Classwide Immigration Enforcement Under Consent Decrees After § 1252(f)(1): The Seventh Circuit’s Partial Stay in Castañon‑Nava v. DHS

I. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Margarito Castañon‑Nava v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, No. 25‑3050 (7th Cir. Dec. 11, 2025), is a dense and important immigration and remedies case at the intersection of:

• classwide enforcement of immigration arrest standards,
• the scope and waivability of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)’s bar on injunctions,
• the allocation of arrest and detention authority between 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(a)(2), 1225, and 1226, and
• the power of courts to modify and enforce institutional reform consent decrees against later administrations.

The litigation began in 2018 as a class action challenging the Chicago ICE Field Office’s practice of making warrantless civil immigration arrests without satisfying 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)’s requirement that the officer have reason to believe the noncitizen is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained. After years of discovery and motion practice under two different presidential administrations, the parties entered a detailed Consent Decree in 2021, approved in 2022, that:

• required DHS/ICE to reaffirm and train on the limits in § 1357(a)(2),
• mandated recordkeeping for warrantless arrests,
• created enforcement mechanisms and remedies (including release), and
• set a three-year term, subject to extension if enforcement motions were pending.

In 2025, with the Consent Decree nearing its scheduled expiration, plaintiffs moved to enforce and to extend it, pointing to a series of alleged violations. While those motions were pending, a senior DHS official unilaterally announced that DHS would no longer comply with the Decree, notwithstanding its express terms. The district court:

1. On October 7, 2025, found widespread noncompliance and extended the Consent Decree by 118 days (to February 2, 2026) under Rule 60(b)(5).
2. On November 13, 2025, ordered the release (to bond or ATD) of:
   • 13 individuals the parties agreed were arrested in violation of the Decree/§ 1357(a)(2), and
   • over 600 “potential class members” whose arrest records had not yet been fully reviewed (later reduced to about 442).

DHS and ICE appealed and sought an emergency stay pending appeal of both orders. The Seventh Circuit (Judge Lee, joined by Judge Pryor) granted the stay in part and denied it in part, against a vigorous dissent by Judge Kirsch.

At the core of the decision are three interlocking questions:

• How far can a federal consent decree go in prescribing how a federal agency enforces the immigration laws, and how easily can a later administration escape it?
• What does § 1252(f)(1) actually bar with respect to classwide injunctive relief in immigration enforcement cases?
• Can ICE rely on § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s “applicant for admission” mandatory detention authority to justify detention of noncitizens arrested deep in the interior of the country, long after entry?

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. The Issues on Appeal

The appeal concerns only emergency relief — a stay pending appeal — not the ultimate merits. DHS sought to stay:

1. The October 7, 2025 order:
   • Partially granting plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the Consent Decree.
   • Granting plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(5) motion to modify by extending the Decree 118 days (from May 12, 2025 to February 2, 2026), based on “substantial noncompliance,” including a unilateral agency declaration that the Decree no longer applied.
2. The November 13, 2025 order:
   • Ordering the release of 13 class members whose arrests the parties agreed violated § 1357(a)(2) and the Decree.
   • Ordering the release (to bond or alternatives to detention) of more than 600 “potential class members” (now ~442) who had been arrested in the Chicago field area during the relevant period and did not pose high public-safety risks, even though no individualized finding had yet been made that each had been arrested in violation of § 1357(a)(2).

DHS argued that both orders violated 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)’s prohibition on classwide injunctions “enjoin[ing] or restrain[ing] the operation” of covered immigration provisions, especially §§ 1225 and 1226, and that the district court had abused its discretion in modifying the Consent Decree.

B. The Court’s Holdings

Applying the four Nken v. Holder factors for a stay pending appeal, the majority concluded:

1. No stay of the October 7 extension of the Consent Decree.
   • DHS is not likely to succeed on the merits of its challenge to the 118‑day extension as applied to warrantless arrests under § 1357(a)(2).
   • The extension does not violate § 1252(f)(1) because it governs only warrantless arrests under § 1357(a)(2), a provision outside the range (§§ 1221–1232) covered by § 1252(f)(1).
   • DHS likely waived any § 1252(f)(1) objection to this classwide relief by:
     • entering into the Consent Decree with full knowledge of § 1252(f)(1), and
     • failing to invoke § 1252(f)(1) in opposing the Rule 60(b)(5) motion to modify.
   • The district court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 60(b)(5) in extending the Decree for precisely the 118 days DHS had effectively repudiated it, and the government showed no irreparable harm from complying with its own agreement.
2. Partial stay of the November 13 release order.
   • For individuals arrested pursuant to I‑200 “warrants” under § 1226:
     • DHS is likely to succeed on its argument that ordering their classwide release violates § 1252(f)(1) because it effectively enjoins the operation of § 1226 on a classwide basis, contrary to Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez.
     • The stay is granted as to these individuals.
   • For individuals arrested without any warrant (true § 1357(a)(2) arrests):
     • The majority preliminarily rejects DHS’s late-breaking effort to justify their detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s “applicant for admission” mandatory detention authority.
     • The court holds that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to “aliens seeking admission,” not to noncitizens already inside the United States who are arrested in the interior; such interior arrests are governed by § 1226, consistent with Jennings v. Rodriguez.
     • Therefore, § 1252(f)(1) does not bar relief for these warrantless arrests, because DHS’s invocation of § 1225 is both legally incorrect and factually unsupported.
     • However, the Consent Decree only authorizes release “upon a determination … that [the] Class Member was … arrested contrary to the terms of the Agreement.” The district court ordered release of hundreds of “potential” class members without such individualized determinations.
     • DHS is thus likely to succeed on its argument that the court exceeded its authority under the Decree’s own remedial scheme.
     • The stay is granted as to these individuals until individualized determinations are made under Section IV(E) of the Consent Decree.
   • The panel stays its own order for 14 days to allow DHS to seek emergency relief from the Supreme Court.

C. The Dissent

Judge Kirsch dissents in full. In his view:

• The district court improperly used an agreement about § 1357(a)(2) to control how the current administration interprets and implements entirely different provisions, §§ 1225 and 1226, in a core area of executive discretion — immigration enforcement.
• Institutional reform consent decrees involving government actors must be interpreted narrowly to preserve democratic governance and avoid binding future officials to their predecessors’ policy choices.
• Section 1252(f)(1) squarely bars both:
  • the October 7 order’s extension to forbid ICE’s I‑200 warrant practice under § 1226, and
  • the November 13 order’s classwide release of detainees in defiance of the government’s reading of §§ 1225 and 1226.
• The majority misapplies Aleman Gonzalez by allowing classwide injunctive relief whenever the court thinks the government’s statutory interpretation is wrong; Aleman Gonzalez says the opposite.
• Given the powerful separation-of-powers concerns and the statutory bar, DHS is likely to succeed on appeal, and the balance of harms favors a stay of both orders.

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Immigration Statutes

1. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (warrantless civil immigration arrests).
   • Authorizes immigration officers to arrest without a warrant only if the officer:
     1. has reason to believe the alien is in violation of immigration laws, and
     2. has reason to believe the alien “is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.”
   • This “likely to escape” condition is the centerpiece of the Consent Decree; plaintiffs alleged ICE was systemically ignoring it.
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (arrest and detention of noncitizens “already in the country”).
   • Allows arrest and detention “on a warrant issued by the Attorney General” pending a removal decision.
   • Implemented via I‑200 warrants; at issue here are “field-issued” I‑200s used to arrest “collateral” individuals encountered during operations.
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (mandatory detention of applicants for admission).
   • Applies “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission” where “the examining immigration officer determines that [the alien] is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”
   • Such an alien “shall be detained” for full removal proceedings under § 1229a.
   • The government attempted to rely on this provision, mid-litigation, to justify detaining interior arrestees, contrary to longstanding agency practice.
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) (the “injunction bar”).
   • Eliminates jurisdiction/authority of all courts (other than the Supreme Court) to “enjoin or restrain the operation” of the provisions of Part IV of the INA (8 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1232) on anything other than an individual alien basis.
   • Central to whether classwide injunctive relief is permissible concerning arrests and detentions under §§ 1225 and 1226.

B. Key Supreme Court and Circuit Precedents

• Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785 (2022)
  • Held that § 1252(f)(1) does not limit subject-matter jurisdiction; instead, it restricts remedial authority to grant certain injunctions.
  • Left open whether § 1252(f)(1) is waivable; the Seventh Circuit here leans toward “yes,” analogizing to waiver of personal jurisdiction, venue, sovereign immunity, etc.
• Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U.S. 543 (2022)
  • Held that § 1252(f)(1) bars classwide injunctive relief that would require the government to change how it applies §§ 1225(b) or 1226 — even if the court’s interpretation of those sections is correct.
  • Important distinction: courts may still enjoin unlawful operation of provisions not listed in § 1252(f)(1), “even if that injunction has some collateral effect on the operation of a covered provision.”
• Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018)
  • Explained the basic allocation:
    • §§ 1225(b)(1) & (b)(2): detention authority over “aliens seeking admission,” i.e., at or seeking entry at the border; and
    • §§ 1226(a) & (c): detention authority over “aliens already in the country.”
  • The Seventh Circuit relies heavily on this structural reading to reject DHS’s late reliance on § 1225(b)(2)(A) for interior arrests.
• Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992)
  • Articulates Rule 60(b)(5) standard for modifying institutional reform consent decrees:
    • Movant must show a “significant change either in factual conditions or in law” that makes compliance substantially more onerous, unworkable, or detrimental to the public interest, or makes the decree’s basic objectives unfulfilled.
    • Modification must be “suitably tailored” to the changed circumstances.
  • Here, the district court treated systemic noncompliance plus DHS’s unilateral repudiation email as such “changed circumstances.”
• Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009)
  • Stressed the need for flexibility in modifying institutional reform injunctions against governmental entities.
  • Warned that court-ordered regimes can improperly “displace” state or local democratic choices if not revisited as circumstances change.
  • The dissent in Castañon‑Nava invokes Horne to argue for greater deference to the current administration’s immigration enforcement choices.
• Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc, plurality)
  • Emphasized that consent decrees regulating government must rest on a “substantial claim under federal law,” and warned against decrees that unduly restrict future elected officials.
  • Cited by both the majority (to show this threshold was satisfied by § 1357(a)(2)) and the dissent (to insist decrees be interpreted narrowly to preserve democratic governance).
• Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc)
  • Cautioned courts to avoid interpretations of government consent decrees that unnecessarily embroil courts in executive policymaking or bind public officials beyond the scope clearly agreed upon.
  • Forms the backbone of the dissent’s separation-of-powers critique.
• Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009)
  • Sets the four-factor test for a stay pending appeal:
    1. Likelihood of success on the merits (most critical).
    2. Irreparable injury to the movant absent a stay (also critical).
    3. Substantial injury to other parties from issuance of a stay.
    4. Where the public interest lies.
  • The majority applies these factors separately to the October 7 and November 13 orders.
• Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025) and Noem v. Vazquez Perdomo, 2025 WL 2585637 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2025)
  • CASA: addressed universal injunctions and emphasized that enjoining the government from enforcing statutes enacted by elected representatives can amount to irreparable sovereign harm.
  • Noem (Kavanaugh, J., concurring): reiterated that “any time that the Government is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.”
  • DHS relied on these to argue irreparable harm; the majority distinguishes CASA as dealing with universal injunctions and the Judiciary Act, not class actions under Rule 23(e), and notes that here the Decree requires compliance with § 1357 rather than forbids execution of a statute.

C. Other Notable Authorities

• Arias v. Rogers, 676 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982)
  • Recognized that illegal immigration arrests and detentions can be remedied by release via habeas corpus, based on constitutional and statutory violations, including § 1357(a)(2).
  • Cited by the panel to justify release as an appropriate remedy within the Consent Decree’s framework.
• Recent district decisions on §§ 1225 vs 1226 (cited by the majority)
  • Corona Diaz v. Olson (N.D. Ill. 2025), Hasan v. Crawford (E.D. Va. 2025), Lopez Benitez v. Francis (S.D.N.Y. 2025):
    • These decisions reflect a multi-district backlash against DHS’s July 8, 2025, internal memorandum revising its position to treat many interior arrestees as detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
    • The Seventh Circuit notes these to support its view that § 1225’s “applicant for admission” language does not extend to interior arrests of long-present noncitizens.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. The Consent Decree and § 1252(f)(1): Waiver and Scope

1. Is § 1252(f)(1) waivable?

DHS argued that § 1252(f)(1) is “jurisdictional” and thus unwaivable. The majority rejects that characterization, relying on Biden v. Texas, which held that § 1252(f)(1) does not strip subject-matter jurisdiction, but limits the court’s ability to grant certain types of injunctive relief.

Once § 1252(f)(1) is recognized as a limitation on remedies rather than subject-matter jurisdiction, the majority reasons by analogy: numerous structural or remedial limits are waivable, including:

• personal jurisdiction (Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.),
• venue (Hoffman v. Blaski),
• state sovereign immunity (Sossamon v. Texas), and
• objections to equitable jurisdiction (Pusey & Jones).

By parity of reasoning, the panel suggests that § 1252(f)(1) — which is not jurisdictional in the strict sense — can be waived as well. This is not a formal holding, but the opinion treats waiver as strongly likely to be accepted on the merits.

2. How did DHS “waive” § 1252(f)(1) as to warrantless arrests?

The majority identifies two independent waivers:

• Consent Decree entry. DHS:
  • had already twice raised § 1252(f)(1) before the district court (opposition to class certification; motion to dismiss), and
  • then entered a Consent Decree providing classwide injunctive-like obligations concerning warrantless arrests under § 1357(a)(2),

  thus intentionally relinquishing a known right, satisfying the classic waiver standard (Miller v. Willow Creek Homes).

• Failure to reassert in Rule 60(b)(5) briefing. DHS did not invoke § 1252(f)(1) when opposing plaintiffs’ motion to extend the Decree.
  • Under Seventh Circuit practice, failing to raise an argument in the district court waives (or at least forfeits) it on appeal (Wheeler v. Hronopoulos).

The dissent strongly resists applying waiver here, arguing that DHS’s earlier consent cannot bar it from invoking § 1252(f)(1) against new injunctive applications that reach beyond § 1357 into §§ 1225 and 1226. The majority concedes that waiver is less obvious as to the I‑200 warrant practice under § 1226, and expressly notes it does not find waiver on that point. That sets up the careful distinction that follows.

3. Substantive scope: what does the Decree actually cover?

The majority’s core interpretive move is to strictly read the Consent Decree as governing only:

• warrantless civil arrests under § 1357(a)(2), where no warrant (I‑200 or otherwise) is issued.

On this reading:

• ICE’s use of I‑200 “warrants,” even if rapidly filled out in the field and used to avoid § 1357’s “likely to escape” requirement, falls under § 1226, not § 1357.
• The Consent Decree does not — and under § 1252(f)(1) cannot — authorize classwide injunctive interference with § 1226 detention practices.

The district court, by contrast, had:

• found that ICE’s field-issued I‑200s were an end‑run around § 1357(a)(2) and the Decree’s spirit, and
• treated those arrests as effectively “warrantless” for Decree purposes.

The majority accepts the factual finding (that ICE was using I‑200s to avoid § 1357’s escape analysis), but holds that, whatever one thinks of the legality of this practice, § 1252(f)(1) bars classwide relief that “restrain[s] the operation” of § 1226. Invalidating I‑200 warrants for a class therefore exceeds what the Consent Decree can lawfully accomplish.

This leads to a nuanced result:

• The Consent Decree is enforceable and extendable as to genuine warrantless arrests under § 1357(a)(2).
• But the district court may not rely on the Decree to invalidate ICE’s classwide use of I‑200 warrants under § 1226, even if that practice is arguably illegal or abusive.

Any challenge to defective I‑200 warrants must instead be brought on an individual basis (e.g., habeas petitions), rather than via classwide relief.

B. Rule 60(b)(5) Modification: Extending the Decree

To obtain a modification under Rule 60(b)(5), plaintiffs had to show:

1. a significant change in factual circumstances (often, substantial noncompliance), and
2. a modification suitably tailored to that change (Rufo).

The district court found both, relying on:

• 22 proven violations of the Decree/§ 1357(a)(2) out of 26 arrests investigated (all by warrantless arrest), and
• the June 11, 2025 DHS email unilaterally declaring the Decree terminated in defiance of its express provision that it survived so long as enforcement motions were pending.

The court extended the Decree by precisely 118 days — the period from June 11, 2025 (the repudiation email) to October 7, 2025 (the ruling). It rejected plaintiffs’ request for a three-year extension.

The Seventh Circuit finds no abuse of discretion in this:

• The factual finding of substantial noncompliance is supported by the record.
• Unilateral repudiation of the Decree itself is a paradigmatic “significant change in circumstances.”
• The extension is modest and tightly tailored; it functionally “restores” the Decree’s effectiveness for the days DHS tried to nullify it.

The dissent sees this as an improper extension of judicial control over immigration enforcement, driven in part by the district court’s desire to curb the I‑200 warrant practice under § 1226. The majority acknowledges that the I‑200 analysis may be problematic under § 1252(f)(1), but emphasizes that even ignoring I‑200 issues, the noncompliance with § 1357-arrest standards fully justified the 118-day extension.

C. The November 13 Release Order: Statutes and Contract

1. Section 1252(f)(1) and I‑200 warrant arrests

For those detainees held pursuant to alleged § 1226 authority via I‑200 warrants, the majority has little difficulty:

• Ordering their classwide release is, in practical terms, an injunction altering how DHS/ICE may “operate” § 1226 in the Chicago field region.
• Aleman Gonzalez teaches that such relief is barred by § 1252(f)(1) even if the government’s view of § 1226 is wrong and the court’s is right.
• The enforcement must instead occur through individualized challenges or, as to classwide relief, only with respect to non-covered provisions (like § 1357).

Thus, DHS is likely to succeed on this aspect, and a stay is warranted.

2. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and interior warrantless arrests

For individuals arrested without any warrant, DHS shifted position late in the litigation. Having initially defended these arrests under § 1357(a)(2), DHS argued for the first time at the November 12 hearing that the 13 remaining detainees were being held under § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention authority.

The majority rejects that argument on both legal and factual grounds.

a. Text and structure

• Section 1225(a)(1) defines “applicant for admission” as:

  “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.”

• Section 1225(b)(2)(A) covers “an alien who is an applicant for admission” “seeking admission” whom an officer determines is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.
• Jennings emphasizes a structural distinction:
  • § 1225: “aliens seeking admission into the country” (border/port-of-entry contexts),
  • § 1226: “aliens already in the country.”

The majority reasons:

• Congress deliberately added the “seeking admission” phrase to § 1225(b)(2)(A); reading “applicant for admission” as to “seeking admission” would render that phrase superfluous, violating the presumption against surplusage.
• The phrase naturally captures those at or approaching the border (including some “arriving aliens”), not interior noncitizens arrested in Chicago months or years after entry.
• Longstanding immigration doctrine distinguishes between aliens at the “threshold” versus those who have “entered,” even unlawfully (Zadvydas; Leng May Ma).

Although DHS argues that anyone who “applies” is necessarily “seeking,” the court insists that it must follow Congress’s textual distinctions. Congress could have drafted § 1225(b)(2)(A) to mirror § 1225(a)(1)’s definition if it wanted the same scope, but it did not.

The majority also notes:

• DHS’s July 8, 2025 policy memorandum radically changed its longstanding view; until then, the agency had consistently treated interior arrests as governed by § 1226(a).
• District courts in Illinois, Virginia, and New York had already rejected DHS’s expanded § 1225 theory in habeas cases.

On this preliminary record, the panel concludes DHS is not likely to prevail on the claim that these interior detainees are lawfully held under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Because § 1252(f)(1) only bars injunctions that enjoin the “operation” of the covered provisions, a misapplication of § 1225 does not shield DHS from relief; DHS cannot trigger § 1252(f)(1) by simply labeling detentions as “under § 1225” without legal or factual support.

b. Factual support

The panel further observes that DHS provided no record evidence showing:

• that ICE officers actually treated these interior arrests as within the § 1225 “applicant for admission” regime when made, or
• that the detentions were procedurally processed under § 1225 (as opposed to § 1226 or § 1357).

Section 1252(f)(1) is not activated merely by the government asserting, after the fact, that a covered statute could apply. Courts remain responsible for determining whether the statute is in fact operating in the way DHS claims (Texas v. DHS).

3. Contractual limits: “Potential class members” vs. individualized determinations

Even though the court holds § 1252(f)(1) does not bar relief for true warrantless arrests, it finds a different limit: the parties’ own bargain in the Consent Decree.

Section IV(E) of the Decree provides that a detained class member “shall be released” upon a determination by the parties or the court “that the Class Member was so arrested contrary to the terms of the Agreement.” In other words:

• Release is tied to an individualized finding that a particular class member was arrested in violation of § 1357(a)(2) and the Decree.
• The Decree does not purport to authorize blanket release of all potential class members simply because one expects (based on prior experience) that many will turn out to be unlawfully arrested.

The district court, however, ordered the release of approximately 615 (now 442) detainees who:

• fit the likely temporal/geographic scope of the class, and
• were not considered “high risk” for public safety,

without actually determining (or requiring DHS to concede) that their arrests violated § 1357(a)(2) or the Decree. The court essentially inferred that “given the number” of proven violations, “it stands to reason that a significant number of additional violations will be uncovered.”

The Seventh Circuit concludes this exceeds the court’s authority under the Decree:

• The parties specifically defined when release is appropriate and tied it to violation findings.
• Section V(B)(2), which allows “equitable remedies not otherwise specified,” cannot be used to override the explicit, particularized release mechanism in Section IV(E).

Thus, even though:

• § 1252(f)(1) does not bar relief for these warrantless arrests, and
• DHS’s § 1225(b)(2)(A) argument is unlikely to succeed,

the mass-release remedy is still likely erroneous under basic contract/consent decree interpretation.

D. The Stay Factors under Nken v. Holder

The court treats the October 7 and November 13 orders separately.

1. Likelihood of success on the merits

• October 7 extension:
  • DHS is not likely to succeed:
    • § 1252(f)(1) either is waived as to warrantless arrests or does not apply because § 1357(a)(2) is outside its scope.
    • The Rule 60(b)(5) extension is well-supported and narrowly tailored.
• November 13 release:
  • DHS is likely to succeed in part:
    • As to I‑200 warrant detainees: classwide release violates § 1252(f)(1) because it enjoins operation of § 1226 (barred by Aleman Gonzalez).
    • As to warrantless arrestees: DHS is unlikely to convince the court that they must be held under § 1225(b)(2)(A); but DHS is likely to prevail on its contention that the court cannot order blanket release of “potential” class members without case-specific violation determinations under Section IV(E) of the Decree.

2. Irreparable harm

• October 7 extension:
  • DHS showed no concrete irreparable harm from continuing to comply with a Decree it voluntarily signed, especially when:
    • it did not seek its own modification under Rule 60(b)(5), and
    • the extension merely replaces days lost when DHS unilaterally repudiated the Decree.
  • CASA’s pronouncement of sovereign harm is distinguishable because:
    • CASA addressed universal injunctions barring application of statutes to non-parties; here we have a Rule 23 class action and a negotiated decree,
    • the October 7 order requires DHS to comply with § 1357, not to refrain from executing any statute, and
    • CASA’s irreparable harm analysis depended on a strong likelihood that the injunctions exceeded the Judiciary Act’s remedial authority, whereas here DHS is not likely to prevail on its § 1252(f)(1) argument as to warrantless arrests.
• November 13 release:
  • For I‑200 detainees:
    • DHS suffers irreparable harm when courts enjoin it from operating §§ 1225/1226 as it understands them, consistent with CASA and Noem; § 1252(f)(1) confirms that such classwide interference is generally barred.
  • For warrantless arrestees:
    • Although § 1252(f)(1) does not bar relief, DHS is irreparably harmed when the district court disregards the negotiated structure of the Consent Decree and orders mass release without the individualized process the parties agreed upon.

3. Harm to other parties

With respect to staying the October 7 extension, the court emphasizes:

• Individuals subject to warrantless arrests without probable cause to believe they would flee before a warrant could be obtained suffer ongoing violations of statutory and constitutional rights.
• Per Preston v. Thompson, such ongoing constitutional violations constitute irreparable harm.
• A stay of the extension would remove a key mechanism deterring and remedying such arrests in the Chicago region.

By contrast, temporarily staying the November 13 release order — pending individualized determinations — poses a less clear-cut harm to the potential class members, because:

• they will still be able to seek release individually under the Decree’s procedures,
• the stay is interim, and
• the issue is whether the district court may bypass the agreed-upon individualized evaluation process.

4. Public interest

The court finds this factor “neutral”:

• There is a strong public interest in:
  • effective immigration enforcement (a core sovereign function assigned to the political branches), and
  • government agencies complying with the statutes that govern them, including procedural and limitative statutes such as § 1357(a)(2).
• Both interests are implicated; neither clearly outweighs the other at the stay stage.

V. Simplifying the Complex Concepts

A. Consent Decrees with Government Agencies

A consent decree is a court order embodying a settlement agreement. When the defendant is a government entity, it raises special questions:

• It can lock in certain policies beyond one administration’s term.
• It places continuous oversight power in the hands of the judiciary, sometimes over core executive functions.
• It may inadvertently transfer policymaking choices from elected officials to judges and past negotiators.

Cases like Horne, Evans, and Alliance to End Repression caution courts to:

• ensure decrees rest on ongoing, substantial claims under federal law, and
• interpret them narrowly so as not to hamper democratic change more than necessary.

Here, the majority concludes that:

• the underlying federal claim (enforcement of § 1357(a)(2)) remains substantial and ongoing, and
• the 118-day extension is modest and closely tied to DHS’s own conduct (noncompliance and repudiation).

The dissent argues more emphatically that, especially in immigration enforcement, courts should be reluctant to interpret a consent decree as sacrificing the Executive’s flexibility under other statutes (§§ 1225, 1226).

B. Section 1252(f)(1)’s “Injunction Bar”

Section 1252(f)(1) is often misunderstood. It does not say “no court may ever enjoin the government in immigration cases.” Instead, it says:

• No court (except the Supreme Court) may issue classwide relief that enjoins or restrains the operation of the specified provisions (e.g., §§ 1225, 1226).
• Courts may still:
  • grant such relief as to other provisions (like § 1357) — even if that indirectly affects how the government uses §§ 1225 or 1226, and
  • order injunctive relief for individual aliens as to the covered provisions.

The fine line is between:

• Directly commanding DHS “when, how, and against whom” it may use §§ 1225/1226 (barred at the class level), and
• Ordering DHS to comply with a different statute (like § 1357(a)(2)) that has only collateral implications for its enforcement choices under §§ 1225/1226 (permissible).

C. “Applicant for Admission” vs. Noncitizen “Already in the Country”

Immigration law uses a specialized vocabulary:

• An “applicant for admission” is an alien:
  • who arrives at a port of entry, or
  • who is physically present but has never been formally admitted (e.g., those caught attempting to enter without inspection).
• But § 1225(b)(2)(A) further narrows this to those “seeking admission” — typically those at the threshold of entry, not those long embedded in the interior.
• A noncitizen “already in the country” — including those who entered unlawfully — is governed primarily by § 1226 detention provisions.

This distinction matters because:

• § 1225(b)(2)(A) uses the word “shall” — typically interpreted as mandatory detention for certain categories.
• § 1226(a) is more flexible: ICE “may” detain and “may” release on bond or parole.

ICE’s 2025 policy shift attempted to treat many interior arrests as detentions under § 1225(b)(2)(A), thus:

• foreclosing bond and discretionary release, and
• potentially insulating such detentions from classwide judicial review via § 1252(f)(1).

The Seventh Circuit’s preliminary rejection of that shift is therefore both doctrinal and practically significant.

D. Rule 60(b)(5) and Institutional Reform Decrees

Rule 60(b)(5) allows modification of a decree when “applying it prospectively is no longer equitable.” In practice, for institutional reform cases:

• Triggers for modification often include:
  • new laws or Supreme Court decisions,
  • material changes on the ground, or
  • substantial noncompliance that undermines the decree’s purposes.
• Remedies must be:
  • justified by these changes, and
  • narrowly tailored, not a wholesale rewrite.

Here, the “changed circumstance” was not a benign external factor, but the defendant’s own refusal to comply. The court’s 118-day extension is a textbook example of a narrowly tailored response: it repairs the period during which DHS unilaterally walked away from its obligations.

E. Waiver vs. Forfeiture

• Waiver = an intentional relinquishment of a known right (e.g., knowingly entering a decree that imposes obligations one previously resisted on statutory grounds).
• Forfeiture = failing to raise a right or objection in a timely manner through inattention or mistake.

The majority suggests both occurred with respect to DHS’s § 1252(f)(1) arguments about warrantless arrests under § 1357(a)(2):

• Waiver by agreeing to the Decree after previously raising § 1252(f)(1), and
• Forfeiture (at least) by not re-raising § 1252(f)(1) in opposing the motion to extend.

The dissent worries that treating the Decree as a waiver of objections to future applications — especially those extending into other statutes — unduly constrains later administrations.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Consent Decrees and Federal Immigration Enforcement

This decision sends a mixed but important message about consent decrees involving federal agencies:

• Binding effect on later administrations.
  • Agencies cannot simply “declare” a decree terminated because a new policy preference emerges; they must:
    • either comply, or
    • move under Rule 60(b)(5) to modify or dissolve the decree based on changed circumstances, as in Horne.
  • This promotes stability and reliance interests for affected individuals.
• Limits grounded in underlying claims.
  • Decrees must be anchored in ongoing, substantial federal claims (Evans); here the underlying claim — systemic violation of § 1357(a)(2) — remains live.
  • The court refuses to treat the Decree as a free-floating mandate to enforce plaintiffs’ “preferred policy” on other provisions (notably § 1226).
• Cautious but real judicial oversight.
  • The Seventh Circuit:
    • defends the district court’s power to extend the Decree modestly in response to noncompliance, but
    • pulls back where the court strayed into classwide management of § 1226 arrests and mass releases without individualized review.

B. Clarifying the Reach of § 1252(f)(1)

The decision meaningfully clarifies, within the Seventh Circuit, how § 1252(f)(1) operates:

• Not jurisdictional, and likely waivable.
  • Cements Biden v. Texas’s characterization and points toward allowing waiver by the government.
• Targeted application.
  • The bar applies only to injunctions that enjoin or restrain the operation of provisions within §§ 1221–1232.
  • Relief aimed at § 1357, a non-covered provision, is permissible even if it has collateral effects on DHS’s use of §§ 1225 or 1226.
• No “magic words” shield.
  • DHS cannot immunize itself from classwide relief merely by recharacterizing interior detentions as “under § 1225” late in litigation; courts will examine the legal and factual basis for that characterization.
• But strong protection for § 1226 operations.
  • Any classwide order effectively invalidating arrest or detention practices under § 1226 (e.g., I‑200 warrants) runs into § 1252(f)(1), even if DHS’s interpretation of § 1226 is wrong.

C. Resistance to DHS’s Expanded Use of § 1225(b)(2)(A)

Though preliminary, the Seventh Circuit’s treatment of § 1225(b)(2)(A) is a significant check on DHS’s 2025 policy shift:

• It aligns with multiple district court decisions rejecting DHS’s effort to treat interior apprehensions as § 1225 detention cases.
• It reinforces Jennings’s structural reading: § 1225 for border “admission” cases, § 1226 for interior enforcement.
• Practically, it preserves access to bond/ATD for many interior detainees and keeps their cases within the realm where individualized judicial review remains robust.

D. Enforcement of § 1357(a)(2) as a Substantive Check on ICE Arrest Practices

Castañon‑Nava underscores that § 1357(a)(2) is not a dead letter:

• It imposes meaningful preconditions on warrantless civil immigration arrests in the interior.
• Courts are willing to use class actions and consent decrees to enforce those preconditions, at least regionally, notwithstanding § 1252(f)(1).
• Release is recognized as an appropriate remedy for unlawful arrests and detentions, consistent with Arias v. Rogers.

E. The Dissent’s Warning: Democratic Governance and Judicial Overreach

Judge Kirsch’s dissent, if adopted in the future by higher courts or other circuits, would significantly shift the landscape:

• It would press courts to interpret consent decrees involving governments narrowly, so as not to encroach on the policy space of later elected officials.
• It would treat § 1252(f)(1) quite aggressively, disallowing classwide relief that constrains how the Executive chooses to interpret § 1225 or § 1226, regardless of whether the court believes that interpretation is wrong.
• It views the district court’s extension and release orders as emblematic of “policy preferences of the last administration” being judicially enforced against the current one.

Even though it is a dissent, its critique may influence how future district courts in the circuit craft remedial orders in institutional reform immigration cases, encouraging a more minimalist and text-bound approach to consent decrees.

VII. Conclusion

Castañon‑Nava v. DHS is a rich, multi-layered decision that will shape immigration enforcement litigation in several ways:

• It confirms that the federal government can be held to consent decrees that enforce non-covered statutes (like § 1357(a)(2)) on a classwide basis — and that subsequent administrations cannot shed such decrees simply by declaring them terminated.
• It reaffirms the strong but not absolute nature of § 1252(f)(1)’s injunction bar, cabining it to direct interference with the “operation” of §§ 1221–1232, particularly §§ 1225 and 1226, while allowing classwide relief targeting other provisions with only collateral effects.
• It casts serious doubt on DHS’s attempt to expand § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention regime to noncitizens arrested in the interior, emphasizing the textual and structural distinction between “seeking admission” and being “already in the country.”
• It underscores that even when the government egregiously violates a consent decree, courts remain bound by the decree’s specific remedial structure; equitable power under a decree is not a blank check to order mass release of “potential” class members without individualized determinations.
• Finally, it illustrates the tension inherent in institutional reform litigation: the majority embraces a robust but contained role for courts in enforcing negotiated limits on immigration enforcement; the dissent warns against judicial entrenchment of past policymakers’ preferences and urges deference to democratic governance and statutory injunction bars.

Although this is formally a decision on a motion for a stay pending appeal, the panel’s detailed statutory and remedial analysis provides a strong preview of how the Seventh Circuit is likely to resolve the merits. It also offers an influential framework for lower courts and litigants navigating the difficult terrain where immigration enforcement, class actions, consent decrees, and separation of powers converge.