Comparator Specificity and Discriminatory Purpose: Sixth Circuit Tightens Pleading for Equal Protection and Conspiracy Claims Challenging Urban Redevelopment Enforcement

Introduction

In April Norman v. City of Cincinnati, Ohio, No. 25-3222 (6th Cir. Oct. 17, 2025) (not recommended for publication), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a homeowner’s constitutional and statutory challenges to the City of Cincinnati’s Auburn Avenue Corridor Strategic Development Plan and related code-enforcement actions. The plaintiff, April Norman, alleged that the Plan was a vehicle for racially discriminatory “gentrification,” that the City selectively enforced building codes to force African American residents from Cincinnati’s Mt. Auburn neighborhood, and that City “stakeholders” conspired to accomplish that purpose.

The appellate panel (Judges Gibbons, McKeague, and Ritz) held that the complaint did not plausibly allege an equal protection violation because it lacked nonconclusory facts showing (a) disparate treatment of similarly situated comparators and (b) a discriminatory purpose behind facially neutral redevelopment and enforcement actions. The court also rejected Norman’s conspiracy theories (federal and state) as inadequately pled and deemed her late-breaking Fair Housing Act theory forfeited. With federal claims dismissed, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Ohio extortion claim.

Although unpublished and non-binding, the opinion provides a detailed roadmap for pleading—and defending against—equal protection and conspiracy claims that target municipal redevelopment plans and code enforcement in gentrifying neighborhoods.

Summary of the Opinion

Equal Protection: The complaint failed to state a plausible equal protection claim. Norman did not identify similarly situated non-African American property owners or neighborhoods who received more favorable treatment, and she did not allege nonconclusory facts indicating that the Plan or code enforcement was adopted or applied because of, rather than in spite of, adverse effects on African Americans.
Statutory Claims: Norman cited the Housing and Community Development Act’s definitional section (42 U.S.C. § 5302) and, at the trial court’s prompting, § 5309. She abandoned that theory on appeal and tried, for the first time, to recast her claim under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613. The court held that she forfeited the FHA theory by not pleading or arguing it below.
Conspiracy: Federal conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 failed because there was no plausible underlying constitutional violation and no specific facts showing class-based animus or an agreement. The Ohio civil conspiracy claim failed because there was no independently unlawful act.
Supplemental Jurisdiction: With all federal claims dismissed, the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law extortion claim.
Disposition: Affirmed in full.

Factual and Procedural Background

The case centers on 104 Valencia Street in Cincinnati’s Mt. Auburn neighborhood. In 2016—years before Norman purchased the property—the City cited the then-owner for code violations (deteriorating paint, damaged chimney, missing/rotted soffit, and leaking/missing gutters). After Norman, an African American woman, acquired the property, the City issued notices identifying substantially the same violations, flagged the property for tall grass/weeds twice, and sent a rental registration notice. Norman disputed some notices, performed some repairs, and received abatement bills.

Norman also received numerous unsolicited offers from developers to purchase the property. She alleged that one developer said he had been given a list of properties on which to make offers. While preparing to contest a City civil citation (later dismissed), Norman learned of the Auburn Avenue Corridor Strategic Development Plan. She alleged the Plan—developed by Grossman Group Design and Planning, drawing on a DiSalvo Development Advisors market assessment, and adopted by the City with “stakeholders” including Christ Hospital Network, God’s Bible School and College, and the Mt. Auburn Community Development Corporation—was conceived and implemented to target predominantly African American neighborhoods for redevelopment by leveraging code enforcement.

Norman sued the City, the named institutions, and numerous employees, asserting: (1) denial of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) federal and state civil conspiracy; and (3) state-law extortion against the City. The district court granted Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) motions, holding the claims time-barred and inadequately pled. Norman appealed; the Sixth Circuit affirmed on plausibility grounds.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Pleading Standards: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The court reiterated that labels, conclusions, and naked assertions do not suffice; plaintiffs must allege facts that allow a reasonable inference of liability.
Materials Considered at 12(b)(6): Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008); Song v. City of Elyria, 985 F.2d 840, 842 (6th Cir. 1993). Courts may consider documents referenced in the complaint and central to the claims; here, that included Plan maps and City records.
Equal Protection Framework: Lathfield Invs., LLC v. City of Lathrup Village, 136 F.4th 282, 303 (6th Cir. 2025) (equal protection’s “similarly situated” premise); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (equal protection baseline).
Selective Enforcement/Comparator Requirement: Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011); Bah v. Att’y Gen. of Tenn., 610 F. App’x 547, 554 (6th Cir. 2015); Straser v. City of Athens, 951 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2020); Reynolds v. Szczesniak, 2022 WL 3500191 (6th Cir. Aug. 18, 2022); Daniels v. City of Wyoming, 2017 WL 7661477 (6th Cir. Oct. 5, 2017); Faith Baptist Church v. Waterford Twp., 522 F. App’x 322 (6th Cir. 2013); Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 2011).
Discriminatory Purpose vs. Disparate Impact: Pers. Adm’r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Arsan v. Keller, 784 F. App’x 900, 912 (6th Cir. 2019); Robinson v. Amble, 2019 WL 5152775 (6th Cir. July 17, 2019).
Forfeiture/Abandonment on Appeal: Doe v. Michigan State Univ., 989 F.3d 418, 425 (6th Cir. 2021); Swanigan v. FCA US LLC, 938 F.3d 779, 786 (6th Cir. 2019). New theories raised for the first time on appeal are forfeited; issues not argued in the opening brief are abandoned.
Conspiracy Pleading and Underlying Violation Requirement: Montgomery v. Ferentino, 2021 WL 3204843 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 2021); Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 805 F. App’x 379, 384 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971)); Pahssen v. Merrill Cmty. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356, 368 (6th Cir. 2012); Perry v. Se. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., 154 F. App’x 467, 477 (6th Cir. 2005).
Ohio Civil Conspiracy: Sal’s Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. BERS Acquisition Co., 192 N.E.3d 537, 544 (Ohio Ct. App. 2022) (requiring an independent unlawful act).
Supplemental Jurisdiction: 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Bah, 610 F. App’x at 555.
No Amending via Appellate Brief: Fisher v. Perron, 30 F.4th 289, 300 (6th Cir. 2022).

Legal Reasoning

1) Equal Protection: Comparator Specificity and Purposeful Discrimination

The court understood Norman’s equal protection theory in two parts: (a) the Plan itself was adopted for the purpose of pushing African American residents out of Mt. Auburn, and (b) code enforcement against her property was selectively applied to further that goal.

The claim failed at the threshold for two independent reasons:

Lack of similarly situated comparators. For selective enforcement, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that others “similarly situated” were treated differently. Norman did not allege that the City declined to issue similar code violations to comparable non–African American property owners in Mt. Auburn. Her broader assertion that “aggressively targeted enforcement” was not applied in “non-African-American areas of the City” was deemed conclusory because she identified no comparator neighborhoods and pleaded no facts showing why any candidate neighborhood would be similarly situated.
No facts showing discriminatory purpose. A neutral policy with disparate racial effects does not violate equal protection without proof of discriminatory purpose—the policy must be adopted “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects on a protected group. Norman’s allegations (that the Plan drew on data about vacant/code-deficient single-family homes and that such conditions correlated with predominantly African American neighborhoods) did not support an inference that the defendants acted with racially discriminatory intent. The court also noted a temporal mismatch: the same property was cited for the same violations years before Norman purchased it and before the Plan existed, undercutting an inference that post-Plan enforcement was racially targeted or Plan-driven.

The court further observed that Plan materials—properly considered at the pleading stage—did not clearly encompass Norman’s property within the Plan’s rezoning or prioritized “key” redevelopment areas, muddying the causal link between the Plan and any harm to her parcel.

2) Statutory Theories: HCDA and FHA

Norman cited 42 U.S.C. § 5302 (a definitional section of the Housing and Community Development Act). The district court analyzed the claim under § 5309 (HCDA’s anti-discrimination provision) and concluded there is no private right of action; Norman did not challenge that holding on appeal, abandoning the issue. On appeal she pivoted to the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613. The Sixth Circuit deemed the FHA theory forfeited because it was not pleaded, briefed, or argued below. The court expressly recognized that private suits are permitted under the FHA but declined to consider a theory raised for the first time on appeal.

3) Conspiracy: No Underlying Violation, No Specific Agreement, No Animus

Federal conspiracy claims under §§ 1983 and 1985 require, respectively, an underlying constitutional violation and, for § 1985(3), class-based discriminatory animus. Neither was plausibly alleged. Beyond that, the complaint’s references to “stakeholders” and “collaborators,” and to Grossman Group and DDA’s roles in planning and assessment, lacked the “who, what, when, where, and how” specificity necessary to support an inference of an agreement.

The Ohio civil conspiracy claim failed for want of an underlying unlawful act. Attempts to add factual detail via the appellate brief could not cure the pleading defects; a complaint cannot be amended on appeal.

4) Supplemental Jurisdiction

With all federal claims dismissed, the district court appropriately declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining Ohio extortion claim under § 1367(c)(3).

Impact and Practical Implications

This decision crystallizes several recurring hurdles for plaintiffs who challenge municipal redevelopment initiatives and code enforcement on equal protection grounds:

Comparator precision matters. Plaintiffs should identify specific, similarly situated comparators—either individual properties or neighborhoods—receiving more favorable treatment, and explain why those comparators are alike in relevant respects (e.g., housing stock, code status, market conditions, zoning, ownership patterns).
Purpose, not just pattern. Alleging disparate impact alone is insufficient under equal protection. Plausible facts must support an inference of discriminatory purpose: contemporaneous statements, selection criteria that function as proxies for race, departures from usual procedures, or patterns tightly linked to decisionmakers’ intentions.
Timeline coherence. Where code enforcement predates a contested plan and a plaintiff’s ownership, it weakens any inference that later enforcement was plan-driven or racially motivated.
Geographic fit. If the plan’s mapped focus areas do not include the plaintiff’s property, pleading must show a concrete mechanism by which plan implementation affected the property.
Conspiracy requires specifics. Mere collaboration or “stakeholder” status—without concrete facts of an agreement, participants, timing, and acts in furtherance—will not satisfy federal or Ohio conspiracy pleading standards.
Choose and preserve the right statute. If a plaintiff intends to proceed under the Fair Housing Act (including a disparate-impact theory recognized in Inclusive Communities), that theory must be pleaded in the complaint and defended at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Attempting to pivot on appeal will be deemed forfeiture.
Private HCDA claims are precarious. District courts often find no private right of action under HCDA § 5309; litigants should be prepared to rely on alternative vehicles (e.g., FHA, § 1983 with a municipal policy/custom theory, or state-law claims).
Early dismissal leverage for defendants. Municipalities and affiliated private entities can use Twombly/Iqbal to challenge conclusory allegations and to introduce plan documents and public records at the Rule 12 stage under Bassett.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Equal Protection and “Similarly Situated”: The Equal Protection Clause requires that the government treat like cases alike. To claim selective enforcement, a plaintiff must identify a comparator who is similar “in all relevant respects” but was treated better. Broad assertions about entire areas without comparators usually fail.
Discriminatory Purpose vs. Disparate Impact: Disparate impact (a policy disproportionately affects a racial group) is not enough under the Constitution. There must be facts suggesting decisionmakers adopted or applied the policy “because of” the adverse effect. The FHA, by contrast, permits disparate-impact claims, but they must be pleaded.
Plausibility Pleading (Twombly/Iqbal): Courts accept well-pled facts as true, but not legal conclusions or bare assertions. Facts must make liability reasonably inferable, not merely possible.
Forfeiture and Abandonment: Arguments not made in the trial court are forfeited; issues not argued in the opening brief on appeal are abandoned. Courts will not consider new legal theories raised for the first time on appeal.
Conspiracy (Federal and State): A civil conspiracy requires an agreement among two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful objective, plus an underlying unlawful act. Specific factual allegations are required; vague references to collaboration are insufficient.
Supplemental Jurisdiction: Federal courts may decline to decide state-law claims once federal claims are dismissed early, typically resulting in dismissal of state claims without prejudice so they may be refiled in state court.
Considering Documents at the Motion to Dismiss Stage: Courts may consider documents referenced in the complaint and central to the claims (e.g., an adopted development plan and its maps). This can shape plausibility analysis without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.

Additional Observations

State Action by Private Stakeholders: The court did not need to reach whether private “stakeholders” acted under color of state law for § 1983 purposes. Future plaintiffs should anticipate this hurdle and allege facts showing joint action, compulsion, or entwinement with the City.
Statute of Limitations: The district court also held claims time-barred; the Sixth Circuit affirmed on pleading grounds without reaching limitations. Timeliness remains a separate, critical obstacle in redevelopment disputes.
FHA as a Potential Vehicle: Had the complaint pleaded an FHA theory—especially a disparate-impact claim cognizable under Texas Dep’t of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (2015)—the analysis could have been different. But that pathway requires careful pleading and causation.

Conclusion

April Norman v. City of Cincinnati underscores that constitutional challenges to redevelopment strategies and code enforcement must be grounded in concrete, comparator-based allegations and facts supporting discriminatory purpose. The Sixth Circuit’s unpublished opinion synthesizes existing precedent to make three practical points: (1) equal protection selective-enforcement claims rise or fall on well-pleaded comparator and intent allegations; (2) conspiracy theories require specific agreement facts and an underlying wrong; and (3) plaintiffs must select, plead, and preserve the correct statutory vehicle from the outset. For municipalities and associated private entities, the decision provides a clear template for early dismissal of conclusory claims. For would-be plaintiffs, it is a cautionary lesson in the rigor of Twombly/Iqbal pleading in the redevelopment and gentrification context.