and Standard of Review

The dissent underscores:

• YINC cases are “difficult and fact-intensive,” often close calls.
• Appellate courts owe substantial deference to district courts’ factual findings and discretionary decisions because trial judges:
  • Observe witnesses in person,
  • See the parent’s conduct over time,
  • Are better positioned to weigh risk in real time.
• The majority, in the dissent’s view, effectively applies a de novo review standard.

For the dissent, the record contained substantial evidence to support the district court’s findings, and thus the court’s adjudication should have been affirmed.

2. View of Mother’s Mental Illness and Stability

The dissent highlights:

• Mother’s long-term pattern of mental health crises, including:
  • Throwing plates, books, and other items at J.D.,
  • “Consistently demonstrat[ing] out-of-control mental health,”
  • Rapid escalation and concerning outbursts.
• Her refusal to engage in mental health services at the time of adjudication.

The dissent interprets Mother’s relative stability around the hearing as:

• A transitory condition, not long-term stability.
• Partly attributable to the Department’s intervention and emergency services.

Thus, the dissent believes it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that J.D. remained at risk of neglect due to Mother’s untreated, chronic mental health issues.

3. Connection Between Parental Condition and Ability to Parent

Responding directly to the majority’s assertion that most problematic episodes occurred outside J.D.’s presence, the dissent stresses:

• A parent in the throes of delusions, paranoia, and erratic behavior is inherently less able to meet the basic needs of a 14‑year‑old child.
• The district court could reasonably infer neglect from Mother’s overall inability to function, even if specific acts occurred outside J.D.’s direct view.

4. Vulnerability of Teenagers

The dissent strongly challenges any implication that teenage self-sufficiency obviates the need for parental protection. Drawing on empirical literature, it notes that teenagers:

• Are at increased risk of:
  • Substance abuse,
  • Sexual assault,
  • Sex trafficking.
• Require active, functioning parental oversight to navigate these risks.

The dissent expresses concern that the majority’s approach may lead the Department to under-protect adolescents who are “couch surfing” or otherwise lacking effective parental care, simply because they can perform basic self-care tasks.

E. Likely Impact and Implications

1. For the Department and CPS Practice

This decision sends a clear message to the Department:

• Faithful SAMS application is essential. CPS workers must:
  • Know the five safety threshold criteria,
  • Apply them rigorously, and
  • Document how each is (or is not) met.
• Generalized mental health concerns are insufficient. Workers must:
  • Articulate specific, concrete ways in which a parent’s condition places this child at imminent risk of severe harm.
  • Distinguish remote or hypothetical risks from present threats.
• Continuous reassessment is mandatory. Under § 41‑3‑423(1)(b), MCA, the Department must monitor family progress and withdraw when:
  • Caregiver protective capacities improve, and
  • All five SAMS safety conditions are no longer present.
• Older youth require a nuanced approach. Their self-protective capabilities and independence should be factored into the risk analysis, not used to automatically justify removal or, conversely, to dismiss their vulnerabilities.

2. For Parents with Mental Health Conditions

The opinion may offer some reassurance to parents with mental health diagnoses:

• A diagnosis, or even documented episodes of bizarre or delusional behavior, does not automatically equate to abuse or neglect.
• Courts will look for a between the parent’s condition and actual or imminent harm to the child.
• Evidence of insight (such as self-reporting episodes, arranging temporary care with relatives, seeking treatment) may demonstrate “protective capacity” and weigh against removal.

However, the dissent signals that trial courts still retain broad discretion to interpret patterns of untreated mental illness as risk factors. Parents who refuse treatment or minimize their condition may still face adverse findings where specific risks to children can be shown.

3. For Trial Courts

District judges in Montana will likely read Matter of J.D. as:

• A directive to articulate more specific factual findings linking parental conduct to statutory definitions of harm or substantial risk.
• An implicit warning that generalized statements of “concern” will not, by themselves, survive appellate scrutiny.
• A reminder to require the Department to produce:
  • Detailed testimony on SAMS use,
  • Documentation of safety planning, and
  • Evidence of ongoing reassessment of risk and protective capacities.

4. For Attorneys (Parents, Children, and the State)

• Parents’ counsel can:
  • Demand that the Department identify each alleged safety threat and how it satisfies all five SAMS criteria.
  • Highlight the child’s self-protective strengths, stable living conditions, and absence of documented harm.
  • Use Matter of J.D. to argue against removal in cases with mental health diagnoses but no concrete harm.
• Children’s counsel should:
  • Be alert to situations where a child may feel safe and bonded with a mentally ill parent despite agency concerns.
  • Press for specific, child-focused evidence of harm, not adult-centric perceptions of abnormality.
• State’s counsel will need to:
  • Present more robust expert testimony when relying on mental health as a basis for removal.
  • Connect mental health symptoms to concrete safety scenarios (e.g., medication noncompliance leading to inability to supervise, or particular delusions leading to dangerous acts).
  • Ensure that CPS witnesses can explain and apply SAMS with specificity, not as a vague background tool.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Youth in Need of Care (YINC)

A “Youth in Need of Care” is a child that a court has found to be abused, neglected, or abandoned under Montana’s statutory definitions. Once adjudicated as a YINC, the child comes under the court’s protective jurisdiction, and the court can:

• Grant temporary or permanent custody to the Department or others,
• Order services and treatment for the family,
• Eventually terminate parental rights in extreme cases.

2. Abuse, Neglect, and Physical Neglect

• Abuse or neglect includes:
  • Actual physical or psychological harm, or
  • A substantial risk that such harm will occur.
• Physical neglect is:
  • Failure to provide basics like food, shelter, or clothing; or
  • Failure to supervise; or
  • Exposing the child to an “unreasonable” physical or psychological risk.

In Matter of J.D., the alleged neglect fell into the latter category—exposing J.D. to unreasonable risk due to Mother’s mental illness. The Court found the evidence did not show that such risk was concrete, substantial, and imminent.

3. Substantial Risk vs. Mere Possibility

A substantial risk means:

• A strong likelihood, not a remote chance.
• Based on specific facts about the child’s situation, not general fears about what could happen in theory.

A mere possibility is:

• A hypothetical scenario without concrete factual support.
• Insufficient by itself to justify removal or YINC adjudication under Montana law.

4. Imminent Risk

“Imminent risk” under § 41‑3‑101(1)(d), MCA, means that:

• Harm is likely to occur now or within days, not months or years away.
• There is a present, ongoing condition that could soon result in serious harm if not addressed.

5. Preponderance of the Evidence

“Preponderance” is the standard of proof in YINC adjudications. It means:

• More likely than not (greater than 50% likelihood).
• The Department’s evidence must tip the scale in favor of a conclusion that the child has been abused, neglected, or abandoned—or is at substantial risk thereof.

6. Standard of Review: Clear Error and Abuse of Discretion

• Clear error (for factual findings):
  • Occurs when a finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or
  • The judge misapprehends the effect of the evidence, or
  • A review of the entire record leaves the appellate court firmly convinced a mistake was made.
• Abuse of discretion (for ultimate decisions, like YINC adjudication):
  • Occurs when a court acts arbitrarily, without thoughtful judgment, or beyond reason, in a way that causes substantial injustice.

In Matter of J.D., the majority concludes that the district court’s factual findings of physical neglect were clearly erroneous, and therefore its decision to adjudicate J.D. as a YINC was an abuse of discretion. The dissent sees this as a misapplication of deferential review.

7. SAMS Safety Threshold and Protective Capacities

• SAMS safety threshold asks whether:
  • Harm is severe,
  • Imminent,
  • Clearly observable,
  • The child is vulnerable, and
  • Family conditions are out of control.
• Protective capacities refer to a parent’s ability to:
  • Recognize threats to the child,
  • Control their own behavior to keep the child safe,
  • Use supports (relatives, services) when needed to protect the child.

The Court considered Mother’s actions—such as arranging for J.D. to stay with Aunt T.M. during a previous crisis—as indicators of protective capacity.

VI. Conclusion

Matter of J.D. represents a significant refinement of Montana’s child protection jurisprudence. The Supreme Court:

• Reaffirms that forced removal and YINC adjudication are extraordinary measures that require more than generalized concern or parental abnormality.
• Clarifies that mental illness alone does not equal abuse or neglect; there must be evidence that the illness has resulted in harm, or creates a specific, substantial, and imminent risk of harm to the child.
• Elevates the importance of the Department’s own SAMS safety threshold and continuous reassessment obligations, requiring clear alignment between policy, statutory standards, and the evidence presented.
• Distinguishes between risk and danger, and between younger, highly vulnerable children and older youths with significant self-protective capacities.

At the same time, the dissent warns against unduly limiting trial courts’ discretion and downplaying the vulnerabilities of adolescents in unstable family environments. The tension between the majority and dissent underscores the fundamental difficulty of balancing the state’s duty to protect children with the constitutional and statutory imperative to preserve family integrity whenever safely possible.

Going forward, Matter of J.D. will likely be cited whenever the Department seeks removal based on mental health concerns, and when courts are called upon to delineate the line between legitimate, specific, imminent safety threats and generalized, speculative fears. It makes clear that in Montana, concrete, imminent harm—not mere abnormality or unease—must drive the most intrusive state interventions into the family.