Clements II: Opening the Door to Habeas Jurisdiction Based on Sex-Offender Residency Restrictions

Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in Louis Mathew Clements v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, No. 24-11353 (11th Cir. July 9, 2025) (“Clements II”) resurrects a long-simmering question: can a convicted sex offender who has fully served his sentence, but who remains subject to onerous lifetime registration and residency requirements, satisfy the “in custody” prerequisite for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)? In reversing a district court’s jurisdictional dismissal and remanding for record development, the panel signals—more explicitly than any prior Eleventh Circuit case—that sex-offender residency restrictions can, in principle, amount to custody.

The case pits Louis Matthew Clements, a defendant convicted in 2008 of lewd and lascivious conduct under Florida Statute § 800.04(6), against the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections. Having completed probation in 2013, Clements nevertheless remains bound by Florida’s lifetime sex-offender registration scheme, including stringent residence-buffer zones surrounding schools, day-cares, parks, and playgrounds. His second habeas petition (April 2024) argued that these geographic exclusions, which allegedly limit him to only “50 % of the State’s land,” place him “in custody.” The district court summarily rejected the petition as jurisdictionally barred, relying on the Eleventh Circuit’s earlier opinion, Clements v. Florida, 59 F.4th 1204 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Clements I”).

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the dismissal, faulting the lower court for overlooking the appellate reservation in Clements I and for prematurely cutting off factual development. The ruling does not grant habeas relief; instead, it clarifies the analytical framework, remands for an evidentiary record, and implicitly widens the gateway for post-sentence habeas review predicated on modern sex-offender restrictions.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Rosenbaum, Newsom, and Kidd, JJ.) vacated the Middle District of Florida’s order that dismissed Clements’s second § 2254 petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
It held that Clements I left open—and therefore did not decide—whether Florida’s residency buffer zones, when combined with registration and reporting duties, can satisfy the “in custody” criterion.
Because the district court sua sponte dismissed without allowing factual development or State response, the Eleventh Circuit remanded for the parties to build a record on how the residency restrictions operate in practice and whether their cumulative effect substantially restrains Clements’s liberty.
The panel emphasized the “very liberal” construction of § 2254(a)’s custody requirement and reiterated that physical imprisonment is unnecessary; significant restraints on autonomy may suffice.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). Recognized parolees as “in custody,” establishing that non-incarcerative restraints can satisfy the requirement. Clements II leans on Jones to underscore that the core inquiry is the extent of liberties curtailed, not physical confinement.
Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989). Confirmed that custody is evaluated at the time of filing. The court re-invokes this rule to limit analysis to Clements’s status in April 2024.
Howard v. Warden, 776 F.3d 772 (11th Cir. 2015). Articulated the Eleventh Circuit’s “very liberal” construction of custody; cited to justify a flexible, fact-intensive approach.
Hubbard v. Campbell, 379 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2004). Clarified that a Certificate of Appealability (COA) is unnecessary when the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Applied here to explain why Clements could appeal as of right.
Clements I, 59 F.4th 1204 (11th Cir. 2023). The immediate antecedent. Clements II distinguishes it, stressing that the earlier panel expressly reserved the residency-restriction question for “another day,” thereby preventing Clements I from operating as law-of-the-case or binding precedent on that precise aspect.

Legal Reasoning

The panel conducts a jurisdictional analysis anchored in § 2254(a)’s custody clause. Three critical moves characterize its reasoning:

Reservation Doctrine. The opinion holds that when an appellate court explicitly reserves an issue, the district court cannot later treat that issue as foreclosed. Thus, the prior “hesitant” holding concerning registration/reporting duties does not bind courts on the distinct (though related) residency-restriction issue.
Cumulative-Effects Test. Consistent with Jones and Eleventh Circuit precedent, the panel instructs the district court to examine the combined impact of registration, reporting, and residency requirements on Clements’s freedom to “live, work, or travel” like ordinary citizens. If the sum total imposes “significant restraints,” custody may be satisfied.
Need for Evidentiary Development. Because the district court dismissed sua sponte, the record lacks essential facts—e.g., geographic mapping of forbidden zones, availability of compliant housing, frequency of required in-person reporting, penalties for non-compliance, and comparative data for non-offenders. Without such material, appellate review would be speculation. Hence remand.

Impact on Future Cases

Expansion of Habeas Eligibility. Although not yet a holding that sex-offender residency rules do create custody, Clements II unmistakably legitimizes the argument. District courts in the Eleventh Circuit must now conduct fact-specific inquiries instead of dismissing registrant petitions reflexively.
Procedural Guidance. The decision instructs lower courts to refrain from sua sponte dismissals where factual questions about liberty constraints exist and encourages allowing the State’s responsive pleadings.
Ripple Beyond Sex-Offender Context. The opinion may embolden litigants subject to other civil regulatory regimes—e.g., domestic-violence restraining orders, GPS monitoring, or firearm prohibitions—to argue they are “in custody” for habeas purposes.
State Policy Scrutiny. Florida (and by extension other states) could face increased constitutional challenges to residency-buffer statutes, potentially affecting local ordinances that exceed state minima.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“In Custody” (Habeas). A threshold requirement under § 2254. Historically meant jail or prison, but now extends to parole, probation, supervised release, and, potentially, other liberty-restricting conditions. The essence is whether the State exerts significant control not imposed on the public at large.
Residency Restrictions. Statutes prohibiting registered sex offenders from living within a specified distance (commonly 1,000–2,500 feet) of places where children congregate. Violations typically carry felony penalties.
Remand. When an appellate court sends a case back to a lower court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Here, remand allows evidence gathering (maps, statistics, testimony) on the real-world impact of Florida’s restrictions.
Sua Sponte Dismissal. A court’s dismissal on its own initiative, without a motion from either party. Proper only when the jurisdictional defect is clear; here, the Eleventh Circuit deemed it premature.
Non-Argument Calendar. A docket procedure whereby the appellate panel decides a case based only on the briefs, without oral argument—used widely for jurisdictional or relatively straightforward issues.
Law-of-the-Case Doctrine. A rule preventing courts from re-litigating issues already decided in the same case. Because Clements I expressly left the residency matter undecided, that doctrine does not bar consideration in Clements II.

Conclusion

Clements II is a pivotal, though unpublished, Eleventh Circuit decision clarifying that modern, far-reaching sex-offender residency restrictions may constitute “custody” for habeas corpus purposes—provided the petitioner develops a robust factual record demonstrating substantial restraints on liberty. By vacating the jurisdictional dismissal and remanding for evidentiary inquiry, the court reinforces the liberal construction of § 2254(a) and places the burden squarely on the lower courts to engage in nuanced, fact-specific analyses rather than abstract categorizations. Going forward, registrants—and perhaps others constrained by pervasive civil regulations—gain a potential pathway to federal habeas review, while states face renewed scrutiny of civil regulatory schemes once assumed to be beyond the reach of habeas jurisdiction.