Conceding a Jury Question as a Judicial Admission: New Limits on Rule 59 New-Trial Motions in Shahood v. City and County of Butte-Silver Bow

I. Introduction

In Shahood v. City and County of Butte-Silver Bow, 2025 MT 287 (DA 25‑0036), the Montana Supreme Court reversed a district court’s order granting a new trial to plaintiff Jennifer Shahood after a jury found her more than fifty percent at fault for a low‑speed collision with a municipal snow grader.

Although the underlying dispute arises from a relatively modest traffic accident, the decision establishes two important procedural principles of statewide significance:

1. Preservation of error for Rule 59 new‑trial motions based on “irregularity in the proceedings”: allegedly improper or prejudicial closing arguments cannot support a new trial unless the complaining party either made a timely contemporaneous objection or preserved the issue through a specific, ruled‑upon motion in limine.
2. Concessions at the directed‑verdict stage as judicial admissions: when a party explicitly concedes at trial that an issue (here, comparative negligence) must go to the jury, that concession may constitute a judicial admission that there is sufficient evidence for reasonable jurors to disagree, thereby waiving any later Rule 59 challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on that issue.

The opinion therefore sharpens Montana law on judicial admissions, motions for new trial under M. R. Civ. P. 59(a), and preservation of objections to closing argument. It also reinforces deference to jury determinations of comparative fault, even where the defendant’s negligence has been established as a matter of law.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Accident

On March 13, 2019, Butte-Silver Bow (BSB) employees Brian Moe and Marty Hanley were operating road graders in tandem to remove snow from Main Street in Butte. Their operation involved aligning the blades of the graders and pushing a windrow of snow north, away from the Front Street intersection. Moe’s grader, though facing north, occupied the southbound side of Main Street.

The key facts, as disputed at trial, included:

• Moe’s account: He testified he was already reversing at about 1–1.5 mph with his backup alarm sounding and warning lights flashing, having checked mirrors and backup camera, when he saw Shahood’s southbound vehicle pass him in the rightmost southbound lane “well outside” the grader. As he was slowing to connect blades with Hanley, he heard the impact. Based on locations, he estimated that Shahood moved into the center lane roughly 10–15 feet behind his actively reversing grader.
• Shahood’s account: She testified she passed the grader, then merged into the center lane and stopped at a red light at the Front Street intersection when the grader struck her from behind. She claimed she did not see warning lights, did not hear an alarm, never saw the grader moving, and that it was “occupying both the center and turning lane.” She admitted she was concerned about what the graders were doing but also admitted that after pulling in behind the grader she “was not” paying attention to it.

The collision speed was extremely low—around 1–1.5 mph, according to both Moe and the plaintiff’s accident reconstruction expert, and the physical damage appeared minor (a broken taillight and modest body damage). The key contested issues were comparative negligence and the existence, causation, and extent of alleged injuries, given Shahood’s pre‑existing conditions and her refusal of treatment at the scene.

B. Claims and Defenses

Shahood sued BSB, asserting:

• Negligence based on Moe’s alleged failure to exercise ordinary care; and
• Negligence per se for alleged violation of traffic statutes governing backing and operation of vehicles.

BSB denied negligence and advanced two central statutory theories:

• Under § 61‑8‑106(2), MCA, traffic regulations do not apply to “equipment actively engaged in work upon the highway,” so Moe’s grader allegedly was exempt from certain rules.
• Under § 61‑8‑317, MCA, motorists must yield the right‑of‑way to authorized highway maintenance equipment displaying proper flashing lights. BSB argued that it was Shahood who violated this statutory duty by positioning herself behind the working grader.

C. The Trial

A five‑day jury trial was held in May 2024. The evidence relevant to comparative negligence included:

• Testimony from Moe and Hanley that the grader was actively reversing with lights and alarms engaged when Shahood passed and then positioned herself behind it.
• Testimony from first responders: an officer who viewed the accident as “minor” and listed Moe’s inattentiveness on the report, but who also testified motorists have a duty to give working equipment a “wide berth” and yield the right‑of‑way; and an EMT who recorded complaints of back pain but noted refusal of on‑scene treatment.
• Evidence about pre‑existing conditions and medical causation, including concessions by one of Shahood’s doctors that it was difficult to distinguish injury from the natural progression of prior conditions, and literature suggesting that very low‑speed impacts pose little risk of injury.

At the close of evidence, Shahood’s counsel moved for a partial directed verdict (judgment as a matter of law) in her favor on:

• BSB’s negligence,
• negligence per se, and
• causation (that BSB’s negligence caused some injury).

Crucially, she did not seek a directed verdict on comparative negligence. To the contrary, she expressly told the court that BSB’s comparative negligence defense had to remain on the verdict form, and explained that the jury must be free to decide, for example, that she was “60 percent negligent and she doesn’t recover anything.”

The district court granted the partial directed verdict on BSB’s negligence, negligence per se, and causation, explicitly leaving the issue of Shahood’s comparative negligence for the jury.

In closing, BSB argued that:

• Shahood “crowded the plow” and failed to give working equipment the “wide berth” required by statute and common sense;
• She failed in her duty to look where she was going and see what was in plain sight; and
• Her conduct suggested possible distraction (stated as “I don’t know what was on [her] mind, whether she was distracted in some way”).

No contemporaneous objections were made to these statements, and there was no specific, ruled‑upon motion in limine addressing them.

Using the special verdict form proposed by the plaintiff, the jury found:

• Both BSB and Shahood were negligent; and
• Fault was apportioned 54% to Shahood and 46% to BSB.

Under Montana’s comparative negligence statute, § 27‑1‑702, MCA, a plaintiff whose negligence is greater than 50% is barred from recovery. Thus, despite BSB’s negligence being established as a matter of law, the verdict barred Shahood from any recovery.

D. Post‑Trial Motion and District Court Ruling

Shahood moved for a new trial under M. R. Civ. P. 59(a), invoking § 25‑11‑102(1) (irregularity in the proceedings) and § 25‑11‑102(6) (insufficiency of the evidence).

The district court granted the motion, holding:

• Irregularity in the proceedings (§ 25‑11‑102(1)): The combination of BSB’s closing-argument references to Moe as a “working man,” the value of plowed streets, a suggestion that Shahood may have been distracted, and juror familiarity with BSB employees allegedly created cumulative prejudice and denied Shahood a fair trial.
• Insufficiency of the evidence (§ 25‑11‑102(6)): The court also concluded the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that Shahood was 54% negligent.

BSB appealed, challenging the grant of a new trial and several earlier rulings, including the partial directed verdict in favor of Shahood and the exclusion of certain medical records.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

Justice Ingrid Gustafson, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the order granting a new trial and reinstated the jury verdict. The Court held:

1. No preserved “irregularity in the proceedings”:
   • Montana law requires a party seeking a new trial based on improper closing argument or similar irregularity to have preserved the issue by either a timely contemporaneous objection or a sufficiently specific motion in limine that has been ruled upon.
   • Because Shahood did neither, she forfeited the irregularity arguments, and the district court manifestly abused its discretion in granting a new trial on that ground.
2. Judicial admission and waiver of sufficiency challenge:
   • Through her counsel’s explicit trial concession that comparative negligence “must remain on the verdict form” and “remains for a jury,” Shahood made a judicial admission that reasonable jurors could differ on that issue.
   • That admission, made as an intentional, tactical choice to obtain a partial directed verdict on other elements, waived her ability to later argue that there was no evidence to support the jury’s comparative negligence finding.
3. In any event, substantial evidence supported the verdict:
   • Even if not waived, the jury’s apportionment of 54% fault to Shahood was supported by substantial evidence, including her own admission that she was “not” paying attention to the grader after pulling in behind it, and the statutory duty to yield to working maintenance vehicles displaying lights.
   • Accordingly, the new trial could not be justified under § 25‑11‑102(6), MCA.
4. Because reversal of the new-trial order was dispositive, the Court did not reach BSB’s additional arguments regarding:
   • the propriety of the partial directed verdict on negligence, negligence per se, and causation,
   • the earlier denial of partial summary judgment, or
   • the exclusion of certain medical records.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standards of Review and the Rule 59 Framework

The Court began by distinguishing the standards of review applicable to different grounds for a new trial:

• Irregularity in the proceedings (§ 25‑11‑102(1), MCA): Reviewed for manifest abuse of discretion. Citing In re Guardianship of A.M.M., 2015 MT 250, and Styren Farms, Inc. v. Roos, 2011 MT 299, the Court reiterated that an abuse of discretion must be “obvious, evident, or unmistakable” and must materially affect the complaining party’s substantial rights.
• Insufficiency of the evidence (§ 25‑11‑102(6), MCA): Reviewed de novo. Following Giambra v. Kelsey, 2007 MT 158, and Stubblefield v. Town of West Yellowstone, 2013 MT 78, the Court’s task is only to determine whether substantial credible evidence supports the jury’s verdict.

Rule 59(a), M. R. Civ. P., incorporates traditional Montana statutory grounds for new trials through § 25‑11‑102, MCA, which lists multiple bases including irregularity (§ 25‑11‑102(1)) and insufficiency of the evidence (§ 25‑11‑102(6)).

B. Irregularity in the Proceedings: Preservation of Objections to Improper Closing Argument

1. The governing doctrine

The Court framed the “irregularity” issue in terms of alleged misconduct of counsel in closing argument and the overall trial environment. Key precedents included:

• United Tool Rental, Inc. v. Riverside Contracting Inc., 2011 MT 213: a trial court may grant a new trial if counsel misconduct is so pervasive that it denies a fair trial by materially affecting a party’s rights.
• Reno v. Erickstein, 209 Mont. 36 (1984): failure to contemporaneously object to improper argument waives the right to later claim error on appeal or in a motion for new trial.
• Evans v. Scanson, 2017 MT 157: confirmed that an objection to allegedly improper closing argument must be made when the grounds become apparent; absence of such an objection generally forfeits the issue.

The Court also relied heavily on the law of motions in limine:

• State v. Ankeny, 2010 MT 224: a motion in limine can substitute for a contemporaneous objection, but only if it is specific and articulates the grounds for the objection; broad, general motions are not sufficient.
• Anderson v. BNSF Railway, 2015 MT 240: emphasized the “special advantages” of motions in limine, including the ability to preserve issues without repeated objections before the jury.

Critically, the Court summarized the rule as follows:

To obtain a new trial for “irregularity in the proceedings” based on improper closing argument, the moving party must have properly preserved the issue at trial by:

1. making a timely, specific contemporaneous objection to the statements, or
2. securing a definitive ruling on a specific motion in limine addressing those statements.

Absent such preservation, claims of irregularity are forfeited.

2. The central role and limits of Cooper v. Hanson

The district court relied on Cooper v. Hanson, 2010 MT 113, where this Court ordered a new trial on the basis of cumulative prejudice, including closing-argument references to a physician-defendant’s reputation and the community’s “luck” to have his services.

In Cooper:

• The plaintiff had filed motions in limine specifically aimed at preventing such arguments (e.g., damage to reputation, impact on license, financial hardship) and highlighted their impropriety.
• The district court denied the motions as too vague and broad, but defense counsel assured the court they would not make improper arguments.
• Despite that, defense counsel’s closing arguments violated those boundaries.

On post-trial review, this Court in Cooper treated the earlier motions in limine and defense counsel’s assurances as sufficient to preserve the issue—recognizing that repeated objections in front of the jury would only emphasize the improper themes the motions had attempted to forestall.

By contrast, in Evans, where the district court never ruled on a motion in limine, the Court held that the plaintiff could not rely on that unresolved motion to avoid contemporaneous objection; no definitive ruling meant no preservation.

3. Application in Shahood: Forfeiture of irregularity arguments

In Shahood, the district court concluded that BSB’s closing-argument references to Moe as a “working man,” the value of plowed streets, suggestions of possible distraction, and remarks about a legal duty to “stay out of the way of working plows,” combined with juror familiarity with BSB employees, created a prejudicial environment warranting a new trial.

The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, emphasizing:

• No contemporaneous objections were made to the challenged statements during closing argument.
• No specific motion in limine addressing such statements had been ruled upon, unlike in Cooper.

Because neither preservation route was satisfied, the Court held:

“[W]e need not consider the propriety of BSB's statements during closing argument or make any determination regarding the creation of cumulative prejudice. Shahood did not preserve her right to raise these issues post-trial.”

The district court’s grant of a new trial under § 25‑11‑102(1), MCA, therefore constituted a manifest abuse of discretion.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Judicial Admission

1. Failure to move for directed verdict vs. judicial admission

Ordinarily, a party’s failure to seek a directed verdict on an issue does not waive the ability to argue insufficiency of the evidence in a post-trial motion. The Court reaffirmed that rule, citing Adami v. Murphy, 118 Mont. 172 (1945), which allows a sufficiency challenge in a new-trial motion even without a prior directed-verdict motion.

However, the Court recognized a distinct basis for waiver: judicial admission. Under Kohne v. Yost, 250 Mont. 109 (1991), and Bilesky v. Shopko Stores, 2014 MT 300, a party can conclusively bind itself to certain facts, preventing later contradiction.

2. Definition and policy of judicial admissions

Relying on Kohne and Bilesky, the Court reiterated the three elements of a judicial admission:

1. A statement is made to the court;
2. The statement is made by a party or the party’s attorney;
3. The statement is an unequivocal statement of fact.

Judicial admissions:

• Have the effect of a confessory pleading;
• Are conclusive on the party making them—no further evidence can be introduced to contradict the admitted fact; and
• Serve two core policies:
  • Efficiency: saving time, labor, and expense by narrowing what is contested; and
  • Integrity of the process: preventing parties from “playing fast and loose with the facts” to suit self-interest, as emphasized in Bilesky.

3. The precedents: Kohne, Bilesky, and Weaver

The Court’s approach to judicial admissions in Shahood is best understood in light of three key cases:

• Kohne v. Yost, 250 Mont. 109:
  • Defense counsel repeatedly stated in closing that a 13‑year‑old defendant in a BB‑gun case was at fault, though less so than the plaintiff.
  • The jury found neither party negligent. The plaintiff sought a new trial, arguing the verdict was inconsistent with defense counsel’s concessions.
  • This Court held that defense counsel’s statements constituted judicial admissions of some negligence by the defendant, making a “zero negligence” verdict unsupportable.
• Bilesky v. Shopko, 2014 MT 300:
  • To avoid sanctions for spoliation of video evidence, Shopko stated in briefing that it “will not disagree” with the plaintiff’s description of what the lost video would have shown.
  • The plaintiff sought to treat those statements (e.g., that her pants were visibly wet, that she fell forward) as judicial admissions.
  • This Court agreed, emphasizing that Shopko made an “intentional, tactical” decision to adopt those facts to avoid sanctions and could not later contradict them at trial.
• Weaver v. State, 2013 MT 247:
  • In a trial brief on a reverse condemnation claim, plaintiffs stated that the State’s actions (a backburn) were “reasonable and necessary,” while also alleging negligence.
  • They quickly filed a Notice of Errata correcting the language. The State argued the statement was a judicial admission that barred the negligence claim.
  • Both the district court and this Court held that, in context—alternative pleading and prompt correction—the statement was not an unequivocal factual admission and thus not a judicial admission.

These cases show that whether a statement becomes a judicial admission depends heavily on context and intent: Was it an intentional, tactical concession, or an inadvertent or context‑limited formulation?

4. Applying judicial admission doctrine to Shahood

In Shahood, the concession at issue was not about an historical fact (e.g., “the defendant was negligent”) but about the procedural posture of an element: whether comparative negligence presented a jury question.

Shahood’s counsel:

• Expressly asked for a directed verdict on BSB’s negligence, negligence per se, and causation;
• Expressly disclaimed any request for a directed verdict on comparative negligence; and
• Affirmatively told the court that BSB’s comparative negligence defense “must remain on the verdict form” and that the jury must remain free to attribute >50% fault to her, even to the point of a complete bar to recovery.

The Supreme Court interpreted these statements as:

• A clear, deliberate acknowledgement that there was evidence from which reasonable jurors could find that Shahood was negligent to some degree; and
• A tactical concession made to strengthen her request for a partial directed verdict on BSB’s negligence and causation by narrowing what remained genuinely in dispute.

The Court held that, under the policies articulated in Bilesky, this was precisely the sort of “intentional, tactical decision” that triggers judicial admission:

“Shahood cannot benefit from asserting one position—that is, her position that reasonable jurors could disagree as to Shahood's negligence—yet then assert a contrary position post-trial to the detriment of BSB—that is, that there was no evidence of Shahood's negligence.”

Accordingly, the Court concluded that:

• Shahood’s concession satisfied the elements of a judicial admission (statement to court, by counsel, unequivocal as to there being a triable comparative negligence issue); and
• She thereby waived her right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the jury’s comparative negligence finding in a Rule 59 motion.

5. Alternative holding: substantial evidence exists regardless of waiver

Even assuming no waiver, the Court proceeded to assess whether substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict—viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to BSB as the prevailing party, per Payne v. Knutson, 2004 MT 271, and Stubblefield.

Key legal principles applied included:

• Comparative negligence (§ 27‑1‑702, MCA; Giambra; Faulconbridge v. State, 2006 MT 198):
  • A plaintiff is contributorily negligent when they fail to exercise reasonable care for their own safety and that failure contributes to the injury.
  • Montana uses comparative negligence: a negligent plaintiff may still recover so long as their negligence is not greater than that of the defendant(s), but recovery is reduced proportionately. If the plaintiff’s negligence is >50%, they recover nothing.
  • Allocation of comparative fault is almost always a jury question (Peterson v. Eichhorn, 2008 MT 250), even where defendant negligence is established as a matter of law.
• Substantial evidence standard (Upky v. Marshall Mountain, LLC, 2008 MT 90):
  • Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion—it can be less than a preponderance but more than a “mere scintilla.”
  • Even if the evidence is “inherently weak” or contradicted, a verdict stands if it has substantial credible support.
• Duty of self‑care (Estate of Mabee v. Wheatland County, 2025 MT 252): Every person has a duty to exercise ordinary care for their own safety.

The jury instructions, which were unchallenged, included:

• A duty to “look where you are going and see that which is in plain sight”; a motorist is presumed to see what is plainly visible and cannot avoid liability by claiming not to have seen it.
• The statutory duty under § 61‑8‑317, MCA, to yield the right‑of‑way to highway maintenance equipment displaying proper lights while engaged in maintenance activities.

Viewed in that legal context and in the light most favorable to BSB, the Court found substantial evidence of comparative negligence:

• Testimony by Moe and Hanley that:
  • Moe was actively backing up with flashing lights and backup alarm engaged;
  • Shahood passed and then moved into the lane behind him at a short distance (10–15 feet); and
  • She positioned her vehicle essentially in the path of an obviously operating grader.
• Shahood’s own admissions that:
  • She observed the grader occupying much of the southbound roadway;
  • She was concerned about what the grader was doing; but
  • After moving behind it, when asked whether she was “paying attention at all to the grader,” she answered, “I was not.”

From this, the jury could reasonably conclude that:

• Shahood failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety by positioning her car close behind a large piece of actively working equipment and then not paying attention to it; and
• She violated her statutory duty to yield the right‑of‑way to maintenance equipment engaged in work with lights flashing.

Given this evidence, the Court held that reasonable jurors could find her more than 50% at fault. The jury’s 54/46 apportionment therefore rested on substantial evidence and could not be set aside under § 25‑11‑102(6), MCA.

D. Unreached Issues: Directed Verdict and Other Pre‑Trial Rulings

Importantly, the Supreme Court declined to address BSB’s other appellate arguments because resolution of the new‑trial issue was dispositive. Those unreached issues included:

• Whether the district court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of Shahood on BSB’s negligence, negligence per se, and causation;
• Whether BSB’s motion for partial summary judgment on negligence per se should have been granted; and
• Whether exclusion of certain medical records was erroneous.

As a result:

• The directed verdict on BSB’s negligence and causation remains intact as part of the trial record.
• The operative result of the case, however, is that no damages are awarded because the jury’s allocation of fault (>50% to the plaintiff) stands.

This unusual posture underscores that, in Montana, a defendant can be negligent as a matter of law and still face no civil liability to the plaintiff if the jury reasonably finds the plaintiff more than fifty percent at fault.

V. Impact and Implications

A. Litigation Strategy: The Risk of Tactical Concessions

Shahood provides a clear warning to trial lawyers:

• When seeking a partial directed verdict or other targeted ruling, avoid framing concessions in a way that could later be characterized as an unequivocal factual admission.
• If counsel explicitly states that a given element “must” go to the jury or that reasonable jurors could disagree, that statement may later:
  • Bind the client as a judicial admission; and
  • Preclude any Rule 59 challenge arguing there was no evidence on that issue.

Practically, counsel should:

• Frame such arguments as legal contentions (“even assuming arguendo there is enough to go to the jury, the defendant is nevertheless negligent as a matter of law on these elements”), rather than factual concessions.
• Avoid categorical language that suggests factual agreement about the sufficiency of the opposing party’s proof.

B. Preservation of Error: Object or Lose It

The decision reinforces a strict view of preservation:

• Allegedly improper closing-argument remarks must be objected to when made, unless truly preserved by a specific and ruled‑upon motion in limine.
• General concerns about highlighting prejudice to the jury are not enough, absent a Cooper‑style record of specific pretrial rulings and assurances.

For practitioners, the takeaway is blunt: if you don’t object, you likely can’t complain later.

C. Comparative Negligence and Public-Entity Defendants

The ruling also carries implications for negligence law and governmental defendants:

• It confirms that comparative negligence remains a robust defense even where a governmental entity is negligent per se or negligent as a matter of law. The factfinder may still apportion a dispositive share of fault to the plaintiff.
• The Court implicitly endorsed the use of § 61‑8‑317, MCA (duty to yield to highway maintenance equipment), as a powerful factor in evaluating motorists’ comparative negligence when they interact with snowplows, graders, and similar equipment.

This may encourage public entities and their insurers to more aggressively invoke statutory right‑of‑way duties in defending snow-removal and maintenance operations.

D. Judicial Admissions Beyond Historical Facts

By treating a concession about what issues “must” go to the jury as a judicial admission, Shahood subtly extends the doctrine beyond classic admissions of concrete historical facts (e.g., “the floor was wet,” “the defendant was at fault”) into the realm of meta-factual or procedural concessions about sufficiency of evidence.

This may:

• Invite more argument in future cases over whether trial statements characterizing the state of the evidence or the appropriateness of a jury question amount to binding admissions; and
• Encourage greater caution in how lawyers articulate trial strategy on the record, especially around motions for directed verdict or JMOL.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Irregularity in the Proceedings” and Rule 59 New Trials

Under § 25‑11‑102(1), MCA, a new trial may be granted for an “irregularity in the proceedings” that prevents a party from having a fair trial. Common examples include:

• Serious misconduct by counsel (e.g., improper appeals to passion or prejudice in closing argument);
• Procedural errors by the court that materially affect a party’s rights; or
• Unfair surprise or other disruptions that undermine the fairness of the trial.

However, to rely on such irregularities, a party usually must:

• Object promptly when the problem arises; or
• Have preserved the issue via a specific, ruled‑upon motion in limine.

B. Motions in Limine and Contemporaneous Objections

• A motion in limine asks the court, before or during trial, to exclude certain categories of evidence or argument (e.g., “no argument about the defendant’s personal finances”).
• A contemporaneous objection is an immediate objection during trial when improper evidence or argument is offered.

In Montana:

• A specific motion in limine that is ruled upon can preserve an issue without repeated courtroom objections.
• An unruled or overly general motion in limine, however, does not substitute for an objection at the moment the problem occurs.

C. Judicial Admission

A judicial admission is a statement made in court by a party or the party’s lawyer that:

• Concedes a fact for purposes of the case;
• Is clear and unequivocal; and
• Is binding on the party—no contrary evidence may be introduced.

Judicial admissions are different from:

• Evidentiary admissions, which are just pieces of evidence that can be weighed against other evidence; and
• Argument or legal opinion, which usually are not treated as irrevocable concessions of fact.

In Shahood, the Court treated counsel’s explicit trial concession that comparative negligence “must remain” for the jury as an unequivocal factual concession that reasonable jurors could differ on that issue, making it unsuitable for a post-trial “no evidence” attack.

D. Directed Verdict / Judgment as a Matter of Law

A directed verdict (or judgment as a matter of law) occurs when the judge decides that no reasonable jury could find for the opposing party on a particular element because the evidence is legally insufficient. The judge then directs a verdict on that element instead of allowing the jury to decide it.

In Shahood, the district court directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on:

• BSB’s negligence,
• negligence per se, and
• causation,

but left comparative negligence—the relative fault of the plaintiff—to the jury.

E. Comparative Negligence and the 50% Bar

Under Montana’s comparative negligence statute, § 27‑1‑702, MCA:

• If the plaintiff is negligent, their damages are reduced in proportion to their percentage of fault so long as their negligence is not greater than that of the defendant(s).
• If the plaintiff’s negligence is greater than 50%, they are completely barred from recovery.

Thus, in Shahood, the jury’s allocation of 54% fault to the plaintiff and 46% to BSB meant that:

• BSB was negligent (as established by directed verdict); but
• Shahood recovered nothing, because her own negligence exceeded 50%.

F. “Substantial Evidence” vs. “Preponderance of the Evidence”

• Preponderance of the evidence is the trial standard: the factfinder must be convinced an element is more likely true than not.
• Substantial evidence is the appellate review standard: the question is whether there is enough evidence that a reasonable person could have reached the verdict, even if the appellate court might have weighed it differently.

A jury verdict supported by substantial evidence usually must be upheld, even in the face of conflicting testimony or weak evidence, because the jury—not the appellate court—resolves factual disputes and credibility.

VII. Conclusion

Shahood v. City and County of Butte-Silver Bow is a significant procedural decision that:

• Tightens the requirements for obtaining a new trial based on irregularities in the proceedings, making clear that claims of improper closing argument will ordinarily be forfeited absent timely objection or a specific, ruled‑upon motion in limine.
• Extends the doctrine of judicial admissions to encompass tactical trial concessions about what issues must go to the jury, and uses that doctrine to bar a post‑verdict sufficiency‑of‑the‑evidence attack.
• Reinforces the deference Montana courts give to jury determinations of comparative negligence when supported by substantial evidence, even where defendant negligence is established as a matter of law.

For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of:

• Preserving objections in real time or through precise motions in limine;
• Exercising care in making tactical concessions at the directed‑verdict stage; and
• Respecting the limited role of appellate courts in reweighing evidence and reassessing comparative fault determinations made by juries.

In the broader Montana legal landscape, Shahood strengthens the finality of jury verdicts, clarifies the bounds of judicial admissions, and provides clearer guidance on how Rule 59(a) should operate in civil negligence cases.