Conclusive Plea Record Bars §2255 Ineffective Assistance Claims

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Nathaniel Blancher v. United States (No. 24-10584, 11th Cir. Apr. 25, 2025), which clarifies when a federal court may summarily deny a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion asserting ineffective assistance of counsel after a guilty plea. Petitioner Nathaniel Blancher, a registered sex offender, pleaded guilty to multiple federal charges arising out of transporting and sexually abusing a 14-year-old girl across state lines. After receiving a total 40-year sentence—exceeding the 30 years he believed he would get—Blancher filed a pro se § 2255 motion alleging his lawyer had wrongly assured him he would not face more than 30 years in prison. The district court denied relief without a hearing, concluding that the written plea agreement and plea colloquy showed Blancher understood the maximum penalties. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Blancher’s § 2255 motion under Strickland v. Washington. On appeal, Blancher argued he suffered prejudice because, but for counsel’s alleged misadvice, he would have insisted on going to trial rather than pleading guilty to offenses carrying up to life imprisonment plus consecutive ten-year terms. The court declined to grant an evidentiary hearing or require a government response, holding the record “conclusively show[ed]” no prejudice:

The plea agreement and plea colloquy expressly outlined the statutory maximums (life on Count One and up to 30 years on Count Three) and warned that 30 years was merely the minimum total sentence.
Blancher acknowledged under oath that no promises had been made about the sentence, that the court alone would impose it, and that he could not withdraw his plea if the court imposed a higher sentence than recommended.
Because Blancher knowingly and voluntarily accepted those terms, there was no reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea absent counsel’s alleged misadvice.

Accordingly, the court held there was no plain error in summarily denying relief under § 2255(b) and affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Establishes the two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel (deficient performance + prejudice).
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985): Adapts Strickland’s prejudice prong to guilty-plea cases, requiring a showing of a reasonable probability the defendant would have pleaded not guilty and gone to trial.
Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357 (2017): Emphasizes reliance on contemporaneous evidence over “post hoc assertions” when evaluating whether a defendant would have pleaded differently.
Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2014): Reinforces the strong presumption that statements under oath during a plea colloquy are truthful.
United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938 (11th Cir. 2001): Holds that a defendant cannot claim lack of notice of maximum penalty when the court explicitly recited the statutory maximum at the plea hearing.
11th Cir. R. 3-1: Provides that failure to object to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation waives appellate review of unobjected factual and legal conclusions except for plain error.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Amendment guarantees effective assistance of counsel, but under Strickland the defendant must show both (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficiency prejudiced the defense. In the guilty-plea context, Hill requires proof of a reasonable probability the defendant would have gone to trial but for counsel’s errors. The Eleventh Circuit applied these principles as follows:

Record Conclusiveness and No Hearing Required: 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) allows denial of relief without a hearing when “the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” Here, the plea agreement and plea colloquy themselves ruled out any plausible misapprehension about maximum penalties.
Contemporaneous Evidence Controls: Consistent with Lee, the court relied on what Blancher acknowledged at the change-of-plea hearing—under oath—that he understood the applicable statutory maximums, mandatory minimums, and the non-binding nature of any sentencing recommendations.
Presumption of Veracity: Under Winthrop-Redin, a defendant’s sworn statements during plea colloquy are highly reliable. Blancher repeatedly confirmed he had no undisclosed promises about his sentence.
Plain Error Standard: Because Blancher failed to object to the magistrate judge’s report under 11th Cir. R. 3-1, the court reviewed only for plain error and found none affecting his substantial rights or the fairness of the proceeding.

3.3 Impact

This decision reinforces several practical points for practitioners and courts:

Where a plea agreement and colloquy clearly recite statutory penalties and reserve sentencing discretion to the judge, a § 2255 defendant may not relitigate what he claims counsel orally promised.
Counsel should ensure that clients understand and acknowledge the full range of punishments both in writing and under oath at the plea hearing to minimize later collateral challenges.
District courts may summarily dispose of ineffective-assistance claims when the files and records “conclusively” foreclose prejudice, sparing scarce resources.
Defendants who fail to object to a magistrate judge’s report risk forfeiting appellate review beyond plain error.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion: A prisoner’s collateral attack on the validity of his federal sentence, akin to a habeas corpus petition.
Strickland Test: Two-part analysis requiring a showing of deficient attorney performance and prejudice to the defendant’s case.
Guilty-Plea Prejudice (Hill): To prove prejudice after a plea, a defendant must show he would have gone to trial but for counsel’s errors.
Plea Colloquy: The court’s on-the-record questioning of a defendant under oath to ensure his plea is voluntary and informed.
Plain Error Review: The most deferential appellate standard, applied when a party forfeits an objection by failing to raise it in district court.
Certificate of Appealability (COA): A permission slip that a § 2255 movant must obtain before appealing a denied collateral challenge.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Blancher underscores that a fully integrated plea agreement and thorough plea colloquy—which detail statutory maximums, minimums, and the court’s sentencing discretion—can conclusively preclude a defendant’s later claim of prejudice under Strickland. By relying on contemporaneous admissions under oath, the court avoided an unnecessary evidentiary hearing and reaffirmed the strong presumption that plea colloquy statements are truthful. Going forward, this decision serves as a reminder that both defense counsel and judges must ensure that defendants are unmistakably apprised of sentencing risks at the time of plea, and that § 2255 petitions cannot relitigate clear, on-the-record understandings.