Clarifying the Tapia Line at Revocation: References to Rehabilitation Are Permissible When Not the Reason for Imprisonment

Introduction

United States v. Duane Gibson (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025) addresses a recurring problem at sentencing: how far a district judge may go in discussing a defendant’s rehabilitative prospects without violating Tapia v. United States, which forbids imposing or lengthening a term of imprisonment to promote rehabilitation. The case arises from the revocation of Duane Gibson’s supervised release following drug-possession and related violations. The district court imposed 24 months’ imprisonment—the statutory maximum but also the bottom of the properly calculated advisory Guidelines range (24–30 months, capped at 24 by statute). In explaining the sentence, the court cited the nature of the violations, the need to protect the public, and the opportunity for Gibson to better himself while in custody.

On appeal, Gibson argued two points: first, that the district judge impermissibly relied on rehabilitation in violation of Tapia; and second, that the statutory-maximum sentence was substantively unreasonable. A divided panel affirmed. Judge Nalbandian authored the lead opinion (joined in judgment by Judge White), Judge White concurred in the judgment, and Judge Clay dissented.

Although the opinion is not recommended for publication, it delivers practical guidance on the Tapia boundary at supervised-release revocation, flags the standard-of-review question for unpreserved Tapia claims, and reiterates that a within-Guidelines sentence— even at the statutory maximum—carries a strong presumption of reasonableness when the record shows individualized consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the 24-month revocation sentence. On the Tapia claim, the court held there was no error because the district judge’s references to rehabilitation were not the reason for the sentence; rather, the record showed the sentence was grounded in permissible factors: the nature of the violations, protection of the public, Gibson’s history and characteristics, and the Guidelines. The judge also expressly disclaimed reliance on dismissed violations and credited time already served.

The court emphasized two framing points:

• References to rehabilitative opportunities are permissible if they are not the reason for the imprisonment term or its length. The judge’s closing comment about providing Gibson “opportunities to better [himself]” was permissible in context.
• The discussion of rehabilitation was invited by the parties (including the defense), and the court had an obligation to address those non-frivolous arguments on the record. This did not convert rehabilitation into an impermissible sentencing factor.

On substantive reasonableness, the court applied the presumption of reasonableness to the within-Guidelines sentence and found no abuse of discretion. The judge’s explanation—focused on the nature of the violations, public protection, and individualized considerations—was sufficient, and the mere fact that the sentence reached the statutory maximum did not defeat the presumption.

The opinion also canvassed how courts classify Tapia claims (procedural vs. substantive). Noting intra-circuit inconsistency, the lead opinion explained that Tapia violations fit most naturally within procedural error subject to plain-error review when not preserved, and catalogued other circuits treating them that way. But the panel ultimately resolved the case by holding that Gibson’s claim failed under either standard.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Influenced the Decision

• Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011): The Supreme Court held that a court may not impose or lengthen a prison sentence to promote rehabilitation. However, a sentencing court may discuss rehabilitation opportunities, recommend placement, and express hope that a defendant will engage in treatment—so long as those considerations are not the reason for the imprisonment term or its duration. This is the central constraint shaping the analysis.
• United States v. Deen, 706 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 2013): Applied Tapia to revocation. Reversal where the court imposed an above-Guidelines sentence “to give the Bureau of Prisons another chance” to rehabilitate—an impermissible reason.
• United States v. Krul, 774 F.3d 371 (6th Cir. 2014): Clarified that the court does not reverse whenever it is merely possible that rehabilitation drove the sentence; rehabilitation must be “the reason.” Also recognized that when the defense invites discussion of rehabilitation, Tapia error is less likely.
• United States v. Adams, 873 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2017): Found Tapia error where the judge tied an 18-month sentence to the time needed to “reset” and remain sober—an express length-for-rehabilitation rationale. The majority distinguishes Adams because no comparable express linkage existed here.
• United States v. Walker, 649 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Censke, 449 F. App’x 456 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Sanders, 472 F. App’x 376 (6th Cir. 2012): Tapia violations where judges expressly linked the imprisonment length to treatment needs or program duration.
• United States v. Collier, 506 F. App’x 459 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Tolbert, 459 F. App’x 541 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Yarbrough, 774 F. App’x 293 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Frost, 770 F. App’x 744 (6th Cir. 2019): No Tapia error where the court expressed hope or encouragement about rehabilitation programs without making rehab the reason for imprisonment.
• Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011): Postsentencing rehabilitation may inform resentencing. The lead opinion leverages Pepper and § 3553(a) to emphasize that district courts must engage the offender’s history, characteristics, and needs, while respecting Tapia’s boundary.
• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2007): Sentencing framework—individualized assessment; procedural vs. substantive reasonableness; abuse-of-discretion standard.
• United States v. Reed, 72 F.4th 174 (6th Cir. 2023); United States v. Cunningham, 669 F.3d 723 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2010): Substantive reasonableness principles and the presumption for within-Guidelines sentences.
• United States v. Wheeler, 851 F. App’x 592 (6th Cir. 2021): A sentence at the statutory maximum can still be within-Guidelines and presumptively reasonable.
• United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018): Sentencing is reasoned discretion, not math—supporting the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation.
• United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Jones, 489 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2007): Duty to address non-frivolous arguments and explain the sentence to facilitate appellate review.
• United States v. Jaques, No. 24-3390, 2025 WL 561784 (6th Cir. Feb. 20, 2025): Cited for the observation that circuits overwhelmingly treat Tapia claims as procedural (subject to plain-error review when unpreserved); the panel notes intra-circuit inconsistency but resolves Gibson under either standard.

Legal Reasoning

1) The Tapia boundary at revocation: “The reason” versus “references”

The opinion reaffirms a workable Tapia line: a court violates § 3582(a) only when rehabilitation is the reason for imposing imprisonment or for its duration. Mere references—hope that the defendant will participate in programs, recommendations for placement, or identification of available services—are not forbidden. That line prevents Tapia from swallowing sentencing courts’ duty under § 3553(a) to consider the defendant’s history and characteristics, including needs for training, education, and medical care, while respecting Congress’s decision that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting rehabilitation.

The record showed that the district court anchored Gibson’s sentence in permissible § 3553(a) considerations: the nature and seriousness of his violations (including Grade A controlled-substance violations triggering mandatory revocation), public protection, his personal history and characteristics, and the Guidelines. The court further narrowed the rationale by disavowing reliance on dismissed violations and acknowledging time already served. In that context, the single sentence acknowledging “opportunities to better yourself” did not convert rehabilitative aims into the reason for the sentence. The court’s comment tracked formulations previously approved in Collier, Tolbert, Yarbrough, and Frost.

2) Invited discussion and the duty to address non-frivolous arguments

The panel gave weight to two process-based considerations:

• Invited discussion: The defense emphasized Gibson’s lack of motivation, need for treatment, and plan to obtain a GED and CDL, and urged the court to consider these as mitigation. When a defendant invites discussion of rehabilitation, the court does not commit Tapia error by responding to, and contextualizing, those points. This echoes Krul.
• Duty to explain: Because both sides raised rehabilitation-related considerations, the district court had an obligation to address those non-frivolous arguments to build an adequate record for review (Simmons; Jones). It would have been unreasonable for the court to ignore them; addressing them did not transmute rehabilitation into an impermissible sentencing factor.

3) Standard of review and preservation

The defense did not object when the court inquired about any unraised objections after pronouncing sentence. The lead opinion underscores why Tapia claims naturally fit procedural error—considering an impermissible factor—and therefore, when unpreserved, should be reviewed for plain error. It also notes that sister circuits uniformly treat Tapia errors as procedural. That said, the panel expressly determined that the choice of standard did not affect the outcome here: the sentence stands under either plain-error or abuse-of-discretion review.

4) Substantive reasonableness

The court found the 24-month sentence substantively reasonable. The advisory range was 24–30 months, but § 3583(e)(3) capped the maximum at 24 months for a Class C underlying felony. A sentence at the statutory maximum can still be within-Guidelines and presumptively reasonable. The district court sufficiently explained the sentence by highlighting the nature of the violations, the need to protect the public, and individualized factors (including disavowal of dismissed violations and consideration of time served). No additional explanation was required solely because the term reached the statutory maximum (Wheeler), and sentencing remains a matter of reasoned discretion rather than arithmetic (Rayyan).

Concurrence and Dissent

Judge White, concurring in the judgment

Judge White viewed the case as in near equipoise. She acknowledged that the district court’s phrasing—listing rehabilitative “opportunities to better yourself” alongside permissible factors—could, on its face, suggest Tapia reliance. But considering the full record, she agreed that permissible factors drove the sentence and the rehabilitation comment was an observation in the context of an extended discussion of Gibson’s repeated failures to capitalize on services. She would not reach the procedural-versus-substantive classification of Tapia claims because it was unnecessary to the disposition and inadequately briefed by both sides.

Judge Clay, dissenting

The dissent would reverse and remand. It emphasizes Tapia’s categorical bar and Krul’s formulation that reversal is required where there is an identifiable basis for concluding the sentence was based, at least in part, on rehabilitation. Because the district court explicitly named “opportunities to better [himself]” as one of three reasons supporting imprisonment, Judge Clay concluded that rehabilitation was part of the sentencing calculus, which Tapia forbids. He also would treat the Tapia claim as a substantive unreasonableness challenge reviewable for abuse of discretion even without a contemporaneous objection, citing prior Sixth Circuit cases that analyzed Tapia through the substantive lens.

Impact and Practical Guidance

Although nonprecedential, the opinion offers salient guidance for practitioners and district courts in the Sixth Circuit.

• For district judges:
  • It is safe to discuss rehabilitative opportunities, encourage participation in programs, and recommend placements; it is unsafe to make rehabilitation the reason for imprisonment or its length.
  • When parties frame mitigation around treatment needs or educational goals, respond to those non-frivolous arguments, but anchor the sentence in § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C) factors (seriousness, deterrence, protection of the public) and individualized characteristics under § 3553(a)(1).
  • Avoid listing rehabilitation as a discrete sentencing rationale. Consider structuring remarks so that any discussion of programs follows the pronouncement of sentence and is framed as a recommendation or hope, not a justification.
• For defense counsel:
  • Preserve Tapia objections. If the court’s explanation suggests rehabilitation is part of the rationale, object when invited at the close of sentencing to allow clarification and preserve non-plain-error review.
  • When presenting mitigation centered on treatment needs, pair it with non-rehabilitative § 3553(a) arguments (e.g., history of compliance, limited culpability, time served, collateral consequences) to avoid converting the hearing into a rehabilitation-centric discussion.
• For appellate practitioners:
  • Expect continued movement toward treating unpreserved Tapia claims as procedural errors subject to plain-error review, in line with other circuits, even though the Sixth Circuit has discussed Tapia in both procedural and substantive frames.
  • Reversal remains most likely where the record contains express statements tying imprisonment length to program duration or to the time needed for rehabilitation (e.g., Deen, Walker, Censke, Adams).
• For supervised-release revocation:
  • Tapia’s constraint applies at revocation (Deen), but courts still must consider many § 3553(a) factors under § 3583(e). Explicitly connecting the prison term to rehabilitation invites reversal.
  • A sentence at the statutory maximum can be within-Guidelines and presumptively reasonable if the capped range bottoms at the statutory maximum, provided the court’s explanation reflects individualized reasoning.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Tapia rule: A court may not impose or lengthen a term of imprisonment to promote rehabilitation. Judges may discuss programs, express hope, and recommend placements, but those are not valid reasons to choose the prison term or its length.
• Revocation vs. original sentencing: At supervised-release revocation, the court applies § 3583(e), which cross-references many § 3553(a) factors. If certain violations occur (e.g., Grade A controlled-substance violations), revocation may be mandatory. The statutory maximum for revocation depends on the class of the original offense (here, Class C—two years maximum).
• Guidelines cap by statute: Sometimes the advisory range exceeds the statutory maximum. If the advisory range is 24–30 months but the statute caps imprisonment at 24 months, the legally available range is effectively 0–24 months; a 24-month sentence is both the bottom of the advisory range (as capped) and the statutory maximum.
• Within-Guidelines presumption: A sentence within the advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable on appeal. The defendant may rebut this by showing the sentence is greater than necessary in light of § 3553(a), but this is a high bar.
• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness:
  • Procedural errors involve how the sentence was imposed (e.g., miscalculating the range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, considering forbidden factors, failing to explain). Unpreserved procedural errors are usually reviewed for plain error.
  • Substantive reasonableness addresses whether the sentence length is greater than necessary in light of § 3553(a). Substantive claims are reviewed for abuse of discretion and are not subject to plain-error forfeiture rules.
  The Sixth Circuit has discussed Tapia claims under both rubrics, and this opinion signals alignment with the majority of circuits that treat unpreserved Tapia claims as procedural.

Conclusion

United States v. Gibson reinforces a pragmatic, record-sensitive application of Tapia at the revocation stage. The panel holds that a district court does not commit Tapia error merely by referencing rehabilitative opportunities or expressing hope that a defendant will improve while incarcerated, so long as rehabilitation is not the reason for the imprisonment term or its duration. The opinion adds two practical refinements: first, when the defense invites rehabilitation-focused mitigation, the court may address those arguments without crossing Tapia’s line; and second, judges must still build a record that ties the sentence to permissible § 3553(a) factors. On the second issue, the court underscores that a within-Guidelines sentence— even at the statutory maximum—remains presumptively reasonable when supported by an individualized explanation.

The concurrence’s “near equipoise” caution and the dissent’s “in part” emphasis highlight that words matter. District courts should avoid listing rehabilitation as a sentencing rationale. Still, when the record makes clear that imprisonment stems from the nature of the violations, public protection, and the offender’s history and characteristics, Tapia does not bar a judge from encouraging a defendant to seize rehabilitative opportunities that may be available during incarceration. Practitioners should also note the court’s signal that unpreserved Tapia claims fit procedural error subject to plain-error review, aligning with the growing consensus across circuits.

Key takeaway: At revocation, as elsewhere, Tapia forbids imprisonment to promote rehabilitation, not the mention of rehabilitation. The safest course is to keep rehabilitation in the realm of recommendation and encouragement, while ensuring the sentence itself rests on the permissible § 3553(a) purposes of punishment, deterrence, and public protection.