Clarifying the Vagueness Doctrine in Third-Party Notification Conditions of Supervised Release
Comprehensive Commentary on United States v. Falandis Russell, 7th Cir., June 11 2025

1. Introduction

United States v. Falandis Russell consolidates two appeals arising from a multi-year armed-robbery spree in Chicago. While the factual canvas contains familiar federal-criminal themes—competency disputes, guideline calculations and supervised-release conditions—the decision is jurisprudentially noteworthy for two reasons:

• It reiterates and refines how district courts must weigh dueling psychological opinions when determining competency under 18 U.S.C. § 4241.
• More significantly, it vacates a so-called “third-party notification” supervised-release condition, reinforcing this circuit’s developing line of authority (Kappes, Bickart) that such conditions are impermissibly vague unless tightly cabined. This clarification hardens the standard that probation officers cannot be given open-ended authority to compel an offender’s speech to private citizens.

The parties:

• Falandis Russell – pleaded guilty to multiple Hobbs-Act robberies; challenged (i) the district court’s competency ruling, and (ii) the procedural soundness of an above-guideline 180-month sentence.
• Terrance Williams – pleaded guilty to a subset of the robberies; attacked a single supervised-release condition that required him to “notify” a person if the probation officer deemed him a risk.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit, per Judge Lee, held:

1. Competency – The district court’s finding that Russell was competent to stand trial was not clearly erroneous. The court permissibly credited government experts over the defense expert and buttressed that conclusion with independent evidence (school records, jail calls).
2. Sentencing Procedure – Russell’s 180-month sentence was procedurally sound: the judge expressly addressed his cognitive limitations and gave an adequate § 3553(a) explanation.
3. Supervised Release Condition – The “third-party notification” condition imposed on Williams was vacated and remanded. Even after two textual tweaks, it remained vague, delegated too much discretion, and risked First-Amendment concerns.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) – The canonical two-prong competency standard: (1) rational and factual understanding of proceedings; (2) ability to consult with counsel.
• United States v. Wessel, 2 F.4th 1043 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v. Nichols, 77 F.4th 490 (7th Cir. 2023) – Recent restatements of the clear-error standard for appellate review of competency findings.
• Wipf v. Kowalski, 519 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2008); Goodpaster v. Indianapolis, 736 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir. 2013) – Deference to trial judges’ weighing of competing experts and credibility calls.
• Price v. Thurmer, 637 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2011) – Mental illness ≠ per se incompetence.
• United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2016) – Earlier cases striking down broad risk-notification conditions for vagueness and over-delegation.
• United States v. Sandidge, 863 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2017) – De-novo review for vagueness challenges to release conditions.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Competency

The panel applied the “clearly erroneous” lens and emphasized four analytical pillars:

1. Holistic Record Review – The district court did not rely solely on expert testimony; it also examined functional evidence (prison calls, school files) illustrating Russell’s communicative abilities.
2. Dueling Experts – Where two government experts (Muhkin & Dinwiddie) contradicted the defense expert (Jajko), the judge’s choice to credit the former—because they reviewed more complete data and flagged malingering—fell within permissible discretion.
3. Mental Illness vs. Legal Incompetence – Reaffirming Price, the opinion distinguishes diagnosis from incapacity: only deficits that impede counsel-assistance or understanding matter.
4. Clear-Error Boundary – The appellate court stressed it could not re-weigh evidence; it needed a “definite and firm conviction” of error, which it lacked.

3.2.2 Sentencing Procedure

The appellate court recited § 3553(c) and found:

• The judge explicitly discussed the mitigating argument (cognitive impairment) and its custodial ramifications.
• Explained departure: severity of armed robberies, victim terror, criminal history, uncharged but proven robberies.
• Lack of unwarranted disparity: detailed comparison with co-defendant Williams.

3.2.3 Supervised Release ­– Vagueness & Delegation

The disputed condition empowered the probation officer to:

“…determine that you pose a risk to another person…, require you to tell the person about the risk…, and confirm that you have done so.”

The panel saw three constitutional/administrative defects:

1. Vagueness – Terms like “risk,” “pose,” and unspecified “person” provide no intelligible standard.
2. Excessive Delegation (Article III) – Judicial authority to impose punitive conditions cannot be entirely transferred to probation officers.
3. Compelled Speech (First Amendment) – Forcing a defendant to self-disclose criminal history to undefined individuals burdens speech without narrow tailoring.

Because the government conceded vagueness, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to reassess necessity and craft narrower language if warranted.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

• Third-Party Notification Conditions – The Seventh Circuit has now thrice (with Kappes, Bickart, and Russell) signaled that open-ended risk-notification conditions will not survive appellate review. Future district courts must:
  • Specify which third parties (by relation or category).
  • Define the risk threshold.
  • Ensure judicial, not administrative, trigger mechanisms (e.g., prior court approval).
• Competency Disputes – The decision strengthens trial-court latitude in “malingering” cases and endorses reliance on collateral evidence (phone calls, school records) to corroborate expert impressions.
• Sentencing Rationale – The opinion re-affirms that “robbery sprees + firearms + victim terror” provide ample justification for substantial upward variances even when cognitive deficits exist.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Competency to Stand Trial (Dusky Standard) – Legally, a defendant must (1) understand what is happening and (2) be able to assist counsel. It is a present-tense inquiry focusing on functionality, not diagnostic labels.
• Malingering – A clinical term for the deliberate exaggeration or fabrication of symptoms for secondary gain (e.g., avoiding trial).
• Supervised Release – A post-incarceration period during which offenders must follow court-imposed conditions, monitored by U.S. Probation.
• Third-Party Notification Condition – A release term requiring an offender to warn identifiable persons of potential danger. Constitutional issues arise if “identifiable” is undefined or if the warning duty is limitless.
• Vagueness Doctrine – Under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, laws or conditions must be clear enough for an ordinary person to understand what is required or prohibited.
• Non-Delegation Principle (Article III Angle) – Core judicial powers (like imposing punishment) cannot be ceded wholesale to executive agents without clear, reviewable standards.
• § 3553(a) Factors – Statutory checklist guiding federal sentencing: seriousness, deterrence, protection of the public, rehabilitation, guideline range, and parity among similarly situated defendants.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Falandis Russell crystallizes two doctrinal strands in Seventh-Circuit criminal jurisprudence. First, trial judges receive wide berth to resolve competency disputes when they marshal multiple data streams and address malingering head-on. Second—and of broader precedential heft—the court draws an increasingly bright line against amorphous third-party notification conditions in supervised release. By insisting on textual precision and cabined discretion, the panel fortifies due-process and First-Amendment protections for defendants, while simultaneously providing district courts with a roadmap for crafting constitutionally sound conditions. Practitioners and probation offices must heed the message: clarity, specificity, and judicial oversight are indispensable whenever liberty-restricting or speech-compelling conditions are on the table.