Collateral Estoppel from an Unappealed Motion to Reopen Does Not Moot a Pending Petition for Review; Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms Need for Credible, Individualized Proof for CAT Relief

Collateral Estoppel from an Unappealed Motion to Reopen Does Not Moot a Pending Petition for Review; Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms Need for Credible, Individualized Proof for CAT Relief

Introduction

In Miguel Angel Martinez Moz v. U.S. Attorney General, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed two significant questions that frequently arise in immigration litigation. First, the court rejected the government’s attempt to moot a petition for review by invoking collateral estoppel based on the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of a later motion to reopen that the petitioner did not appeal. Second, the court affirmed the BIA’s denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), emphasizing the centrality of credibility findings, the requirement of individualized risk, and the limited role that generalized country conditions play absent credible and corroborated personal risk evidence.

The case centers on petitioner Martinez Moz, a Salvadoran national with multiple prior removals from the United States, who sought withholding of removal and CAT protection, asserting he faced torture in El Salvador by both MS-13 and law enforcement due to gang-related perceptions connected to his tattoos. The immigration judge (IJ) denied relief on adverse credibility and evidentiary grounds; the BIA affirmed. During the petition for review, the government argued the matter was moot because the BIA later denied a motion to reopen based on new developments in El Salvador—a denial the petitioner did not separately appeal. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, held the petition was not mooted by collateral estoppel, and ultimately affirmed on the merits.

Summary of the Opinion

  • The court held that the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen—especially where the motion concerns new evidence and is unappealed—does not collaterally estop or moot a pending petition for review of the BIA’s original decision. The issues are not identical: the initial appeal reviews alleged legal and factual errors on the existing record, whereas a motion to reopen addresses whether new, material evidence warrants reopening.
  • On the merits, the court affirmed the BIA’s denial of CAT relief. The panel credited the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, the lack of adequate corroboration, and the absence of individualized evidence establishing that it was more likely than not that the petitioner would be tortured with governmental involvement or acquiescence upon return to El Salvador.
  • The court also rejected challenges based on “reasoned consideration,” concluding that the BIA adequately considered country conditions and the record as a whole and was not required to address every argument line-by-line.
  • The court reaffirmed Eleventh Circuit precedent tying the failure to establish a well-founded fear of persecution to the inability to meet the higher CAT standard when the claims hinge on the same core factual predicate.
  • The final outcome: the petition was not moot, but the denial of CAT relief was affirmed.

Factual and Procedural Background

Martinez Moz, a native of El Salvador, first entered the United States in 2006 and was removed multiple times (2012, 2013, and 2019). He returned again at an unknown date and was detained in December 2022. Claiming fear of torture by MS-13 and police due to gang-related perceptions associated with his tattoos, he sought withholding of removal and CAT protection.

The IJ made a detailed adverse credibility finding, citing inconsistencies across the petitioner’s reasonable fear interview, hearing testimony, and I-589 application; omissions in his U.S. criminal history; and the IJ’s assessment that it was “implausible, bordering on contrary to common sense” that the petitioner wore multiple MS-13 tattoos yet was not a gang member. The IJ also found insufficient corroboration and, even assuming credibility, concluded the record failed to show an objectively reasonable fear of persecution or that torture was more likely than not.

The BIA affirmed the adverse credibility and corroboration findings and dismissed the appeal. On CAT, the BIA found no individualized evidence sufficient to satisfy the burden and concluded the IJ appropriately considered country conditions. During the pendency of the petition for review, the petitioner was removed to El Salvador and reportedly detained under the country’s “State of Exception.” He sought reopening at the BIA based on new evidence; the BIA denied the motion, finding the evidence not sufficiently new, material, or individualized to establish a likelihood of torture. The petitioner did not appeal that denial. The government then moved to dismiss the pending petition as moot under a collateral estoppel theory. The Eleventh Circuit denied that request and proceeded to affirm the BIA on the merits.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • Dailide v. U.S. Attorney General, 387 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2004): Sets out the elements of collateral estoppel—identity of issues, necessity of the finding, actual litigation, and full and fair opportunity. The panel relies on Dailide to hold that the issues resolved in a motion to reopen (new evidence; materiality) are not identical to those in the original appeal (errors on the existing record).
  • 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), (c)(1): Governs BIA motions to reopen. The panel underscores that reopening is discretionary and limited to new, previously unavailable, and material evidence.
  • Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Attorney General, 577 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2009): Standard of review—legal questions de novo; factual findings under the deferential substantial evidence standard.
  • Jathursan v. U.S. Attorney General, 17 F.4th 1365 (11th Cir. 2021) and Perez-Guerrero v. U.S. Attorney General, 717 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2013): “Reasoned consideration” requirement—BIA must show it “heard and thought,” but need not address every argument in detail.
  • Lingeswaran v. U.S. Attorney General, 969 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020): CAT standard—more likely than not that the applicant would be subjected to torture.
  • Mehmeti v. U.S. Attorney General, 572 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2009): If an applicant cannot establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected ground, he cannot show that he will more likely than not be tortured as a result of that same protected ground—used here to reject the CAT claim premised on the same discredited narrative.
  • A.P.A. v. U.S. Attorney General, 104 F.4th 230 (11th Cir. 2024): Reaffirms the consequences of adverse credibility findings for related relief including CAT where the same factual predicate is advanced without adequate, credible corroboration.
  • 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a): Defines “torture,” including that it must involve specific intent and be inflicted by, at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official. The panel notes the BIA’s point that substandard prison conditions arising from negligence or resource scarcity do not meet the regulatory definition.
  • INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976); Tan v. U.S. Attorney General, 446 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir. 2006): The agency need not address each contention once it resolves the dispositive grounds and demonstrates reasoned consideration.

Legal Reasoning

1) Collateral estoppel and mootness

The government’s mootness theory rested on collateral estoppel: because the petitioner did not seek judicial review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen, the BIA would be estopped from revisiting CAT issues on remand, rendering the pending petition for review pointless. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this premise at the first step of the collateral estoppel test—identity of issues.

  • The BIA’s original decision addressed legal and factual issues on the record then before it (credibility, corroboration, likelihood of torture, government acquiescence).
  • The later motion to reopen required the BIA to assess whether new, previously unavailable evidence was sufficiently material to warrant reopening and whether it made it more likely than not that petitioner would be tortured if proceedings were reopened. That is a fundamentally different inquiry governed by distinct regulatory standards and a discretionary framework.
  • Because the issues are not identical, collateral estoppel does not apply. Moreover, accepting the government’s position would “insulate the Board’s initial CAT decision from our review,” a result the panel declined to endorse.

2) CAT standard and the effect of asylum/withholding failures

The court reiterated that CAT requires proof that it is more likely than not the applicant would be tortured and that the torture would be by, at the instigation of, or with the acquiescence of a public official. Although CAT does not require a nexus to a protected ground, the Eleventh Circuit applied its precedent (Mehmeti) to conclude that where the applicant’s inability to establish a well-founded fear of persecution undermines the same factual theory underlying CAT, that failure is fatal to the CAT claim absent independent, credible, individualized evidence. The panel held it was bound by this precedent and could not revisit its logic.

3) Adverse credibility and corroboration

The panel emphasized that the BIA did not deny CAT relief solely on the basis of adverse credibility. Rather, credibility was one part of a broader assessment that included:

  • Material inconsistencies between the reasonable fear interview, hearing testimony, and I-589;
  • Omissions of criminal history in the I-589;
  • The IJ’s plausibility finding regarding multiple MS-13 tattoos contrasted with disavowal of gang membership;
  • Insufficient corroboration to rehabilitate the testimony or to supply the necessary individualized risk.

Given these deficiencies, the substantial evidence standard compelled affirmance.

4) Country conditions and reasoned consideration

The court found the BIA provided reasoned consideration of the country conditions evidence concerning El Salvador’s “State of Exception,” including reports alleging arbitrary arrests and abuses. The BIA and IJ acknowledged these conditions but found:

  • Evidence was generalized and did not tie the risk specifically to the petitioner in an individualized way;
  • Allegations of substandard prison conditions or harms arising from negligence or resource scarcity do not meet the regulatory definition of “torture” requiring specific intent and official involvement or acquiescence;
  • The record lacked current evidence of any targeting of the petitioner since 2019.

The panel held that the BIA’s explanation was sufficiently detailed to demonstrate it “heard and thought,” and the BIA was not obligated to address each discrete argument in writing.

Impact and Implications

1) Procedural: Preserving petitions despite motions to reopen

  • The court’s clarification prevents the government from mooting a pending petition for review by pointing to an unappealed denial of a motion to reopen. Because the issues are not identical, collateral estoppel does not attach, and courts can still review the original BIA decision.
  • Practitioners can concurrently pursue a petition for review and seek reopening without fear that denial of reopening (even if unappealed) will automatically defeat appellate jurisdiction via collateral estoppel.
  • The decision preserves meaningful judicial review of the original record and avoids an end-run around appellate oversight.

2) Substantive: CAT evidentiary burdens in the Eleventh Circuit

  • The opinion reinforces a stringent approach to CAT relief: applicants must provide credible, individualized evidence demonstrating a probability (>50%) of torture with governmental involvement or acquiescence. Generalized country conditions—even disturbing ones—are insufficient without personal linkage.
  • The Eleventh Circuit continues to treat failures to establish a well-founded fear of persecution as highly probative against CAT relief when the claims rely on the same factual theory, unless additional credible and specific evidence independently supports CAT.
  • The court reaffirms that adverse credibility findings can be determinative when not offset by strong corroboration. Implausibility findings (e.g., gang tattoos inconsistent with disavowal of membership) may legitimately undercut credibility.
  • Evidence of harsh detention conditions, standing alone, generally will not satisfy the definition of “torture” under 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 absent evidence of specific intent and the requisite level of official involvement or acquiescence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Collateral estoppel: A rule that prevents re-litigation of the same issue after it has already been fully and fairly litigated and decided. It applies only when the issues are identical in both proceedings. Here, the original appeal (review of BIA merits decision) and the later motion to reopen (new evidence, materiality, and discretionary reopening) involved different issues.
  • Motion to reopen: A request to the BIA to re-open a concluded case based on new, previously unavailable, and material evidence. It is discretionary and focuses on whether the new evidence warrants fresh proceedings—not whether prior legal errors occurred.
  • CAT relief: Protection from removal when an applicant proves it is more likely than not they will be subjected to “torture” in the country of removal. Torture must involve severe pain or suffering, specific intent, and be inflicted by or with the consent/acquiescence of a public official. No nexus to a protected ground is required, but applicants must provide individualized proof.
  • Reasoned consideration: The BIA must show it considered the key issues and evidence and explain its reasoning sufficiently for judicial review. It need not address every argument in writing.
  • Substantial evidence review: A deferential standard. The court asks whether reasonable factfinders could reach the same result on the record; it does not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for the agency’s.
  • Government “acquiescence” in CAT: Requires that public officials know of or remain willfully blind to the likely torture and breach their legal duty to intervene. General lawlessness or poor conditions, without more, usually does not suffice.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision clarifies an important procedural safeguard: an unappealed BIA denial of a motion to reopen does not collaterally estop or moot a pending petition for review of the original BIA decision because the issues are not identical. On the merits, the opinion reaffirms core principles governing CAT in the Eleventh Circuit: applicants must surmount a rigorous evidentiary burden with credible, individualized proof linking their likely harm to “torture” as defined by regulation and to government involvement or acquiescence. Generalized country conditions—such as El Salvador’s “State of Exception”—cannot substitute for particularized evidence. Adverse credibility findings, especially when grounded in significant inconsistencies and implausibilities and unmitigated by strong corroboration, will typically be fatal. The court therefore declined to moot the petition but affirmed the BIA’s denial of CAT relief.

While unpublished and nonprecedential, the decision is instructive for practitioners navigating parallel litigation tracks (petitions for review and motions to reopen) and underscores the Eleventh Circuit’s continued insistence on credibility, corroboration, and individualized risk in CAT claims.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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