Clear-Error, Not De Novo: Sixth Circuit Clarifies Appellate Review for Perjury-Based §3C1.1 Enhancements and Upholds Digital-Device Search Condition Under Plain Error

Introduction

In United States v. Daniel Jackson, No. 24-6105 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2025), a published opinion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Daniel Jackson’s 97-month sentence and term of supervised release following a jury conviction for possessing fentanyl and at least 50 grams of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Two sentencing issues were presented on appeal: (1) whether the district court erred in applying a U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 obstruction-of-justice enhancement based on a finding that Jackson committed perjury at trial; and (2) whether the district court adequately justified a supervised-release condition authorizing searches of Jackson’s electronic devices, cloud storage, and data storage locations by the U.S. Probation Office.

The case is most notable for resolving a longstanding ambiguity in Sixth Circuit law about the standard of appellate review for perjury-based obstruction enhancements. Relying on Supreme Court guidance concerning mixed questions and the Sixth Circuit’s recent sentencing jurisprudence, the panel held that clear-error review governs when the district court has made the required perjury findings (falsity, willfulness, and materiality). On the supervised-release issue, the court, applying plain-error review (because Jackson did not object below), held that the district court’s officer-safety and recidivism rationale adequately supported the digital-search condition.

Summary of the Opinion

The panel—Judges Thapar, Readler, and Hermandorfer (author)—affirmed in full. First, the court clarified that appellate review of a § 3C1.1 enhancement premised on trial perjury is for clear error, not de novo, so long as the district court specifically identifies the perjured testimony and makes findings on falsity, willfulness, and materiality. Applying that standard, the court upheld the enhancement, concluding the district court did not clearly err in finding Jackson willfully lied when he testified that a deputy planted drugs in his truck and in the police cruiser.

Second, as to the supervised-release condition authorizing searches of “computers, other electronic devices, cloud storage locations, and data storage locations,” the court reviewed for plain error. It held there was no “clear or obvious” error because the district court tied the condition to officer safety and the risk of recidivism—reasons that the Sixth Circuit and other circuits have accepted as legitimate bases for search conditions designed to monitor compliance and protect probation officers.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion synthesizes multiple lines of authority to settle the standard-of-review question and to sustain the sentencing decisions:

United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993): The Supreme Court held that, upon a proper determination that the accused committed perjury at trial, the § 3C1.1 enhancement is required. Dunnigan also emphasized safeguards—district courts must make findings that satisfy the elements of perjury—to protect the defendant’s right to testify while disallowing perjury.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 & cmt. n.4(B), n.2 (2024): The guideline and commentary explicitly include perjury as obstructive conduct and reiterate that a denial of guilt under oath that constitutes perjury triggers the enhancement.
United States v. Roberts, 919 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Sassanelli, 118 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1997): Sixth Circuit cases requiring the sentencing court to identify the precise perjurious testimony and make findings as to falsity, willfulness, and materiality.
United States v. Camejo, 333 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 2003): Once perjury is properly found, application of the enhancement is “mandatory.”
United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Collins, 799 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Boring, 557 F.3d 707 (6th Cir. 2009): Illustrate how contradictions with substantial trial evidence and jury crediting of government witnesses can sustain findings of falsity and willfulness.
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. 387 (2018); Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59 (2001); Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 (1985): Supreme Court decisions articulating when mixed questions warrant deferential review due to case-specific factual assessments and credibility determinations.
United States v. Florence, --- F.4th ----, 2025 WL 2539022 (6th Cir. Sept. 4, 2025): The Sixth Circuit recently applied clear-error review to fact-bound sentencing determinations (drug-premises enhancement) under Lakeridge’s framework, reinforcing deference for district courts’ credibility-based findings.
United States v. Thomas, 933 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Mooney, 135 F.4th 486 (6th Cir. 2025); United States v. Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2002): Sixth Circuit cases reflecting inconsistent formulations (sometimes de novo, sometimes clear error) for obstruction enhancements, which the present decision harmonizes.
United States v. Kingsley, 241 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 2001): Upholds broad search conditions to protect probation officers and prevent recidivism—authority the court relies on to sustain the electronic-device search condition.
United States v. Poole, 133 F.4th 205 (2d Cir. 2025); United States v. Betts, 511 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hanrahan, 508 F.3d 962 (10th Cir. 2007): Sister-circuit decisions approving comparable search conditions.
Plain-error and reasonableness review anchors: United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (plain-error framework and the “begin and end” with the second prong where dispositive); United States v. Inman, 666 F.3d 1001 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Tellez, 86 F.4th 1148 (6th Cir. 2023).
Additional Sixth Circuit perjury/enhancement cases underscoring willfulness/materiality and rejecting chilling-effect arguments: United States v. Washington, 702 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Streets, 401 F. App’x 81 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Ellison, 336 F. App’x 483 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Kimberly, 412 F. App’x 750 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. O’Lear, 90 F.4th 519 (6th Cir. 2024); United States v. Iossifov, 45 F.4th 899 (6th Cir. 2022).

Legal Reasoning

The central legal development is the panel’s resolution of the standard-of-review question for perjury-based § 3C1.1 enhancements. Framing the issue as a mixed question of law and fact, the court asked whether deference was warranted under the Supreme Court’s Lakeridge/Buford/Anderson line, which emphasizes deference when the mixed question “immerses courts in case-specific factual issues” and credibility determinations uniquely suited to trial judges. The court answered “yes,” for three interrelated reasons:

The legal application of § 3C1.1 to perjury is settled and “mechanical” after Dunnigan and the guideline commentary: once perjury is found, the enhancement follows.
What truly drives the enhancement is the predicate factfinding (falsity, willfulness, materiality), which is intensely fact-bound and grounded in credibility assessments.
Sixth Circuit practice has effectively treated the ultimate perjury determination as a factual finding reviewed for clear error, so long as the district court identifies the testimony and makes the requisite findings.

With the standard set, the panel held the district court satisfied the Dunnigan/Roberts procedural requirements. The sentencing court identified the specific testimony it deemed perjurious: Jackson’s assertions that a deputy planted drugs in both the vehicle’s dashboard area and the cruiser, and that a police dog alerted to the deputy’s pocket. It then expressly found this testimony was false (contradicted by three deputies and rejected by the jury), willful (not a product of confusion or stress), and material (went to the core issue of possession). Applying clear-error review, the panel found those determinations well supported by the record.

The panel rejected Jackson’s two defensive themes. First, it held that characterizing false testimony as “misperceptions” does not undermine a finding of willfulness when the testimony alleges a deliberate police frame-up; the district court permissibly viewed that as a willful falsehood rather than memory lapse. Second, the court reiterated that the right to testify does not include a right to commit perjury, and that the requirement of specific perjury findings mitigates chilling concerns recognized in Dunnigan.

On the supervised-release condition, the court applied plain-error review because Jackson lodged no objection nor sought additional findings despite the district court’s invitation. The panel “began and ended” with the second prong—no clear or obvious error—because the district court articulated two accepted aims: protecting probation officers and mitigating a pronounced risk of recidivism given Jackson’s refusal to accept responsibility and blame-shifting. Those reasons, the court observed, justifiably support the electronic-device search condition, citing Kingsley and in-parallel rulings from other circuits. Jackson cited no contrary law, defeating the “clear/obvious” error requirement under Tellez and Vonner.

Impact

This opinion carries several important implications:

Clarified standard of review: The Sixth Circuit has now squarely held that perjury-based § 3C1.1 enhancements are reviewed for clear error where the district court has made the necessary perjury findings. This settles prior intra-circuit inconsistency and materially heightens the deference defendants must overcome on appeal.
District court best practices: Trial judges must continue to identify the specific testimony at issue and make express findings on falsity, willfulness, and materiality. Failure to do so remains reversible error. But if those boxes are checked, appellate reversal becomes unlikely.
Defense strategy and the right to testify: Defendants contemplating testimony that squarely contradicts multiple law-enforcement witnesses should anticipate that, if convicted, perjury-based enhancements will be hard to dislodge on appeal. Counsel should be prepared to argue the absence of willfulness with record-based specifics if they preserve the issue.
Supervised-release electronic search conditions: The opinion does not broadly endorse such conditions in every case; rather, it holds that imposing them was not plainly erroneous given the court’s stated goals (officer safety and recidivism). For preserved challenges, litigants will likely focus on 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)’s requirements—reasonable relatedness to § 3553(a) factors, no greater deprivation of liberty than necessary, and consistency with Sentencing Commission policy statements—and on tailoring, scope, and suspicion standards. Still, this decision signals that where district courts articulate concrete supervision needs, broad digital-search conditions may withstand review, especially under deferential standards.
Mixed-questions trend in sentencing: By invoking Lakeridge and its own recent Florence decision, the Sixth Circuit continues to move fact-intensive sentencing determinations into the clear-error lane, recognizing trial courts’ superior vantage for credibility and context.

Complex Concepts Simplified

What is the § 3C1.1 obstruction-of-justice enhancement?

Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines increases a defendant’s offense level by two if the defendant willfully obstructed justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the current offense. The commentary lists examples, including perjury.

What counts as “perjury” for § 3C1.1?

Per Dunnigan, the sentencing court must find the defendant gave:

False testimony
Willfully (with intent to deceive, not by mistake or confusion)
About a material matter (i.e., something that could influence the outcome)

The court must identify the specific testimony and make findings as to each element. Once those findings are made, the enhancement is mandatory.

Clear error vs. de novo review

De novo: The appellate court decides an issue anew, without deference.
Clear error: The appellate court defers to the trial court’s findings and will overturn only if left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Credibility determinations and fact-heavy judgments typically receive clear-error review.

Plain-error review (when no objection below)

To win under plain error, the appellant must show:

(1) an error,
(2) that is clear or obvious,
(3) that affected substantial rights (usually outcome determinative), and
(4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Failing any prong defeats relief; appellate courts often dispose of such arguments at the second prong if the law is not clearly to the appellant’s side.

Supervised-release search conditions

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), special conditions must be reasonably related to certain § 3553(a) factors, impose no greater deprivation of liberty than necessary, and be consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements. Courts often uphold search conditions designed to:

Protect probation officers and the public
Monitor for recidivism and deter future crimes
Facilitate effective supervision for compliance

The sophistication, breadth, and intrusiveness of digital searches raise heightened privacy concerns, but appellate outcomes frequently turn on the standard of review and the district court’s explanation and tailoring.

Conclusion

United States v. Jackson provides a clarifying and consequential rule for Sixth Circuit sentencing appeals: when a district court identifies the perjurious testimony and makes findings on falsity, willfulness, and materiality, the application of a § 3C1.1 obstruction enhancement for trial perjury is reviewed for clear error. That deference, grounded in Supreme Court precedent on mixed questions and credibility, will make appellate reversals rarer—while preserving the requirement that district courts do the necessary factfinding.

The opinion also reinforces that supervised-release search conditions targeting electronic devices can be sustained, particularly under plain-error review, when the district court explains how they serve officer safety and address the risk of recidivism. For litigants, the takeaways are practical: preserve objections to special conditions; demand and make detailed findings; and, for defendants considering trial testimony, weigh the substantial risk that a jury-rejected frame-up narrative may later support a perjury-based obstruction enhancement. In the broader legal landscape, Jackson continues the Sixth Circuit’s trend toward deferential review of fact-bound sentencing determinations and underscores the importance of transparent, tailored sentencing rationales.