Clark v. Commissioner: Sixth Circuit Reaffirms Broad ALJ Discretion under the 2017 Medical-Opinion Rule (§ 404.1520c)

1. Introduction

Donald Roy Clark, a former warehouse foreman and inside salesman, sought Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under the Social Security Act (SSA) after ceasing work in October 2018 due to multiple physical and mental impairments. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied benefits, finding that Clark could still perform “light work,” including his previous sales position. The District Court for the Western District of Michigan affirmed, and Clark appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

The appeal placed two interrelated questions before the Sixth Circuit:

• Did the ALJ comply with the revised medical-opinion regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, which abolished the treating-physician “controlling weight” rule for claims filed on or after 27 March 2017?
• Was the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (RFC) finding—allowing Clark to stand/walk four hours per day and perform light work—supported by substantial evidence?

The Sixth Circuit answered yes to both, issuing an unpublished but instructive opinion that further solidifies the breadth of ALJ discretion under § 404.1520c.

2. Summary of the Judgment

In a unanimous decision authored by Judge Larsen, the panel (Judges White, Larsen, and Murphy) affirmed the district court. Key holdings include:

1. Validity of § 404.1520c. Clark initially suggested the regulation was invalid but abandoned that argument in his reply brief; the court accordingly treated the regulation as valid.
2. Sufficiency of ALJ Explanation. The ALJ’s discussion—finding treating-source opinions only “somewhat” or “partially” persuasive, identifying specific deficiencies, and explaining reliance on state-agency opinions—satisfied the articulation requirements of § 404.1520c(b).
3. Substantial-Evidence Review. Objective imaging, treatment notes reflecting stable pain, and Clark’s self-reported activities (golfing, fishing, deer-hunting attempts) provided more than a “mere scintilla” of evidence supporting the RFC.
4. Waiver. Arguments based on Social Security Ruling 03-2p (complex regional pain syndrome) were deemed waived because they were not presented to the magistrate judge.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Emard v. Commissioner of Social Security, 953 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 2020) – recited for the standards of review and the definition of “substantial evidence.” Influence: It set the analytical template the court applied.
• Rabbers v. Commissioner of Social Security, 582 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2009) – quoted for the allocation of the evidentiary burdens at steps 1-5 of the sequential evaluation.
• Castellon-Vogel v. International Paper Co., 829 F. App’x 100 (6th Cir. 2020) – reaffirmed the principle that issues not raised before a magistrate judge are deemed waived on appeal.

Though few precedents were required, the panel’s application of Emard is pivotal: once “reasonable minds could accept” the evidence relied on by the ALJ, the appellate task ends.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeded in three logical stages:

1. Standard of Review. The panel reiterated that it reviews the district court de novo, but with deference to the ALJ on factual findings unless legal error or lack of substantial evidence exists. This nested deference heavily favors affirmance when the ALJ has made facially reasonable findings.
2. Section 404.1520c Application.
   • The court accepted § 404.1520c’s abolition of mandatory deference to treating physicians as settled law.
   • Under the regulation, ALJs must evaluate persuasiveness across five generic “factors,” but need only explicitly articulate the two most important—supportability and consistency.
   • The ALJ’s critique of Dr. Brummett’s ultimate disability conclusion (reserved to the Commissioner) and Dr. Berland’s vagueness on standing duration was deemed an adequate supportability explanation. References to stable imaging, treatment notes, and claimant activities supplied the consistency analysis.
3. Substantial Evidence for RFC. The panel highlighted:
   • Mild degenerative findings on MRI and X-ray imagery;
   • Clinic notes documenting pain stability and functional range;
   • Clark’s recreational activities incompatible with alleged total incapacity;
   • Lack of deterioration over the relevant period.
   Together, these “relevant” pieces of evidence provided a rational basis for the ALJ’s light-work RFC, even though contrary evidence also existed.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

While unpublished and “Not Recommended for Publication,” the opinion carries practical weight inside the Sixth Circuit’s Social Security bar:

• Clarifies Post-2017 Landscape. The decision underscores that ALJs need not write exhaustive dissertations; a concise discussion explicitly addressing “supportability” and “consistency” suffices.
• Strategic Implications for Claimants. Treating-source opinions, though still important, can no longer be expected to overcome adverse state-agency opinions solely by virtue of the treating relationship. Claimants must marshal objective findings and longitudinal evidence to enhance supportability and consistency.
• Waiver Enforcement. The court’s strict waiver approach (SSR 03-2p argument) warns litigants that raising all regulatory theories at the magistrate stage is essential.
• Administrative Efficiency. By upholding short but reasoned ALJ decisions, the judgment promotes docket economy, signaling that appellate courts will not remand simply because the ALJ did not tick every rhetorical box.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Residual Functional Capacity (RFC)

A medical-legal assessment of what a claimant can still do on a sustained basis (sitting, standing, lifting, mental tasks) despite impairments. It is expressed in work-exertional terms: sedentary, light, medium, heavy.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c

The 2017 regulation replacing the “treating-physician rule.” Instead of “controlling weight,” ALJs now grade each medical opinion’s “persuasiveness” based chiefly on:

• Supportability – internal logic and citation to medical evidence.
• Consistency – alignment with the broader record.

The rule was intended to streamline adjudication and reduce litigation focused on hierarchical weighting.

Substantial Evidence

A deferential standard of review: such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It does not require the “best” or “most” evidence—only enough to be reasonable.

Waiver Doctrine

Issues not raised before the magistrate judge (when objections are invited) cannot be resurrected on appeal, promoting procedural fairness and efficiency.

5. Conclusion

Donald Roy Clark’s appeal ultimately faltered not because his medical complaints lacked merit, but because the ALJ articulated a minimally adequate, evidence-based explanation—strictly required under § 404.1520c—and because Clark did not preserve alternative regulatory theories. The Sixth Circuit’s decision reinforces three essential propositions:

1. The revised medical-opinion framework endows ALJs with broad discretion, constrained chiefly by the dual duties to discuss supportability and consistency.
2. Appellate courts applying the substantial-evidence test will uphold an ALJ if “reasonable minds” could agree, even where counter-evidence exists.
3. Procedural rigor—raising arguments at every stage—is indispensable; otherwise, even potentially meritorious issues (e.g., SSR 03-2p) are lost.

Thus, Clark v. Commissioner serves as a cautionary tale for claimants and counsel alike: the path to Social Security benefits increasingly hinges on meticulous record development and early, well-preserved legal arguments rather than on post-2017 expectations of deference to treating physicians.