Clarifying Title IX “Appropriate Person,” Notice, and Deliberate Indifference Standards in Staff-to-Student Harassment Claims

Introduction

In Rachael DeMarcus et al. v. University of South Alabama et al., 11th Cir. No. 23-11670 (Apr. 10, 2025), eight former members of the University of South Alabama women’s volleyball team sued the University, its head coach Alexis Meeks-Rydell, and several athletic staff. The players alleged that Coach Meeks-Rydell engaged in a pattern of physical, verbal, psychological, and sexual abuse over two seasons, and that various University administrators and assistant coaches either witnessed the misconduct or received reports of it but failed to act. They brought federal claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alongside pendent state-law claims. The district court dismissed the Title IX and § 1983 counts with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. On appeal, a divided Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed the dismissal of all federal claims, with a partial concurrence/dissent as to one player’s Title IX theory.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit’s majority opinion, authored by Judge Newsom, addressed two principal issues:

Title IX Liability for Staff-on-Student Harassment: The court reaffirmed the three‐part test for “teacher on student” Title IX claims (Doe v. School Board of Broward County, 604 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2010)):
- Appropriate Person—a school official “high enough up the chain-of-command” to take corrective action (Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998));
- Actual Notice—that official must receive sufficient information to know of the harassment;
- Deliberate Indifference—the response must be “clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”
Applying those elements, the court held that only the Athletic Director (Joel Erdmann), the Senior Associate Athletic Director (Jinni Frisbey), and the Associate Athletic Director (Chris Moore) qualified as “appropriate persons.” Assistant coaches (Rob Chilcoat and Patricia Gandolfo) did not. Of the many reports of misconduct, only one—by player Maddie Soboleski in December 2020 describing forced hotel-room “sexual conduct”—amounted to actual notice of Title IX–triggering sexual harassment. Once that notice arrived, the University placed Coach Meeks-Rydell on leave within a month, and she resigned shortly thereafter. Those steps foreclosed any finding of “deliberate indifference,” so the Title IX claims were dismissed.
§ 1983 Substantive Due Process Claims: The court applied the “conscience-shocking” standard (County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)) and reiterated that government actors are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violate a “clearly established” constitutional right. The players’ allegations of forced play through injury, denying medical care, slaps, spiked balls, forced “floor hugs,” and unwanted kisses—while serious and potentially actionable under state law—did not meet the high bar for conscience-shocking conduct or put the staff on notice of a clearly established right. Accordingly, the § 1983 counts were dismissed on qualified-immunity grounds.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998): Recognized a private right of action under Title IX and held that “appropriate persons” must have authority to take corrective action.
Doe v. School Board of Broward County, 604 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2010): Formulated the three-part test for Title IX staff-on-student harassment claims (appropriate person, actual notice, deliberate indifference).
Floyd v. Waiters (Floyd I & Floyd II), 133 F.3d 786 (11th Cir. 1998) (vacated & reinstated), 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999): Earlier Eleventh Circuit explorations of who qualifies as an appropriate person.
Hawkins v. Sarasota County School Board, 322 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2003): Held that in staff-on-student Title IX cases, “appropriate person” is a limited, readily identifiable school administrator.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Set the pleading standards for “plausibility” and precluded threadbare legal conclusions.
§ 1983 and Due Process Cases—County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998); Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Board of Education, 229 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000) (conscience-shocking corporal punishment); and qualified-immunity authorities such as Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7 (2020).

Legal Reasoning

1. Appropriate Person

Under Gebser and Broward, notice must go to a school official “high enough up the chain-of-command” whose inaction would constitute an official decision not to remedy the misconduct. The court unanimously agreed that the Athletic Director (Erdmann) and the two associate athletic directors (Frisbey and Moore) fit that description. By contrast, assistant coaches—even if they witnessed abuse—are not school administrators with the requisite corrective authority and therefore cannot provide the basis for Title IX notice.

2. Actual Notice

Title IX requires “actual notice” of “sexual harassment.” The court emphasized that general allegations of “inappropriate” or “improper” conduct—without any factual detail explaining the sexual nature of the misconduct—are insufficient under Twombly/Iqbal. Only Maddie Soboleski’s December 2020 report, detailing forced hotel-room sexual contact and unwelcome physical advances, gave the University actual notice of Title IX‐triggering harassment. Other reports (e.g., by parents or teammates complaining of general abuse, reputational evidence, or pressuring a player to write an NCAA letter) were deemed “threadbare” or too attenuated to count.

3. Deliberate Indifference

Once actual notice is established, the recipient’s response must be “clearly unreasonable.” Here the University placed Coach Meeks-Rydell on administrative leave one month after the December 2020 report and she resigned the next month—measures the court found plainly reasonable. There were no allegations that the coach continued to interact with the players or that the University took any further dilatory steps.

4. Substantive Due Process and Qualified Immunity

The players alleged that the coach’s physical and sexual misconduct violated a Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity, actionable under § 1983. Applying the “conscience-shocking” standard of Lewis, the court held that although the allegations described reprehensible behavior, they did not rise to the “extreme” level required to “shock the conscience.” Nor was there any precedent clearly establishing that the coach’s alleged conduct violated constitutional limits. Accordingly, the court found all individual defendants entitled to qualified immunity.

Impact

Pleading Rigour in Title IX Claims—Plaintiffs alleging staff-on-student sexual harassment must carefully plead:
1. Which officials qualify as “appropriate persons” and their authority;
2. Exactly what conduct was reported, to whom, and when;
3. What response was—or was not—taken and why it was unreasonable.
Limits on “Appropriate Person”—Only high-level school administrators (not low-level staff or assistant coaches) can provide Title IX notice.
§ 1983 Claims Remain Narrow—Allegations of forced play, denial of care, or even non-consensual physical contact must cross a high “conscience-shocking” threshold to survive qualified immunity.
Practical Guidance for Universities—Prompt administrative leave and credible investigations upon receiving specific reports of sexual misconduct will generally avoid Title IX liability.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Appropriate Person”: A school official with actual authority to remedy harassment—typically senior administrators, not assistant coaches or low-level staff.
“Actual Notice”: Specific factual information given to an appropriate person that would lead a reasonable official to understand sexual harassment is occurring.
“Deliberate Indifference”: A response to known harassment so unreasonable that it amounts to an official decision to ignore the misconduct.
Plausibility Pleading (Twombly/Iqbal): Complaints must do more than recite legal elements; they must include enough factual detail to allow the court to draw a reasonable inference of liability.
“Conscience-Shocking” (§ 1983 Due Process): Only extreme, egregious actions by state actors—beyond rough treatment—violate substantive due process.
Qualified Immunity: Government officials are shielded from suit unless they violate a constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time.

Conclusion

DeMarcus v. University of South Alabama provides a rigorous blueprint for Title IX and § 1983 claims in the collegiate context. It underscores that:

Title IX claims based on staff-on-student sexual harassment require precise pleading of (1) which administrators had corrective authority, (2) actual notice of specific harassing acts, and (3) a clearly unreasonable institutional response.
Not every abusive or non-consensual act by a coach gives rise to federal liability—either under Title IX or substantive due process—and universities can generally avoid Title IX liability by acting promptly and reasonably once detailed allegations surface.
§ 1983 substantive-due-process claims for bodily integrity face an especially steep hill: the “conscience-shocking” standard and qualified immunity make success rare where the alleged injuries, though serious, do not mirror the extreme cases in which courts have recognized constitutional torts.

Going forward, both plaintiffs and institutions will look to this decision for clear guidance on the scope of Title IX duties and the permissible boundaries of coach‐student interactions under federal law.