Closing the Oglesby Loop and Recalibrating FOIA Proof: Third Circuit Tightens Exemption 7(D) and 7(E), Sets a Trial‑Exhibit Disclosure Presumption, and Limits FOIA’s Reach Over State Task Forces

Introduction

In a precedential opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit resolved wide‑ranging issues arising out of a federal inmate’s efforts to obtain government records about his mortgage‑fraud prosecution. The case, Anthony L. Viola v. U.S. Department of Justice (Nos. 18‑2573 & 22‑2186, decided Nov. 3, 2025), confronts three central questions:

Whether a county mortgage fraud task force with federal participation can be treated as a “federal agency” under FOIA for jurisdictional and merits purposes;
What FOIA requires of agencies when describing the scope and methods of their searches—particularly whether an agency must do more than search the most likely repository of responsive records; and
How rigorously courts will scrutinize law‑enforcement privacy and technique exemptions—especially Exemptions 6, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E)—when agencies rely on categorical or conclusory justifications.

The opinion affirms the dismissal of the Cuyahoga County Mortgage Fraud Task Force for lack of personal jurisdiction, and it affirms in part and vacates in part summary judgment for the FBI and EOUSA (both DOJ components) on the FOIA claims. In doing so, the court announces and refines several important FOIA doctrines:

Agencies must “close the Oglesby loop” by affirmatively showing they searched all locations likely—not merely most likely—to contain responsive records.
For Exemption 7(D), agencies relying on implied confidentiality under a “singularity‑plus‑consequences” theory must supply FOIA‑workable specifics (and, if necessary, in camera detail), not bare conclusions.
Exemption 7(E) protects techniques and procedures, not the routine results of well‑known methods; NCIC query results cannot be swept in merely to avoid tipping off targets (that is Exemption 7(A)’s domain).
Identification of a document as a government trial exhibit materially alters the Exemption 6/7(C) privacy balance; to withhold such an exhibit, the agency must show non‑use at trial and that non‑use was privacy‑driven, not mere trial strategy.
FOIA does not “federalize” state or local entities—even those that receive federal funds and cooperate closely with federal agencies.

Summary of the Opinion

Task Force Dismissal (Personal Jurisdiction): Affirmed. The Cuyahoga County Mortgage Fraud Task Force is not a federal agency under FOIA merely because it received federal funds and cooperated with DOJ components. Forsham’s narrow potential for treating funded private grantees as agencies does not extend to state/local governmental bodies; extending it would offend federalism and FOIA’s text.
EOUSA’s FOIA Search: Adequate. EOUSA searched the U.S. Attorney’s Office case systems, the FOIA storage room, electronic folders, and the prosecuting AUSA’s email; it also went beyond the request’s text by searching for references to named third parties. The requester’s failure to identify his company by name defeated demands for broader company‑based searches.
FBI’s FOIA Search: Inadequate in two respects. The FBI’s focus on its Central Records System (CRS) did not “close the loop” by negating other likely locations. And limiting the method to searches indexed by Viola’s name/case file was unreasonable as to records about Dawn Pasela’s death (where the request was not name‑limited).
Exemptions 6 and 7(C): The agencies’ general frameworks were acceptable (including the FBI’s categorical Vaughn approach). But specific withholdings were vacated in part:
- Government trial exhibits: The agency must show non‑use at trial and that non‑use was based on privacy concerns (not trial strategy) to sustain privacy withholdings.
- Defense exhibits treated as agency records: EOUSA did not offer enough context to support balancing; remanded.
- Bar grievance materials: Personal identifiers were properly redacted; but names/signatures on Ohio Disciplinary Counsel letters may need disclosure if the signer is a public official—EOUSA failed to establish otherwise.
- Witness statements: No blanket rule permits withholding statements wholesale under 6/7(C); “inextricably intertwined” assertions require more than conclusory labels; remanded for proper segregability and tailored analysis.
- One FBI interview note: Redactions sustained under 6/7(C) based on concrete privacy harms articulated by the Bureau.
Exemption 7(D): The FBI’s withholdings based on implied confidentiality were vacated. The “singularity‑plus‑disastrous consequences” rationale was too conclusory without FOIA‑workable particulars (e.g., number of sources, why the information reveals the source, and the nature of threatened harms). In camera submissions may be necessary if public justification would itself compromise confidentiality.
Exemption 7(E): Withholdings of NCIC query results as “techniques and procedures” were vacated. The technique (querying NCIC) is routine and well known; 7(E) does not reach mere results of standard techniques. Concerns about tipping off targets are for Exemption 7(A), which the FBI did not assert here. The FBI’s failure to segregate non‑exempt portions also undercut withhold‑in‑full positions.
District Court’s Opinion Adequacy: Any deficiency in the district court’s explanation was harmless because the Third Circuit reviewed the record de novo and resolved all issues.
Disposition: Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part. On remand, Viola may move for summary judgment; the district court may permit revised agency motions based on corrected searches, explanations, and segregability analyses.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

FOIA “Agency” Definition and Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980): Forsham left open that a private, federally funded research group under “virtually day‑to‑day supervision” might, in rare cases, be treated as an “agency” for FOIA. The Third Circuit refuses to extend this narrow possibility to state/local governmental units—like a county task force—because FOIA’s text defines “agency” as federal entities (cross‑referencing the APA) and federalism would be distorted if state/local bodies became “federal” for FOIA purposes merely due to funding or cooperation.
Oglesby v. Department of the Army, 920 F.2d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1990), adopted in Abdelfattah v. DHS, 488 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2007): Sets the two‑part search adequacy test—(1) search all locations and files likely to contain responsive records; (2) use methods reasonably calculated to find them. The opinion underscores that “most likely” is insufficient; agencies must “close the loop” and expressly or fairly imply that no other likely repositories exist.
Weisberg, Morley, and Oglesby line: Support the requirement for a detailed, good‑faith, and reasonably calculated search methodology, consistent with the content and phrasing of the request.
Exemptions 6 & 7(C) balancing precedents: International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 5 v. HUD and Sheet Metal Workers v. VA confirm a balancing approach with a stronger tilt for 7(C) (law‑enforcement context). Reporters Committee and DoD v. FLRA confine public interest to shedding light on agency operations. The Third Circuit adds a significant nuance: when a document is identified as a government trial exhibit, the government’s own designation signals intended public disclosure, tilting the balance toward transparency and requiring a specific privacy‑based non‑use justification.
Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1999): Addresses public use for Exemption 3; the Third Circuit analogizes—though it stops short of requiring actual use for 6/7(C), it elevates the showing needed when the government itself has readied a document for public trial use.
Landano, 508 U.S. 165 (1993) and Davin, 60 F.3d 1043 (3d Cir. 1995): Guide Exemption 7(D). No general presumption of confidentiality; agencies may rely on two “FOIA‑workable” implied‑confidentiality circumstances (character of the crime; source’s relation to the crime). The Third Circuit accepts that “singularity of information” plus serious consequences can imply confidentiality, but only if supported by fact‑specific, FOIA‑workable showings (potentially via in camera submissions).
Davin and Ferri on 7(E): Distinguish protected techniques/procedures from routine, widely known methods. The Third Circuit—consistent with Davin and D.C. Circuit authority (e.g., Blackwell)—requires a “risk of circumvention” showing, and here it distinguishes results of NCIC queries (not techniques) from the methods themselves.
Exemption 7(E) split noted: The court flags a post‑decision circuit split: some circuits (Fourth, Ninth, Second) limit the “risk of circumvention” requirement to guidelines, not techniques. The Third Circuit adheres to its precedent (Davin) applying the requirement to both prongs, thus keeping the bar relatively higher for agencies within the Third Circuit.
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. DOE, 644 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1981): Although Coastal States encourages explicit district court findings in FOIA cases, the Third Circuit treats any shortcoming here as harmless, given its de novo review.

Legal Reasoning and How the Court Reached Its Conclusions

1) No Personal Jurisdiction Over the County Task Force

Viola argued a creative waiver theory: if the Task Force were a “federal agency,” FOIA’s venue and service rules would supply personal jurisdiction. The court rejected step one. FOIA’s definition of “agency” (cross‑referencing the APA) is strictly federal; Forsham’s narrow possibility for private grantees does not apply to state/local governments. Federal funding and advisory involvement—standing alone—do not convert a local entity into a federal agency. With no federal‑agency status, there is no FOIA‑based personal jurisdiction or waiver; dismissal stands.

2) Search Adequacy: “Closing the Oglesby Loop”

EOUSA: Searched multiple logical repositories and even exceeded the request’s scope by checking for third‑party names. Because the request failed to identify the company by name, EOUSA had no duty to embark on unspecific company‑wide searches. Allowing the allegedly offending AUSA to participate in the search was not, by itself, unreasonable, particularly with additional staff involvement.
FBI: The FBI asserted that responsive records “would reasonably be expected” in CRS. That is not enough. Oglesby demands a representation—explicit or reasonably implied—that no other likely locations exist. The FBI also failed to tailor its method to the breadth of Viola’s request for records “regarding” Pasela’s death; limiting to files indexed by Viola’s name or case file was not reasonably calculated to find such records.

3) Exemptions 6 and 7(C): Calibrating the Privacy Balance

General frameworks: EOUSA’s document‑specific Vaughn index and the FBI’s categorical Vaughn approach permitted meaningful review. The court rejected a generic “form‑only” attack.
Government trial exhibits: Because the government itself designated these documents for potential public use, the baseline balance tilts toward disclosure. To sustain privacy withholding, the agency must show (a) the exhibit was not actually used, and (b) non‑use was driven by privacy concerns, not trial strategy. EOUSA made no such showing.
Defense exhibits: Treated as agency records in EOUSA’s possession, but EOUSA failed to supply sufficient detail to perform the privacy/public‑interest balance. Remanded for a document‑specific justification.
Bar grievance documents: Personal identifiers (address, DOB, home phone) remain protected; they reveal little about federal agency operations. But the identity/signature of the Ohio Disciplinary Counsel signer may be public if the signer is a public official; EOUSA did not establish otherwise.
Witness statements: No blanket, witness‑statement‑wide rule under 6/7(C). The label “inextricably intertwined” is not a magic wand; agencies must demonstrate and segregate.
One FBI interview note: The FBI’s privacy rationale (protecting targets, cooperators, victims, and mentioned third parties) was sufficiently specific; redactions sustained.

4) Exemption 7(D): “FOIA‑Workable” Proof of Implied Confidentiality

Landano forecloses categorical presumptions of confidentiality and identifies two FOIA‑workable inferences: (i) the character of the crime (e.g., violent gang murder), and (ii) the source’s relationship to a dangerous organization. The FBI instead pressed a “singularity‑plus‑disastrous consequences” theory: the information was so unique that disclosure would reveal the source, who would face severe harm. The Third Circuit accepted the legal sufficiency of this theory in principle but found the record devoid of FOIA‑workable specifics:

No identification of the number of confidential sources;
No explanation how specific pieces of information were uniquely traceable to a particular source; and
No articulation of who would retaliate and how (i.e., the nature of the “disastrous consequences”).

Because those particulars may themselves be sensitive, the court encourages in camera submissions to carry the agency’s burden without compromising confidentiality. On this record, however, the 7(D) withholdings (including segregability) could not stand.

5) Exemption 7(E): Techniques/Procedures, Not Routine Results

The FBI invoked 7(E) to withhold NCIC search results from April 2009, arguing that disclosure would reveal when and which agency queried the database, tipping off targets. The court held:

7(E) protects “techniques and procedures” and “guidelines,” not the routine results of well‑known techniques like database queries.
“Tipping off” concerns fit Exemption 7(A) (interference with enforcement), which the FBI did not invoke here.
The Third Circuit continues (per Davin and Blackwell) to require a “risk of circumvention” showing under both 7(E) prongs, noting contrary authority in other circuits but adhering to its own precedent.
Withhold‑in‑full positions also failed for lack of a meaningful segregability analysis.

Impact and Forward‑Looking Consequences

A. Search Adequacy: The “Close the Loop” Requirement

In the Third Circuit, agencies must explicitly state (or permit a reasonable inference) that they searched all locations likely to contain responsive records—not merely the “most likely” system. Stock declarations that “records would reasonably be expected to be located in X” will not suffice.
Agencies must tailor methods to the breadth of the request. If a request is not keyed to a person or case number (e.g., “all records regarding Pasela’s death”), limiting the search to name/case indexes is unreasonable without more.

B. Exemptions 6/7(C): Trial‑Exhibit Recalibration and Better Context

New presumption for government‑identified trial exhibits: Once the government earmarks a document as a trial exhibit, the privacy balance shifts toward disclosure; agencies must prove non‑use and privacy‑based reasons for non‑use to sustain withholding under 6/7(C).
For other records (defense exhibits; witness statements), agencies must supply context, identify specific privacy interests, and demonstrate non‑segregability. Conclusory invocations of “inextricably intertwined” will not carry the day.

C. Exemption 7(D): Higher Evidentiary Bar for Implied Confidentiality

Within the Third Circuit, agencies relying on implied confidentiality outside Landano’s two “workable” categories must be prepared to substantiate the singularity of information, the mechanism by which identity would be deduced, the realistic harms, and—importantly—whether multiple sources exist. In camera affidavits are expressly anticipated.
This decision discourages rote 7(D) assertions and encourages more granular, fact‑driven showings, especially where agencies cluster large numbers of pages under 7(D).

D. Exemption 7(E): Narrowing the Scope for Routine Database Results

NCIC query results, without more, are not “techniques or procedures” within 7(E). Agencies must consider 7(A) where real‑time disclosure risks interference with enforcement.
Third Circuit practitioners should note the court’s adherence to the “risk of circumvention” requirement for techniques as well as guidelines, notwithstanding a developing circuit split.

E. FOIA’s Institutional Reach: State/Local Entities Are Not Federal Agencies

Task forces formed under state law and staffed by state/local actors—even when they cooperate extensively with federal agencies and receive federal funding—are not FOIA “agencies.” Requesters must route FOIA requests to federal entities and use state public‑records laws for non‑federal bodies.

F. Litigation Practice

Agencies should expect more frequent remands in the Third Circuit where declarations do not “close the loop,” where 7(D) is asserted without FOIA‑workable specifics, or where 7(E) is stretched to cover results of routine techniques.
Requesters: Draft FOIA requests precisely. Non‑specific references (e.g., “my company” without a name) limit agencies’ duties and make “reasonably calculated” searches easier to justify.
Courts retain discretion to invite in camera submissions to balance transparency with legitimate confidentiality needs—particularly under 7(D).

Complex Concepts Simplified

FOIA “agency”: Only federal entities as defined by statute (including executive departments and independent agencies). State and local governments—even if federally funded or cooperating with federal authorities—are not FOIA agencies.
Oglesby search adequacy: Agencies must (1) search all likely places, not just the “best” place; and (2) use methods likely to find the records (e.g., correct keywords, custodians, systems), calibrated to the request’s scope.
Vaughn index: An itemized log explaining what was withheld/redacted and why, enabling meaningful challenge and judicial review, sometimes with categorical groupings if they are specific and correlated.
Exemption 6: Protects personal privacy in personnel/medical/similar files where disclosure would clearly and unwarrantedly invade privacy.
Exemption 7(C): Protects personal privacy in law‑enforcement records where disclosure could reasonably be expected to be an unwarranted invasion of privacy. The 7(C) balance favors privacy more strongly than 6.
Exemption 7(D): Protects (i) the identity of confidential sources; and (ii) information furnished by a confidential source in criminal or national security investigations. Confidentiality may be express or implied, but agencies must prove it.
Exemption 7(E): Protects law‑enforcement techniques/procedures and investigative guidelines if disclosure risks circumvention of the law (in the Third Circuit, for both prongs). Routine techniques already known to the public are generally not covered; results of those techniques are not “techniques.”
Segregability: Even if parts of a record are exempt, agencies must release all reasonably segregable non‑exempt portions; withhold‑in‑full is disfavored absent specific justification.
Exemption 7(A) (contrast): Shields law‑enforcement records where disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings. If the concern is tipping off targets, 7(A)—not 7(E)—is the fit.
“Closing the loop”: A shorthand from Oglesby jurisprudence meaning the agency clearly indicates that it searched every likely repository (and explains why others are not likely), rather than just its preferred or most obvious system.
In camera submission: Confidential affidavits or records provided directly to the judge, used to substantiate exemptions (especially 7(D)) without revealing sensitive details publicly.

Conclusion

Viola v. DOJ is a significant Third Circuit FOIA decision that raises the bar for agency justifications in several recurrent settings. It clarifies that:

State and local task forces are not federal “agencies” for FOIA, notwithstanding federal funding or cooperation;
Agencies must “close the Oglesby loop” by searching all likely locations and tailoring methods to the scope of each request;
For Exemptions 6/7(C), identification as a government trial exhibit shifts the privacy balance toward disclosure unless the agency shows non‑use for privacy reasons;
For Exemption 7(D), agencies cannot rely on conclusory implied‑confidentiality assertions; FOIA‑workable specifics (and in camera detail if necessary) are required;
For Exemption 7(E), routine methods’ results—like NCIC query printouts—are not “techniques or procedures,” and concerns about tipping off targets belong under 7(A); and
Segregability must be demonstrated with specificity; withhold‑in‑full demands careful justification.

Practically, this opinion will influence how DOJ components (and other federal agencies) draft declarations and Vaughn indexes in the Third Circuit: declarations must be more explicit about search universes, more granular about implied confidentiality, and more disciplined in separating 7(A) from 7(E) rationales. For requesters, the opinion offers new footholds to challenge incomplete searches and broad law‑enforcement exemptions, while reminding that FOIA requests must be precise. In sum, the decision both tightens FOIA’s procedural rigor and refines its substantive balance between transparency and legitimate law‑enforcement confidentiality.