Clark v. Wyoming Department of Corrections and the Demands of Equal Protection and Retaliation Pleading in Pro Se Prisoner Appeals

I. Introduction

The Tenth Circuit’s order and judgment in Clark v. Wyoming Department of Corrections, No. 25‑8020 (10th Cir. Nov. 21, 2025), arises from a wide‑ranging pro se civil rights action by a Wyoming state prisoner, William R. Clark. The decision, while designated as non‑precedential, is instructive in at least three important areas:

What is required for a pro se appellant to preserve issues for appellate review.
How equal protection challenges to prison job and program assignments are analyzed under rational‑basis review.
What factual specificity is necessary to state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim based on prison discipline allegedly imposed in response to grievance activity.

Clark sued the Wyoming Department of Corrections (WDOC), private medical provider Nephacare, and numerous prison officials at the Wyoming State Penitentiary under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various constitutional violations related to mail policies, access to medical care, access to prison programs and jobs (including a “service dog program”), grievance procedures, and family visitation.

The district court, conducting the mandatory screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for prisoner civil rights complaints, dismissed Clark’s original complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim and granted leave to amend. After he filed an amended complaint, the court again screened and this time dismissed with prejudice, concluding that none of his theories stated a plausible claim for relief.

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit:

Affirmed dismissal of the bulk of Clark’s claims (Claims 1–4 and 7–11) on the ground that he failed to meaningfully challenge the district court’s reasoning, effectively abandoning or waiving them on appeal.
Affirmed dismissal of Claim 5, an equal protection challenge to an alleged WDOC policy favoring sex offenders and informants for better jobs and programs, applying deferential rational‑basis review.
Affirmed dismissal of Claim 6, which combined an equal protection challenge and a First Amendment retaliation theory arising from a disciplinary conviction based on allegedly coded mail.

Although the order is “not binding precedent” (except for law‑of‑the‑case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), it is citable for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Its detailed application of preservation rules, equal protection doctrine, and modern pleading standards to a pro se prisoner complaint provides a useful roadmap for future litigants and courts in the Tenth Circuit.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Background

Clark filed his original complaint in January 2025, alleging numerous constitutional violations. The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), found it too vague and conclusory to state any plausible claim for relief, and dismissed it without prejudice while granting leave to amend.

In his amended complaint, Clark asserted eleven claims, which the district court grouped under six general headings:

Prison mail policies.
Denial of medical treatment.
Unequal treatment in placement in a prison dog‑training program.
Equal protection claims more generally.
Problems with prison grievance procedures.
Denial of family visitation.

After screening, the district court found no claim stated a plausible constitutional violation and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. Clark appealed.

B. Disposition of the Appeal

The Tenth Circuit exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reviewed the § 1915A dismissal de novo, citing McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 2001).

Claims 1–4 and 7–11 (abandoned on appeal).
Clark’s opening brief essentially copied—verbatim or nearly verbatim—the allegations of his amended complaint, without addressing the district court’s legal reasoning. Relying on Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 555 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2009), and Nixon v. City & County of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364 (10th Cir. 2015), the panel held that such a brief does not preserve issues for review because it fails to engage with and challenge the decision under review. Thus, the court affirmed dismissal of these claims on the ground that Clark had not meaningfully contested the district court’s analysis.
Claim 5 – Equal protection challenge to alleged program/job policy.
Clark alleged that in WDOC, “only sex offenders and child molesters or prison informants receive jobs of quality and [are] firs[t] for all programs,” including the service dog program, and that he was refused all jobs and excluded from the workers’ unit because he is not a child molester and would not inform on other inmates. The district court dismissed this claim, relying on Estate of DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections, 473 F.3d 1334, 1343 (10th Cir. 2007), for the proposition that inmates have no right to access every type of program available to other inmates.

On appeal, Clark protested that prison policies and law require that “all inmates are treated fairly” and asked how a federal court could say not all inmates have a right to be treated the same. The Tenth Circuit held that his argument misunderstood equal protection doctrine: the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid all classifications; it forbids different treatment of persons who are alike in all relevant respects, absent an adequate justification. Because the alleged classification did not involve a fundamental right and was not based on a suspect class, the court applied rational‑basis review and held that Clark did not attempt to overcome the presumption of validity. It thus affirmed the dismissal.
Claim 6 – Disciplinary action for coded mail; equal protection and retaliation.
Clark alleged that a fellow inmate had tried to send a letter with religious runes that prison officials refused to mail. To “test” the system, Clark copied ancient Hebrew writing from a picture in his Saint Joseph Daily Missal and attempted to mail it. Prison staff interpreted the characters as a simple cipher and concluded that they translated to: “send spice with cash app has to look perfect. Mesg card too but spice is cash.” Based on that interpretation, he was charged with attempting to use the mail system to conduct illegal activity, convicted in prison disciplinary proceedings, and punished with 60 days in solitary confinement and the loss of his prison job.

Clark alleged that this violated (i) equal protection and (ii) the First Amendment because the charges were allegedly fabricated to punish him for contacting the WDOC Director’s office to complain about being blocked from appealing grievance denials.

As to equal protection, the district court held—and the Tenth Circuit agreed—that Clark failed to allege he was treated differently than similarly situated prisoners. As to retaliation, the district court found Clark’s allegations about his contact with the Director’s office too vague (no date, no identification of which director, and no description of the subject matter). The Tenth Circuit agreed that exhibits attached to the complaint supplied some of these missing details, but ultimately affirmed dismissal because Clark failed to plead facts supporting that his protected activity was the but‑for cause of the disciplinary action, as required by Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019), and the plausibility standard of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

The court concluded by affirming the judgment and granting Clark leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of fees and costs.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Preservation of Issues on Appeal: Pro Se Litigants and the Duty to Challenge the Judgment

The most immediate practical aspect of the opinion is the Tenth Circuit’s insistence that even pro se litigants must do more on appeal than simply repeat their pleading below. This drove the result for the majority of Clark’s claims.

1. The problem: Copying the complaint is not an appellate argument

For Claims 1–4 and 7–11, the panel compared the amended complaint to Clark’s opening brief and noted that large portions of the brief were “a verbatim or near-verbatim repetition” of the complaint’s allegations (citing specific record pages to show the overlap). As in Semsroth, where the plaintiffs’ brief reproduced their summary‑judgment response, Clark’s brief “inherently fail[ed] to address in a direct way the decision under review.”

The Tenth Circuit reiterated two related principles:

The “first task” of an appellant. Quoting Nixon v. City & County of Denver, the court noted that an appellant’s first task “is to explain to us why the district court's decision was wrong.” Narrating perceived injustices or reasserting factual allegations cannot substitute for reasoned legal argument that engages with the court’s analysis.
Limits of liberal construction for pro se filings. Citing Carney v. Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, 875 F.3d 1347 (10th Cir. 2017), the panel reaffirmed that while pro se filings are construed liberally, the court “cannot make arguments for” the litigant. Liberal construction does not relieve pro se parties of their obligation to identify and challenge legal rulings.

Because Clark’s brief “contains nary a word to challenge the basis of” the district court’s dismissals of Claims 1–4 and 7–11, the court treated those claims as effectively abandoned and affirmed their dismissal.

2. Doctrinal context: Issue preservation and waiver

The Tenth Circuit’s approach is rooted in familiar appellate practice: issues not properly raised and argued in an opening brief are generally deemed waived. This principle applies across civil litigation, not just in prisoner cases.

The key point is that an appellant must:

Identify the specific rulings being challenged (e.g., “the district court erred in holding that Clark failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim”).
Explain why those rulings are legally incorrect (e.g., misapplication of a standard, misreading of precedent, failure to consider certain facts).
Support the argument with at least some legal authority and reasoning, not merely re‑assert factual allegations.

By emphasizing these requirements in a pro se prisoner case, the panel sends a clear signal: even in the relatively informal context of § 1915A screening and pro se appeals, failure to engage the court’s reasoning is fatal on appeal.

B. Claim 5 – Equal Protection and Access to Prison Jobs and Programs

1. Clark’s allegation

In Claim 5, Clark alleged that within WDOC:

“only… sex offenders and child molesters or prison informants receive jobs of quality and [are] firs[t] for all programs,” including “the service dog program,” while he “was refused all jobs and out right refused to be placed in the workers unit due to the fact [he is] not a child molester and [he] will not inform on other inmates.” (R. at 59)

The amended complaint labeled this as an “equal protection” claim and—though it also mentioned separation of powers, the Eighth Amendment, and due process—the appeal focused entirely on equal protection.

2. District court’s holding

The district court dismissed Claim 5, quoting Estate of DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections, 473 F.3d 1334, 1343 (10th Cir. 2007), for the proposition that “inmates do not ‘have a right to access every type of program available to other inmates, ranging from work to recreation.’” Because there is no fundamental constitutional right to any particular prison program or job, the court concluded that failing to provide Clark access to certain programs did not, by itself, give rise to a claim.

3. Clark’s appellate argument

On appeal, Clark responded rhetorically: “Wow!! School, recreational programs and all jobs are here for all inmates per policies. Federal and state laws are made so all inmates are treated fairly. How can a federal court say all inmates don't have the right to be treated the same?” (Aplt. Br. at 6).

The Tenth Circuit construed this as a misunderstanding of the scope of the Equal Protection Clause.

4. Equal Protection framework applied

The panel began with the Supreme Court’s basic formulation from Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992):

“[The Equal Protection Clause] does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” (505 U.S. at 10)

The court then identified two key questions:

Does the challenged policy involve a fundamental right or a suspect classification (such as race, national origin, or religion) that would trigger heightened scrutiny (strict or intermediate)?
If not, does the policy survive rational‑basis review, which is highly deferential?

a. No fundamental right to prison programs

Relying on Estate of DiMarco, the panel agreed with the district court that access to specific prison programs or jobs is not a fundamental constitutional right. There is no inherent due process or equal protection right to work, educational, or recreational programs while incarcerated.

b. No suspect classification

The classification alleged by Clark is unusual: he claims that prisoners who are sex offenders, child molesters, or informants are favored for desirable jobs and programs, and that he was disadvantaged because he does not belong to those groups.

The court held that:

Being a non-sex‑offender is not a suspect class.
Neither “sex offenders,” “child molesters,” nor “informants” are suspect classifications under equal protection doctrine.

Because neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class was implicated, the alleged policy is subject only to rational‑basis review.

C. Rational‑basis review and the plaintiff’s burden

Under rational‑basis review, the state’s classification:

Is presumed constitutional.
Will be upheld if there is any conceivable legitimate governmental interest that it rationally furthers—even if that is not the actual reason the government adopted the policy.

The Tenth Circuit relied on FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993), which stressed that the challenger “has the burden to negative every conceivable basis which might support” the classification. This is an extremely high bar, especially in the prison context where courts afford substantial deference to administrators’ judgments on security, rehabilitation, and internal order.

The opinion does not spell out potential rationales for the alleged policy, but some that could be “conceivable” include:

Targeting programming toward higher‑risk offender groups (e.g., sex offenders) to reduce recidivism in a specific category.
Offering incentives (jobs or programs) to informants to encourage cooperation in maintaining institutional security.

Under Beach Communications, the court need not confirm that WDOC actually had these rationales in mind; it is enough that such rationales could exist.

The panel held that Clark did not even attempt to meet this burden. His filings asserted unfairness but did not address why the alleged policy lacked any conceivable rational basis. On that ground, the court affirmed dismissal of Claim 5.

5. Practical implications for prison equal protection claims

The decision underscores that:

Merely showing that different groups of inmates receive different program or job opportunities is not enough to state an equal protection claim.
A plaintiff must either:
- Allege discrimination based on a suspect class (e.g., race), or
- Show that a non‑suspect classification is irrational under any conceivable legitimate governmental purpose.
Complaints grounded solely in perceived unfairness or conflict with internal policy language (e.g., “all inmates are treated fairly per policies”) will rarely satisfy rational‑basis review.

In short, for non‑suspect classifications involving access to programming, courts will expect detailed allegations explaining why the policy is not just unfair, but constitutionally irrational.

C. Claim 6 – Disciplinary Action, Equal Protection, and First Amendment Retaliation

1. Factual background

Claim 6 combined both equal protection and First Amendment retaliation theories.

Clark alleged:

Another inmate had previously attempted to send a letter containing “religious runes,” which prison officials refused to mail.
To “see if he could provoke the same response,” Clark copied a set of characters from a picture in his Saint Joseph Daily Missal, depicting Jesus holding a scroll with ancient Hebrew writing, and mailed the copied writing to a third party.
Prison guards intercepted the letter, concluded that the characters were actually a simple cipher, and determined that they decoded to: “send spice with cash app has to look perfect. Mesg card too but spice is cash.” (R. at 102)
Clark was charged with using the mail system for illegal activity, convicted in disciplinary proceedings, and sanctioned with 60 days in solitary confinement and loss of his prison job.
He claimed this discipline violated equal protection and was also a form of retaliation for contacting the WDOC Director’s office about problems he was experiencing in appealing grievance denials.

2. Equal protection component: lack of comparators

Clark attempted to frame this as another equal protection violation, but the district court held that he “failed to state a plausible claim because he offered nothing to suggest he was treated differently than others similarly situated.”

The Tenth Circuit agreed. To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must generally plead:

He was treated differently from other persons similarly situated in all relevant respects, and
The difference in treatment lacked adequate justification under the applicable level of scrutiny.

In this context, a “comparator” would be another prisoner who:

Engaged in substantially similar conduct (e.g., sending coded or suspicious mail), but
Was not disciplined (or was disciplined less harshly) for that conduct,
Under otherwise similar circumstances (similar disciplinary history, security classification, time frame, etc.).

Clark’s allegations about another inmate sending “runes” are not fleshed out: he alleges simply that the other inmate’s letter was “refused” by the mailroom, not that that inmate was or was not disciplined, or whether the circumstances were otherwise comparable. Without specific comparator allegations, there is no plausible equal protection theory. The appellate court, noting that Clark offered no argument to rebut the district court’s reasoning, affirmed dismissal of the equal protection aspect of Claim 6.

3. Retaliation component: protected conduct and causation

The more nuanced part of Claim 6 was Clark’s contention that the disciplinary charge was fabricated in retaliation for his contacting the WDOC Director’s office to complain that he was not being allowed to appeal grievance denials.

The Tenth Circuit recognized, as it had in Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1211 (10th Cir. 2018), that:

“The filing of prison grievances is constitutionally protected activity.”

In general, a First Amendment retaliation claim by a prisoner requires the plaintiff to allege:

He engaged in constitutionally protected activity (e.g., filing grievances or complaining to higher officials).
He suffered an adverse action that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing that activity (e.g., disciplinary charges, solitary confinement).
The protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s decision to take adverse action—now formulated in many contexts as a but‑for causation standard.

The Tenth Circuit imported the Supreme Court’s causation standard from Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398–99 (2019), which held that in First Amendment retaliation claims, the retaliatory motive must be the but‑for cause of the injury.

a. The district court’s concerns about vagueness and exhibits

The district court initially faulted Clark’s complaint for vagueness regarding his contact with the Director’s office: it did not specify:

When the contact occurred.
Which director was contacted.
The subject matter of the communication.

On appeal, Clark pointed out that his complaint included exhibits (R. at 92–94) showing:

His written letter to the Director’s office.
A response from a staff member in that office.

The Tenth Circuit agreed with Clark that these exhibits filled some of the gaps, and, under Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009), could be considered as part of the complaint at the screening stage because:

They were attached to the complaint.
Their authenticity was not in dispute.

Thus, the court accepted that Clark had sufficiently alleged protected activity (contacting the Director’s office about grievances) and provided some detail about that activity.

b. Failure to plausibly allege but‑for causation

Even crediting those exhibits, the key deficiency was causation. Applying Iqbal’s plausibility standard, the panel held:

“Clark simply announces that his contact with the director's office was the reason he was allegedly subject to made-up charges based on his letter containing (he says) ancient Hebrew writing. Nothing in Claim 6 allows a plausible inference that this is true. Nor do we see support anywhere else in the amended complaint.”

In other words, the complaint lacked:

Temporal detail (e.g., dates showing that the disciplinary charge closely followed the protected complaint).
Statements or admissions by officials linking the discipline to his complaint.
Pattern evidence (e.g., that he was singled out for discipline, or that officials regularly retaliated against inmates who contacted the Director).
Other circumstantial facts that would support an inference that, but for his complaint to the Director, he would not have been disciplined for the mail incident.

Without such allegations, the panel found Clark’s assertion of retaliatory motive to be a bare conclusion, which Iqbal instructs courts not to accept as though it were a well‑pleaded fact.

Thus, while acknowledging that filing grievances is protected and that exhibits can cure some vagueness in a complaint, the Tenth Circuit held that Clark failed to state a plausible retaliation claim because he did not plead facts supporting a reasonable inference that the contact with the Director’s office was the but‑for cause of his discipline.

IV. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

The opinion relies on several Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases. Each plays a distinct role in the court’s analysis:

1. McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 2001)

Role: Standard of review.

The Tenth Circuit confirmed that it reviews § 1915A screening dismissals de novo, applying the same standard as for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals. That means the appellate court independently assesses whether the complaint states a plausible claim, accepting well‑pleaded factual allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

2. Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 555 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2009)

Role: Preservation of issues on appeal.

In Semsroth, the plaintiffs’ appellate brief was essentially a verbatim copy of their response to summary‑judgment motions. The Tenth Circuit held that such a brief fails to address the district court’s reasoning and therefore does not preserve issues for appeal. Clark’s opening brief suffered the same defect for most of his claims.

3. Nixon v. City & County of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364 (10th Cir. 2015)

Role: The “first task” of an appellant.

The court quoted Nixon’s admonition that an appellant must explain why the district court’s decision was wrong; a narrative of perceived injustice cannot replace legal argument. This underlined why Clark’s mere repetition of his allegations failed to preserve issues.

4. Carney v. Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, 875 F.3d 1347 (10th Cir. 2017)

Role: Limits of liberal construction for pro se litigants.

While courts construe pro se filings liberally, Carney emphasized that they cannot craft arguments on the litigant’s behalf. The panel relied on this to justify enforcing standard appellate briefing requirements against Clark.

5. Estate of DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections, 473 F.3d 1334 (10th Cir. 2007)

Role: No fundamental right to specific prison programs.

DiMarco involved a transgender inmate and addressed, among other things, conditions of confinement and program access. It contains the oft‑quoted statement that inmates have no right to access every type of program available to others. The Tenth Circuit used this to reinforce that Clark’s lack of access to certain jobs or programs did not implicate a fundamental right.

6. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992)

Role: Basic equal protection principle.

Nordlinger provides the foundational statement that the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid all classifications, only unjustified different treatment of persons similarly situated. The panel used it to correct Clark’s assumption that equal protection requires identical treatment for all inmates.

7. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993)

Role: Rational‑basis review and the burden on the challenger.

Beach Communications is pivotal in rational‑basis cases. It held that economic and social classifications are presumed valid and must be upheld if any conceivable rational basis supports them. The challenger bears the burden of negating every conceivable basis. The court applied this demanding standard to Clark’s attack on the alleged policy favoring certain inmates for jobs and programs.

8. Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2009)

Role: Considering exhibits at the pleading/screening stage.

Smith allows courts to consider documents attached to a complaint as part of the pleadings if their authenticity is not in dispute. The Tenth Circuit used this to acknowledge that Clark’s exhibits (his letter to the Director and the response) could be used to clarify his retaliation allegations.

9. Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2018)

Role: Grievances as protected First Amendment activity.

Requena reaffirmed that filing prison grievances is constitutionally protected conduct. The panel invoked this to recognize that Clark’s communication to the Director’s office about grievances could support the first element of a retaliation claim.

10. Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019)

Role: But‑for causation in retaliation claims.

Although Nieves arose in the context of retaliatory arrest, the Tenth Circuit drew on its holding that a plaintiff must show that retaliatory animus was a but‑for cause of the adverse action. This standard raised the bar for Clark, requiring him to plausibly allege facts showing that, absent his protected complaint to the Director’s office, he would not have been disciplined for the mail incident.

11. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

Role: Plausibility standard for pleading.

Iqbal established that a complaint must contain enough factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” permitting the court to draw a reasonable inference of liability. Conclusory allegations and legal labels are insufficient. The panel applied this to reject Clark’s bare assertion that the disciplinary charge was “totally made up” in retaliation, noting the absence of supporting factual detail from which retaliation could be plausibly inferred.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A Screening

Section 1915A requires federal courts to screen civil complaints filed by prisoners against governmental entities or officers. At screening, the court must dismiss any claim that:

Is frivolous or malicious.
Fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune.

The standard for “fails to state a claim” mirrors Rule 12(b)(6): the court assumes the facts alleged are true but asks whether they plausibly establish a legal violation. Screening thus functions as an early gatekeeping mechanism to weed out deficient prisoner suits before full litigation.

2. Pro Se Liberal Construction vs. Duty to Present Arguments

“Liberal construction” means courts read pro se filings generously, overlooking technical drafting errors and interpreting allegations broadly. But it does not mean:

The court supplies missing legal arguments.
The court becomes an advocate for the litigant.
The normal rules of appellate procedure (like issue preservation) are suspended.

Clark’s case illustrates this limit: even though he was proceeding pro se, he still had to identify the district court’s legal errors and argue why they were wrong. Merely restating factual allegations was not enough.

3. Equal Protection: Classifications, Suspect Classes, and Levels of Scrutiny

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (applied to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment) requires that the government not treat similarly situated people differently without adequate justification.

Courts evaluate classifications using different “levels of scrutiny”:

Strict scrutiny (most demanding): applied to classifications involving suspect classes (e.g. race, national origin) or infringing fundamental rights (e.g., right to vote). The government must show the classification is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.
Intermediate scrutiny: applied to certain quasi‑suspect classifications (e.g., gender). The government must show an important interest and a substantial relationship between the classification and that interest.
Rational‑basis review (most deferential): applied to all other classifications. The law is upheld if there is any conceivable legitimate governmental interest that the classification rationally furthers.

In Clark’s case:

There is no fundamental right to a particular prison job or program.
The classification he alleged (sex offenders/informants vs. non‑sex‑offenders/non‑informants) is not suspect.
Therefore, rational‑basis review applies, and the policy is presumed valid unless he can show it is irrational.

4. Rational‑Basis Review and “Negative Every Conceivable Basis”

Rational‑basis review is highly deferential. A challenger must show that:

The classification does not rationally relate to any legitimate governmental objective.
No conceivable justification—whether or not the government actually relied on it—supports the classification.

As Beach Communications emphasizes, this means the challenger bears the burden to “negative every conceivable basis which might support” the law. In practice, this is a steep hill to climb, particularly in prison litigation where security, order, and rehabilitation are routinely accepted as legitimate objectives.

5. First Amendment Retaliation and But‑For Causation

To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege:

He engaged in protected activity (e.g., filing grievances, complaining to officials).
He suffered adverse action (e.g., disciplinary charges, segregation) that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing the protected activity.
The adverse action was motivated by the protected activity, and—after Nieves—the protected activity was the but‑for cause of the adverse action.

“But‑for” causation means:

If the protected activity had not occurred, the adverse action would not have been taken.

Mere temporal proximity (events happening close in time) may help, but usually is not enough by itself. Courts look for:

Timing plus other suspicious facts.
Statements by officials showing retaliatory motive.
Patterns of targeting grievance‑filers.

Clark alleged that his disciplinary charge was “totally made up” to punish him for contacting the Director’s office but did not provide surrounding facts supporting a plausible inference of retaliatory motive. Thus, causation failed under Iqbal and Nieves.

6. Considering Exhibits Attached to the Complaint

When a plaintiff attaches documents to a complaint and their authenticity is not disputed, courts may treat them as part of the complaint for Rule 12(b)(6) or § 1915A purposes. This allows:

Exhibits to clarify or add detail to allegations.
Courts to consider documentary context without converting the motion to summary judgment.

In Clark’s case, his correspondence with the Director’s office filled in some factual gaps about his protected activity, but did not cure the lack of plausible causal allegations.

7. Non‑Precedential Orders and Judgments

The Tenth Circuit labeled this decision an “order and judgment” that:

Is not binding precedent,
Except under doctrines like law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel, but
“May be cited… for its persuasive value” consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

Thus, while it does not formally bind future panels, it will likely be cited in district and circuit courts as guidance on how similar issues should be analyzed.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. For Pro Se Prisoner Appeals

The opinion sends a clear message: prisoners appealing § 1983 dismissals must:

Read the district court’s order carefully.
Identify each legal basis on which their claims were dismissed.
Explain, in their own words, why each basis is wrong, referencing case law or legal principles where possible.

Simply restating the facts alleged below, or expressing disagreement with the outcome without engaging the reasoning, will result in affirmance on grounds of waiver or abandonment. This is significant because many prisoner appeals are pro se and often consist of narrative complaints rather than structured legal arguments.

B. For Equal Protection Challenges to Prison Programs and Jobs

Clark reinforces several points:

There is no fundamental constitutional right to participate in any particular prison program or hold any specific prison job.
Most prison classifications regarding programs, jobs, housing, and privileges will be reviewed under rational‑basis scrutiny unless they involve suspect classes or fundamental rights.
Under rational‑basis review, a prisoner must show that the classification is irrational in light of any conceivable legitimate penological interest—a very demanding standard.

As a result, equal protection challenges to differential access to programs and jobs will typically require:

Evidence that the classification is based on race, religion, or another suspect category, or
Detailed factual allegations showing that the classification is utterly arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to any legitimate security, rehabilitation, or management interest.

The Clark opinion suggests that generalized assertions of unfairness or references to internal policy equality language are not enough.

C. For First Amendment Retaliation Claims in the Prison Context

The decision is particularly important for prisoners asserting retaliation claims:

It reaffirms that grievance‑related activity is protected under the First Amendment.
It clarifies that, at the pleading stage, the prisoner must allege specific facts that, if true, support a plausible inference that protected activity was the but‑for cause of the adverse action.
It illustrates the limits of conclusory allegations; a mere assertion that discipline was “made up” or “in retaliation” is insufficient without factual context (timing, statements, pattern, etc.).

Going forward, courts may cite Clark when dismissing retaliation claims that lack factual detail connecting protected activity to discipline. This could have a substantial effect on how prisoner complaints must be drafted to survive § 1915A screening.

D. For Pleading Standards and Use of Exhibits

Clark also shows how:

Exhibits attached to a complaint can—and should—be used to bolster factual allegations, especially where the narrative is sparse.
Even when exhibits fill some gaps, plaintiffs must still cross the line from possible to plausible, as required by Iqbal.

The court’s partial agreement that Clark’s exhibits cured some vagueness, but its ultimate conclusion that causation remained implausible, underscores that well‑chosen exhibits are helpful but not a substitute for a coherent, factually detailed narrative in the complaint itself.

VII. Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit’s order in Clark v. Wyoming Department of Corrections is, on its face, a routine affirmance of a § 1915A dismissal of a pro se prisoner complaint. Yet its analysis crystallizes several important principles:

Appellate preservation: Even pro se appellants must directly challenge the district court’s legal reasoning; recycled pleadings do not preserve issues for review.
Equal protection in prisons: There is no fundamental right to particular programs or jobs; classifications in allocation of such benefits are ordinarily subject only to rational‑basis review, under which prisoners face a steep burden to show unconstitutionality.
Retaliation pleading standards: Grievance‑related activity is protected, but retaliation claims require plausible factual allegations that protected activity was the but‑for cause of the adverse action, not just speculative assertions of motive.
Pleading with exhibits: Documents attached to a complaint are considered part of the pleadings and can cure some deficiencies, but the complaint must still satisfy the broader plausibility requirements of Iqbal.

Though non‑precedential, Clark is likely to be invoked as persuasive authority in future Tenth Circuit prisoner litigation, particularly in screening and dismissing equal protection and retaliation claims that lack the necessary specificity and legal grounding. It stands as a cautionary example both of the substantive hurdles inmates face when challenging prison policies and of the procedural discipline required to litigate such challenges successfully on appeal.