Compassionate Release: “Unusually Long Sentence” Requires a Real Change-in-Law Disparity; Florida Attempted First-Degree Murder Remains a Career-Offender Crime of Violence

1. Introduction

In United States v. Demetrius Floyd (11th Cir. Jan. 15, 2026) (unpublished, per curiam), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a federal prisoner’s motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Floyd argued that his sentence was “unusually long,” that he would not be a danger if released, and that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors supported relief.

The central issues were (i) whether Floyd identified an “extraordinary and compelling reason,” particularly under the Sentencing Commission’s “unusually long sentence” framework; (ii) whether changes in drug mandatory minimums actually created a “gross disparity” for him; and (iii) whether he still qualified as a career offender (including whether his Florida attempted first-degree murder conviction remained a “crime of violence”).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed, holding that Floyd failed to show extraordinary and compelling circumstances and, in any event, the district court acted within its discretion in finding that he remained a danger and that the § 3553(a) factors did not favor release. The panel emphasized:

Floyd’s “unusually long sentence” theory relied on statutory changes to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), but he was convicted of the lesser-included offense under § 841(b)(1)(B), whose relevant mandatory minimums remained the same.
Floyd would still be sentenced as a career offender today because his predicates remain qualifying offenses, including Florida attempted first-degree murder as a crime of violence.
Under Eleventh Circuit doctrine, denial is proper if any required condition for compassionate release fails, and the district court was not required to address all factors or mitigating evidence once it concluded the statutory and guideline requirements were not satisfied.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2021): The panel applied Giron’s framework for review: de novo review of eligibility questions under § 3582(c)(1)(A), and abuse-of-discretion review for the ultimate denial once eligibility is established. This reinforces that compassionate release involves both legal gatekeeping and discretionary judgment.
United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234 (11th Cir. 2021): Tinker is the decision’s procedural backbone. It holds that compassionate release requires three conditions (extraordinary and compelling reason; consistency with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; and favorable § 3553(a) factors) and that failure on any one permits denial without reaching the others. The panel used this to validate the district court’s ability to deny based on danger/§ 3553(a) without fully entertaining Floyd’s “unusually long sentence” theory.
United States v. Gibson, 434 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2006) and United States v. Estrada, 777 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2015): These cases supply the de novo standard for career-offender and crime-of-violence determinations—important because Floyd’s “disparity” argument depended on whether his guideline status would change today.
United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022): Taylor held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), because attempt liability can be satisfied by intent plus a substantial step that does not necessarily include the “use, attempted use, or threatened use” of force. Floyd invoked attempt-related reasoning to attack his own predicate, but the panel did not extend Taylor to Florida attempted first-degree murder under the Guidelines.
State v. Gray, 654 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1995) and Williamson v. State, 994 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2008): These Florida Supreme Court decisions eliminated and then applied the elimination of “attempted felony murder” in Florida. Floyd relied on them to argue he had been convicted of a “non-existent” offense. The panel rejected this as a category error: Gray/Williamson concern attempted felony murder, while Floyd’s predicate was attempted first-degree murder, which requires intent in a way felony murder does not.
United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir. 2019): Ochoa provides the interpretive bridge between the Guidelines “crime of violence” definition and the ACCA “violent felony” definition. The court used this to justify relying on ACCA jurisprudence to resolve the guideline predicate question.
Hylor v. United States, 896 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2018): Hylor is the panel’s key substantive anchor for the predicate issue: it states that Florida attempted first-degree murder is a violent felony under the ACCA and describes attempted murder as a “prototypically violent crime.” The panel relied on Hylor to hold the predicate remains valid, supporting continued career-offender treatment.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The compassionate-release structure: three necessary conditions

The opinion reiterates a strict tripartite structure for compassionate release: the defendant must show (1) an extraordinary and compelling reason, (2) consistency with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (including the “not a danger” requirement), and (3) that § 3553(a) supports release. Under United States v. Tinker, failure of any prong ends the analysis.

B. “Unusually long sentence” depends on a change in law that actually changes this defendant’s exposure

Floyd framed his sentence as “unusually long” by pointing to later statutory reductions to certain mandatory minimums in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The panel’s response was formal but decisive: Floyd was convicted under § 841(b)(1)(B), and the relevant mandatory minimum structure under that subsection did not change in a way that reduced his exposure. Therefore, the supposed “change in law” did not create the kind of “gross disparity” contemplated by the “unusually long sentence” provision in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6).

Put differently, the court treated the “change in law” inquiry as defendant-specific: it is not enough that Congress reduced penalties elsewhere in the statute; the defendant must show that the legal change would materially reduce his likely sentence if imposed today.

C. Career-offender status remains intact; the Florida “non-existent crime” theory fails

Floyd’s disparity argument also depended on whether he would still be a career offender. The panel held he would:

His Florida cocaine delivery conviction remains a qualifying drug predicate.
His Florida attempted first-degree murder conviction remains a qualifying crime of violence, relying on Hylor v. United States and the ACCA/Guidelines interpretive linkage in United States v. Ochoa.

The court then dispatched Floyd’s state-law argument: State v. Gray and Williamson v. State addressed the logical and doctrinal impossibility of “attempted felony murder” (because felony murder’s mens rea is supplied by legal fiction, which does not translate to attempt liability). But that reasoning does not undermine “attempted first-degree murder,” which is an intent-based offense. Accordingly, the panel held Floyd was not convicted of a “non-existent” Florida crime.

D. Danger and § 3553(a): seriousness, recidivism, and supervised-release violations

Even aside from the “extraordinary and compelling” question, the court affirmed the district court’s determination that Floyd remained a danger (18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)) and that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against release. It emphasized:

The seriousness of the drug offense (significant cocaine quantity).
The violent nature of the predicate attempted first-degree murder.
A history of continued lawbreaking after prior sentences, including crimes while on supervised release.

Under United States v. Tinker, these findings independently supported denial and reduced the need for extensive discussion of other mitigating evidence (including rehabilitation).

3.3. Impact

Although unpublished and not binding precedent, the decision illustrates how Eleventh Circuit panels are likely to approach compassionate-release motions after the Sentencing Commission’s expanded policy statement:

“Unusually long sentence” claims will be tightly tethered to the defendant’s actual statute of conviction and guideline posture. Broad references to congressional reductions elsewhere (here, changes to § 841(b)(1)(A)) will not help defendants sentenced under a different subsection (here, § 841(b)(1)(B)).
Career-offender status is a practical barrier to “gross disparity”. If the predicate convictions still qualify, courts may conclude there is no meaningful change in the likely sentencing outcome “today,” undermining both disparity and individualized circumstances arguments.
State-law invalidation arguments must match the precise offense. Florida’s rejection of “attempted felony murder” does not undermine “attempted first-degree murder,” and courts will not treat them as interchangeable.
Danger and § 3553(a) remain independent veto points. Under Tinker, district courts can deny relief without reaching every other contention once one prong fails.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Compassionate release (§ 3582(c)(1)(A)): A mechanism allowing a court to reduce a federal prison term when stringent conditions are met—typically requiring an extraordinary reason, alignment with the Commission’s policy statement, and favorable sentencing factors.
“Extraordinary and compelling reason”: A term of art defined through U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, including categories like medical conditions, age, family circumstances, and (as discussed here) an “unusually long sentence” in light of qualifying changes in law and individualized circumstances.
“Unusually long sentence” / “gross disparity” (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)): Relief is potentially available where a change in law would likely produce a dramatically lower sentence if imposed now—evaluated case-by-case. This opinion underscores that the change must actually affect the defendant’s sentencing exposure.
Career offender (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1): A guideline designation that increases the guideline range when the defendant has at least two qualifying prior felony convictions (crimes of violence or drug offenses) and the current offense is also qualifying.
Crime of violence / elements clause: A prior offense qualifies if its legal elements require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force (or if it matches an enumerated offense). Courts analyze the statutory elements, not the facts of the defendant’s conduct, in many contexts.
Dangerousness (§ 3142(g)): A forward-looking assessment of risk to persons or the community, informed by offense circumstances and criminal history, among other factors.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Demetrius Floyd affirms a stringent, defendant-specific approach to compassionate release. The opinion’s core takeaway is that an “unusually long sentence” argument depends on a real, applicable change in law that would materially alter the defendant’s sentence today; changes to other statutory tiers are not enough. The court also reinforces that Florida attempted first-degree murder remains a qualifying crime of violence for career-offender purposes, and that district courts may deny relief based on danger and § 3553(a) without exhaustively addressing every asserted extraordinary reason.