Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Third Circuit’s nonprecedential decision in Joseph Roberts v. Borough of Manheim (No. 24-1830, Oct. 17, 2025), a selective-enforcement equal protection challenge arising out of municipal code enforcement against auto-related businesses in Manheim, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs Joseph Roberts (a Caucasian property owner operating a battery business) and Kim Zapata (a Hispanic auto-repair operator) sued the Borough and zoning officials, alleging discriminatory, selective enforcement against Hispanic-owned car-related businesses and seeking municipal liability under Monell. The District Court granted summary judgment to defendants; the Third Circuit affirmed.

The crux of the appeal was whether plaintiffs identified similarly situated comparators who were treated more favorably. The panel held they did not: the proposed comparators differed in critical regulatory respects (applicable ordinance, a site-specific zoning board decision, licensure status) and in complaint history, each of which independently explained different outcomes. The court also deemed the Monell claim waived because plaintiffs failed to brief it on appeal.

Although the opinion is designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” it provides a clear, practical synthesis of comparator analysis in selective-enforcement cases and underscores the importance of issue preservation for municipal-liability claims.

Summary of the Opinion

• Facts and posture: Following neighbor complaints in 2021, Manheim’s zoning officer inspected Roberts’s multi-lot industrial property. She found violations tied to Roberts’s battery business and to Zapata’s auto-repair operation, as well as noncompliance with a 1998 Zoning Hearing Board decision covering the lots. After warnings and two violation notices, the Borough sued Roberts for ongoing violations, later settling for corrective measures. Roberts and Zapata then sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for equal protection and municipal liability.
• Holding: Affirmed. The equal protection claim failed because plaintiffs did not identify any similarly situated comparator treated more favorably. The municipal-liability claim was waived on appeal.
• Comparator analysis:
  • Fiore (auto sales only): Not comparable. He did not operate an auto-repair garage (hence different ordinance), was not subject to the 1998 decision, and there was no record of complaints—contrasting with complaint-triggered enforcement against appellants.
  • Jannone (auto sales and repair with dealer license): Not comparable. A dealer license authorized storage of registered and unregistered vehicles, neutralizing the specific violation asserted against appellants.
  • Shelley/Ortiz (Caucasian landlord, Hispanic tenant): Evidence of consistent (not disparate) enforcement—the Borough fined Shelley for unregistered vehicles on his property, undermining the claim of race-based selective enforcement.
• Monell: Waived due to failure to brief the claim on appeal.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986): Cited for the summary-judgment standard: a dispute is “genuine” if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. The panel reviewed the record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, assuming contested facts (including the alleged discriminatory remark) but still found no triable equal protection claim because the comparator element failed as a matter of law.
• Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014): Provided both the standard of review (plenary) and the equal protection requirement that plaintiffs show different treatment than similarly situated persons. The panel leaned heavily on Blunt’s framing to emphasize that comparators must be truly alike in relevant dimensions.
• Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2008): Quoted for the proposition that “similarly situated” means “alike in all relevant aspects.” The opinion operationalizes “relevant aspects” in the municipal code context: applicable ordinances, site-specific rulings (like the 1998 ZHB decision), licensure status, and the presence of complaints that trigger enforcement.
• Stradford v. Secretary Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 53 F.4th 67 (3d Cir. 2022): Cited for the principle that “other factors explaining disparate treatment will usually preclude persons from being similarly situated.” The panel carried that logic forward by identifying neutral differentiators (e.g., licensure, distinct regulatory predicates, and complaint history) that severed comparator equivalence.
• Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2010): Invoked (n.5) to underscore that evidence of consistent enforcement negates disparate-treatment proof—a key point in the Shelley/Ortiz analysis, where the Borough’s fine of a Caucasian property owner for his Hispanic tenant’s vehicles cut against the plaintiffs’ selective-enforcement narrative.
• Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978): Recited as the municipal-liability framework. The panel did not reach the merits because the claim was waived on appeal. Still, the posture implicitly highlights that without an underlying constitutional violation, Monell liability generally fails.
• Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2016): Cited for appellate waiver: issues not argued in the opening brief are forfeited. The panel applied Halle to deem the Monell claim waived.

Legal Reasoning

The panel approached the equal protection claim through the well-established gateway requirement: plaintiffs must demonstrate that they were treated differently from similarly situated comparators. Importantly, the court treated “similarity” as a function of the underlying regulatory matrix and factual predicates:

• Regulatory predicates matter: Zapata operated an auto-repair garage subject to an ordinance specifically governing such facilities; Fiore did not, rendering Fiore’s auto-sales business a poor comparator. Separately, the lots at issue were bound by a 1998 Zoning Hearing Board decision imposing site-specific restrictions. Those individualized constraints were not present for Fiore either.
• Licensure matters: The court placed decisive weight on dealer licensing for Jannone. Because the license authorized the storage of registered and unregistered vehicles onsite, the very conduct that would constitute a violation for unlicensed actors was lawful for him. This single factor sufficed to defeat comparator status.
• Complaint-driven enforcement matters: The enforcement against Roberts’s property was complaint-triggered (e.g., noise at 4:00 a.m. on a Sunday), a neutral, non-discriminatory trigger. The absence of complaints regarding the proposed comparators further undermined similarity and provided a rational differentiator under Stradford.
• Consistency defeats disparate treatment: The Shelley/Ortiz example showed the Borough fining a Caucasian owner for a Hispanic tenant’s unregistered vehicles. That consistency undercut the claim that the Borough selectively enforced rules against Hispanic-owned businesses.

Notably, the panel acknowledged evidence viewed favorably to plaintiffs, including Roberts’s account of an allegedly biased statement by the zoning officer. Yet it did not need to rule on discriminatory purpose because the record failed to show discriminatory effect—an indispensable element proven through comparators. The opinion also observed that many violations arose from Roberts’s own (non-Hispanic) battery business or general property conditions, further complicating the claim that enforcement was targeted at Hispanic-operated car-related businesses.

On municipal liability, the panel applied a straightforward appellate rule: because appellants did not brief the Monell claim, it was waived. Although the court did not reach the merits, the equal protection disposition suggests that even a properly preserved Monell claim would struggle absent an underlying constitutional violation and proof that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force.

Practical Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

• Heightened comparator specificity in code enforcement: Plaintiffs must now carefully match comparators across the full regulatory landscape. Differences in:
  • Applicable ordinances (e.g., auto-repair vs. auto-sales rules),
  • Site-specific decisions or conditions (e.g., ZHB directives unique to a property),
  • Licensure (e.g., dealer licenses authorizing vehicle storage), and
  • Complaint histories or other neutral enforcement triggers
  will likely defeat comparator status. This opinion gives municipalities a roadmap for defending selective-enforcement claims by documenting these distinctions.
• Stray or disputed remarks are not enough without comparators: Evidence suggestive of bias will rarely reach a jury unless plaintiffs also demonstrate discriminatory effect through valid comparators. This places a premium on data-driven proof (e.g., enforcement records against truly comparable entities).
• Preservation of Monell claims is critical: The waiver underscores a recurring appellate pitfall. Even where plaintiffs believe the equal protection merits are strong, they must brief Monell or risk forfeiture, especially since Monell often requires separate proof of policy, custom, or ratification.
• Municipal documentation strategy: For defendants, clearly tying enforcement to complaint logs, licensure checks, and site-specific regulatory frameworks can neutralize allegations of selective enforcement and defeat comparator arguments at summary judgment.
• Nonprecedential but instructive: While not binding under the Third Circuit’s I.O.P. 5.7, the opinion is likely to be persuasive in district courts handling similar § 1983 selective-enforcement claims in the municipal code context.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Selective-enforcement equal protection claim: Requires proof that the plaintiff was treated differently than others who are similarly situated and that the difference is due to an improper motive (e.g., race) or lacks a rational basis (class-of-one theory). This case focused on the threshold “similarly situated” element.
• “Similarly situated” means “alike in all relevant aspects”: In code enforcement, “relevant aspects” include the precise ordinances regulating the business, site-specific zoning decisions, licensure status, and neutral triggers such as complaint histories.
• Monell municipal liability: A municipality is not vicariously liable for employees’ actions. Plaintiffs must show a municipal policy, custom, or decision by a final policymaker that caused the constitutional violation. If there is no underlying constitutional violation, Monell typically fails. Here, the claim was also waived on appeal.
• Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB) decision: A site-specific adjudication that can impose unique conditions on particular lots. Violating a ZHB decision is a distinct regulatory infraction that may not apply to proposed comparators.
• Dealer license significance: In many jurisdictions, a dealer license authorizes storage of vehicles (including unregistered inventory) onsite. That authorization can transform what looks like a violation for one operator into permissible conduct for a licensed comparator.
• Waiver on appeal: Issues not argued in the opening appellate brief are forfeited. Courts will not rescue unbriefed claims—even important ones like Monell—once waived.
• Complaint-driven enforcement: Municipalities often act on citizen complaints. A record showing that enforcement followed complaints supplies a neutral reason for action and can defeat claims of selective enforcement absent comparators subject to similar complaints but treated differently.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Roberts and Zapata because they failed to identify similarly situated comparators who received more favorable treatment. The court’s careful, fact-specific comparator analysis highlights that equal protection claims premised on selective municipal code enforcement rise or fall on the alignment of relevant regulatory and factual conditions—ordinance applicability, site-specific zoning decisions, licensure status, and complaint history. Evidence suggestive of bias cannot substitute for the absence of genuine comparators.

On municipal liability, the panel’s waiver ruling is a cautionary tale: plaintiffs must preserve and brief Monell theories or lose them on appeal. More broadly, this decision underscores the evidentiary rigor plaintiffs must bring to selective-enforcement litigation and offers municipalities a practical framework—rooted in neutral differentiators—to rebut claims of discriminatory treatment.

Key Takeaways

• Comparator proof is indispensable: businesses must be alike in all relevant regulatory and factual aspects.
• Licensure, site-specific zoning decisions, and complaint logs are powerful, neutral differentiators.
• Consistent enforcement examples undermine disparate-treatment claims.
• Alleged discriminatory remarks do not obviate the need to show discriminatory effect through comparators.
• Monell must be distinctly argued on appeal; otherwise, it is waived.