Clarifying the Use of Arrest Records and Section 3553(a)(2)(A) Factors in Supervised Release Revocation Sentencing

Introduction

United States v. Gregory (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2025) addresses two recurring issues in supervised-release revocation proceedings: (1) whether a sentencing court may properly rely on a defendant’s bare arrest record or unproven allegations connected to those arrests, and (2) the scope of sentencing factors permissible under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), specifically whether the “retributive” factors set out in § 3553(a)(2)(A) may be considered.

Defendant-Appellant Deshaun Gregory pleaded guilty in 2018 to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), received 65 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release, and began that term on October 17, 2022. Between March 2023 and June 2024 Gregory incurred three state-level arrests and admitted multiple supervised-release violations (drug use, failure to report, home-detention non-compliance). The district court revoked his release, sentenced him to 14 months’ imprisonment plus 22 months’ additional supervised release, and he appealed on procedural and substantive-reasonableness grounds.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit unanimously affirmed. In a summary order, the court held:

• Procedural Reasonableness
  • Reliance on bare arrest records or unsubstantiated allegations at sentencing is error under due-process principles (United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2007)), but any such error here was harmless under the plain-error standard (United States v. Ortiz, 100 F.4th 112 (2d Cir. 2024)).
  • Section 3583(e) enumerates which §§ 3553(a) factors a revoking court “must” consider but does not prohibit consideration of other factors (United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2006)). Gregory’s argument that § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors—“reflect the seriousness of the offense,” “promote respect for the law,” “provide just punishment”—were excluded fails both as a matter of controlling precedent and because the district court explicitly invoked only §§ 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D).
• Substantive Reasonableness
  • The 14‐month term, at the top of the Guidelines range for supervised-release revocation, was justified by the number and seriousness of Gregory’s violations and his extensive criminal history (including violent conduct), balanced against his difficult upbringing and documented mental-health challenges. Under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, the sentence did not “shock the conscience” or constitute a “manifest injustice.”

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2007): A district court may not base a sentence on unproven allegations; arrests alone, without independent evidence, are an insufficient foundation.
• United States v. Yilmaz, 910 F.3d 686 (2d Cir. 2018): Sentencing‐reasonableness review combines de novo review of legal questions (e.g., Guidelines interpretation) and clear‐error review of factual findings.
• United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2006): Section 3583(e) does not forbid consideration of non-enumerated § 3553(a) factors; it merely mandates consideration of the listed ones.
• United States v. Ortiz, 100 F.4th 112 (2d Cir. 2024): The plain-error standard applies when a defendant fails to object at sentencing: error must be clear, affect substantial rights, and seriously undermine proceedings’ fairness.
• Fifth and Third Circuit cases (e.g., United States v. Johnson, 648 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Mateo-Medina, 845 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2017)) reinforce that bare arrests cannot underpin a sentencing enhancement.

Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit applied its deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. On procedural reasonableness, the court recognized that unproven arrests cannot serve as the sole basis for punishment but found any reliance here harmless when weighed against admitted violations and other factually supported aggravators. As to § 3583(e), the court relied on Williams to hold that Congress did not forbid the district court from considering § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors but noted the judge expressly limited the sentencing analysis to §§ 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D). For substantive reasonableness, the court gave weight to the sentencing judge’s intimate familiarity with the defendant’s background, mental health, and violation history, concluding that the 14-month term fell within the permissible range and did not shock the conscience.

Impact

This decision clarifies two points for practitioners and lower courts in supervised-release revocations:

1. A district court should avoid sole reliance on bare arrest records or unsubstantiated allegations, though any such error may be deemed harmless if the sentence is otherwise well supported.
2. Section 3583(e) requires consideration of certain § 3553(a) factors but does not categorically bar consideration of “retributive” factors in § 3553(a)(2)(A); judges remain free to assess all relevant purposes of sentencing so long as they explicitly address the statutorily mandated ones.

As a result, sentencing courts will take care to document evidentiary support for all aggravating facts and to articulate which § 3553(a) factors have been considered.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised Release Revocation: Post‐prison period during which a defendant must comply with conditions (reporting, abstaining from drugs, etc.). Violations can lead to re-imprisonment.
• Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness: Procedural concerns the fairness of how the sentence was determined (use of evidence, legal errors). Substantive concerns whether the sentence itself is reasonable given the facts and the law.
• Plain‐Error Review: If a party did not object below, an appellate court will correct only clear and prejudicial errors that seriously undermine the process.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors: Eight categories of considerations (e.g., seriousness of offense, need for deterrence, protection of public). § 3583(e) calls out which of these a court “must” consider when revoking supervised release.

Conclusion

United States v. Gregory affirms the district court’s revocation-sentence, reinforcing that bare arrests should not form the exclusive factual foundation for revocation penalties—even though harmless‐error review may salvage a sentence when a richer evidentiary record exists. It also confirms that § 3583(e) does not shut the door to § 3553(a)(2)(A) considerations, so long as a judge explicitly addresses the mandated factors. Together, these principles guide future sentencing in supervised-release revocations toward transparency, evidentiary sufficiency, and comprehensive evaluation of all relevant sentencing purposes.