Completion of a Short Revocation Sentence Without Ongoing Supervision Renders Sentencing Appeal Moot Absent Concrete Collateral Consequences

Case: United States v. Michael Avant, No. 24-4007 (6th Cir. Mar. 27, 2025) (unpublished)

Panel: Judges Moore, Gibbons, and Murphy. Opinion by Judge Karen Nelson Moore.

Introduction

This appeal arose from a supervised-release revocation in the Northern District of Ohio. After refusing to sign a credit-authorization form required by the conditions of his supervision, Michael Avant admitted the violation at a revocation hearing. The district court revoked supervision and imposed a below-Guidelines custodial sentence of 100 days, with no supervised release to follow.

Avant appealed, arguing that his 100-day sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. While the appeal was expedited, he completed the custodial term and was released. The central appellate question became jurisdictional: whether completion of the short custodial sentence mooted the appeal where no post-release supervision remained and no collateral consequences were shown.

The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. Relying on longstanding Article III case-or-controversy principles and Spencer v. Kemna, the court held that because Avant’s sentence was fully served and he identified no concrete, continuing injury traceable to the revocation sentence, the court lacked power to grant effectual relief or reach the merits.

Summary of the Opinion

Holding: An appeal challenging the reasonableness of a custodial revocation sentence is moot once the sentence has been completed and the defendant has not shown any concrete, continuing collateral consequence. No mootness exception applies.
Disposition: Appeal dismissed as moot.
Key Rationale: Article III jurisdiction requires a live controversy and the possibility of effectual relief. After sentence completion, absent ongoing supervision or other specific collateral harm, there is no redressable injury. The “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception does not apply because there is no reasonable expectation that Avant will be subject to the same action again.

Factual and Procedural Background

Underlying case: Avant previously pled guilty to bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) and received 168 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. He began supervision in January 2022; it was set to end January 12, 2025.
Violation: In October 2024, the Probation Office reported that Avant refused to sign a form authorizing a credit check to verify compliance with conditions restricting unauthorized debt or credit. Avant admitted the refusal, explaining he feared it would affect a post-supervision mortgage application.
Revocation sentence: The district court found a violation. After hearing argument, it imposed 100 days’ imprisonment and terminated supervision (no follow-on supervised release).
Appeal and interim events: Avant appealed, pressing procedural and substantive unreasonableness. A motions panel denied release pending appeal for lack of a substantial question. Briefing was expedited and completed January 21, 2025. Avant completed his 100-day sentence and was released on February 12, 2025. The Sixth Circuit then requested supplemental briefing on mootness.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971) and Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969): Anchor the “case or controversy” requirement. A federal court may adjudicate only live disputes capable of effectual relief. The opinion quotes Rice and applies Powell’s formulation that a case is moot when issues are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest.
Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895) and Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992): Emphasize dismissal where events make it impossible to grant “any effectual relief whatever.” The Sixth Circuit uses this to explain why it cannot unwind a fully served 100-day sentence.
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472 (1990): Parties must retain a personal stake at each stage. Here, completion of custody with no ongoing supervision eliminated Avant’s personal stake in sentencing relief.
McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc) and Demis v. Sniezek, 558 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2009): Sixth Circuit authorities reinforcing that mootness is jurisdictional and must be considered throughout a case. They provide the immediate circuit framework applied here.
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998): Critical on collateral consequences. Unlike criminal convictions (for which collateral consequences are presumed), parole revocations (and by extension supervised-release revocations) do not carry a presumption of collateral consequences. A defendant must demonstrate a concrete, continuing injury beyond the expired custody. The court applies Spencer to reject presumed collateral consequences and finds Avant offered none.
Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc): Articulates the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception and its two requirements. The court relies on Rosales-Garcia (and Spencer) to say there is no reasonable expectation Avant will again be subject to the same action.
United States v. Lewis, 166 F. App’x 193 (6th Cir. 2006) and United States v. Thomas, 43 F. App’x 728 (6th Cir. 2002): Persuasive, unpublished Sixth Circuit decisions holding that challenges to completed custodial sentences are moot where no meaningful relief can be granted. They directly parallel Avant’s posture.
Hanrahan v. Mohr, 905 F.3d 947 (6th Cir. 2018): Reiterates that mootness is jurisdictional; without jurisdiction, courts cannot adjudicate merits. Supports the court’s refusal to reach reasonableness arguments.

Legal Reasoning

Article III threshold: The court begins with the case-or-controversy requirement. Jurisdiction exists only if the court can offer “effectual relief” to a prevailing party. With Avant already released from his 100-day revocation sentence, there is no custodial term to reduce or vacate in a way that provides practical relief.
No ongoing supervision, no redressable injury: Unlike cases where a defendant remains on supervised release (allowing the court to modify or terminate conditions), Avant had no supervision to follow his custodial term. This distinguishes situations where some remedy (e.g., shortening or altering supervision) could keep the controversy live.
No collateral consequences shown: Under Spencer, collateral consequences are not presumed for revocation decisions. Avant neither alleged nor demonstrated any concrete, continuing harm (such as ongoing restraints or legal disabilities) attributable to the revocation sentence.
No applicable mootness exception:
- Collateral consequences: Not alleged and not presumed.
- Capable of repetition yet evading review: The record supplies no reasonable expectation that Avant will again face the same revocation scenario. The mere short duration of the sentence does not itself satisfy the exception.
- Voluntary cessation: Not implicated; the government did not voluntarily cease challenged conduct to avoid review.
Jurisdictional bar controls: Because mootness is jurisdictional, the court cannot consider Avant’s asserted procedural or substantive unreasonableness arguments, despite the expedited briefing and the reality that short sentences often end before appellate review concludes.

Why This Case Matters

Confirms the Spencer framework for revocation appeals: Collateral consequences are not presumed for revocation (as they are for criminal convictions). Defendants bear the burden to show a concrete, continuing injury; otherwise, completion of custody ends the appeal.
Signals the importance of post-judgment timing and relief strategy: For short revocation sentences, counsel must act early—seek release pending appeal, expedited disposition, or identify specific collateral consequences—to avoid mootness.
Clarifies the inapplicability of the “capable of repetition” exception to ordinary revocation sentences: Courts will not assume a defendant will reoffend or reenter supervision in a way that reproduces the same issue.

Practice Implications and Strategic Notes

Identify collateral consequences quickly: If appealing a revocation sentence likely to expire before decision, consider whether the revocation imposes ongoing harms—e.g., continuing supervised release, fines or restitution still due, ongoing registration obligations, immigration consequences, or other legal disabilities—and document them. Generalized reputational harm or speculative future sentencing effects are typically insufficient under Spencer.
Seek interim relief to preserve a live controversy: Move for release pending appeal, for a stay of execution of the sentence, or to expedite appeal. While the motions panel here found no “substantial question,” such motions sometimes preserve review in close cases.
Consider condition challenges ex ante: If a supervisee believes a condition (such as a credit-check authorization) is unlawful or overbroad, the proper vehicle is a motion to modify conditions under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) rather than refusal to comply, which risks revocation and, as here, a short sentence that may evade merits review.
Vacatur not addressed: The court dismissed without vacating the revocation judgment. Although vacatur may be considered when mootness arises through happenstance, courts are cautious in criminal matters and Spencer itself did not order vacatur. Counsel seeking vacatur should request it expressly and be prepared to show equitable entitlement.
Unpublished but instructive: Although “Not Recommended for Publication,” the decision aligns with binding Supreme Court precedent and consistent Sixth Circuit practice, and so it is persuasive authority for similar mootness disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mootness: Even if a case was live when filed, it becomes moot if later events make it impossible for the court to give meaningful relief. Courts then lack constitutional power to decide the merits.
Collateral consequences: Continuing legal harms or disabilities that persist after a sentence ends (e.g., ongoing supervision, fines, registration requirements). For criminal convictions, courts presume some collateral consequences exist; for revocations, they do not, so the appellant must show them.
Capable of repetition yet evading review: An exception to mootness that applies only if (1) the issue is inherently short-lived and (2) there is a reasonable expectation the same party will face the same issue again. It rarely applies in ordinary revocation-sentencing disputes.
Supervised release revocation: If a supervisee violates conditions, the court may revoke supervision and impose a term of imprisonment and, in some cases, an additional term of supervised release. The Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter 7 policy statements are advisory.
Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness (sentencing): Procedural reasonableness concerns the process—calculating the Guidelines, considering § 3553(a) factors, explaining the sentence; substantive reasonableness asks whether the length of the sentence is reasonable in light of the factors. Avant’s appeal raised both, but the court did not reach them because of mootness.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s dismissal in United States v. Avant restates a straightforward but consequential jurisdictional rule: when a short revocation sentence is fully served and no supervised release or other concrete collateral consequence remains, an appeal challenging the sentence is moot. The decision, grounded in Spencer v. Kemna and bedrock case-or-controversy doctrine, underscores the practical hurdles to appellate review of short custodial revocation sentences and places a premium on early, strategic efforts to preserve live controversies or to demonstrate tangible, continuing harms. For practitioners, the case serves as a clear reminder to seek timely interim relief, to challenge questionable conditions before violations occur, and to identify and substantiate collateral consequences where possible. While unpublished, the opinion is firmly aligned with Supreme Court precedent and Sixth Circuit practice, and it will likely guide similar mootness assessments in revocation appeals going forward.