Collateral Attacks on Criminal Forfeiture Are Not Cognizable Under Bivens; Failure to Object Waives Appellate Review; Prefiling Injunctions May Be Expanded to Cover Related Forfeiture/Foreclosure Claims

1. Introduction

In John Williams v. Federal Agents of the United States Marshals Servi, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed (1) the dismissal, as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), of John T. Williams’s pro se civil complaint and (2) the expansion of an existing prefiling injunction requiring him to obtain leave of court before filing additional in forma pauperis actions challenging the forfeiture/foreclosure of his Georgia properties arising from his New York criminal conviction.

The core dispute traces back to Williams’s 2016 New York conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud. As part of the criminal judgment, the New York court ordered restitution and forfeiture of Williams’s interests in two Georgia properties to the United States. Roughly a decade later, Williams filed a Bivens-based damages-and-equitable-relief action in the Northern District of Georgia against unidentified federal agents and officials, alleging unconstitutional seizure and sale of those properties.

The key issues on appeal were procedural and substantive: (i) whether Williams waived appellate review by failing to object to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, and (ii) whether—waiver aside—the district court plainly erred in concluding that his Bivens lawsuit was an impermissible vehicle to undo a criminal forfeiture and that an expanded prefiling injunction was warranted to curb repetitive, frivolous filings.

Although the decision is marked “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” it meaningfully synthesizes three recurring doctrines in federal practice: waiver under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, the limited remedial scope of Bivens, and the permissible breadth of prefiling restrictions under the All Writs Act for vexatious litigants.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed for two independent reasons:

Waiver: Williams did not object to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation despite being warned of the deadline and the consequences. Under 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (and consistent with Evans v. Ga. Reg'l Hosp.), this waived his right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.
No plain error on the merits: Even if reviewed, Williams could not use a Bivens action to invalidate or unwind a criminal forfeiture, which is part of the sentence (United States v. Gilbert; Libretti v. United States). His Takings Clause theory failed in any event because the New York forfeiture order was final and expressly authorized the United States Marshals Service to seize the properties, and property already lawfully acquired by the government through authority other than eminent domain does not support a takings claim (Bennis v. Michigan). The expanded prefiling injunction was a permissible response to a long pattern of duplicative, frivolous litigation and did not wholly bar access to court (Procup v. Strickland; Miller v. Donald).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Waiver for Failure to Object to a Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation

11th Cir. R. 3-1 (rule-based waiver): The court applied the rule that failing to object to an R&R—after being informed of the objection period and the consequences—waives appellate challenges to the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to findings and conclusions. This is not merely a technicality; it is a structural mechanism preserving the efficiency of magistrate judge referrals under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Evans v. Ga. Reg'l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017): Cited for the proposition that the Eleventh Circuit generally does not review recommendations to which no objection was made. The opinion notes that Evans was “abrogated on other grounds by Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,” underscoring that the waiver principle remains intact.
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644 (2020): Referenced only to clarify that the abrogation of Evans does not disturb the waiver doctrine being applied here.

B. The Limited Scope of Bivens and the Nature of Criminal Forfeiture

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Nar- cotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971): The foundational authority for an implied damages remedy against federal officers in limited circumstances. The opinion treats Bivens as a narrow remedy and rejects its use as a mechanism to collaterally attack a criminal sentence component.
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001): Cited for Bivens’s limited remedial function—principally, money damages in limited contexts—reinforcing that Bivens is not an all-purpose vehicle for equitable invalidation of government action.
United States v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 888 (11th Cir. 2001), superseded by rule on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Marion, 562 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2009): Cited for the key characterization that “criminal forfeiture is part of a defendant’s sentence.” This framing is dispositive because it situates forfeiture within the criminal judgment—something generally challengeable through direct appeal or habeas channels, not via a later civil suit seeking return of property.
Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29 (1995): Reinforces that forfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed following conviction. The court uses Libretti to confirm that Williams’s requested relief— a declaration that forfeiture was unlawful and an order returning the properties—would function as an attack on the sentencing judgment itself.

C. Takings Clause Limits Where Government Lawfully Acquires Property Outside Eminent Domain

Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996): The court quotes Bennis for the principle that a takings claim does not lie where the government has “already lawfully acquired” the property under authority other than eminent domain. The Eleventh Circuit applied that principle to a criminal forfeiture authorized by a final forfeiture order.

D. Prefiling Injunctions and Vexatious Litigation Controls

Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc): A cornerstone Eleventh Circuit case recognizing federal courts’ inherent power and constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction and the judicial process from abusive litigants. Procup also supplies the limiting principle that restrictions must not “completely foreclose” access to the court.
Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2008): Cited both for the abuse-of-discretion standard of review and for the rationale that a “sheer volume” of frivolous in forma pauperis suits threatens the availability of the courts. It supports use of the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), to restrict vexatious filings.
Johnson v. 27th Ave. Caraf, Inc., 9 F.4th 1300 (11th Cir. 2021); Copeland v. Green, 949 F.2d 390 (11th Cir. 1991); Cofield v. Ala. Public Serv. Comm'n, 936 F.2d 512 (11th Cir. 1991); Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1993): These cases are cited collectively to demonstrate that prefiling restrictions—particularly “leave of court” requirements—are routinely upheld as valid tools to manage abusive litigation and protect scarce judicial resources.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Procedural Disposition: Waiver as an Independent Ground

The court’s first ground is procedural and decisive: Williams received explicit notice that he had fourteen days to object and that failure to object would waive challenges to the magistrate judge’s factual findings and legal conclusions. When he did not object, 11th Cir. R. 3-1 operated as a forfeiture of appellate arguments directed at the underlying dismissal and injunction. This rule serves institutional goals: it encourages litigants to bring errors to the district court’s attention early, discourages sandbagging, and preserves appellate review for genuinely contested issues.

B. Substantive Disposition: No Plain Error Because Bivens Cannot Unwind a Criminal Sentence Component

Even assuming review, the court treated Williams’s suit as an impermissible collateral attack. His complaint sought not just damages but also declarations that the forfeiture was unlawful and an order returning the properties—relief that would effectively negate a component of the criminal sentence.

The opinion’s logic runs in a tight chain:

Criminal forfeiture is part of the sentence (United States v. Gilbert; Libretti v. United States).
Bivens is a limited damages remedy and does not authorize a litigant to invalidate a criminal forfeiture order via civil litigation (Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko).
Therefore, the requested equitable relief (return of property; declaration of invalid forfeiture) is not cognizable under Bivens in this setting, and the claim is properly dismissed as frivolous when the challenge must be channeled through direct appeal or habeas proceedings in the convicting jurisdiction.

C. Takings Clause: A “Final Forfeiture Order” Forecloses the Theory

Williams attempted to reframe the dispute as a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim “independent of the criminal process,” premised on the assertion that the New York court never entered a “final forfeiture order.” The Eleventh Circuit rejected the factual predicate by pointing to the order’s own terms: it declared itself final upon entry, deemed itself part of the sentence, required inclusion in the judgment of conviction, and expressly authorized the United States Marshals Service to seize the properties.

With lawful acquisition established, Bennis v. Michigan supplies the doctrinal end point: the Takings Clause does not require compensation where the government has already lawfully acquired the property through authority other than eminent domain—here, criminal forfeiture.

D. Prefiling Injunction: Tailored Clarification, Not a Total Bar

Williams challenged the expanded injunction as violating rights of access and redress under the First and Fifth Amendments. The court responded in classic Eleventh Circuit terms: federal courts may restrict vexatious and abusive litigants to protect jurisdiction and ensure access for others (Procup v. Strickland; Miller v. Donald), including through leave-of-court requirements for new filings.

Two features made the injunction defensible:

Record of abuse: The court emphasized the “at least twenty” lawsuits filed by Williams challenging the conviction, forfeiture, and related matters, plus the filing of three “nearly identical” suits despite prior warnings.
Continued access: The injunction did not “completely foreclose” access (Procup v. Strickland). Williams could still file if he paid the filing fee, or could proceed in forma pauperis with leave of court. This “gatekeeping” model is precisely the type repeatedly upheld in Johnson v. 27th Ave. Caraf, Inc., Copeland v. Green, Cofield v. Ala. Public Serv. Comm'n, and Martin-Trigona v. Shaw.

3.3. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision has practical significance in three recurring litigation contexts:

Magistrate practice and appellate preservation: It is a clear reminder that failing to object to an R&R can be outcome-determinative under 11th Cir. R. 3-1, narrowing appellate review to (at most) plain error and often ending the case.
Channeling challenges to criminal forfeiture: The opinion reinforces that forfeiture is part of the criminal sentence and, as such, attempts to re-litigate forfeiture through later civil constitutional suits—particularly those seeking return of property—will be treated as improper collateral attacks.
Strengthening prefiling injunction jurisprudence: The court signals that when a litigant repeatedly repackages the same challenge (here, forfeiture/foreclosure arising from a conviction), district courts may broaden or clarify existing injunctions to cover the evolving variants—so long as access is not completely barred.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Bivens action: A judicially created remedy that, in limited situations, allows a person to seek money damages from federal officers in their individual capacities for constitutional violations. It is not a general tool to reverse criminal judgments or obtain broad equitable relief undoing a sentence.
Criminal forfeiture: A loss of property imposed as part of a criminal sentence because the property is connected to the crime. Because it is part of the sentence, it is ordinarily challenged through the criminal case (direct appeal) or post-conviction avenues, not a new civil lawsuit in another district.
Takings Clause (Fifth Amendment): Generally requires compensation when the government takes private property for public use through eminent domain. But when the government lawfully acquires property through other means—such as forfeiture imposed as punishment—the Takings Clause does not provide a compensation remedy in the same way (as reflected in Bennis v. Michigan).
In forma pauperis (IFP): Permission to file a case without paying standard court fees due to indigence. Because IFP status lowers financial barriers, Congress and courts permit early screening and dismissal of frivolous claims (e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)).
Report and recommendation (R&R) and waiver: A magistrate judge may issue an R&R proposing how the district judge should rule. If a party does not object within the specified time after being warned, the party typically waives appellate challenges to those unobjected-to findings and conclusions (11th Cir. R. 3-1).
Prefiling injunction / leave-of-court requirement: A court order requiring a litigant with a history of abusive filings to obtain permission before filing new cases (often limited to particular subject matter). It is meant to protect the court and other litigants from harassment and resource drain, and it is permissible if it does not entirely block access to courts.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirms three interlocking principles. First, under 11th Cir. R. 3-1, a litigant who fails to object to a magistrate judge’s R&R—after being warned—waives appellate challenges to the district court’s adoption of that recommendation. Second, Bivens is not a vehicle to invalidate or unwind criminal forfeiture, which United States v. Gilbert and Libretti v. United States confirm is part of the criminal sentence; rebranding the dispute as a Takings Clause claim fails where a final forfeiture order authorized seizure and the government has lawfully acquired the property (Bennis v. Michigan). Third, district courts may expand or clarify prefiling injunctions against repeat frivolous filers to protect judicial resources, so long as access is not completely foreclosed (Procup v. Strickland; Miller v. Donald).

In broader context, the opinion is a procedural cautionary tale (preserve issues through timely objections) and a substantive boundary marker (civil constitutional litigation cannot be used to relitigate sentencing forfeiture in a different forum), while also illustrating the judiciary’s willingness to use calibrated filing restrictions to prevent serial abuse of the federal docket.