Clarifying the “Reasonable Opportunity to Observe” Standard and Mistrial Evaluation in Minor Sex-Trafficking and Child Pornography Prosecutions

Introduction

United States v. Lavonte Sampson, 25a0275n.06 (6th Cir. June 5, 2025) addresses critical questions under two federal statutes—18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (sex trafficking of a minor) and 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (production of child pornography)—as well as procedural issues concerning mistrial motions, discovery of mental-health records, and sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant, Sampson, a 36-year-old man, was convicted after a jury trial in the Eastern District of Michigan for luring, sexually exploiting, and commercially trafficking a 15-year-old girl (“Jane Doe”). On appeal, Sampson challenged (1) the denial of his motions for mistrial and for a new trial, (2) the district court’s refusal to compel production of the minor’s mental-health records under Brady v. Maryland and Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c), and (3) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting both convictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in full.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals unanimously held:

Mistrial/New Trial Motions: Applying the five‐factor test from United States v. Forrest (1994) and Caver (2006), the court concluded that Jane Doe’s emotional outburst and use of a racial epithet during cross‐examination did not warrant a mistrial or new trial. The errors (if any) were isolated, unsolicited by the prosecution, and cured by prompt, clear limiting instructions and a jury poll.
Brady and Rule 17(c) Request: Sampson sought the victim’s mental-health records, but the government disclaimed possession of any such materials. The court found no basis to compel non-federal agencies to produce records the prosecution did not hold. Furthermore, Sampson failed to show how the broad categories of therapy or social-services files he requested satisfied the “relevant, admissible, and specific” requirements for a Rule 17(c) subpoena.
Sufficiency of Evidence: Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence was sufficient to prove both counts beyond a reasonable doubt. Sampson secretly videotaped sexual acts with a minor, used those images to advertise her for commercial sex, and spent hours with the victim—giving him a reasonable opportunity to observe her youth under 18 years, satisfying § 1591(c).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Brady v. Maryland (1963): Established the government’s obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence in its possession.
Giglio v. United States (1972): Extended Brady to include evidence affecting witness credibility.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c): Governs pretrial subpoenas for documents; requires a showing that the materials are “relevant, admissible, and specific.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.3 & 33: Set the standard of review for mistrial and new trial motions—abuse of discretion.
United States v. Forrest (6th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Caver (6th Cir. 2006): Supply the five-factor framework for evaluating witness misconduct and the propriety of granting mistrials.
United States v. Frei (6th Cir. 2021): Clarifies that § 2251(a) does not require that production of child pornography be the sole purpose of the sexual activity.
United States v. Latimer (6th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Jakits (6th Cir. 2025): Articulate the de novo standard for sufficiency challenges, confirming convictions stand if any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Legal Reasoning

1. Mistrial and New Trial: The court applied the established five‐factor test:

Whether the remark was unsolicited;
Whether the government’s questioning was reasonable;
Whether a prompt, clear limiting instruction was given;
Whether the government acted in bad faith;
Whether the statement was minor compared to the trial record as a whole.

Jane Doe’s outburst occurred during defense cross‐examination (factors 1 & 2 inapplicable), was followed by immediate, forceful curative instructions and a jury poll (factor 3), and bore no evidence of prosecutorial bad faith (factor 4). It formed only a small part of a voluminous evidentiary record (factor 5). Accordingly, no abuse of discretion arose in denying Sampson’s mistrial and new trial requests.

2. Brady and Rule 17(c): Brady requires disclosure only of “favorable” evidence actually in the prosecution’s possession. Here the government testified it held no mental-health files relating to Jane Doe. Sampson did not produce evidence to the contrary. Under Rule 17(c), Sampson also failed to identify specific, admissible records—the motion remained speculative and overbroad—so the district court correctly denied the subpoena.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Viewed in the light most favorable to the government:

Section 2251(a): Sampson secretly recorded sexual acts with a minor—evidence of intent to produce child pornography. Under Frei, production need not be the sole purpose of intercourse.
Section 1591(a) & (c): Because Sampson spent hours with Doe, recorded her, and remarked she looked “really young,” he had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” her and thus cannot claim ignorance of her age. His advertisements, price-setting, and coordination of adult buyers confirm the requisite conduct.

Impact

United States v. Sampson reinforces several principles likely to guide future cases:

Courts will closely scrutinize mistrial requests arising from witness outbursts under a clear, five-factor test emphasizing curative instructions and the relative weight of the misconduct.
Defendants cannot leverage Brady or Rule 17(c) to chase vague or hypothetical records not in the prosecution’s hands—and must make a concrete showing of relevance and admissibility.
In child-trafficking prosecutions under § 1591, evidence that a defendant spent time observing a purported adult victim can satisfy the “reasonable opportunity to observe” element, eliminating the need to prove actual knowledge of minority if the opportunity was present.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Brady Material”: Evidence in the government’s possession that could help the defense (e.g., impeach a witness or prove innocence). Brady requires disclosure; it does not compel production of records held by external agencies.
Rule 17(c) Subpoena: A tool for defendants to obtain documents before trial—but only if they can show those documents exist, are directly relevant to their defense, and would be admissible at trial.
Five-Factor Mistrial Test: Guarantees fairness by balancing the spontaneity of a witness’s misconduct against the efficacy of prompt judicial remedies (instructions, polling, etc.).
“Reasonable Opportunity to Observe” (§ 1591(c)): If a defendant spent time in personal proximity to a victim who appeared underage, the law treats that as enough notice of minority. It shifts the burden away from proving subjective knowledge of the victim’s exact age.

Conclusion

United States v. Sampson makes clear that: (1) isolated witness outbursts do not automatically derail a trial if promptly cured by judicial action; (2) Brady and Rule 17(c) demands must be concrete, not speculative; and (3) sex-trafficking defendants who spend time with a young-looking victim and use that victim to advertise commercial sex cannot escape liability by feigning ignorance of her age. Collectively, these rulings sharpen the procedural and substantive contours of federal prosecutions for sex trafficking and child pornography, ensuring both defendant fairness and robust protection for underage victims.