Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t v. Holland, 139 Nev. 96, 527 P.3d 958 (2023): Reiterates the court’s approach in workers’ compensation matters—deferential review of factual findings (clear error or arbitrary abuse) and de novo review of legal questions, with a consistent commitment to the plain meaning of the statutory scheme. Here, that approach frames the court’s textual reading of NRS 617.455.
• Manwill v. Clark County, 123 Nev. 238, 162 P.3d 876 (2007): Construed NRS 617.457(1) (heart disease). The court held the presumption required only two showings—heart disease and qualifying service—after which causation was conclusively established “whatever the cause.” The court distinguishes Manwill because NRS 617.457 lacks any exposure requirement, a result of deliberate 1989 amendments eliminating prior causation factors. In contrast, NRS 617.455(1) still requires exposure to specified noxious agents for lung disease.
• Allstate Ins. v. Fackett, 125 Nev. 132, 206 P.3d 572 (2009), and Barber v. State, 131 Nev. 1065, 363 P.3d 459 (2015): Invoke whole‑statute harmonization—reading related provisions together to effectuate legislative purpose and avoid unreasonable outcomes. The court uses these canons to integrate subsections (1) and (5) of NRS 617.455.
• Seaborn v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 55 Nev. 206, 29 P.2d 500 (1934): Anti‑surplusage canon—courts should avoid interpretations that render statutory words meaningless. Applied here, treating subsection (5) as a stand‑alone entitlement would largely nullify the exposure clause in subsection (1) for most claimants.
• Scalia & Garner, Reading Law (2012): Punctuation and whole‑text canons. The comma placement supports reading “arising out of and in the course of employment” as modifying the exposure phrase rather than displacing it, underscoring the two‑component causation structure in subsection (1).
• NRS 617.135(10) (2021): Defines “police officer” to include correctional officers, confirming Holguin’s eligibility for the presumption if other elements are met.
• 1989 Legislative Amendments: The Legislature removed causation qualifiers from the heart‑disease statute (NRS 617.457) while simultaneously adding a conclusive presumption to the lung‑disease statute (NRS 617.455(5)) but leaving intact the exposure requirement in NRS 617.455(1). This asymmetry is central to the court’s statutory analysis.

Legal Reasoning

1. Two causation components in NRS 617.455(1). The statute makes lung diseases compensable only if (a) “caused by exposure to heat, smoke, fumes, tear gas or any other noxious gases,” and (b) that exposure “ar[o]se out of and in the course of the employment.” The court’s grammatical parsing—supported by punctuation canons—treats “arising out of and in the course of employment” as modifying the exposure clause, not replacing it.
2. What the presumption in NRS 617.455(5) does—and does not—do. Subsection (5) conclusively presumes that the lung disease “arose out of and in the course of employment” for qualifying first responders (two or more years of continuous full‑time service and a disabling diagnosis). It resolves the second causation component in subsection (1). But subsection (5) says nothing about—and therefore does not eliminate—the first causation component: the required exposure to specified noxious agents.
3. Harmonizing subsections; avoiding surplusage. Reading subsection (5) to create a stand‑alone, all‑purpose entitlement would drain subsection (1)’s exposure language of meaning for most claimants (save volunteers or those with less than two years’ service), violating anti‑surplusage principles. A harmonized reading preserves the Legislature’s choice to keep exposure causation for lung claims while adding a presumption that eases only the course‑and‑scope showing.
4. Distinguishing Manwill and the heart‑disease statute. The court underscores that Manwill turned on a materially different statute; NRS 617.457 no longer contains an exposure requirement because the 1989 Legislature intentionally removed it. In contrast, the same session preserved the exposure requirement for lung disease while adding the presumption. The divergent textual choices reflect distinct legislative policy judgments that courts must honor.
5. Application to COVID‑19 facts. Even assuming COVID‑19 constitutes a lung disease (the court accepts the physician’s diagnosis), Holguin presented no evidence that his lung disease was caused by exposure to “heat, smoke, fumes, tear gas, or any other noxious gases.” His proof showed viral transmission from a coworker, which satisfies neither the enumerated agents nor the “other noxious gases” category on this record. Because the exposure element failed, the claim was properly denied.

Impact and Practical Consequences

For first responders and correctional officers

• Two‑part proof remains mandatory. Even with two or more years of qualifying service (triggering the conclusive presumption on course‑and‑scope), claimants must still prove exposure to the listed agents (heat, smoke, fumes, tear gas, or other noxious gases) caused the lung disease.
• COVID‑19 and similar pathogens. This decision strongly signals that viral infections, standing alone, do not satisfy the “noxious gases” exposure requirement. Absent evidence of causative exposure to enumerated gases (for example, tear gas during training or riot response; sustained smoke or fume inhalation) that caused the disabling lung disease, claims premised solely on pathogen transmission will fail under NRS 617.455.
• Evidence strategy. Practitioners should marshal:
  • Documented instances of exposure to tear gas, smoke, or chemical fumes (training logs, incident reports, environmental measurements).
  • Medical expert opinions tying the lung pathology to such exposures to a reasonable medical probability.
  • Temporal and dose‑response evidence (frequency/duration of exposures; symptom onset/worsening) to establish causation.

For administrators and adjudicators

• Structured test. Determine: (1) Is there a qualifying lung disease and disablement? (2) Did the claimant meet the service threshold to invoke the conclusive presumption on course‑and‑scope? (3) Is there competent evidence that the disease was caused by exposure to the enumerated agents?
• Burden allocation. The presumption conclusively establishes course‑and‑scope for qualifying claimants, foreclosing rebuttal. But claimants retain the burden to prove exposure causation under subsection (1).

Doctrinal and legislative implications

• Textual fidelity. The court reaffirms a textualist approach in workers’ compensation, emphasizing punctuation, whole‑text harmony, and anti‑surplusage canons. Similar statutes will likely be read in tandem rather than in isolation.
• Statutory asymmetry persists. Heart disease (NRS 617.457) and lung disease (NRS 617.455) remain differently structured: the former has no exposure requirement; the latter does. If broader coverage for infectious respiratory illnesses in first responders is desired, the remedy lies with the Legislature (e.g., adding pathogens to the enumerated exposures or creating a discrete presumption for communicable diseases).
• Scope of “other noxious gases.” While not definitively defined here, the opinion’s reasoning and the enumerated examples suggest the category is limited to chemical or particulate inhalants akin to heat/smoke/fumes/tear gas, not biological pathogens. Future cases may refine the boundaries (e.g., diesel exhaust, wildfire smoke, industrial chemicals), but proof must show causation.