Commonwealth v. Blakeney: No Public-Record Presumption in PCRA “Unknown Fact” Exception and Reasonable Diligence in Juror-Nondisclosure Claims

Introduction

In Commonwealth v. Blakeney (Pa. Nov. 5, 2025), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the Dauphin County PCRA court’s dismissal of a capital defendant’s successive PCRA petition as untimely and remanded for further proceedings. The appeal presented a focused jurisdictional question under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA): whether the petitioner satisfied the “previously unknown fact” exception to the PCRA’s time bar where the asserted new facts implicated juror nondisclosure, and those facts had once appeared in a publicly available news report.

The case arises from Herbert Blakeney’s conviction for the first-degree murder of his estranged wife’s 14‑month‑old son and the attempted murder and aggravated assault of the roommate, Duana Swanson. A linchpin of the Commonwealth’s case at trial was testimony from Officer William Vernouski about events culminating in the child’s killing. Blakeney represented himself at trial and defended on a theory that the officer killed the child and that there was a police cover‑up.

Decades later, post‑conviction counsel located an obituary for the mother of Juror #7 from Blakeney’s trial, cross‑referenced relatives listed in that obituary, and discovered that, prior to Blakeney’s trial, the juror’s nephew had been charged with attempting to murder his infant son—the nephew’s preliminary hearing occurred the same day Juror #7 was questioned during voir dire. Blakeney alleged he did not know and could not, through due diligence, have known of this fact until October 16, 2023. He argued that Juror #7’s nondisclosure denied him an impartial jury and that the petition, while facially untimely, fit the exception at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).

The PCRA court dismissed without a hearing, reasoning that because a June 25, 2002 newspaper article reported the nephew’s charges, the “information is not a new fact, but at best, a new discovery of a previously known fact.” The Supreme Court rejected that rationale, holding that the court improperly employed the “public record presumption” that the Court repudiated in Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020), and further erred in its approach to due diligence.

Summary of the Opinion

Justice McCaffery, writing for the Court, held:

The PCRA court’s dismissal rested on legal error. A petitioner’s knowledge cannot be presumed merely because the pertinent facts appeared in a public source such as a newspaper. Small controls and forecloses reliance on any public-record presumption.
Small’s repudiation of the public-record presumption applies to the adjudication of PCRA petitions regardless of the date of the underlying trial. The operative event is the filing of the PCRA petition, not when the trial occurred.
Even assuming awareness of the nephew’s case, the record did not permit a legal conclusion that Blakeney knew the nephew was related to Juror #7. The Commonwealth’s inconsistent positions—both imputing knowledge from a shared surname and contesting that any familial relationship was proven—underscore the need for fact-finding.
On diligence, the Court declined to impose a duty on Blakeney (or any counsel) to investigate a juror’s extended family based solely on a scribbled-out answer on a questionnaire that ultimately selected “no.” Reasonable diligence does not demand “perfect vigilance.”
The order of dismissal was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion (contemplating a hearing to determine relationship, knowledge, and diligence).

Standard of review was de novo because the PCRA court decided purely legal issues without a hearing, and thus made no factual findings to which deference was owed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020): The Court’s cornerstone precedent. Small held that the “newly discovered fact” exception in § 9545(b)(1)(ii) looks to the petitioner’s actual knowledge and diligence and does not erect a presumption that facts in the public record were known or knowable. Small requires a “circumstance‑dependent analysis of the petitioner’s knowledge, not that of the public at large.” In Blakeney, the Court applies Small to reject the PCRA court’s reliance on a 2002 news article as dispositive against timeliness.
Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221 (Pa. 2016): Cox articulates that due diligence does not require “perfect vigilance and punctilious care,” but reasonable effort under the circumstances. Blakeney extends that principle to the juror‑nondisclosure context, holding that a scratched‑out response that ultimately reads “no” does not trigger a duty to research a juror’s extended family.
Commonwealth v. Aljoe, 216 A.2d 50 (Pa. 1966): Aljoe is cited to distinguish between an honest mistake and intentional deception in voir dire disclosures—a question relevant to the merits of a juror bias claim. The Court notes that whether Juror #7’s answer was mistaken or deceptive is a merits issue to be addressed after factual development.
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 946 A.2d 645 (Pa. 2008): The Court references its prior decision for background on the trial evidence, though the current appeal is limited to PCRA timeliness and jurisdiction.

Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds in two steps: (1) correcting the PCRA court’s reliance on a now‑repudiated legal presumption, and (2) clarifying what due diligence requires in this setting.

Repudiation of the public‑record presumption governs PCRA timeliness adjudications. The Court emphasizes that § 9545(b)(1)(ii) demands a petitioner‑specific inquiry: Were the facts unknown to this petitioner, and could they have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence? Small makes clear that courts may not short‑circuit this inquiry by presuming knowledge from the mere public availability of information. The Commonwealth’s attempt to confine Small on “retroactivity” grounds fails because Small addresses the jurisdictional gateway for PCRA petitions—a question triggered at the time of post‑conviction proceedings, not by the date of the trial. Indeed, Small itself applied its rule to a defendant tried in 1983.
No imputation of knowledge based on a shared surname. The Commonwealth’s inconsistent positions (imputing knowledge from a shared last name while simultaneously contesting that any familial relationship is proven) highlight why factual development, not legal presumption, is necessary. The question whether Juror #7 is, in fact, the nephew’s relative—and if so, whether and when Blakeney could have discovered that—is for a hearing.
Reasonable diligence in the juror‑nondisclosure context. The Court rejects the notion that a scratched‑out “yes” on a questionnaire—followed by a “no” checkmark—imposed on Blakeney a duty to further investigate Juror #7 or his extended family. It treats the final written “no” as a clear response that could reasonably be accepted at face value, particularly with an imminent capital trial. The Court thus reaffirms that diligence is measured by reasonable efforts, not exhaustive investigation or omniscience. Whether the juror’s incomplete disclosure was an honest mistake or intentional deception is a merits issue for later development.
Procedural posture and standard of review reinforce the result. Because the PCRA court dismissed without a hearing and on legal grounds, the Supreme Court reviewed de novo and confined itself to correcting legal errors. Other issues the Commonwealth raised on the sufficiency of the petition were expressly left unresolved because the PCRA court had not addressed them.

Impact

The decision has several important implications for PCRA practice and juror‑bias litigation in Pennsylvania:

Reinforced repudiation of public‑record presumption: Trial courts cannot deny § 9545(b)(1)(ii) relief on the basis that facts once appeared in newspapers or other public sources. Courts must analyze what the petitioner actually knew and could, through reasonable diligence, have known.
Temporal reach of Small clarified: Small applies to the adjudication of PCRA petitions regardless of when the trial occurred. Prosecutors and courts cannot salvage the public‑record presumption by labeling Small “non‑retroactive.”
Due diligence in juror‑nondisclosure claims: Reasonable diligence does not require investigating a juror’s extended family absent some concrete impetus. A scribbled-out questionnaire answer that ends with an unambiguous “no” does not generate a duty to conduct genealogical or background research on a juror’s relatives.
Fact development will be central on remand: Petitioners raising juror‑nondisclosure claims should be prepared to prove the familial relationship and timelines of discovery. The Commonwealth’s concession or dispute regarding relationships can determine whether a hearing is required, but where contested, a hearing is the proper vehicle to resolve such facts.
Capital PCRA appeals: The opinion reaffirms that capital PCRA orders are directly appealable to the Supreme Court (42 Pa.C.S. § 9546(d)), and that pure legal dismissals without hearings are reviewed de novo.

For practitioners, Blakeney also suggests practical guidance:

Document the date and manner of discovery of “new facts.” Blakeney’s petition specified October 16, 2023 as the discovery date and filed promptly thereafter (October 20, 2023), which fits any reasonable diligence and timing assessment.
When claiming juror bias based on nondisclosure, attach the juror questionnaire, voir dire transcript, and corroborating materials (e.g., obituaries, court dockets, news reports) to support both the factual predicates and diligence.
Anticipate and address whether the nondisclosure was likely an honest mistake versus intentional concealment, as this distinction bears on the merits of a bias claim (per Aljoe).

Complex Concepts Simplified

PCRA time bar (42 Pa.C.S. § 9545): After a conviction becomes final, a PCRA petition must be filed within one year unless one of three narrow exceptions applies: (i) government interference, (ii) previously unknown facts not discoverable by due diligence, or (iii) a newly recognized, retroactive constitutional right.
“Previously unknown fact” exception (§ 9545(b)(1)(ii)): To open the PCRA’s jurisdictional gate, a petitioner must show (1) the key facts were unknown to them, and (2) they could not have discovered those facts earlier through reasonable efforts. The exception focuses on the petitioner’s actual situation and efforts, not on whether the facts were somewhere in the public domain.
Public‑record presumption (repudiated): Before Small, some courts treated facts reported in public sources as presumptively known or knowable, defeating the “unknown fact” exception. Small abolished this presumption; Blakeney underscores that courts cannot resurrect it.
Due diligence: This is not “perfect vigilance.” It asks whether the petitioner took reasonable steps to uncover the facts. In juror‑nondisclosure contexts, reasonable diligence does not require researching a juror’s extended family absent a specific reason.
Juror nondisclosure and bias: If a juror fails to truthfully answer material voir dire questions, it can undermine the right to an impartial jury. Whether a misstatement was a good‑faith mistake or intentional concealment matters on the merits; it does not, by itself, defeat the timeliness exception if the nondisclosure was unknown and not discoverable through reasonable diligence.
Standard of review and hearings: When a PCRA court dismisses without a hearing based solely on legal reasoning, the Supreme Court reviews de novo. Factual disputes about what the petitioner knew, when they knew it, familial relationships, and diligence typically require an evidentiary hearing.

Conclusion

Commonwealth v. Blakeney is a strong reaffirmation—and clarifying extension—of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding in Small that the “public record presumption” has no role in the PCRA’s previously unknown fact exception. The decision makes three key contributions:

It confirms that Small governs the adjudication of PCRA petitions irrespective of the age of the underlying trial; the question is petitioner‑specific knowledge and diligence at the time of post‑conviction proceedings.
It delineates reasonable diligence in the juror‑nondisclosure context, rejecting an expectation that capital defendants (or any litigants) must investigate a juror’s extended family based on a scribbled‑out questionnaire entry that ultimately reads “no.”
It underscores that where the petition pleads concrete dates and newly uncovered relationships, courts should not deny jurisdiction on legal presumptions but should instead conduct hearings to resolve disputed facts such as the existence of a family relationship and the petitioner’s actual knowledge.

The bottom line is that courts must decide § 9545(b)(1)(ii) issues by examining the petitioner’s actual knowledge and reasonable diligence—not by presuming knowledge from public reporting, shared surnames, or speculative inferences. Blakeney’s remand signals that juror nondisclosure claims anchored in newly uncovered familial ties will receive fact‑driven scrutiny rather than categorical dismissal. While the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the juror bias claim, its jurisdictional ruling will shape PCRA practice across Pennsylvania, particularly in cases involving late‑discovered evidence of juror relationships and potential biases.

Appendix: Procedural Notes

Case: Commonwealth v. Blakeney, No. 817 CAP (Pa. Nov. 5, 2025).
Lower Court: Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, order entered Aug. 1, 2024 (dismissal without hearing).
Jurisdiction: Direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a capital case (42 Pa.C.S. § 9546(d)).
Standard of Review: De novo (purely legal dismissal; no factual findings).
Key Authorities: 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), (b)(1)(ii); Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020); Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221 (Pa. 2016); Commonwealth v. Aljoe, 216 A.2d 50 (Pa. 1966).
Note on Record: The opinion describes the instant filing as a “third” PCRA petition, but later references “five PCRA petitions later.” The discrepancy does not affect the Court’s jurisdictional analysis or disposition.