Compliance Is Not Enough: Third Circuit Reaffirms Broad Discretion Over Early Termination of Supervised Release and Confirms Appellate Review Despite Misstated Notice

Introduction

In United States v. Catharine L. Miller, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the Western District of Pennsylvania’s denial of a motion for early termination of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). The appeal arose approximately eight years into Miller’s lifetime term of supervised release, imposed following her 2008 guilty plea in the Southern District of Illinois to traveling in interstate commerce to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor (18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)). The District Court concluded that, although Miller had engaged in rehabilitative programming and maintained compliance, early termination was not warranted after weighing the applicable § 3553(a) factors and the interest of justice.

The central issues before the Third Circuit were:

• Whether the District Court properly applied § 3583(e)(1) and relevant Third Circuit precedents—particularly United States v. Melvin—in denying early termination;
• Whether the District Court was required to find (or expressly analyze) “exceptional” or “new” circumstances before denying the motion;
• Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction given a notice of appeal that identified the “final judgment” rather than the order denying early termination; and
• The appropriate standard of review on appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit (Chief Judge Chagares, with Judges Roth and Rendell) affirmed the District Court’s denial of early termination. The panel held:

• District courts have broad discretion under § 3583(e)(1) to deny early termination after considering specified § 3553(a) factors, the defendant’s conduct, and the interest of justice. They need not find “exceptional” or “new” circumstances as a prerequisite to granting relief (reaffirming Melvin), and a simple statement that the court considered the factors suffices (reaffirming Sheppard).
• The District Court explicitly considered the circumstances Miller highlighted—religious study, rehabilitative programming including sex offender treatment and a victim-impact course, and educational achievements—and concluded that, while commendable, they reflected expected compliance and did not warrant early termination.
• Appellate jurisdiction existed notwithstanding Miller’s misstatement in her notice of appeal, because denials of § 3583(e) motions are final decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and notices of appeal are construed liberally.
• Under the abuse-of-discretion standard (and regardless of any argument about plain-error review), the District Court’s decision was sound and consistent with Third Circuit law.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Significance

• United States v. Melvin, 978 F.3d 49 (3d Cir. 2020)
  Melvin is the Third Circuit’s anchor case on § 3583(e)(1). It clarified that a district court:
  • Must consider the enumerated § 3553(a) factors, the defendant’s conduct, and the interest of justice;
  • Need not find “exceptional, extraordinary, new, or unforeseen circumstances” as a prerequisite for early termination, although such circumstances may suffice to justify it; and
  • Has broad discretion to deny early termination even where a defendant is compliant and has engaged in positive programming.
  In Miller, the panel applied Melvin to reaffirm that “exceptional” circumstances are not required, and that the District Court permissibly viewed Miller’s rehabilitative steps and compliance as commendable but not compelling grounds for early termination.
• United States v. Sheppard, 17 F.4th 449 (3d Cir. 2021)
  Sheppard confirms that district courts need not make detailed findings on each § 3553(a) factor; a statement of consideration suffices. Miller’s panel relied on Sheppard (and Melvin) to hold that the District Court’s explanation—acknowledging Miller’s programming, treatment, and education, and explicitly invoking the § 3553(a) considerations—was enough to support denial.
• United States v. D’Ambrosio, 105 F.4th 533 (3d Cir. 2024)
  D’Ambrosio establishes that orders denying § 3583(e) motions are final decisions appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Miller leverages D’Ambrosio to confirm appellate jurisdiction over the October 13, 2023 denial, notwithstanding the notice of appeal’s imprecise reference to “final judgment.”
• United States v. Soriano Nunez, 928 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2019) and United States v. Rodriguez, 855 F.3d 526 (3d Cir. 2017)
  These decisions reiterate that, in criminal cases, the “sentence is the judgment.” The panel referenced them to contextualize the notice-of-appeal wording. Although Miller’s notice referenced “final judgment,” the court construed it liberally to reach the order at issue.
• TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2019); Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2013); SMITH v. BARRY, 502 U.S. 244 (1992); Trzaska v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 865 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2017)
  These authorities embody the principle that notices of appeal are construed liberally and that technical defects do not thwart jurisdiction where intent to appeal a specific order is clear. The panel relied on this corpus to uphold jurisdiction despite the notice’s misstatement.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s legal analysis proceeded in three steps: jurisdiction and standard of review, the statutory framework controlling early termination, and application to Miller’s record.

1. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
   The court had criminal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Although Miller’s notice referenced a “final judgment,” the court treated the notice liberally and—consistent with D’Ambrosio—recognized the denial of the § 3583(e) motion as a final, appealable decision. The court reviewed for abuse of discretion (per Melvin). The government urged plain-error review because certain arguments were not raised below; the panel declined to decide that point because the denial stood even under abuse-of-discretion review.
2. Statutory Framework: 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) and § 3553(a)
   Section 3583(e)(1) authorizes early termination of supervised release “after the expiration of one year” if, after considering specified § 3553(a) factors, the court is “satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant and the interest of justice.” The relevant § 3553(a) factors include, among others:
   • Nature and circumstances of the offense; history and characteristics of the defendant (§ 3553(a)(1));
   • Deterrence, protection of the public, and effective provision of training, care, and treatment (§ 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D));
   • Guidelines, policy statements, sentencing disparities, and restitution (§ 3553(a)(4)-(7)).
   Under Sheppard and Melvin, district courts need not provide exhaustive factor-by-factor findings; a reasoned statement reflecting consideration of these factors suffices.
3. Application to Miller’s Motion
   Miller contended that “exceptional” or “new” circumstances—spiritual growth evidenced by Biblical study certificates; sex-offender-specific treatment and a victim-impact program; and workforce development—supported early termination and that the District Court failed to consider them. The panel found the opposite: the District Court expressly acknowledged and weighed each of these asserted achievements. It concluded that these steps, while commendable, reflected compliance and rehabilitation expected during supervised release and incarceration, and did not warrant early termination when balanced against the § 3553(a) factors and the interest of justice.
   
   In short, the District Court permissibly:
   • Assessed the seriousness and nature of the underlying conduct and Miller’s history;
   • Considered public safety and deterrence interests;
   • Weighed Miller’s positive programming and compliance; and
   • Determined that early termination was not justified at this stage.
   Because Melvin does not require “exceptional” circumstances for relief, and because the District Court reasonably found that the circumstances here were not extraordinary (and, even if they were positive, were insufficient), there was no abuse of discretion.

Impact and Implications

Although designated “Not Precedential,” the opinion is instructive on several recurring themes in early-termination practice in the Third Circuit.

• Compliance and Rehabilitation Are Necessary but Often Insufficient: The decision underscores that successful completion of programming, treatment, and religious or educational pursuits—while laudable—may be viewed as expected compliance. Courts may require a showing that continued supervision is no longer necessary to serve deterrence, public safety, and other § 3553(a) aims, or that specific developments make supervision redundant or counterproductive.
• No “Exceptional-Circumstances” Requirement—But Extraordinary Changes Can Help: Melvin removes any mandatory “exceptional circumstances” threshold, but the panel reaffirms that such circumstances may suffice where present. Practitioners should still marshal concrete, particularized evidence of change (e.g., long-term exemplary performance, documented risk reduction, stable and verifiable community supports) tied to the § 3553(a) factors.
• Deference on Appeal Is Substantial: Abuse of discretion is a deferential standard. This opinion illustrates how difficult it is to overturn a reasoned denial of early termination on appeal. The best chance for relief is building a compelling, well-documented record in the district court.
• Jurisdictional Safety Net for Notices of Appeal: Citing D’Ambrosio and liberal-construction principles, the court confirmed appellate review despite a technically imprecise notice of appeal. While this is reassuring, best practice remains to identify the precise order appealed.
• Sex-Offense Context: Where the underlying offense involves sexual misconduct with a minor and a lifetime term of supervised release, courts often emphasize public-safety and deterrence considerations. This case signals that even after a substantial period (here, about eight years) of compliance, early termination may face a high bar absent especially persuasive evidence that supervision is no longer necessary.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised Release vs. Probation: Supervised release follows imprisonment and is designed to assist reentry while protecting the public. Probation is an alternative to imprisonment. Early termination under § 3583(e)(1) applies to supervised release.
• Early Termination (18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)): After at least one year, a court may end supervised release if, having considered certain § 3553(a) factors, it is satisfied that the defendant’s conduct and the interest of justice warrant it. It is discretionary, not automatic.
• The § 3553(a) Factors (Subset for § 3583(e)(1)): The court focuses on the nature of the offense; the defendant’s history and characteristics; deterrence; protection of the public; effective training/treatment; guidelines and policy statements; sentencing disparities; and restitution. The court need not address each factor in detail if the record shows they were considered.
• Abuse of Discretion: A highly deferential standard. The appellate court asks whether the district court made a clear error of judgment, applied the wrong legal standard, or based its decision on a clearly erroneous view of the facts. Reasonable denials are affirmed even if another judge might have decided differently.
• Plain Error: A stricter standard for unpreserved issues. The appellant must show an error that is clear or obvious, affects substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
• Nonprecedential Opinions: In the Third Circuit, such opinions are not binding under I.O.P. 5.7. They may be cited for persuasive value (subject to applicable rules), but they do not control future panels.
• Liberal Construction of Notices of Appeal: Courts often forgive technical defects in a notice where the appellant’s intent to appeal a particular order is reasonably clear; the goal is to avoid elevating form over substance.

Practical Guidance for Early-Termination Motions in the Third Circuit

• Frame evidence around the § 3553(a) factors the court must consider; do not rely solely on generalized compliance.
• Document specific, individualized developments demonstrating durable, verifiable reduction in risk and the diminishing utility of supervision (e.g., professional risk assessments, long-term employment, stable housing, community ties, mentorship roles).
• Show that continued supervision imposes concrete burdens that do not advance the purposes of sentencing (without minimizing public-safety concerns).
• Where applicable, present corroborating letters from treatment providers, employers, and community organizations.
• Address the original offense conduct candidly; explain why supervision is no longer necessary to deter or protect the public in light of present circumstances.
• Preserve specific arguments in the district court and, if appropriate, file a reply brief to meet the government’s opposition head-on—this maximizes your chance for relief and sets up any appeal.

Conclusion

United States v. Miller reinforces the Third Circuit’s settled approach to early termination of supervised release. District courts possess broad discretion under § 3583(e)(1); they must consider the specified § 3553(a) factors, the defendant’s conduct, and the interest of justice, but they are not obligated to find “exceptional” or “new” circumstances before acting. Compliance and laudable rehabilitative steps, while necessary, frequently will not suffice on their own—particularly in serious cases involving sexual offenses against minors and lifetime supervision.

On the procedural side, the decision confirms that denials of § 3583(e) motions are final, appealable orders and that notices of appeal are construed liberally to avoid jurisdictional traps. For practitioners, the opinion underscores the importance of building a detailed, individualized record in the district court tying post-sentencing developments to the § 3553(a) factors and articulating why continued supervision no longer advances sentencing goals. Even then, given the deferential standard of review, the district court’s reasoned judgment will often control.