Re-affirming Complete § 301 LMRA Pre-emption over State-Law Challenges to Union-Negotiated COVID-19 Policies: Sullivan v. Gelb

1. Introduction

Sullivan v. Gelb, No. 24-1917-cv (2d Cir. June 17 2025) is a Second Circuit summary order that, while formally non-precedential, supplies a robust and timely clarification of the scope of complete pre-emption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) when unionized employees attack COVID-19 vaccination policies embedded—or allegedly embedded—in a collective-bargaining agreement (“CBA”).

Parties: Mark Sullivan, a tenured chorister at the Metropolitan Opera (“Met”), sued Peter Gelb (Met General Manager), Marcia Sells (Chief Diversity Officer), Stephanie Basta (administrative staff), and Samuel Wheeler (a union official with the American Guild of Musical Artists – “AGMA”).

Background: Sullivan was terminated for refusing to comply with a COVID-19 policy, negotiated between the Met and AGMA, mandating vaccination and associated safety protocols. He filed state-law tort claims—tortious interference, negligent misrepresentation and negligence, fraud, and “concerted-action” liability—contending the policy had not properly become part of the CBA. He also (initially) pleaded a hybrid § 301/DFR (duty of fair representation) claim against Wheeler, but later disavowed it.

Procedural posture: Defendants removed to federal court citing § 301 pre-emption. The district court (Woods, J.) denied Sullivan’s remand motion, dismissed all claims, and denied reconsideration. Sullivan appealed. The Second Circuit affirmed.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• All state-law claims are completely pre-empted by § 301 LMRA because their resolution “is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the CBA.”
• The hybrid § 301/DFR claim—assumed arguendo—was time-barred by the six-month statute of limitations.
• Therefore, federal subject-matter jurisdiction existed from the moment of removal, the district court properly dismissed the complaint, and the order denying reconsideration is upheld.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) – Articulates the “complete pre-emption” corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule. The panel relies on Caterpillar to confirm that, even if a plaintiff pleads only state-law theories, removal is proper when federal law so thoroughly occupies the field that the state claims are “converted” into federal ones.
2. Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983) – Establishes that § 301’s pre-emptive force “is so powerful” it converts state contract claims implicating labor-management agreements into federal claims.
3. Foy v. Pratt & Whitney Group, 127 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1997) – Governs removal analysis for § 301 pre-empted claims and is repeatedly cited to measure whether Sullivan’s tort theories turn on interpreting the CBA.
4. Dougherty v. AT&T, 902 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1990) – Second Circuit precedent for looking past artful pleading; dictates that labelling a claim as “state tort” does not avoid § 301 when CBA interpretation is required.
5. Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) – Supreme Court decision defining when claims are “inextricably intertwined” with a CBA.
6. Wall v. Construction & General Laborers’ Union, 224 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2000) – Reasserts the “inextricably intertwined” standard, applied here to Sullivan’s concerted-action and fraud claims.
7. Anderson v. Aset Corp., 416 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2005) – An example of tortious-interference claims pre-empted because violation of the employment contract would hinge on CBA interpretation.
8. McKee v. Transco Products, Inc., 874 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1989) & White v. White Rose Food, 128 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1997) – Fix the six-month limitations period for hybrid § 301/DFR suits, used here to extinguish Sullivan’s latent DFR claim.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

The Second Circuit’s reasoning unfolds in two tight inquiries:

1. Jurisdiction/Pre-emption. The court first decides whether the removal was proper. Applying complete § 301 pre-emption, it surveys each state-law cause of action and asks:
   • Does adjudication require interpretation of the CBA?
   • Would success hinge on duties created by the CBA?
   The answer is “yes” across the board because Sullivan’s entire theory is that the Met and AGMA lacked authority under the CBA to impose the COVID-19 policy. This necessarily pulls the court into CBA construction.
2. Merits and Limitations. Even treating the complaint as a hybrid § 301/DFR action, it was filed over six months after Sullivan learned of Wheeler’s role. Under DelCostello v. Teamsters (not cited but implicit) and subsequent Second Circuit cases, that delay is fatal.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

Although a summary order lacks formal precedential weight, the opinion is poised to be persuasively cited because:

• It furnishes a blueprint for lower courts confronting the wave of litigation in which unionized employees challenge COVID-19 or other public-health measures as outside the scope of their CBAs.
• By grouping diverse tort theories (fraud, negligence, concerted action) under the umbrella of CBA interpretation, the panel sends a cautionary signal: creative pleading will not circumvent § 301 when the gravamen is contractual authority.
• The case emphasizes the strict six-month statute of limitations for hybrid § 301/DFR claims, nudging employees to act promptly once aware of union conduct they find objectionable.
• Finally, the decision intersects with the broader debate on public-health mandates in the workplace, legitimising the collective-bargaining process as the proper forum—rather than collateral state tort suits—for grievances over such mandates.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Complete Pre-emption. Unlike ordinary “conflict” pre-emption (which is a defense), complete pre-emption is jurisdictional. Once a particular federal statute (here, § 301 LMRA) wholly displaces parallel state law, the case is born under federal law, allowing removal even if the complaint never mentions the federal statute.
• § 301 LMRA. Grants federal courts jurisdiction over “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.” It aims for uniform interpretation of CBAs nationwide.
• Hybrid § 301/DFR Claim. A lawsuit that simultaneously alleges (a) the employer breached the CBA and (b) the union breached its duty of fair representation. Both prongs must be proven; failure of either sinks the claim.
• Duty of Fair Representation (DFR). A union’s legal obligation to represent all members of the bargaining unit fairly, in good faith, and without discrimination.
• “Inextricably Intertwined.” A doctrinal phrase indicating that determining liability requires interpreting the CBA—not merely referring to it. If true, § 301 pre-empts.

5. Conclusion

Sullivan v. Gelb reaffirms a straightforward but often misunderstood rule: when a plaintiff’s complaints about workplace policies turn on whether those policies are authorized by a collective-bargaining agreement, state causes of action are swept into the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts under § 301 LMRA. The decision also showcases the unforgiving six-month limitations clock on hybrid § 301/DFR claims. For practitioners, the message is twofold: artful re-labelling of contract disputes as torts will not defeat § 301 pre-emption, and employees must move rapidly if they believe their union has failed them. Although a summary order, the court’s meticulous reasoning supplies potent persuasive authority at the intersection of labor law and pandemic-era workplace mandates.