Clarifying “Used Together for a Unified Purpose”: Interdependency Requirement under Section 705 of the Eminent Domain Code

Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Pignetti, G. & J. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation (No. 26 & 27 EAP 2023, decided April 25, 2025). Gianni and Jennifer Pignetti (“the Pignettis”), owners of three non-contiguous parcels used in furtherance of an electrical contracting business, challenged PennDOT’s taking of two of those parcels and sought to have them valued as a single unit under Section 705 of the Eminent Domain Code (26 Pa. C.S. § 705). The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court’s combined-valuation order, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The majority held that “used together for a unified purpose” simply means parcels that further the same enterprise may be valued together. Justice Brobson’s dissent argues that the statutory phrase carries a more demanding interdependency requirement grounded in common-law precedent, dictionary definitions, and the Code’s legislative history.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court’s majority affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s ruling that the Pignettis failed to satisfy Section 705’s prerequisite for valuing non-contiguous parcels as one. The majority reasoned that the statute’s plain text requires only that the separate tracts be “used together” toward a common end. It declined to consult dictionary definitions or legislative‐history materials, concluding that the phrase is self-explanatory and that any deeper inquiry would overcomplicate the compensation analysis. Having found no ambiguity in the statutory language, the Court held that PennDOT properly valued the two parcels separately.

In dissent, Justice Brobson contends that “used together for a unified purpose” should be read in light of antecedent common-law cases—e.g., Morris v. Commonwealth (80 A.2d 762 (Pa. 1951)) and H.C. Frick Coke Co. v. Painter (48 A. 302 (Pa. 1901))—which required non-contiguous parcels to be “so inseparably connected in the use to which they are applied that the injury or destruction of one must necessarily and permanently injure the other.” He supports his view with dictionary definitions of “use” and “together,” and invokes the Statutory Construction Act’s presumption against changing existing common law without clear legislative direction. Under that framework, the Pignettis’ generalized storage use of the two tracts did not demonstrate the requisite interdependency.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Morris v. Commonwealth, 80 A.2d 762 (Pa. 1951): Established that non-contiguous parcels qualify for combined valuation only if they are “so inseparably connected” in use that harm to one injures the other.
Kossler v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 57 A. 66 (Pa. 1904): Early articulation of the interdependency rule for assessing damages in partial takings.
Potts v. Pennsylvania & S.V.R. Co., 13 A. 291 (Pa. 1888): First enunciated the principle that non-contiguous properties must be inseparably connected in use to be regarded as one parcel.
H.C. Frick Coke Co. v. Painter, 48 A. 302 (Pa. 1901): Applied similar reasoning to contiguous tracts under common ownership.
Everhart v. PMA Ins. Group, 938 A.2d 301 (Pa. 2007): Confirms that courts will not disturb established common law without clear legislative intent.
Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501–1991: Permits consulting legislative commentary where text is ambiguous, subject to the primacy of statutory language.

Legal Reasoning

The majority employed a plain‐meaning approach, emphasizing context and legislative brevity. It declined to treat “together” as ambiguous and rejected dicta on dictionary definitions and legislative commentary as unnecessary. By contrast, the dissent applied a multi‐step construction analysis:

Identify ambiguity: The dissent argues that “together” can mean either (a) “simultaneously” or “in a group” or (b) “as an integrated whole.”
Consult common‐law background: Because Section 705 was intended to codify pre-Code case law, the dissent reasons we must read the statute consistent with the Morris/Potts interdependency rule.
Examine dictionaries: “Use” means “put into action or service,” while “together” carries multiple nuanced senses. Only the integrated‐whole sense aligns with the common-law rule.
Apply the Statutory Construction Act: The 1964 Joint State Government Committee Comment expressly references Morris and Frick Coke as the source of Section 705’s rule, confirming that no change was intended.

Impact

This decision governs how Pennsylvania courts will assess partial takings of non-contiguous parcels under Section 705:

Under the majority’s view, property owners need only show that separately held tracts further the same enterprise.
Under the dissent’s approach, owners must demonstrate tangible interdependency—i.e., that losing one parcel would diminish the value of the other.

Going forward, condemning authorities may rely on the majority’s broad reading to oppose combined valuations. Property owners and valuation experts will need to address both interpretations when presenting Section 705 claims, and appellate courts may face repeated statutory‐construction arguments.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Eminent Domain Code § 705: Allows multiple non-contiguous parcels under common ownership to be valued together if they are “used together for a unified purpose.”
Non-contiguous Parcels: Separate parcels of land not physically adjacent but owned by the same party.
Interdependency: A relationship in which the use or value of one parcel is connected to or dependent on another parcel.
Unified Purpose: A single objective or end that links the use of multiple parcels.
Statutory Construction Act: Framework of rules guiding how courts interpret unclear or ambiguous statutes, including reliance on legislative history and common‐law background.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Pignetti confirms that Section 705 claims will turn on how “used together for a unified purpose” is construed. The majority’s plain‐meaning approach favors a broader application, requiring only shared purpose, while Justice Brobson’s dissent insists on an interdependency test that harmonizes with long‐standing pre-Code precedent. Property owners and condemning agencies must now prepare to address both strands of authority, and future litigation may clarify which interpretive method prevails in practice. This decision thus marks a pivotal moment in Pennsylvania eminent-domain law, shaping compensation rights for common-owner takings of non-contiguous parcels.