Clarifying “Able to Provide Support” in Michigan Child‐Protective Jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)

1. Introduction

In In re D. V. Lange, Minor (Mich 2025), the Michigan Supreme Court resolved a contested child‐protective petition under the Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention Act (CANPA), MCL 712A.1 et seq. DHHS sought jurisdiction over a 13-year-old boy (“DVL”) after a hospital discharged him for intensive outpatient treatment, but his mother refused to bring him home out of fear he would harm himself, her, the family pets, or his siblings. The key legal questions were:

Does a parent “when able to do so” neglect or refuse proper support under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) if the parent is physically capable but has no realistic means to keep the child safe at home?
Does a parent’s refusal to bring a dangerous child home amount to “neglect” under MCL 712A.2(b)(2), making the home an unfit environment?

2. Summary of the Judgment

By a 4–3 vote, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the Wayne Circuit Court’s dismissal of DHHS’s petition. Chief Justice Clement’s majority opinion held that:

Under MCL 712A.2(b)(1), a parent must be both able (i.e. possessing sufficient power, skill, or resources) and neglectful to trigger jurisdiction. Here, although the mother had the physical ability to pick up her son, she lacked sufficient resources or means to keep him safely at home given his severe mental‐health risk.
Under MCL 712A.2(b)(2), “neglect” requires “negligent treatment”—the failure to exercise the care expected of a reasonably prudent person in similar circumstances. The mother’s efforts to obtain inpatient treatment and her refusal to bring a dangerous child home satisfied the standard of a reasonably prudent person, so there was no negligent treatment.

The Court thus held the trial court did not clearly err in dismissing jurisdictional grounds under both subsections.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

In re Jacobs, 433 Mich 24 (1989): Held that MCL 712A.2(b)(1) requires a culpability element (“when able to do so”) before assuming jurisdiction. Also concluded that MCL 712A.2(b)(2) focuses on objective conditions, without requiring culpable intent.
In re Hockett, 339 Mich App 250 (2021): The Court of Appeals applied Jacobs to a schizophrenic child case, holding that both §§ (b)(1) and (b)(2) supported jurisdiction when the mother could not provide for her child’s severe mental-health needs at home.
In re Holbrook, 513 Mich 898 (2023): Highlighted the statutory gap for parents overwhelmed by children’s mental-health crises and invited legislative reform.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The majority’s decision turns on textual and canons‐based interpretation:

“When able to do so” (MCL 712A.2(b)(1)): The Court imported the Merriam-Webster definition of “able”—“having sufficient power, skill, or resources.” It rejected a purely physical or technical ability standard. The mother’s testimony that her home environment could not safely contain her son meant she lacked “sufficient…resources” to comply.
“Negligent treatment” → “neglect” (MCL 712A.2(b)(2), incorporating MCL 722.602(1)(d)): Both lay and legal dictionaries define “negligent” as a failure to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent person. The mother’s repeated attempts to obtain inpatient care and her refusal to bring a dangerous juvenile home met that standard.
Standard of review: The Court applied a clear‐error standard to the trial court’s fact findings and de novo to statutory interpretation, giving due deference to the circuit judge’s determinations.

3.3 Impact on Future Cases

This ruling clarifies that:

Courts must assess a parent’s actual power, skill, or resources before making a neglect finding under MCL 712A.2(b)(1).
“Neglect” under MCL 712A.2(b)(2) involves a reasonableness inquiry—whether a parent’s conduct measures up to what an ordinarily prudent person would do.
Plain‐language statutory interpretation can override prior case law (e.g. Jacobs as to § (b)(2)) when the Legislature provides a clear definition.
Legislative reform may be needed to address “no‐fault” intervention for severely mentally‐ill juveniles whose parents are not culpable but cannot safely care for them at home.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Preponderance of the evidence: More likely than not (i.e. > 50% chance).
Clear error: A reviewing court will not overturn the trial court unless it is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred in fact‐finding.
Adjudicative vs. dispositional phase:
- Adjudicative phase: Does the court have legal jurisdiction? (Is there statutory ground?)
- Dispositional phase: What is the appropriate outcome? (Placement, services, supervision.)
Incorporation by reference: When one statute adopts the defined terms of another (e.g. MCL 712A.2(b) adopting “neglect” from MCL 722.602).
“Negligent treatment”: Failing to exercise the care an ordinarily prudent person would in similar circumstances.

5. Conclusion

In re Lange establishes that Michigan courts must focus on a parent’s real ability and reasonable conduct in child‐protective jurisdiction inquiries under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). It confirms that mere physical capacity to care for a juvenile is insufficient—courts must ask whether a parent has the sufficient power, skill, or resources to keep a child safely at home. It also makes clear that “neglect” under § (b)(2) is an objective negligence standard. While this decision upholds protections for blameless parents in cases of extreme juvenile mental-health crises, it also underscores the statutory gap for children who need state intervention even when their caregivers are not neglectful. Legislative action to create a no‐fault intervention process may be the next necessary step in Michigan’s child-welfare reform.